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ABSTRACT
In the context of policy recommendations to re-establish intergenerational equity this 
thesis enquires into the ways in which intergenerational relations in Germany became 
framed by the metaphor of the generational contract. Taking gender as an analytical tool, 
the thesis explored the discursive repertoires of generation and contract in a historical 
perspective. On this basis social contract theories are analysed with respect to the 
conflicting justifications they establish for the regulation of intergenerational relations. 
The analysis then focuses on how generational politics in the German welfare state drew 
on these justifications and how the generational contract came to be associated with 
fraud. It is argued that the ruse of the metaphor of the generational contract was its claim 
to embody social solidarity ‘for all’ Germans, while constituting and maintaining 
divisions of gender and social class in and by a social insurance system tailored to the 
male life course. Women’s positioning in the proposed measures to restructure the 
generational contract reveals its inherent multiplicity and contradictory structure.
Arguing that intergenerational relationships in families have been mostly taken for 
granted, the thesis develops the heuristic framework of kinscripts in order to analyse the 
micro-politics of intergenerational commitments of members of two family generations 
that are cast as antagonists in the alleged resource competition: women of the welfare 
generation and their adult children. Deploying an innovative set of methods based on the 
problem-centred interview the empirical analysis produced rich evidence of the 
ambivalences of intergenerational commitments, their continuities and changes. The 
analysis uncovers the social logic of ‘contracts of need’ shaped by situational and 
contextual pressures and the constraints and possibilities that kin networks opened up for 
women in post-war Germany. In contrast the narratives of the adult children reveal as yet 
a more symbolic meaning of intergenerational relations although in the anticipation of 
parental care needs gendered and classed responsibilities reappeared. On the basis of the 
theoretical and empirical findings it is argued that the frame of generational accounting 
systems has to be broadened to include kin work. Implications for multigenerational 
social policies are outlined.
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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the twentieth century intergenerational relations, or to be more precise the 
cohesion between generations, is (again) seen to be at risk. In a plea for recognition of the 
contributions of older people and to mutual understanding between generations, the UN 
proclaimed 1999 ‘International Year for Older Persons’. The motto ‘Towards a society 
for all ages’ calls for the creation of multigenerational social policies, thus 
acknowledging inequalities, exclusions and potential tensions in intergenerational 
relations. By way of introducing the contemporary discourse on intergenerational 
relations I will present three very different genres of texts, the first a macro socio­
economic analysis of intergenerational transfers, the second an outline of 
intergenerational family therapy and the third a depiction of the alleged confrontation of 
generations in two German popular science books. I suggest that these texts in their own 
way conceptualise mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion that in Germany are called 
the generational contract, and highlight the ways in which the scenarios of the 
generational contract under threat and the measures to remedy them are currently framed. 
They thereby exemplify dominant meaning systems and imageries of the generational 
contract. As outlined below the aim of this study was to explore both theoretically and 
empirically the underlying assumptions of the generational contract in a historical and 
gender perspective. By bringing out the gendered implications of generational contracts, 
the thesis aims to contribute to a shift in the current debates about mobilising ‘new forms 
of solidarity’ in order to maintain the German welfare state.
The metaphoricity of the generational contract
The essay ‘Preventing conflicts between generations. For an active management o f the 
allocation o f resources between generations ’ by the French economist Denis Kessler
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(1996) integrates a range of demographic and economic data into an interpretation of the 
current state of resource allocation between generations in industrialised countries. From 
this description he draws several guidelines for future policy development in the context 
of fundamental demographic change.
Kessler’s essay suggests that intergenerational cohesion in western societies is manifest 
in and regulated by ‘a permanent overlapping of a great many forms of exchange and 
transfers between coexisting generations’ (Kessler op. cit., p. 12). Following the 
dominant conceptual divide between public and private the author distinguishes public 
transfers that are organised by the state and local authorities, from private transfers that 
are organised within families. According to Kessler these transfers rest on different 
foundations, that is, on assumptions about human self-interest and/or altruism in the case 
of private, and personal and structural factors such as the lack of forethought, information 
and resources of social actors to protect themselves adequately in the case of public 
transfers. Public transfers are mainly passed from the younger ‘active’ generations to the 
older ones, with expenditure on contributory pensions being the largest item, followed by 
health insurance spending. Whereas these transfers in most industrialised countries are 
paid by payroll taxes, the smaller amount of public transfers that benefits the younger 
generations, such as spending on education and training, is paid by the general budget. 
Private transfers, such as the financial assistance of children, inter-vivo bequests and 
inheritances are mainly passed in the opposite direction from the older to the younger 
generation. Yet, because they are smaller in volume, Kessler concludes that the net 
balance of private and public transfers favours the older generations, even though, as he 
admits, he has to disregard all non-monetary transfers such as assistance in kind and the 
giving of time and attention.
Kessler (op. cit., p. 2) holds that ‘the relative equilibrium of present-day intergenerational 
transfer mechanisms’, is currently threatened by an ‘unprecedented demographic 
breakdown’ in western societies. This breakdown refers to the well-documented predicted 
relative increase of older in relation to younger generations due to a sharp decline in the 
birth rate over the last thirty years and to a rise in life expectancy. Drawing on a range of 
projections by the OECD Kessler presents the scenario that from 2005 the working
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population will age and shrink, concentrating the volume of primary income on a smaller 
fraction of an ageing population. This shift will threaten public pay-as-you-go pension 
(PAYG) schemes where people in gainful employment constantly pay through their 
social security contributions for the pensions of those retired, with a projected rise of 
public expenditure for retirement, in Germany e.g. by more than 40% (see also Kaufrnann 
1997). The three well-known measures for adapting the PAYG pension system are first, 
an increase in contributions and/or budgetary financing with expected adverse effects on 
economic competitiveness, unemployment, saving rates and public deficits; second, the 
increase of the average retirement age, which would require a labour market for people 
aged over 60; and third, a decrease of the relative value of pensions in relation to the 
income of the working population. With respect to changes in private transfers Kessler 
points to the expected increase in the volume of inheritance and wealth that the older 
generation accumulated under favourable economic conditions and will pass on to the 
younger generation.
To avoid unprecedented conflicts and competition between different age groups over the 
sharing of resources -  that under the assumption of generational selfishness could be 
aggravated by the increasing power of decision-making by an ageing electorate -  Kessler 
suggests several guidelines for a political management of resources. These guidelines 
claim to take into account both justice between coexisting and successive generations and 
to contribute to the renewal o f ‘the fundamental social contract’ (Kessler op. cit. p. 30). 
They include an increase in investment in occupational training to assure that numerically 
smaller generations will be qualitatively better trained; the encouragement or compulsion 
of younger generations to vote; an extension of retirement age; a shift of financing 
transfers from payroll to a broad-based contribution system; a limitation of seniority rules 
that link salaries to increasing age; a limitation of health insurance spending; a limitation 
of public debts which places a burden on future generations; the encouragement of 
younger generations to finance their retirement by private savings to alleviate successive 
generations and promote investment; and the encouragement of the private transmission 
of wealth.
Without assessing the scenario of resource competition that are not limited to the German
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case (for Britain see Jamieson 1990) or the political recommendations I will merely 
emphasise here that interrelations between what is constructed as private and public as 
well as any form of intergenerational support provided within and across household 
boundaries remain outside the dominant economic frame of reference. They can therefore 
not be included in any form of ‘intergenerational accounting system’ (Kessler op. cit., p. 
33), whether or not such a system is desirable. Neither are transfers and their proposed 
changes reviewed with respect to gender or indeed any other parameter of social 
inequality such as class or ethnicity. A fundamental part of intergenerational cohesion is 
thus lacking.
The series of essays on transgenerational solidarity by the renowned North American 
family therapist Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy (1987) expresses a commitment to 
acknowledging, maintaining and restoring balanced exchanges and reciprocal fairness in 
intergenerational family interaction. The family in this approach is conceived of as an 
ongoing social system held together by visible and invisible loyalties. Boszormenyi-Nagy 
metaphorically calls the mechanism of this intra- and intergenerational cohesion a ‘ledger 
of fairness’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 305). Its criterion of ‘relational justice’ is 
derived from the family members’ personal considerations of ‘balances of reciprocal 
fairness of both observable transactions and resultant interpersonal ... consequences’ 
(Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 307). The author holds that family members incur 
responsibility for their exchanges. Whereas reciprocal fairness generates merited trust, 
‘injustice’, such as the exploitation of a child’s feelings of loyalty, leads to imbalance, 
stagnation and lost of trust. Worst of all intergenerational injustice suffered is likely to be 
passed down the generational line.
The role of the intergenerational family therapist is to help family members to review 
their ‘side of mutual entitlements and indebtednesses’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 
192) and design adequate action strategies. These can include the development of 
‘appropriate terms of repaying’ one’s parents for care received earlier as well as the 
development of the parents’ acceptance of such repayments. The overall therapeutic aim 
is to rebuild and mobilise trust in close relationships with an emphasis on accountability, 
not self-denying altruism.
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Although Boszormenyi-Nagy on the one hand holds that reciprocal fairness has to be 
determined in a ‘committed dialogue’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 191) between 
members of different generations the foundations of reciprocal justice on the other hand 
are assumed to be grounded in the biological ‘facts’ of generation. These facts are used to 
naturalise intergenerational rights and duties.
The legacy of parental accountability originates from the existential fact of 
reproduction. Having given life to a dependent infant, parents owe it nurturance. 
Conversely, the legacy of filial loyalty originates from the fact of conception, 
early human survival, and growth ... it should be noted that in modified form the 
legacy of filial loyalty exists even when children have been given up or 
abandoned very early in life. Whatever the degree of parental responsibility or 
behavior after a child’s birth, the child’s relationship to the parents who give him 
or her life is a unique, nonsubstitutable, and unreworkable fact of his or her 
existence.
(Boszormenyi-Nagy 1987, p. 220)
This acknowledgement of accountability for reciprocal intergenerational exchanges, 
Boszormenyi-Nagy argues, becomes increasingly important in a societal context of 
‘disintegrating trustworthiness’ and decreasing family commitments. Threats of 
transgenerational solidarity are said to result from people’s increased mobility and 
geographical dispersion but also from ‘women’s more active pursuit of their careers’, the 
increase in divorces and ‘for certain segments of the society, the welfare support of 
mothers with their dependent children’ (Boszormenyi-Nagy op. cit., p. 289).
Again I do not want to evaluate these scenarios here but merely draw attention to the 
ways in which intergenerational relationships, by seemingly referring to biological facts, 
are vested with normative notions of obligations and entitlements. Gender is conspicuous 
by its absence in the discussion of ledgers of fairness and yet it reappears in the scenario 
of declining family commitments.
As stated above in Germany the mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion exemplified in 
these essays are called the ‘generational contract’. Although always used in the singular 
this term refers both to the distributive mechanism of contributory social insurance, 
particularly the pension system and to the exchanges assumed to link members of
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different family generations. Its common denominator is that ‘in the history of human 
kind it has always been the active generation who provided for the other two’ 
(Biedenkopf 1996, p. 2), i.e. the oldest and youngest members of society. This provision 
of the ‘active’ generation is based on the trust that when they get older subsequent 
generations will provide for them. Although cast as a natural law, the foregoing texts 
illustrate that mechanisms of intergenerational cohesion and solidarity are currently 
considered to be under threat, with a hegemonic focus on the socio-political side of the 
generational contract, the social security system and in particular the pension insurance 
system (see below).
Crisis scenarios are disseminated and dramatised in the German media (see Chapter 3.6.) 
but also in the genre of non-fiction or popular (social) science books. In the context of the 
ageing of population, fiscal pressure and rising social expenditure generations are 
identified as competing interest groups in the distribution of welfare, a novel theme in the 
age-old discourse on intergenerational solidarity and conflict. The widely discussed 
popular social science books by the theologian and sociologist Reimar Gronemeyer (1991) 
and the ex-medical practitioner and journalist Heidi Schuller (1996) are notable examples of 
these emotionally loaded scenarios of a bellicose confrontation between ‘the young’ and 
‘the old’ that allegedly will lead to a break up of the generational contract. Because these 
books had a wide dissemination and received great media attention, they can be expected to 
have some impact in shaping public opinion (Brauninger et al. 1998). Schuller was 
designated shadow minister in the Social Democratic opposition and at the launch of her 
book in 1995 the ex-SPD prime minister of Saarland Oskar Lafontaine presented her theses 
‘For a new generational contract\l Schuller’s book is woven around a critique of 
contemporary German society and social policy; Gronemeyer’s book consists of a sombre 
cultural pessimism. Their sensational rhetoric and alternating loose references to 
demographic and statistical data and everyday life encounters have striking similarities. 
Both authors take the generational contract, once the embodiment of social cohesion and 
solidarity, as a major cause for an impending ‘age class struggle’ that ‘from the turn of the 
millennium could divide the world deeper than racism, gender war or class struggle’ 
(Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 125).
1 All German quotes have been translated by the author.
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In a mixture of statistics, generalisations and dystopian vision Gronemeyer corroborates the 
‘death of the family’ and the inhuman institutionalisation and segregation of the youngest 
and oldest members of society. Whereas the family in the past had been a ‘community of 
interest’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 7), the ‘bracket that held generations together’ 
(Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 23) its collapse now leaves ‘expelled elders, consumption addicted 
adults, neglected children’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 171). The answer to the question ‘How 
could we get into this dilemma?’ is simple: ‘It’s Bismarck’s fault. ... When Bismarck’s 
social legislation started to replace familial provision in old age, the family started to 
dissolve’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 128-9). Schuller shares this view of the erosion of family 
structures for which she assigns responsibility to the current ‘women and family hostile 
politics’ (Schuller op. cit., p. 57).
Both authors argue that the inflated social security system in Germany has promoted a 
general ‘provision and insurance mentality’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 43) and produced a 
self-serving expert system. Boundaries are drawn between the egoistic young old who 
benefit from early retirement and generous sick leave regulations and those in advanced old 
age who rely extensively on health and care provision. Referring to the alleged fraud of the 
public pension system under changing demographic conditions both authors evoke the 
metaphor of a ‘chain letter fraud’: ‘those who enter early take the cream, the late comers 
lose their investment’ (Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 126).
According to Gronemeyer this crisis of the generational contract is further aggravated by 
the legacy of the older generation of irreversible ecological destruction. As a result he 
envisions that the younger generation will end the contract with ‘administrative hardness’ 
(Gronemeyer op. cit., p. 128): spending on hospitals, elder care homes and pensions will be 
cut, the number of operations on older patients limited, and older people obliged to do 
ecological compensation work. Schuller presents her recommendations of cut backs and 
welfare retrenchment (‘the principle of equality has its limits at the scarcity of resources’ 
(Schuller op. cit., p. 188) and a simultaneous strengthening of self-help and friendship as 
constructive suggestions for building a ‘new generational contract’. Institutionally, the 
contributory pension system has to be replaced by a basic pension supplemented by
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occupational and optional private pension schemes and eligibility criteria for social and 
health services have to be tightened. To compensate for state provision the ‘vertical’ 
generational contract (Schuller op. cit., p. 9) has to be extended horizontally: young old 
people have to help people in advanced old age as well as doing voluntary work in the 
social sector in support of younger generations. For these suggestions not to fail in a 
democracy where elders will constitute the majority of the electorate a limitation on the 
voting age is considered as well as an extension of the right to vote according to the number 
of children one has.
Whether the current state of the generational contract is phrased in terms of ‘break up’, 
expected ‘renewal’ (Kessler op. cit., p. 30) or ‘renegotiation and modification’ (Walker 
1996b, p. 11) it is clear that no codified contract has ever been made between generations 
or their representatives. Even if ‘institutions and individuals ... behave as if  such a 
contract exists’ (Walker 1996a, p. 2, my emphasis), how can the dominant assumption 
that contracts regulate things in a determinate manner be reconciled with the conception 
of a revisable contract that is continually open to negotiation (Laslett 1992)?
In order to explore the constructions of the generational contract I suggest that it is 
productive to conceive of the generational contract as a metaphor, which, as the 
foregoing extracts have shown, frames policy recommendations and knowledge. After 
briefly considering the characteristics of such metaphors I will set out the general 
questions of my study. A decisive criteria of metaphor is often conceived in the meta- 
pherein, the ‘carrying over’ of frames or perspectives from one domain to another (Schon 
1993). Max Black, for example, asserts that the investment of an utterance with 
metaphorical force ‘works by “projecting upon” the primary subject a set of “associated 
implications”, comprised by the implication complex’ (Black 1993, p. 28). In this 
perspective the associated implications of contract would be projected on and frame the 
focus of generation, an equally metaphoric concept as the analysis in Chapter 1.3. will 
show.
In effect metaphors rest on and at the same time defy the common distinction between the 
literal and the figurative (Ricoeur 1981; Miller 1992). Since de Saussure’s (1966/1916)
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contention that the signifier (the acoustic image of the sign) does not represent the
signified (the concept), but meaning is constituted as an effect of articulation, that is
through difference from and reference to other signifiers, some scholars have argued that
words and concepts are necessarily defined in terms of one another (Lakoff 1993).
Jonathan Culler (1981), for example, has suggested that the crucial aspect of metaphor is
the metaphoric effect, not its structure. For there to be a ‘flash of insight’ it is often
posited that there be a ‘semantic clash’ or tension between ‘focus’ and ‘frame’. In his
insightful book ‘The reason o f metaphor ’ Donald Miller (1992) on the contrary has
argued that undue privilege has been given to those ‘vital metaphors’ that according to
Ricoeur (1981) go beyond the known polysemy of words. A worn-out ‘dead’ metaphor
(‘the foot of the mountain’), Miller writes, is still a metaphor but one that has become
part of common sense, and ‘seems to us to be the literal, the obvious, the natural, the true,
the correct classification’ (Miller op. cit., p. 41).
[The metaphors] which we have worn away longest, which have become part of 
our unconscious and implicit knowledge have acquired a hegemony in our 
thoughts and are taken as the real. So, the most powerful metaphors in any 
society are ... the ones least likely to occur to us, the ones we have hidden from 
our conscious selves by constant wear and tear.
(Miller op. cit., p. 42)
I shall argue that the generational contract, even perhaps where it has become symptomatic 
of the crisis of intergenerational cohesion (‘the ozone layer of social policy’ as German ex- 
Minister of Health Seehofer (Der Stern 1996) put it), has obtained this pervasive guise of 
naturalness or, more recently, of a natural catastrophe. It is a metaphor that does not 
exceed, deform or deviate from the cultural code; it has become part of the cultural code. 
As such the generational contract operates as what Donald Schon has called a ‘generative 
metaphor’ (Schon 1993). Generative metaphors construct views of social reality ‘through 
a complementary process of naming andframing’ (Schon op. cit., p. 146), thereby setting 
problems and implicitly delineating the range of possible solutions. They convey a ‘sense 
of obviousness of what is wrong and what needs fixing’ (Schon op. cit., p. 148). This 
process is illustrated in Nadia Naples’s (1997) analysis of the ‘new welfare consensus’ in 
the United States, a discursive frame that focuses solely on the obligations of welfare 
recipients towards the state so that counterclaims based on the structural analysis of 
poverty could not be discussed or heard in the U.S. Congressional Hearings on welfare 
reform. Furthermore Naples draws attention to the resonances that some key concepts set
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up. ‘Certain statements within particular discursive frames achieve status and authority 
when tied to larger discourses that resonate with prevailing cultural constructions’ 
(Naples op. cit., p. 908).
Outline of the thesis
Taking the metaphoricity of generational contracts seriously is therefore the point of entry 
to this thesis. As Drucilla Cornell (1997, p. 48) has argued with respect to her use of 
psychoanalysis, ‘we need to have an understanding of both of how symbolic systems 
come to hold sway and of how they are inevitably governed by social fantasies’. I shall 
argue that to engage in the current debates about the generational contract at risk in 
Germany it is necessary to inquire into the ways in which it names and frames debates and 
practices by ‘decomposing’ (Nandy 1992, p. 9) this metaphor. By decomposing I mean to 
undertake a series of investigations across disciplinary boundaries into the ‘associated 
implications’ of the generational contract, its history, legacies and repertories as well as into 
that which often remains excluded from hegemonic discourse: the practices of 
intergenerational commitments. Both its constitutive parts ‘generation’ and ‘contract’ have 
multiple meanings, ‘are carriers of some particular philosophy’ (Miller op. cit., p. 26) and 
tap into powerful western myth, for example, that ‘blood is thicker than water’. The 
thesis will unfold some of these discursive contexts, and ‘confront’ them with current 
debates and in particular with the narratives of a group of older German women and their 
adult children on their intergenerational practices and legacies.
Two broad sets of questions are addressed: First, what implicit and explicit knowledge 
makes the generation contract in Germany intelligible and effective as a powerful 
discursive frame? Or, put differently, what presuppositions of the generational contract 
are at work as ‘intertextual operator(s)’ (Culler op. cit., p. 113) that imply discursive 
contexts, which make possible the various effects of signification and omission in current 
political discourse? And second, what effects, if any, do these repertoires have on the 
micro-politics and practices of intergenerational commitments unfolded by members of 
two family generations who on the basis of their birth cohort are members of the so- 
called welfare and baby boom generation and cast as antagonists in the alleged resource 
competition? To what extent do generational contracts provide meaning structures,
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scripts or repertoires of description and interpretation in the accounts of intergenerational 
practice?
In order to address these questions and inquire into the politics of generational contracts I 
propose the use of gender as an analytical tool. The heuristic assumption is that an 
interrogation of implicit gender relations will reveal much of the contradictory 
constitution of generational contracts and may work to denaturalise and destabilise its 
hegemonic hold. I will draw on the conception of gender by the historian Joan Scott 
(1988, p. 42) who conceives gender as ‘a constitutive element of social relationships 
based on perceived differences between the sexes, and ... a primary way of signifying 
relationships of power’ in and by which differential control over and access to material 
and symbolical resources is organised and legitimised. Importantly she argues that insofar 
as
conceptual languages employ differentiation to establish meaning and ... sexual 
difference is a primary way of signifying differentiation, [g]ender... provides a 
way to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among 
various forms of human interaction.
(Scott op. cit., p. 45-6)
Feminist scholars have argued that the ‘institutionalisation of sexual difference’ (Okin 
1989, p. 6) is not a fixed structure of social organisation but a variable that must itself be 
explained and ‘genealogized, i.e. framed by a historical narrative and rendered temporally 
and culturally specific’ (Fraser and Nicholson 1990, p. 34). Gender must be held open for 
dissonances and analysed in its interrelations with other forms of socio-historical 
positionings such as class, generation and ethnicity. Only in this conjunction does it 
produce specific effects (Bhavnani 1993). Methodically Braidotti (1997, p. 27) has 
suggested that it is productive to start the analysis by bringing out the contradictions that 
are constitutive of the social and symbolic positions of women and to activate them 
towards the destabilisation of the socio-symbolic system and especially of the 
asymmetrical power relations that sustain it.
Using gender as a heuristic tool to decompose the metaphor of the generational contract 
Chapter 1 provides an exploration of the associated implications or repertoires of its 
constitutive parts, contract and generation. The analysis opens the view on the normative,
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symbolic and practical work necessary for forging the generational reproduction-lineage 
nexus and delineates the dominant concept of the commercial exchange contract in order 
to use it as a heuristic tool to specify possible elements of contractual practice and 
elements that do not fall in this register. On this basis Chapter 2 investigates classical and 
neo-classical social contract theories on which the idea of the generational contract 
draws. Social contract theories have shaped common sense beliefs about intergenerational 
rights and duties and their gender implications that also inform German social policy. Its 
intergenerational policies and discourses are explored in Chapter 3. In a historical 
perspective this chapter traces the idea of social solidarity as a ‘cadre d’appertance’ 
(Frankenberg 1996, p. 74) of the German welfare state and focuses on the exclusions and 
inequalities its institutionalisation entails.
In both political philosophy and social policy the gendered practice of day-to-day support 
of the young and old remains to a large extent taken for granted and unacknowledged. 
For this reason Chapter 4 develops a novel heuristic framework of kinscripts that 
conceptualises the practical, symbolic, emotional and material work of maintaining 
intergenerational relations as kin work. It suggests that kin work is a personal and 
political activity and has to be analysed in relation to social institutions, cultural scripts 
and intergenerational legacies. The framework of kinscripts guides the empirical 
investigation of interpretation and orientation patterns of members of two family 
generations, whilst held open to the possibility that further conceptual qualification might 
emerge from the empirical accounts that inform the theoretical discussion. The design of 
the study and a set of innovative methods, their possibilities and constraints are discussed 
in Chapter 5. The remaining three chapters present empirical findings on 
intergenerational practices and legacies of members of the two generations. Chapter 6 
uncovers the significance and social logic of need related households of mothers and 
daughters in post-war Germany from the perspective of women bom around 1930. 
Chapter 7 analyses the kinscripts and ‘contracts of need’ of this group of women in later 
life, particularly support given to their grandchildren and older relatives with its 
underlying ambivalence between solidarity and constraint. Chapter 8 finally focuses on 
the dealing of the women’s adult children with these intra-familial legacies, their 
practices and anticipations of kin work in the context of a proliferation of service
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provision in West Germany.
Theoretically the text analyses are informed by theories that are often subsumed under the 
label of post-structuralism. Post-structuralist theories focus on the domain of language 
where the meaning of social reality is produced and negotiated, social organisation is 
defined and contested and subjectivities are constructed (Weedon 1997). My own 
understanding of language and discourse has been informed by reading some of the 
works by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault. Although these bodies of thought are embedded in different contexts of 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and history, they have certain points of connection in 
attending to that which has been excluded from discourse or cannot be said. At the risk of 
greatly simplifying their understanding of language I will briefly outline some aspects 
that I have found productive in thinking about the representational systems of 
generational contracts.
Trained as a psychologist, my first encounter with theories of language has been the 
writings of Lacan. In a reinterpretation of the linguistic theories of Ferdinand de Saussure 
and Roman Jacobson, Lacan (1966/1977, p. 154) has argued that signifiers are connected 
with other signifiers in a ‘signifying chain’. Meaning, according to Lacan, ‘insists’ in the 
signifying chain without ‘consisting’ in any one of its elements. At the same time 
meaning always exceeds the concrete chain, as different con-texts are associated with 
each of the elements. ‘There is in effect no signifying chain that does not have, as if 
attached to the punctuation of each of its units, a whole articulation of relevant contexts 
suspended ‘vertically’, as it were, from that point’ (ibid.).
Lacan argues that these horizontal and vertical axes of the signifying chain are constituted 
by two operations of the signifier: metonymy and metaphor. Metonymy horizontally 
constitutes the ‘word-to-word connection’ (Lacan op. cit., p. 156) of the signifying chain. 
The fact that meaning is never consistent in the signifier is a consequence of and 
presupposition for its continuous connection, the building of ‘communicative bridges’ 
that intend to fill the gap of a presence of meaning that they constitute. The vertical axis 
of the signifying chain is constituted by metaphor, ‘one wordfor another’ (Lacan op. cit.,
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p. 157). Meaning is produced in the brief moment when one signifier in the chain is 
replaced by another (repressed) one. The substituted occulted signifier remains present 
through its determined absence and its association with the chain. Through the horizontal 
and vertical connections of metonymy and metaphor, contiguity and substitution, 
intended meaning is articulated and displaced and subverted.
Without drawing on the psychoanalytic foundations and implications I take these (rather 
metaphorical!) considerations to be a plea for a dual analytic focus: ‘horizontally’ the 
analysis must specify the contexts in which the concept of the generational contract is 
deployed and its connection with other concepts and meaning systems. ‘Vertically’ it has 
to attend to the hidden legacies or ‘determined absences’ of the associated implications of 
those concepts. At the same time Lacan suggests that any act of reading is an 
interpretation through the reader or listener’s production of contexts. The same holds for 
social-scientific interpretations, which may open up new layers of meaning, but 
inevitably produce new exclusions, which continue to destabilise intended meaning. 
Maija Keranen (1993, p. 35) has suggested conceiving social-scientific interpretations not 
as ‘revealings’ but as ‘remaskings’.
I was introduced to the works of Michel Foucault during the social-scientific training I 
undertook in London. His writings are informative particularly where they attach the 
theoretical process of discourse analysis to the theoretical and material conditions of its 
production. Foucault rejects the method of hermeneutic interpretation, which he calls 
‘commentary’ (Foucault 1963/1973, p. xvi). Although he does not deny ‘that things said 
say more than themselves’ (Foucault 1969/1972, p. 110), he holds that statements, 
defined as ‘enunciative functions’ composed of sentences, propositions or tables, have a 
literal (face value) meaning. This literal meaning can be separated from possible 
ambiguities of sentences and utterances. The task of the discourse analyst is not to 
interpret but to describe the statements in terms of their constituting specific discursive 
formations. Foucault holds that this ‘archaeological’ analysis (Foucault 1972, p. 113) ‘is 
concerned, in a sort of vertical dimension, with the conditions of existence of different 
groups of signifiers’ (Foucault op. cit., p. 109). Its aim is to reconstruct locally and 
historically specific rules that make it possible to construct particular discursive ‘facts’.
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Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, p. 47-9) have argued that Foucault later agreed that face- 
value understandings always draw on a taken-for-granted shared background of practices. 
In what he calls genealogy attention is given to the effective formation and buttressing of 
discourse by non-discursive practices and regimes of power/knowledge. Thus discourses 
are not confined to speech acts or texts, but seen as bound up with material conditions 
and social practices, which are localised on the body and in material institutions. In 
discourse power and knowledge articulate themselves and produce historically specific 
effects of truth that have normative and regulatory functions (Foucault 1978). These 
discourses offer multiple and changing subject positions, which always are subverted in 
what Foucault calls counter discourses.
Even though I think that Foucault unjustly devalued processes of interpretation that are 
inevitably involved in reconstructing discursive formations and are necessary to 
understand the resonances they can set up, his conception of power/knowledge informed 
my considerations of the gendered politics of generational contracts and their effects on 
and constitution by specific social actors and institutions. The interrogation of the 
gendered politics of the generational contract thus does not presuppose that there is any 
one coherent policy shaping contemporary intergenerational relations. Rather the 
discursive field of generational contracts is seen as a dominant repertory of interpretation 
in relation to which politics and practices are formulated and diverge.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the power/knowledge nexus is that it also pervades 
the subject position of the social scientist and her conceptual apparatus (Butler 1997). 
Feminist scholars have demanded that the questions ‘who speaks? who writes? when and 
where? with or to whom? under what institutional and historic constraints?’ (Clifford 
1986, p. 13) have also to be addressed to one’s own project. I suggest that to put this 
demand of self-reflexivity into practice, that is, to reflect on precisely how one’s own 
biography and positionality as well as the ‘micro-politics of the academy’ (Rabinow 
1986), shape one’s reading and writing, is the greatest challenge in contemporary social 
science. Some of these issues are addressed in Chapter 5.5. Inevitably reading and writing 
will move between the poles of drawing on taken-for-granted background practices, 
creating subject positions o f ‘meaning and desire’ (Moore 1994, p. 124) for both readers
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and authors and, where they do ‘succeed’, calling these into question.
Empirically my interest in enquiring into the gendered politics of generational contracts 
was incited by the compelling contradictory narratives of older German women about 
their intergenerational commitments, which confronted me with my own blind spots as to 
the significance of intergenerational relationships in women’s (and men’s) life courses. 
Receiving my sociological training-in-practice I was involved in a research project at the 
University of Bremen that investigated the interweaving of paid and unpaid work in the 
lives of a group of older women who underwent vocational training in two culturally 
contrasting regions in West Germany directly after World War II, and later started a 
family (see Appendix A). In the research the qualitative sample was theoretically based 
on a larger survey. In order to assist the memory of both interviewers and research 
participants the researchers had produced individual ‘life course graphs’ on the basis of 
the survey that were presented in the interview. The graphs marked individual periods of 
employment and family events over a time span of more than forty years for each 
research participant (Chapter 5.4.).
In the light of the women’s narratives it became apparent that the way in which the 
researchers had visualised the life courses was useful to illustrate the often- 
unacknowledged diverse employment sequences of older women over the life course. On 
the other hand the markings of family events such as child birth(s), marriage(s), divorces 
and grandmotherhood were only inadequate representations of the constitution and 
dissolution of family ties, and they did not differentiate sequences of intra- and 
intergenerational family work. Notably the graphs did not take into account the 
substantial amount of time that the research participants had spent in supporting older 
relatives and grandchildren. The reasons for this ‘de-representation’ first, were grounded 
in the fact that we had not conceived these commitments as a normative and expectable 
part of older women’s lives. Consequently they had not been addressed in the quantitative 
questionnaires. Second, the visualisation of individual life courses made it impossible to 
bring out ‘interlocking trajectories’ (Elder 1987, p. 180). Status passages that were 
brought about by transition of another family member, such as the giving up of paid work 
when a daughter re-entered the labour market and needed assistance with child care,
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remained invisible.
However, even more sophisticated visualisations of interdependent life courses cannot 
overcome the fact that unlike the labour market, the family and the social institutions 
regulating it do not provide modes of ‘institutional stocktaking’ that differentiate and 
certify obtained positions on the basis of individual performance (Geissler and Kruger 
1992). On an interpretative level the women’s depictions and evaluations of what I then 
started to conceive of as ‘the work of kinship’ (Di Leonardo 1987) were intriguing by 
their apparent contradictions between the voluntary and compulsory nature of their 
commitments, the stated presence and absence of symbolic and material remuneration.
It was only after the research project was officially completed that I came to realise that 
what the researchers had ‘forgotten’ in the standardised design of women’s life course 
analysis, and what in the social sciences is largely confined to the sub-field of family 
sociology and ageing, constitutes a tacit and invisible part of generational contracts.2 
With this ‘new’ discursive horizon I proceeded to reanalyse the women’s narratives on 
intergenerational commitments and locate them in the context of family histories and the 
broader socio-historical context. What was the stuff that the women’s intergenerational 
obligations were made of? Would they change in the contemporary condition with its 
emphasis on partnership and rights and an alleged shift from the ascription of 
intergenerational responsibilities to negotiation and choice (Riley and Riley 1993)? Intra- 
familial (caring) traditions as well as the practice of intergenerational commitments 
became therefore the explicit focus of selecting and interviewing a group of the women’s 
adult children in order to explore continuity and change in intergenerational practices. At 
the same time the research participants’ narratives provoked a journey into western 
repertoires of contract and generation, of freedom and obligation, duties and rights I had 
known little about and which cast the narratives into a new light. I hope the reader will 
enjoy this passage.
2 Thanks to Claudia Bom for help in developing this idea.
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Chapter 1
REPERTOIRES AND LEGACIES OF ‘CONTRACT’ 
AND ‘GENERATION’
1.1. INTRODUCTION
I will begin the analysis of the generational contract by inquiring into the history of its 
constitutive components, the notions of contract and generation. When and how were 
these concepts applied and defined? What mechanisms of cohesion do the two concepts 
imply or constitute? How were they marked and constituted by gender differences? The 
underlying assumption of these questions is that concepts are produced in specific 
historical and institutional discursive formations, emerge within modalities of power and 
are a product of a marking of difference and exclusion, which are often signified by 
gender difference (Scott 1988). Concepts are key repositories of cultural values and 
meanings and can mobilize powerful feelings and emotions (Hall 1997b). They are a site 
of contention, negotiation and strategic reuse by social actors.
The attempt to outline and contextualise some of the western repertoires and ‘folk myths’ 
of contract and generation, then, is not an attempt to rediscover the origins of those terms 
but to unfold some of their discursive contexts, which may be evoked or obliterated in 
their current usage. At the same time this contextualisation and the delineation of 
dominant frames, particularly with reference to the patriarchal family as a site in which 
contract and generation acquired meaning-in-practice, provides the grounds for a further 
interrogation of the ways in which those concepts were combined in social contract 
theories (Chapter 2) and in the history of the German welfare state (Chapter 3).
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The source material for this exploration is not ‘primary’ legal or medical documents but 
their descriptions and interpretations by philosophers, anthropologists and sociologists. 
The problem ‘that we cannot get to the peasant except through the lord’ as the social 
historian Sabean (1984a, p. 3) has put it with reference to the mediation of early modem 
peasants’ testimonies by court officials and authorities, needs to be acknowledged. But it 
should not be taken to suggest that any unmediated access to historical sources is 
possible. Analysts have to bear in mind that a reading of texts is always a re­
interpretation and construction that ‘passes’ through the commentator. Furthermore, legal 
texts, for example, were always subject to continuous reformulation and commentary. In 
any case, the emphasis in the following chapter is on the repertories of contract and 
generation, not on questions such as whether ancient contracts ‘really’ followed the 
procedures described.
For the contextualisation of contract, I will first look at the dominant ‘paradigm’ of the 
commercial exchange contract, that is, the perception of a binding agreement secured by 
law. I will then focus on how self-interested ‘purposive’ contracts have been defined 
against so-called status contracts and what the gender implications have been. Status 
contracts are said to constitute the ties of kinship and political associations and to change 
the ‘universal position’ of an individual. The exploration of discursive contexts of the 
notion of generation, usually understood as a position in a family lineage or membership 
in age-based historical groups, goes in the opposite direction. Starting from its etymology 
I will look at interpretations of generation in ancient biological texts and then look at the 
legalization and ‘enactment’ of generational positions. The practical and symbolic role of 
families in constructing their genealogies and cohesion will be further developed in 
Chapter 4.
1.2. REPERTOIRES OF INTERPERSONAL CONTRACTS 
The triumph of modern contract doctrine
In her ethnography of a community of Bedouins in the Western Desert of Egypt Lila 
Abu-Lughod (1986, pp. 45-6) describes how the Bedouins define their ‘code of honour’
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in contradistinction to the dominant Egyptians. According to the Bedouins the Egyptians’ 
lack of honour is shown in their use of contracts in transactions whereas for a Bedouin a 
person’s word is sufficient. I will take this simple statement as a point of entry to ask why 
in Western society the principle of contract, contrary to the view of the Bedouins, became 
the embodiment of moral conduct and justice.
Although the British legal theorist Patrick Atiyah (1990b, p. 18) has argued convincingly 
that from a juridical viewpoint ‘there is no such thing as a typical contract’ or even ‘one 
central paradigmatic type of [contractual] conduct’ (1990a, p. 5), contract still is 
associated with the paradigm of the commercial exchange contract. Its underlying idea of 
an agreement (in the form of promise) between two or more parties that becomes legally 
binding through the congruent expression of will came to (new) prominence in 19th 
century political and economical liberalism with an increasing market orientation of 
western societies. Created at least by an implicit expression of intentions, a contract 
brings into existence and specifies duties and rights, or changes in existing ones.
The specific mark of contract is the creation of a right, not to a thing, but to 
another man’s conduct in the future. He who has given the promise is bound to 
him who accepts it, not merely because he had or expressed a certain intention, 
but because he so expressed himself as to entitle the other party to rely on his 
acting in a certain way.
(Winfield 1876/1950, p. 1)
The use of the male gender in this account is more then a grammatical convention. 
Although there always have been exceptions and periods of relaxation, women in western 
societies were by and large excluded from these kinds of binding agreement that secured 
personal reliance on agreed transactions and were necessary to make the market system 
work. Until 1935 English Common Law ruled that ‘a married woman has no power of 
contracting. Any agreement she purports to make “is altogether void, and no action will 
lie against her husband or herself for the breach of it’” (Winfield op. cit., p. 66). Similarly 
the German Munt system for centuries legalised the conjugal ‘protection’ of the 
‘unworldly legally incompetent’ married woman for her own good (Oekinghaus 1925, p. 
38). Residuals of this gender tutelage were incorporated in the German Civil Code at the 
beginning of the 20th century.
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The primary function of contract law was to encourage male citizens to comply with their 
agreements. In the heyday of 19th century political and economic liberalism the historian 
C.G. Addison (1847/1856, p. v), referring to his finding of a ‘surprising uniformity’ of 
contract law, suggested triumphantly that
the law of contracts may justly indeed be said to be a universal law adapted to all 
times and races, and all places and circumstances, being founded upon those great 
and fundamental principles of right and wrong which are immutable and eternal.
(C.G. Addison op. cit., p. v)
Formulations such as these not only express the success of contract doctrine but also the 
naturalness of the fundamental exclusion of women (and non-property owning men) from 
contractual practice. This exclusion was tacitly understood to operate in ‘all places and 
circumstances’ and was seen as perfectly compatible with principles of justice.
Ideologically, contractual obligation was considered superior to all other forms of 
obligation because of the manner of its generation: the contracting parties did not merely 
follow norms, conventions or laws but they were considered ‘to make the law which 
governs their relationship’ (Downes 1993, p. 48, emphasis added). The possibility of this 
(self-) law-giving quality rests on conceptions that individuals have a ‘free will’, that is 
they have the moral and psychological autonomy necessary to make choices but also a 
propensity to comply with their own laws, to be bound by their own will. Individuals can 
give and keep promises. According to Charles Fried (1981, p. 1) contracts are based on 
the promise principle ‘by which persons impose on themselves obligations where none 
existed before’. ‘By promising’ he writes, ‘we transform a choice that was morally 
neutral into one that is morally compelled’ (Fried op. cit., p. 8). Promises are conceived 
as a ‘shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust’ (Fried op. cit., 
p. 16). Atiyah (1990a) has suggested that a reference to the promise principle is therefore 
a reference to another concept imbued with our moral and social ideas.
Even though the concept of contract thus relies on and makes use of a moral institution 
(promising), in its more appealing form, it relies on the assumption of a ‘neutral choice’ 
situation (see Chapter 2). Contracts are generally seen as valid only if they are made 
voluntarily on the basis of a person’s well-considered interests. Individuals are not
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expected to enter into contractual agreements that make them worse off than they would 
be without contractual cooperation. Thus the assumption of freedom and choice is the 
condition sine qua non of contract, which gives obligation created by contract its superior 
status. However, as Fried (op. cit., p. 5) points out, ‘if, as we must, we insist that there be 
a fair choice to promise or not, we have imported external standards of fairness into the 
very heart of obligation’.
The foundations of theories of the will have been elaborated by classical contract 
theorists. Yet, if we look at the work of the founder of modem political theory, Thomas 
Hobbes, there is much less emphasis on choice than the dominant paradigm of contract 
theory suggests. In accordance with the foregoing discussion Hobbes defined contract as 
‘ [t]he mutuall transferring of Right’ (1651/1997, p. 94), which results from freely willed 
deliberation: ‘To convenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of 
deliberation’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 97). Contracts usually rely on the ‘Keeping of promise’ 
‘being trusted’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 94) and being motivated by self-interest. Transferring 
a right ‘is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or 
for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary 
acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe’. To be ultimately binding 
contractual performance has to be guaranteed by law for ‘the bonds of words are too 
weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of 
some coercive Power’ (ibid.). This of course is the argument of the social contract 
(Chapter 2).
Importantly, the assumption that voluntary acts are based on self-interest is also taken to 
mean that self-interested action (in the form of promise) in a coerced situation is 
voluntary and contractually binding. Hobbes did not seem to be opposed to the idea that 
for the overall purpose of keeping peace, contracts can be valid even if they are made 
under force. ‘Because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes 
subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power 
it is to save, or destroy him’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 140).3
3 Similarly in the following passage there seems to be an emphasis on legitimisation of enforced contracts 
even though it is not clear in which cases civil law can release a person from contractual performance.
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As Carole Pateman (1988) has shown, questions of what may still count as a voluntary 
entry into a contract and what kinds of agreements contract can legitimise (prostitution, 
slavery etc.), are subject to continuing debate. Yet the conception of contract remained 
enormously influential and productive because it assumed and created the autonomous 
male individual as a rational self-interested agent. The freedom to contract appeared to 
exemplify this individual freedom and autonomy.
Historically the unrestricted freedom of contract remained more an economic ideal than a 
rule of law even in the 19th century. Only in the aftermath of the French Revolution was 
the right to contract in Germany extended to all male individuals. In the Prussian General 
State Law (Allgemeines Preuftisches Landrecht, APL) of 1791/94 that was in many ways 
the precursor of the German Civil Code, parents and children were defined as a ‘house 
community’, a term that was underpinned by the contract principle, even though married 
women and children remained under tutelage. By stating that a person could not sell his 
person, but only sell his time and labour, servants were transformed into legal subjects 
who entered contracts with their former lords whilst their rights of self-determination 
were de facto limited (Koselleck 1981).
So we see, by drawing on the moral principle of promise and fidelity to one’s word to 
which the Bedouins referred, assumptions of freedom and individual sovereignty were 
incorporated in, and at the same time seen as manifested in contractual practices. 
Associated with the commercial exchange contract, the concept of contract remained 
neutral and non-ethical with respect to morality and gender symbolism. Moreover, under 
the assumption of free choice, contract brought obligations into existence.
The counter-model of status contracts
Even though quasi-feudal relationships, as Koselleck (1981) has argued, largely remained 
in practice in the 19th century, the discourse of contract in a historical perspective was
‘And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him money,
I am bound to pay it, till the Civil Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without 
Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot 
lawfully break’ (Hobbes op. cit., p. 98).
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defined against the idea of personal submission in feudal status relations. In Sir Henry 
Maine’s famous phrase, relations based on contract mark the progressive pole in the 
development ‘from Status to Contract’ (Maine 1861/1917, p. 100). In the order of status, 
Maine held, rights and duties were determined by a person’s position in the patriarchal 
family, characterised by absolute jurisdiction of the head of household over persons and 
property. According to Maine ‘the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees 
those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties... is Contract’ (Maine op. cit., p. 99). Max 
Weber (1922/1978, p. 671) has argued that the ‘reciprocity in rights and duties’ in the 
feudal order of status, too, ‘was in its innermost essence based upon contract, and the 
expression “pactus” was applied with all seriousness’ to a range of statutory 
codifications. In his Sociology o f Law Weber held that family relations just as political 
associations were constituted by ‘status contracts’ (Weber op. cit., p. 672).
Status contracts would have to work within the legal institution of Munt analysed by one 
of Weber’s students, the sociologist Emma Oekinghaus (1925). Etymologically the Old 
High German expression Munt (shield) corresponds to the Latin manus (hand), which 
Heusler (1885 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 4) interpreted as the absolute power of 
the head of household, the manus potestativa. In Roman law the term familia designated 
everybody subjected to the patria potestas, the authority of the head of household, 
including servants and farmhands. As Herlihy (1985, p. 2) notes the pater familias 
thereby was excluded from the family, as he was not subject to his own authority. 
According to old Germanic law Munt guaranteed the Hausvater (pater familias) power 
and authority over free persons and serfs, humans and animals as jus in rem (law relating 
to things) (Gerlach 1996). Only men could obtain ‘Selbstmunf, the right to fend for 
themselves and regulate relations with other heads of households, which is related to the 
right to carry a weapon, acquire property in land and to represent oneself in court.
From the 8th century onwards Munt regulated only power over family members and 
servants who became legal subjects. Their legal capacities, however, remained at the 
discretion of the Hausvater who legally represented those ‘commanded by M unf 
(Muntbefohlene). In the 13th century Munt was further transformed from the power of the 
guardian to the protection of his dependants. Oekinghaus argued that this form of
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‘modem guardianship’ (Heusler op. cit., p. 38) became the longest legally upheld 
inequality between adults.
Sir Henry Maine was not at all oblivious to the fact that the order of contract was a 
domain entirely reserved to (property-owning) men. ‘Ancient Law’, he writes, 
‘subordinates the woman to her blood-relations, while a prime phenomenon of modem 
jurisprudence has been her subordination to her husband’ (Maine op. cit., p. 91). Given 
that in (late) Roman law the wife through marriage legally became the daughter of her 
husband, while in the late 19th century she was legally subordinated as a wife, the 
distinction for married women between the order of status and that of contract collapses.
Max Weber has pointed to the important fact that the patriarchal power of the Hausvater 
included the right to have sexual access to the women of the house. This right was 
institutionalised in a range of ‘sexual contracts]’ (Weber op. cit., p. 689) such as 
prostitution, concubineage and marriage, including temporary forms of marriage. 
Marriage contracts commonly were concluded between husband and the male relatives of 
the wife, and they involved money payments. Whereas Maine (op. cit., p. 92) interpreted 
the husband’s payment of a bride price to the wife’s relations as a price ‘for the tutelage 
which they surrender to him’, Weber argued that the parental payments of a dowry in 
high status families guaranteed the protection of their daughter from absolute conjugal 
submission. Dowries were left in the possession of the wife and were a security in case of 
abandonment or death of the husband. Together with a written agreement that specified 
the legal position of her children and payments made to her in case of her husband’s 
death or her abandonment, the dowry distinguished the class specific ‘full marriage’ from 
other sexual contracts.
Despite the payment of money and the ‘modem’ specification of rights in writing Weber, 
in contrast to the views of the classical social contract theorists (Chapter 2), considered 
the marriage contract as a status contract. Status contracts are defined as the ‘more 
primitive type’ and counter-model of the quantifiable non-ethical commercial exchange 
contract, which he called purposive contract. Purposive contracts spread with the 
expansion of the market system. For the most part status contracts are considered to be
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‘fraternization contracts’ (Weber op. cit., p. 672) by means of which another person 
becomes somebody’s child, father, wife, master, slave, kin or comrade. As will be shown 
in the second part of the chapter (1.3.), the fraternisation between a father and a child 
rests on the uncertainty of (biological) fatherhood, which requires the acknowledgement 
by the father in order to receive legal status. Whereas purposive contracts are based on a 
specific conduct or performance, status contracts
involve a change in what may be called the total legal situation (the universal 
position) and the social status of the persons involved. To have this effect these 
contracts were ... acts having a magical significance. ... To ‘fraternize’ with 
another person did not, however, mean that a certain performance of the contract, 
contributing to the attainment of some specific object, was reciprocally 
guaranteed or expected... The contract rather meant that the person would 
‘become’ something different in quality (or status) from the quality he possessed 
before. For unless a person voluntarily assumed that new quality, his future 
conduct in his new role could hardly believed to be possible at all. Each party 
must thus make a new ‘soul’ enter his body.
(Weber 1978/1922, p. 672)
By insisting that these irreversible status transformations are voluntary acts, status 
contracts are qualified as contracts. At the same time the reference to fraternisation 
effectively conceals inherent hierarchies and power relations and forestalls the question 
whether to assume the unalterable position of a wife or a slave, of whose ‘dependency 
relationship’ Weber (op. cit., 1010) is elsewhere critical, was free from coercion. As 
Shanley (1979 as quoted in Pateman 1988, p. 166) has argued with respect to 17* century 
marriage contracts ‘to contract a marriage was to consent to a status, which in essence 
was hierarchical and unalterable’. Although not confined to women, status contracts had 
particular gender significance. Status contracts between men were largely, but not 
exclusively fraternisation between comrades or fathers and inheriting sons. Entry into 
familial status contracts did not on the whole vest women with the rights to share familial 
and parental power of decision-making or have equal part in inheritance. Inheritance of 
their parents’ property was usually handed over to their husbands.
As indicated in the above quotation Weber also drew attention to a range of magical acts 
that ‘sealed’ and secured fraternisation contracts. In particular he focused on oaths. Oath, 
he claimed, presented a ‘conditional self-surrender’ to magical or divine forces that were 
believed to punish anti-fratemal conduct (Weber op. cit., p. 672). Thus it seems that
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magical oaths are to status contracts what freely willed promise is to commercial 
contracts.
Life tokens and liability in person
However, a number of legal theorists, sociologists and anthropologists, including Weber 
himself, have contended that rigorous formalism was a central characteristic also of early 
monetary contracts. ‘Form and ceremony were everything, substance and intention were 
nothing or almost nothing. Only those transactions were recognized as having legal 
efficacy, which fulfilled certain conditions of form’ (Winfield 1876/1950, p. 107). In 
money lending contracts solemn formulas operated ‘not by way of obligation, but as a 
grant of the sum expressed’ (Winfield op. cit., p. 109). Similarly Weber (op. cit., p. 674) 
held that cash transactions ‘were completely devoid of any promissory elements oriented 
towards the future’. Interestingly however, these solemn formulas used the language of 
promise. The Roman stipulatio bindingly concluded a contract by the ritualistic question 
of the creditor ‘... spondesneV (‘do you promise?’) and the debtor’s answer ‘spondeo’ (‘I 
promise’). Winfield (op. cit., p. 5) suggested that this formula was ‘almost certainly of 
religious origin [and] was in early times supposed to have a kind of magic effect’. At the 
same times it referred exactly to that which later was considered to exemplify the theory 
of the will: the promise principle.
Sociological and anthropological interpretations of ancient money loan contracts, such as 
the Germanic vadiatio, focus on the significance of symbolic pledges by which the debt 
was contracted. According to Weber early money loan contracts produced contractual 
obligation through the conditional liability of the person for non-compliance. In the 
vadiatio the debtor gave a symbolic pledge, often a tally or staff, to the creditor. Weber 
(op. cit., p. 738) claimed that the staff was believed to be an enchanted messenger’s staff. 
Marcel Mauss (1924/1997, p. 62) has interpreted these pledges as ‘life-tokens’. He 
pointed out that pledges were often personal items of little value like a glove or a knife. 
These items were believed to be infused with the individuality of the donor and to bind 
his honour.
The metaphor of a life-token gains weight in the light of common legal practices that in
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place of a surety the debtor became his own surety and pledged himself. If the debt was 
not paid the debtor was forfeited to the lawful possession of the creditor or sold himself 
into temporary slavery. In the German legal institution Einleger the creditor could 
conversely move into the house of the debtor, who was obliged to serve and provide for 
him until the debt was paid. Imprisonment or even execution for debt was not 
uncommon. In Germany imprisonment for debt was only abolished in the 19th century. 
Against this background Weber argued that symbolic and obligatory pledges in money 
loan contracts were an attempt to avoid immediate personal liability and constituted a 
temporal deferral. I shall argue that if money loan contracts were, as Weber suggested, 
precursors of so-called purposive contract, then they too, like status contracts, changed 
the ‘total social status of the individual’ (Weber op. cit., p. 674) -  if the contract was 
breached. Early money loan contracts thus obligated the debtor with ‘life and limb’. 
Mauss has argued that these contracts kept traces of archaic gift exchanges. Gift 
exchanges constituted what he called ‘total social facts’ (Mauss op. cit., p. 78) in which 
‘all kinds of institutions are given expression at one and the same time - religious, 
juridical, and moral...’ (Mauss op. cit., p. 3). According to Mauss these exchanges were at 
the same time self-interested and obligatory, qualifications that under the modem contract 
paradigm are considered to be irreducible opposites.
In the history of contract, as unfolded in Maine’s philosophical account and Weber’s 
Sociology o f Law status contracts, symbolic pledges and liability ‘in one’s body’ are 
interpreted as earlier and more primitive stages in the linear development of contract from 
form to intention, from the power of belief secured by magical forces to the power of will 
secured by law. Only by locating these legacies in the dim and distant past can the 
commercial or purposive contract become a morally neutral device that creates obligation 
where none was before and implies freedom and individual sovereignty. If one follows 
Weber’s (op. cit., p. 669) claim that the tjuridico-economic position of an individual, i.e., 
the totality of his legitimately acquired rights and valid obligations’ is a product of 
inheritance based on family relationships and contracts made by ‘him’, then status and 
purposive contracts are the major distributive mechanisms in creating this position. 
Excluding the case of slavery, the combination of those two modes of contract reinforced 
each other in the case of (property owning) men and they mutually dismantled each other
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in the case of women. Portrayed in simplified terms the entry into status contracts that 
created family relations historically transferred inheritance to the women’s husbands and 
henceforth excluded them as wives from purposive contracts.
1.3. REPERTOIRES OF GENERATION 
Generational perspectives
The term generation is notoriously polysemous even though people draw on 
commonsense understandings when they talk, for example, about the ‘succession of 
generations’. In their informative essay ‘Generation, cohorts, and relations between age 
groups’ Bengtson and colleagues (1985, p. 306) have argued that generation is ‘a 
metaphor for [the] emergence of social realities... linking time and social structure’. The 
multiplicity of reference points is intrinsic in its Greek root genos. The derivative verb 
genesthai means ‘to come into existence’ and, according to The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989, p. 436), denotes both the action of generating and that which is 
generated. Referring to the work of L.L. Nash, Bengtson and colleagues argue that 
genesthai referred in Greek usage to a group of living organisms constituting a single step 
in the line of descendent from a common ancestor, a group of individuals sharing a 
specified status for a limited period, participating in a common event or living through 
the same period of time. Generation is a relational concept and linked to 
conceptualisations of social time: a generation (of siblings, peers, coevals etc.) comes 
into being in relation to another one in a process that marks both continuity and renewal 
(Liischer 1993).
The constant stream of human births and deaths suggests that the act of defining a 
generation is an act of interpretation and construction. Its promise and actual usage from 
the ancient Greeks onwards has been the idea of marking the chronology of important 
events, of describing the social location of individual actors and of explaining resultant 
collective change (Bengtson et al. op. cit., p. 305). As Marinas (1968, p. 91) states in the 
Encyclopaedia o f the Social Sciences, ‘the generational perspective introduces 
discontinuity and articulation in place of an amorphous and confused whole’. Its
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respective units have been defined from the viewpoint of the humanities, social sciences 
and positivism and last but not least, from that of the natural sciences (biology).
The approach in the humanities is illustrated by the contention of the German art 
historian Pinder (1928, as quoted in Dubs 1966, p. 26-7) that generations have distinctive 
worldviews, a communality of a specific way of experiencing life and the world, which 
he called the ‘entelechy’ of a generation. Generation refers both to contemporaries (those 
who live at the same time) and coevals (those who are the same age), a relation that 
Pinder has famously characterised as the ‘non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous’ 
referring to the multidimensionality of social time, that is experienced differently by 
actors of different cohorts.
Everyone lives with people of the same and of different ages... but for each the 
‘same time’ is a different time -  that is, it represents a different period of his self, 
which he can only share with people of his own age.
(Pinder 1928, as quoted ibid.)
As Karl Mannheim (1997/1928, p. 284) has noted, this dictum of the non­
contemporaneity of the contemporaneous challenges the idea of a homogenous 
temporality of a given epoch, but it does not link the entelechies of generations to social 
factors and does not account for different positionalities of coevals.
The modem social-scientific approach to conceptualising generations builds on the 
‘formal sociological’ work of Mannheim who proposed defining generations and their 
entelechies socio-structurally. Individuals who are bom around the same time, Mannheim 
(op. cit., p. 290) argued, have a similar social ‘location in the social whole’. This location 
[Lagerung] is based on similar birth age but also on belonging to the same culture and 
society, which excludes some modes of thought, practice and emotion and promotes 
others. Yet, a similar generational location contains only potentialities. Individuals of a 
similar age become an actual generation ‘in so far as they participate in the characteristic 
social and intellectual currents of their society and period’ (Mannheim op. cit., p. 304). 
Furthermore actual generations are often constituted by a number of ‘antagonistic 
generation-units’, subgroups that are differentiated along class or political lines and 
characterised by different ‘mentalities’ or ‘generation style[s]’ (Mannheim op. cit., pp.
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306-310). A contemporary example of the alleged antagonism of generation units is their 
identification with respect to their different positionality, agency and interests in the 
development of redistributive mechanisms of modem welfare states (Thomson 1989, 
1992; see Chapter 5.2.).
This early social-scientific conception underlies the contemporary notion of ‘cohort 
generations’ (Miller 1997). In contrast to the notion of (birth) ‘cohort’, which is a 
demographic term denoting an aggregate of individuals bom in or around the same time 
(Pilcher 1995), cohort generations are characterised by ‘common perspectives of 
interpretations of the generation’s joint experiences’ (Miller op. cit., p. 8). These 
perspectives are further differentiated by socio-structural variables such as class and 
‘race’. Whereas birth cohorts are defined pragmatically, the boundaries of a cohort 
generation are defined ‘qualitatively’. Boundary markers are demographic differences of 
a group bom during the same period of time in relation to predecessors and successors 
and/or historical events that affected this group of coevals more ‘directly’ than their 
contemporaries (Miller op. cit., p. 6).
The recourse to what Mannheim (op. cit., p. 290) called ‘biological factors’, that is the 
fact that individuals are bom and die, and have a limited life span, is most striking in the 
positivist-historical approach, where the life spans of generations provide the framework 
for the analysis of historical change. Its point of departure is the definition of generations 
as encompassing on average 30 years. This time interval represents the average age gap 
between parents and children (Dubs 1966), the time ‘until political power is handed from 
father to son’ (Rintala 1968, p. 93) and the period of decisive individual activity or the 
‘fact’ as Marinas (1968, p. 90) holds, referring to Ortega, that ‘history is made largely by 
men between the ages of 30 and 60’. Furthermore the approach draws on the assumption 
of a ‘primary biological-psychological tension between young and old’ (Dubs op. cit., p. 
28), in which the older generations is usually identified with a conservative, the younger 
with a liberal worldview. Claiming that resultant tension and conflict are linked to 
historical change, the task of the historian is to identify ‘decisive generations’ and link 
historical development to the succession of generations.
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Despite their different focuses several points of connection appear in these three 
approaches. Emphasis is first put on difference in the attempt to define generations as 
distinct from others. Even though the discursive frames and defining criteria differ, the 
assumption that generations exist in the first place is anchored in the coexistence of 
individuals of a similar age in a socio-historically specific habitat. Furthermore the 
antagonism of different generations, or generation units, within the ensemble of 
contemporaries draws on the assumption of an innate tension between young and old. At 
the same time the fact that individuals are also members of specific family generations 
remains completely divorced from definitions of historical generations, a conceptual 
divide that according to Attias-Donfut and Arber (1999) also characterises contemporary 
debates.
Finally, gender difference remains both present and absent in the ‘classical’ 
conceptualisations of generation. On the one hand women are never explicitly said to be 
principally excluded from belonging to or participating in a generation, like they were, 
for example, from commercial contracts. On the other hand the illustration of 
intergenerational tension by conflicts between father and son and the emphasis on active 
civil participation imply that women have played a rather subordinate role in defining the 
boundaries of a generation and its tensions with other generations. The implicit or 
explicit basing of generational classifications on the male life course with its tripartite 
division between education, employment and retirement is still evident in contemporary 
classifications. The definition of the so-called welfare generation (Chapter 5.2.) is a case 
in point.
Whilst relatively marginal in countries such as Britain, generational perspectives continue 
to frame debates on the continent both in academia and society at large, in particular with 
respect to conflicts in the allocation of resources among generations. Whereas some 
commentators consider generations as the ‘last refuge of the addicts of homogeneity’ 
(Bude 1995 as quoted in Scherr 1997, p. 171), others hold that the multi-perspectivity of 
location and time frames inherent in the generational perspective is a fruitful way to 
approach tensions in the contemporary condition (Liischer op. cit.). The question whether 
or not individuals identify with or are informed by generational perspectives is
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considered to be subject to empirical investigation.
What usually remains beyond current debate is that the notion of generation denotes 
family lineages, or its constitutive ‘reproduction-lineage nexus’ (Collier and Yanagisako 
1987, p. 3), as is suggested by the ancient Greek term genea (generation) for family. It 
appears trivial that a new generation comes into being as a result of the procreation of a 
man and a woman. In western societies the resultant lineage in anthropological terms is 
defined as a ‘cognastic descent [that] is bilateral, using both genders to define the 
boundaries of being a relative’ (Fry 1995, p. 131). Boundaries between generations 
appear self-evident because only in family lineages do we find ‘full intervals’ (Mannheim 
op. cit., p. 279) between one generation and the next, constituted by the time between the 
birth of an individual and his or her ability to procreate. Several contemporary writers 
have therefore suggested limiting the term ‘generation’ to signify lineages between 
grandparents, parents and child in order to avoid conceptual confusion (Pilcher 1995).
In the remainder of this chapter I will unfold some of the discursive contexts of this 
seemingly obvious link between reproduction and lineage. I will show that this link has 
been a product of social construction, of legal circumscription, moralisation and familial 
practice, and is closely linked to the construction and legitimisation of sexual difference.
Framing blood ties: the father as genitor
In both ancient Greek and Latin, generation denoted the process of procreation in the 
biblical sense of ‘begetting and bearing’ (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995, p. 7). The 
biological ‘facts’ of generation in the western world have been set down and disputed in 
ancient accounts of reproductive biology. Passed on by Arab scholars, the body of dogma 
they produced was rediscovered and disseminated in the Middle Ages and remained the 
doctrine of official medicine until the 18th century. In the light of new ‘knowledge’ on 
how generation occurs these texts have been re-examined. In the discussion that follows I 
will draw on the readings of earlier conceptions of generation suggested by the Italian 
anthropologist Gianna Pomata (1996) and the North American historian Thomas Laqueur 
(1990). Whereas Pomata focuses on the interrelations between medical and legal 
definitions of generation, Laqueur is concerned with the ‘making of sex’. According to
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Laqueur, ancient biological accounts of generation are evidence of what he calls the one- 
sex model, in which the female body is considered as an inverted but ‘lesser’ version of 
the male body. Sexual difference was not attached to differences in sexual organs but to 
an invisible economy of bodily fluids, particularly of blood, milk and semen, which were 
thought to convert into one another through varying degrees of body heat.
In the ancient texts two models of generation are juxtaposed, the so-called one-seed and 
the two-seed model (Laqueur op. cit., p. 38). In the 5th century BC the Greek physician 
Hippocrates, or the authors of the writings attributed to his name, held that generation 
occurred when male and female seeds are melted together. Male sperm was refined out of 
blood through an excess of body heat. The sperm was considered ‘a foam much like the 
froth on the sea’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 35). Due to lesser heat, the female body converted 
blood into milk and menstrual blood. Although the male originated from ‘stronger’ sperm 
Hippocrates maintained that both sexes could produce weak and strong versions and the 
outcome of generation depended on the respective quality inherent in the semen mix.
Aristotle’s influential one-seed model in the 4th century BC provided an answer to the 
hypothetical question that if women can produce strong seeds why they would need men 
to generate. Aristotle shared the view that men’s blood was converted into semen through 
innate body heat and that women lacked the capacity to produce vital heat, so that their 
blood changed to milk and menstrual blood. According to Aristotle the woman’s 
menstrual blood in generation provided the raw matter of the embryo, whereas the 
incorporeal pneuma of the male sperm gave the foetus form and soul. On the basis of a 
greater body heat the man thereby became the efficient agent in generation (Pomata 
1996), even if blood itself was ‘ungendered’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 38). In the light of 
Aristotle’s philosophy Laqueur (op. cit., p. 55-6) interprets ‘the strength of the spermain 
generating new life [as] the microcosmic corporeal aspect of the citizen’s deliberative 
strength of his superior rational power, and of his right to govern’.
What is informative in the context of generation is the consideration that if in the 
economy of bodily fluids semen and menstrual blood, and also nourishing milk, were 
derived from blood, the ancient biological accounts suggest that the ‘stuff that links
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generations is literally a tie in blood. In the 2nd century AD Galen endorsed and 
reformulated Hippocrates’s two-seed model. Galen shared the dominant view that men 
were more perfect than women due to their excess of heat, but on his discovery of the 
‘female testicles’ [ovaries] held that women too produced generative seeds. According to 
Galen both male and female semen contributed spiritually and materially to generation, 
but female semen was conceptualised as the weaker auxiliary one, which nourished the 
male sperm. Pomata (op. cit., p. 57) points out that by maintaining that male sperm, 
derived from blood, constituted the foetus’s vascular system Galen was able to 
demonstrate ‘how the link between the child and the father is literally, materially a tie 
derived from blood’. This blood tie links the child to the father and by implication to a 
common ancestor.
I shall argue that the biological ‘discovery’ of intergenerational blood ties gives scientific 
weight to the apparently gender-neutral western folk myth that ‘blood is thicker than 
water’, that is the belief that ‘natural’ kinship ties are stronger than the ties of friendship. 
As Patterson (1997, p. 25) suggests in her discussion of Welsh kinship, the patrilineal 
symbol of blood is powerful because it is ‘given by nature, not man-made’. The blood- 
semen theory thus established what the anthropologist Pitt-Rivers has called 
‘consubstantiality’ (1973, p. 92), i.e. the idea of a prime nexus between father and child 
in ‘blood’ constituting a natural, positive and unbreakable tie between man and his blood- 
relatives. In the case of the Bedouins in the Western Desert of Egypt blood is vested with 
claims of a distinct cultural identity and a nobility of origin, a connotation implied both in 
the Latin genus and in the Greek genos which have the meaning of birth, stock and race 
(Partridge 1966). Abu-Lughold (1986, p. 45) argues that for the Bedouins ‘blood is the 
authenticator of origin or pedigree’. It is worth noting that existentialising references to 
ties in blood as a ‘memory without language’ (Oates 1990 as quoted in Bahr and Bahr 
1996, p. 549) that ‘usually engender deep emotion and intense commitment’ (Bahr and 
Bahr op. cit., p. 548) are made until the present day. Similarly Berscheid (1996, p. 563) in 
the same issue of the Journal ofMarriage and the Family affirms ‘that kin relationships 
are likely to be different from non-kin on the basis of the existence of blood ties alone’. 
The modem interpretation of shared blood refers to shared genes.
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No blood transfusion, no surgeon’s knife, no geographical distance can ever 
change one’s DNA blueprint and its similarity to another’s. The fact that another 
person is blood kin may be suppressed or ignored, but it is a biological fact that 
cannot be altered.
(Berscheid ibid.)
Despite the seeming ungenderedness of blood the emphasis on blood-ties can be found 
particularly in societies with patrilineal descent. The need to establish the father’s blood 
tie to his descendants and his more superior part in generation has to be seen in the light 
of the need to legitimise and valorise claims about fatherhood. ‘In the face of the more 
sensorily evident claim of the mother’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 20) fatherhood is existentially 
uncertain. Thomasset (1992, p. 48) has argued that at the same time as the blood theory 
of semen flourished ‘much... evidence attests to men's obsession with the possibility that 
women might give birth without their participation’. Similarly the accounts of the 
classical social contract theorists give ample evidence of the fundamental uncertainty of 
fatherhood (Chapter 2.3.) and Schultheis (1993) reminds us that only relatively recently 
has it been possible to determine fatherhood biologically.
That apparently contradictory theories concerning generation, for example that only men 
had generative semen, that only women had generative semen and that both sexes 
contributed to generation, were upheld over the centuries is well illustrated in the 
summary of ancient scientific theories by Isidore of Seville in the 7th century AD. 
Laqueur argues that these statements were compatible because they were linked to 
distinct legal circumscriptions of generational positions. As Pomata shows, these legal 
definitions legitimised the position of the father in two ways: through paternal power and 
paternal blood. I will briefly expand on these legal definitions in early Roman law 
because they illustrate how everyday concepts of generation were vested with a gendered 
legal significance that had vital consequences for inheritance rights as well as politico- 
economic citizenship rights. These implications remain concealed in any ahistorical 
usage of lineage categories by modem anthropologists and sociologists.
Early Roman law had three main intergenerational kinship categories: consanguinitas 
(literally: the sharing of blood), agnatio (patrilineal kinship) and cognatio (natural/civil 
kinship). Drawing on the Digest, one of the three parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in
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which Roman law had been compiled and codified in the 6th century AD, Pomata (1996) 
points out that the term cognatio referred to kinship as understood by Natural and Civil 
Law. According to Natural Law cognatio was established by birth and hence included 
also illegitimate children. Natural Law thus gives evidence of the two-seed model 
elaborated above. In Civil Law on the other hand cognatio referred exclusively to birth in 
a legitimate marriage and also included adoption. Thus the Digest suggested that civil 
kinship really ‘is more accurately called agnatio’ (Pomata op. cit., p. 46). The principle 
of agnatio, according to Pomata, was bound up with the patriarchal family. Agnati were 
all those who by birth were under the patria potesta, the power of the head of household 
(1.2.). Yet a man legally became pater familias not through the birth of his child but 
through the death of his own father, which released him from his father’s potesta. I 
suggest that in an important sense the legal establishment of ‘paternity’ (paternal power) 
preceded corporeal paternity.
Pomata (op. cit., p. 46) rightly asserts that gender is a key distinction between natural and 
civil kinship. Whilst men could create both cognatio and agnatio and were able to 
bequeath their legal status to their sons, women could only create ‘natural kinship devoid 
of the privileges attached to legal kinship’. The same holds for the category 
consanguinitas. Although consanguinity in ordinary language denoted the sharing of the 
same blood, in Roman law consanguinei referred exclusively to the children bom to a 
common father, independently of whether they had the same mother. According to 
Laqueur consanguinitas was based on the assumption that only men have generative 
seeds. He quotes Isidore who stated that ‘consanguinity is so called by that which from 
one blood, that is from the same semen of the father, is begotten’ (Isidore de Seville as 
quoted in Laqueur, op. cit., p. 56). As the 14th century jurist Baldus in his commentary on 
consanguinity in the Corpus Iuris Civilis remarks ‘properly speaking, neither a mother 
nor a grandmother can be called blood-relatives’ (Baldus as quoted in Pomata 1996, p. 
43).
Pomata holds that siblings of the same mother and different fathers were called uterini 
(from the same uterus). According to Isidore an illegitimate child was called spurius after 
the female genitalia spurium (from the seed). Whether uterini or spurius, whilst the
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legitimate child is generated from the seed of the father, her illegitimate counterpart is 
derived from the m other’s seed) ‘as if the father did not exist’ (Laqueur op. cit., p. 56). 
Consanguinity was the closest agnatic relationship but it was not equivalent to agnatio. 
This is expressed the order of succession of inheritance that placed consanguinei who 
were still under thepatria potestas before other consanguinei, and those before agnates. 
Thus intergenerational positions were shaped both by paternal blood and paternal power. 
But the power of the patria potestas was not subject to a man’s will power or conduct 
(being gained only by his father’s death) whereas the ties of blood, or more precisely 
their recognition by the paterfamilias, remained an act of will and deliberation. The latter 
case could be an example of what Weber meant by status contract.
In so far as this construction of fatherhood buttressed the status quo, we can assume that 
the state had a strong interest in the biological, legal and political establishment of 
paternity. Moreover the recognition of the father-child bond across many cultures is 
associated with ‘the dawn of civilization’ (Maynes et al. 1996). As the Austrian 
sociologist, writer and cofounder of the Austrian women's movement Rosa Mayreder put 
it the
rise and fall of fatherhood constitutes a wonderful chapter of human history. 
From the level at which the father was zero ... he rises in a sphere of power and 
admiration, which lets him appear as God, who himself is thought of as father, as 
keeper, ruler and providence of the family, which was his absolute kingdom.
(Mayreder 1923 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 9)
Much effort not only on the part of the legal state-apparatus and its changing generational 
politics (chapter 3), but also on the part of cultural and religious institutions and (high 
status) families themselves was necessary to make this rise of fatherhood possible and 
lasting. In the following section I want to highlight briefly some of these mechanisms, 
which are not usually considered as repertoires of generation.
The making of genealogies: generational practices and consciousness
The German economist Gustav Schmoller has described the history of the patriarchal 
family as one in which ‘children ... enter into a relationship of love and sympathy, 
faithfulness and admiration with the formerly more distant father in a conscious
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continuation o f his blood’ (1919 as quoted in Oekinghaus 1925, p. 8, emphasis added). I 
take this proposition to suggest that even though blood ties were legally circumscribed it 
was still necessary to create what Schmoller (ibid.) called ‘a sense of genealogy’ in the 
individuals involved. Referring to the construction of the modem family Bourdieu has 
described what I would consider the making of genealogies as
the product of a labour of institutionalisation, both ritual and technical, [which] 
aimed at durably instituting in each member of the instituted unit, feelings that 
will tend to ensure the integration that is the condition of the existence and 
persistence of the unit.
(Bourdieu 1996, p. 22, emphasis added) 
The practical and symbolic work involved is often concealed with references to natural 
intergenerational affection and solidarity that is allegedly inherent in kinship relations. 
This is illustrated, for example, in the writings of 19th and 20th century western 
anthropologists, who even when considering kinship as a social construct tended to 
presuppose the ‘facts’ of generation, that is the procreation-lineage nexus. Superimposing 
the genealogical grid on non-European cultures anthropologists frequently distinguished 
the physical ‘facts’ of kinship, that is generation and bloodline from the ideas projected 
upon these facts (Schneider 1984). Blood ties or ‘real’ kinship were conceived of as 
naturally entailing quasi-instinctual bonds of solidarity -  ‘the feeling of kindred’ 
(McLennan 1865 as quoted in Schneider op. cit., p. 166) or ‘natural affection’ (Maine 
1861/1917, p. 83).
Studies in European social history on the other hand suggest a very different state of 
affairs. Rather than merely representing family generations, genealogical trees in high 
status families were themselves a product of genealogical making. As Davis (1986) 
shows for France, a pater familias carefully planned the marriages of daughters and the 
careers of sons, and deployed adoption and godparentship in order to strengthen what 
Bourdieu (1996) calls the economic, symbolic and social capital of the family. Rituals 
gave intra- and intergenerational bonds permanence and legitimacy. These rituals were 
often linked to religion, which in turn built on ancient beliefs and cultural practices. This 
is illustrated in the display of pictures of ancestors on the house altar or the building of 
family vaults. Drawing on beliefs in the power of the dead the ‘Catholic economy of the 
mutual salvation of souls’ (Davis op. cit., p. 29) made parents oblige their children to
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pray for their souls and have memorial masses on the anniversary of their death.
After the 14th century, expressions of linear descent multiplied in Western Europe 
whereas collateral kinship positions lost significance. Family histories or the ‘memories’ 
of the house (libri di famiglia, livre de raison) emerged as anew literary genre (Klapisch- 
Zuber 1996; Davis op.cit.). Developed from the account books of well-off households, 
sons or male heirs (and in rare cases their wives or sisters) wrote narratives about the 
history or origin of the family. Their intention was to pass family virtues and life style, 
careers and qualities of parents and ancestors on to their descendants. Illegitimate 
children and women were rarely mentioned. In her study of genealogical trees in 14th and 
15th century Florence Klapisch-Zuber (1996) found hardly any women included at all, 
evidence of the ancient legal maxim Mulier estfinis familice” - a woman is the terminus 
of the family’ (Maine op. cit., p. 87). Whereas the nobility constructed genealogies to 
consolidate their race or sang (blood), i.e. the nobility of their origin, bonne race was 
also understood as a predisposition to virtue. Exemplifying how blood ties were 
symbolically loaded bonne race was passed on by blood and obliged descendants to lead 
a virtuous life and to marry befitting their rank (Davis 1986). This is implied in the Latin 
genus, which also had the meaning ‘good (noble) stock’ (Partridge 1966).
There is not much socio-historical evidence on how intergenerational relationships were 
maintained on a day-to-day level. Statements that the patriarchal family ‘creates the most 
natural systematically and uniformly run division of labour,... which is at the same time 
the simplest way to look after the ill, old, infirm, frail’ (Schmoller as quoted in 
Oekinghaus op. cit., p. 8) imply that this task was assigned mainly to women. This view 
is also suggested in religious writings and novels, which admonished women in particular 
to look after older family members. Responsibilities towards parents-in-law mirrored a 
relationship created through marriage in one created through ‘blood’. In her utopian novel 
The treasure o f the city o f ladies the 15th century Franco-Italian poet Christine de Pizan 
(1411/1985, p. 163) admonished younger women not only to honour and obey older 
people ‘as though they were all your mothers and fathers’ but to ‘help them 
compassionately and comfort them with the strength of your body and with your worldly 
goods in their illnesses and frailty’.
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Thus it seems as if in Western European history the construction of genealogies in terms 
of honour and nobility of origin in high status families was the domain of men, whereas 
women were responsible for enacting these virtues ‘with the strength of their bodies’.
1.4. CONCLUSION
The aim of the preceding sections was to open up some of the discursive contexts of 
contract and generation in a historical perspective, taking gender as an analytical and 
sensitising tool to uncover some of their inherent power hierarchies. I have suggested that 
the legacies and folk models underlying these concepts can be of tremendous cultural 
force if invoked in current debates, even, or particularly, when they remain 
unacknowledged. Whilst referring to very different social ‘realities’ they describe and 
construct the concepts have a multiplicity of meanings. As a mode of acting, contract 
refers to a device that structures and shapes the interaction and cooperation of 
individuals. Generation on the other hand refers to the temporal and structural location of 
individuals, as well as the mode of ‘production’ of this location. I have argued that the 
commercial exchange contract and the family lineage are dominant discursive frames for 
the repertoires of contract and generation, which carry a ‘charge symbolique et 
imaginaire’ (Attias-Donfut 1995, p. 7).
The commercial contract marks the highest stage in a series of more ‘primitive’ devices 
of cooperation. It is associated with the onset of modernity and the market economy, and 
the triumph of rationality and individual sovereignty. In its modem gestalt it has 
‘overcome’ once and for all contracts based on status, magical beliefs and liability in the 
body, as well as the exclusion of women, and now appears truly applicable ‘to all races 
and circumstances’. Strategic cooperation as the mutual transferring of rights is 
conceived as created through the force of will, expressed in words and secured by law 
(because as Hobbes (op. cit., p. 93) put it ‘nothing is more easily broken than a man’s 
word’).
Family lineages were assumed to be grounded in ‘nature’, that is heterosexual
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reproduction, but often remain excluded in modem conceptions of socio-historical 
generations because lineage and kinship are said to lose their structuring impact in the 
contemporary condition. Gender is only explicitly named as a structuring force in the 
ancient texts of reproductive biology, where the prominence of the father was established 
against the evident fact of corporeal motherhood. Cohesion is conceived of as created 
through the force of nature embodied in ties of blood, which entail enduring solidarity. 
Blood is the cultural symbol par excellence for the stuff of intergenerational lineages. At 
the same time an innate tension between younger and older generations is seen to 
potentially threaten cohesion.
Historically the practices and positionalities referred to in contract and generation have 
always been at the intersection of moral, legal and political discourse, and formed and 
transformed by social institutions, including the family. Saliently their legacies have 
included legal codification. For the analysis that is to follow, which is concerned with the 
ways in which contract and generation are combined and what this combination 
constructs and describes, it is important to be sensitised to both the dominant frames of 
those concepts and their constitutive exclusions. I will take the repertoire of contract as 
one that entails freedom, self-regarding rationality, reciprocity and trust. By implication 
cooperative practices based on emotions, habit and values as well as constraints, prior 
obligations and liability in the body are excluded. The repertoire of generation entails 
bilateral descent and unbreakable blood ties, but also an innate tension between young 
and old. It excludes the power of fathers and men to define generational boundaries, as 
well as the work necessarily to maintain intergenerational cohesion and the fact that 
blood ties have been subject to freely willed acts, self-interested strategies and coercion.
These repertoires will be heuristically applied to explore more precisely what is said and 
not said when those terms are deployed. Thus I will ask where, in what appears to be 
non-ethical, rational and mutually advantageous contracts, elements of symbolism, 
morality, ethics and coercion are implied. Conversely, I will ask whether so-called status 
contracts can be found in contemporary societies and look at elements of coercion and 
self-interest. Franz Schultheis (op. cit.), for example, has suggested that status contracts 
are a mode of intergenerational relationships in so far as these relations are unalterable
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and irreversible. Through being bom into specific generational relations persons have a 
social identity assigned, embodied in the family name, and ‘become something different 
in quality’, even if one would have to qualify that persons become something 
qualitatively in the first place and do not enter these relationships voluntarily. The ways 
in which contract and generation are supposed to relate to one another is the subject of 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 2
JUSTIFICATIONS OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOCIAL CONTRACT
THEORIES
2.1. INTRODUCTION
While the previous chapter explored some of the gendered legacies and repertoires of 
contract and generation in a historical perspective the following chapter is concerned with 
how those social constructs are related to one another in social contract theories. I 
investigate those theories because, first, their texts still inform contemporary western 
political thinking about the boundaries and the nature of the public and private in the late 
20th century. Social contract theories developed the idea that political institutions 
including marriage and to some extent parent-child relations are based on convention, 
that is, on contract, consent and agreement. As Hirschmann and Di Stefano (1996, p. 18) 
have argued they created ‘new pictures and visions of politics and the state that captured 
the imagination of many and play a vital role in the structuring of social relations.’ Social 
contract theories inform the metaphor of the generational contract both qualitatively 
(insofar as they specify the justifications of inter-lineage commitments) and logically 
through the rationale of the social contract itself. Billig and colleagues (1988) have 
suggested that notions of liberal philosophy, such as individual freedom and equality 
have become transformed into everyday thinking. As such they can provide repertoires 
for the description and interpretation of intergenerational commitments by contemporary 
social actors that, following the analysis of the conflicting themes of liberal philosophy 
by Billig and colleagues, are likely to present dilemmas rather than systemized schemata.
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I will explore the impacts of these repertoires empirically in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
Second, while the notion of the generational contract draws in some ways on the concept 
of the social contract, built as it is on elements of individual sovereignty and mutually 
advantageous agreements explored in the previous chapter, the place of the social 
contract in the multi-faceted repertoire of contract has not yet been determined. It is the 
nature of this association between the generational and the social contract that is at issue 
in this chapter and provides the background to explore generational politics in the history 
of the German welfare state (Chapter 3).
After briefly recapitulating the logic of the social contract argument I will focus on the 
different themes and modes of justification of intergenerational relations in both classical 
and neo-contractarian theories. These theories draw on different repertoires of generation. 
Whereas the classical social contract theorists focus solely on intergenerational 
relationships within family lineages, neo-contractarians are concerned with issues of 
justice between socio-historical generations or cohorts, including the relation between 
non-contemporary generations and allude to some of the problems in the logic of the 
generational contract.
In the first part I will focus on the ways in which the prominent classical theorists 
Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant have described and legitimised intergenerational cohesion within family 
lineages. Are intergenerational commitments based on natural solidarity, as some modem 
anthropologists and family sociologists would have it? In this case the generational 
contract would be merely a contractual analogy: individuals in families are bound 
together by natural solidarity as individuals in the market sphere are by legally 
enforceable contracts. Or are they based on status contracts, i.e. on status obligations 
derived from social norms, as Weber (1922/1978) seemed to suggest? Or are 
intergenerational relationships based on explicit contractual agreements, and become 
norm creating as the repertoire of contract implies? And what are the gender relations 
implied? Judith Butler (1997) has asserted that theories always posit foundations, that is 
premises that function as legitimising grounds but are themselves constituted through
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exclusion. Foundations are contingent and contestable presumptions and according to 
Butler (op. cit., p. 63) ‘the task is to interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes 
foundation authorizes, and what precisely it excludes and forecloses.’
The analysis in this chapter of classical contract theories is inspired by the work of the 
political theorist Carole Pateman (1988). In her analysis of the status of gender in 
classical social contract theories Pateman has argued that although these theories were 
considered to be the emancipatory doctrine par excellence insofar as they superseded 
dominion based on ascriptive characteristics such as descent and birth, they were based 
on the ‘sexual contract’. Whilst securing citizenship rights for men, the social contract, 
through which civil society comes into existence, presupposes and constructs the physical 
and political subjection of women through the establishment of men’s political right over 
women and their sex-right to access women’s bodies. Pateman argues that women have a 
contradictory role in social contract theories: on the one hand they have to be excluded 
from the original agreement on the basis of their inferiority. On the other hand, although 
they lack the status of civil individuals women must enter the marriage contract as equals 
if the universal freedom of civil society is to be maintained. The ruse of the social 
contract is thus to appear as a guarantee and example of freedom and choice whilst 
constituting modes of domination and subordination.
Nancy Fraser (1997) has criticised Pateman’s approach on the grounds that it remains 
restricted to individual ‘master subject dyads’ and seems to assume that women are 
subjected to the direct command of an individual man. Furthermore she argues that 
Pateman does not offer an explanation for the propensity of male sex-right. Following 
Makus (1996) in this point I suggest that a focus on intergenerational relations and gender 
will shed new light not only on conjugal relationships but also on the interests of the state 
in justifying and codifying the father-child bond.
In the second part of the chapter I will explore conceptions of intergenerational 
responsibilities over time in neo-contractarian theories, taking as examples the neo- 
contractarian theorist John Rawls’s conception of intergenerational justice and the 
distinction of the social scientist Peter Laslett between the intragenerational cohort trust 
and the intergenerational tricontract. It has been argued that a new generational contract
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has to be extended vertically in time in order to draw attention to the interdependency of 
generations removed in time and more specifically to the consequences of our own 
actions for future generations (Busek 1997). In what ways do contemporary theorists 
build on the modes of justification of classical contract theorists? What is the role of 
lineage cohesion for the justice of generations in society at large?
Although the rights of future persons have been implicit in classical contract theories as, 
for example, in Locke’s discussion of inheritance or Kant’s contention that individuals 
'must leave [the land] to the descendants as a treasured pledge’ (Kant 1792/1997, p. 74), 
the problem of intergenerational justice over time was not conceptualised before the 
1970s (Laslett and Fishkin 1992). It concerns questions such as environmental protection 
and moral responsibility for previous injustices and poses the problem that contracts 
between non-contemporaries cannot logically be conceptualised as mutually 
advantageous. Contemporary generations can influence the lives of generations to come 
while future generations can do nothing to influence their predecessors.
2.2. THE LOGIC OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ARGUMENT
The heuristic idea of the social contract is to transfer the contractual justification of rights 
and duties illustrated in the commercial contract (Chapter 1) to the whole of society. In a 
‘thought experiment’ (Kersting 1996, p. 33) socio-political arrangements and principles 
are interpreted as if they were grounded in the consent of all members of society. If 
people were freely and voluntarily to agree upon a given order this would be binding: 
Volenti non fit inuiria (the voluntarily agreed upon does not lead to injustice). It also 
would be a superior arrangement as individuals would not merely obey external laws but 
actively will the laws of their own conduct. Social contract theories thereby do not seek 
to establish the actual historical antecedents of the state but rather its ‘logical 
presuppositions’ (Gough 1957, p. 4) or, in the case of neo-contractarians like Rawls, the 
grounding of principles of distributive justice.
Although it has elements that can be traced back to antiquity, social contract theory as a 
theory of (state) legitimisation, grounded in a post-traditional consensual basis, is
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commonly thought to have its origins in the 17th century.4 Generally speaking the logic of 
the contractual argument can be described as follows: a principle of social life is justified 
if it can be shown to be a result of a contract to which the persons affected would agree 
under well defined and generally accepted conditions. In order to justify their claims 
contractarian theorists construct a plausible initial state in which individuals are 
motivated to agree to a contract, and specify the conditions under which they can come to 
a fair agreement and the principles that would be rationally acceptable under these 
conditions. The argument thus encompasses apre-contractual state (‘state of nature’), the 
process of reaching an agreement on a contract (for example, negotiation behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’), and the result of the agreement, a post-contractual state (‘civil society’). I 
take these in turn.
By describing the situation that leads to contractual agreement ‘[t]he state of nature 
formulates the question for which the contract theory is the answer’, namely, what 
principles can be adopted that would improve upon conditions prevailing without any 
principles (Kersting op. cit., p. 57). It defines the problem of coexistence, for example, a 
distribution of goods and/or modes of cooperation, so setting out a philosophical 
anthropology. Second, the contractual agreement specifies the parties to the contract, the 
structure of the negotiation of the contract and the content of the negotiations, while 
replacing subject and temporal variables of an actual contract with the universal constants 
of a hypothetical contract. The contractual agreement has to include a specification of 
judgements of validity of the contract, for only if a contract is valid can it be normative. 
The post-contractual state, finally, lays out the contractual result, the aim of the 
philosophical proof, the practical rationality of contract and the political order based on 
the agreed upon principles. (Kersting op. cit.; Koller 1986) For example, for Hobbes this 
was an absolute monarchy, for Locke, a constitutional government and for Rawls it is a 
liberal democracy.
An explanation of why we should find a hypothetical contract binding is sometimes made
4 For example, Glaucon, in Plato’s Republic, considered laws to be a pact made by the weak in defence 
against the strong.
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by appeal to a tacit or implicit contract.5 The idea of tacit contract assumes actual 
consensus, expressed and renewed not with words but with ‘behaviour that conclusively 
establishes consent’ (Kersting op. cit., p. 36), such as recognising state law and refraining 
from emigration. To be a valid model of legitimisation, however, the interpretation of 
silence as consent has to reasonably presuppose that alternatives and choices were 
available (Ballestrem 1986; Okin 1995). Otherwise, tacit consent would not be ‘worth the 
paper it’s not written on’ (Nozick 1974, p. 287).
2.3. INTERGENERATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN CLASSICAL SOCIAL
CONTRACT THEORIES
Tacit intergenerational contracts as the expression of self-interest
The founder of modem political philosophy Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) grounded the 
establishment of an absolute monarch {Leviathan) on the contractual consensus ‘of every 
man with every man’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 120). Hobbes conceived the state of nature 
as one where ‘each man is enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands’ 
(1642/1983, p. 122). People are thus under permanent threat of war and there is no 
sovereign authority that ensures that promises and contracts made are kept. According to 
Hobbes, men and women are potentially equal in the state of nature as ‘there is not 
alwayes that difference of strength, or pmdence between the man and the woman’ 
(Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 139). In contrast to dominant views of the father as genitor 
(Chapter 1) they have equal part in procreation. Hobbes conceived intergenerational 
relationships in terms of ‘Dominion’ (ibid.) that is political power.
In the state of nature, Hobbes wrote, parents are both capable and required to make a 
contract about who obtains dominion over the child, an assumption that seems to 
contradict the notion that contracts in that state are always at risk of being breached. In 
the absence of an explicit agreement the mother obtains dominion over the child because 
without marital contracts that only come into existence in civil society, ‘it cannot be
5 Interestingly enough, this can be traced back to Plato. In Criton Socrates refuses to escape from prison 
shortly before his execution, arguing that an escape would be a breach of his convenant with the state 
according to which he had agreed to be a citizen of Athens and honour its laws. Having not used his right 
to emigrate thus far he was bound by the laws even if they did not work in his favour (Ballestrem 1986).
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known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 
140). Having the first and unmediated access to her child it is then £at her own wil, [to] 
either breed [the child] up, or adventure him to fortune’ (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 122). 
Interestingly Hobbes did not presuppose any maternal instinct of the mother to nourish 
her child nor do status relations come into play. On the contrary her decision to bring up 
her child is entirely motivated by self-interest insofar as the child will be obliged to obey 
her because it ‘oweth its life to the Mother’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 140). As he put it in 
De Cive ‘If therefore she breeds him ... she is supposed to bring him up on this 
condition, that being grown a full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey 
her’ (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 122). Thus his dictum that ‘in the state of nature, every 
woman that bears children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord’ (ibid.). Again it is not 
entirely clear why children in this state would honour this covenant of obedience and 
loyalty in exchange for their upbringing.
Although generational dominion, according to Hobbes, is one mode by which civil 
society is constituted he holds that women conventionally lose their maternal and 
political power ‘because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the 
Fathers, not by the Mothers of families’ (Hobbes 1651/1997,p. 140). But if women were 
not necessarily of lesser strength, how could they be excluded from the contractual 
agreement that brings civil society into being and agree to enter into conjugal contracts in 
which ‘the domesticall command belongs to the man’ (Hobbes 1642/1983, p. 124)? 
Hobbes remained surprisingly vague on the point why in civil society ‘a woman for 
societie sake gives herself to a man on this condition; that he shall bear the sway’ (ibid., 
p. 123, emphasis added). One of the ‘justifications’ seems to be the need of a supreme 
undivided authority in the family, because, and here he evokes the authority of Jesus 
(Mat. 6: 24) ‘no man can obey two Masters’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 139). As in the state 
of nature paternal dominion is based neither on sentiment nor status but on an implicit 
contract of an exchange of obedience for upbringing between father and child based on 
‘the Child’s Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared’ (Hobbes 
1651/1997, p. 137).
To fill in the gap in the logic of Hobbes’s argument, one could additionally assume, as
58
Carole Pateman (1988) has suggested, that women in the state of nature were weakened 
in their self-defence by their responsibility for their offspring. This assumption however 
is difficult to reconcile with Hobbes’s notion of maternal lordship. Moreover, it would 
contradict the claim of an original self-interest for nobody would care for subsequent 
generations if this were to compromise his or her own advancement. Ingrid Makus (1996) 
on the other hand has re-emphasized Hobbes’s claim that the shift in parental authority is 
a product of mere convention. According to Makus, the fact that women were explicitly 
characterised as self-interested contradicts the idea that they were seen as unfit for civil 
society. Yet, Makus’s defence of Hobbes does not explain foundations of this convention.
It seems to me that the logic of women’s subjection in civil society, exemplified by their 
loss of maternal authority and conjugal submission, can be only upheld by assuming a 
fundamental inequality between the genders. Hobbes’s discussion of inheritance suggests 
that he is ambivalent about gender equality. While he on the one hand had refuted gender 
inequality on the other hand he depicted it as grounded in nature. Taking the example of 
the monarch, inheritance according to Hobbes is first the domain proper of a man’s will. 
Thus he is free to bequeath his property and succession to whomever he wants. If there is 
no will inheritance is subject to custom, even ‘if the Custome were to advance the 
Female’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 137). Where there is neither a will nor a custom Hobbes 
who had legitimised intergenerational commitments soley on the basis of self-interest 
referred to what he calls ‘the presumption of naturall affection’ (ibid.), embodied in the 
blood ties explored in the previous chapter. Namely
it is to be understood ... that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred 
before any other; because men are presumed to be more inclined by nature, to 
advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, 
rather a Male than a Female; because men are naturally fitter than women, for 
actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a 
Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more 
remote; because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in 
affection; and ‘tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most 
honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.
(Hobbes 1651/1997, ibid.)
To summarise Hobbes’s position on intergenerational relationship I want to emphasise 
first his insistence that generational dominion is political power, which suggests that
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family and state were not yet seen as fundamentally different spheres. Second Hobbes’s 
assumption of individual rationality and self-interest does not allow for any notion of care 
or interpersonal connection beyond pure self-interest in families and politics. There is no 
conception in Hobbes tbat for either mother or father there arise any duties from 
procreation itself. Neither is the tacit contract of an exchange of obedience for upbringing 
grounded on freedom: parents have the choice to bring up children or not but children do 
not have the choice not to pay obedience to those who raised them. Yet filial duty does 
not entail anything beyond obedience and loyalty (for example, the duty to materially 
support older parents). I propose that Hobbes’ s notion of paternal dominion as political 
power serves to secure both political continuity and the commitment of fathers in their 
families while the day-to-day necessity of looking after older and younger family 
members is tacitly assumed to be done by women.
Tacit intergenerational contracts as the expression of Natural Law
Next I want to contrast Hobbes’s conception of an implicit contract between father and 
child with the conception of such a contract in the work of the influential German Natural 
Law theorist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694). Pufendorf held that universal moral 
dictates are authored and commanded by the will of God, and not derived as Hobbes had 
argued through the social contract. Yet ‘the law of nature alone is not directly sufficient 
to preserve the social life of man, but it is necessary that in particular societies different 
kinds of authority also be established’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 273). The ‘imperfect’, 
i.e. only morally binding obligations of Natural Law, have to be turned into ‘perfect’, i.e. 
also legally binding obligations, by contractual consent. Thus Pufendorf, even though a 
Natural Law theorist, employed contract arguments to provide the motivation necessary 
for individuals to adhere to Natural Law.
The first example and foundation for the cultivation of social life is matrimony, ‘the 
nursery of the human race’, which is given by the law of nature. By assuming a 
seemingly natural inferiority of women, Pufendorf can make the entry of women in the 
hierarchical and ‘unequal’ conjugal contract more plausible.
Since the position of the husband is better inasmuch as he enjoys the superiority
of his sex, that pact partakes of the nature of an unequal league, in which the
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husband and wife each owe the other something, the former protection, the latter 
obedience.
(Pufendorf 1660/1927, p. 860, emphasis added)
Yet Pufendorf insisted that a woman, ‘inasmuch as she is his equal’ (Pufendorf 
1672/1931, p. 275) needs to consent to follow her husband’s will, promise fidelity, fulfil 
her ‘connubial duty’ and do her share for her husband when she devotes her energies to 
‘bringing forth and rearing children’. Pufendorf seems to be more explicit than Hobbes 
that the function of the conjugal contract from the point of view of the husband is to 
assure his corporeal fatherhood. At the same time sex is put in the service of 
reproduction, which thus requires and limits a man's sexual access to his wife. As 
Pufendorf (ibid.) put it, the conjugal pact grants the husband the ‘right to his wife’s body 
only in so far as is sufficient to enable him to be certain with a degree of probability that 
his wife’s offspring have been procreated by him’.
Whereas marriage is grounded on an explicit contract between adults, intergenerational 
relations, even though they are likewise predetermined by Natural Law, have to be turned 
into a perfect obligation by a ‘tacit pact’ (Pufendorf 1660/1927, p. 914) because they 
concern minors. But whereas in Hobbes’s account natural affection is qualified as a 
‘presumption’ and does not come into effect in the upbringing of children at all, 
Pufendorf argued that natural affection underlies the pact between father and child but 
has to be transformed into freely willed behaviour. Moreover, just as in the commercial 
contract, according to Pufendorf rights and duties arise for both parents and children ‘in 
an agreement reasonably presumed’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 281).
Aside from the fact that nature herself has enjoined upon the parents the care of 
the children, it has enjoined upon the children reverence towards parents, for the 
reason, that, in taking up the infant, the parent, indeed, declares that he will fulfil 
the obligation laid upon him by nature, and will bring it up well, as far as in him 
lies. Here, although the infant, because it does not know the use of reason, cannot 
expressly promise the reciprocal offices enjoined by nature; none the less, by the 
nature of the transaction, obligation towards the parent contracted in its own 
person, no less than if it had been contracted by an express agreement, manifests 
itself as soon as it can understand what the parent has done towards it.
(Pufendorf ibid., emphasis added)
Pufendorf followed Hobbes in holding that civil society is solely established by men, 
arguing (as Hobbes did not) that ‘as men are in due order the heads of the family, so
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private authority over the children rests with the fathers’ (Pufendorf 1672/1931, p. 282). 
Even though he used the same contractual vocabulary of an implicit intergenerational 
pact, the focus has shifted from self-interested dominion to the justification of paternal 
authority and care. Like Hobbes Pufendorf runs into the problem that children cannot 
consciously enter into mutually advantageous contracts. Instead obligation is supposed to 
be contracted ‘in the body’ of the child before it can be confirmed by the act of will. 
Pufendorf posited reciprocity of rights and duties, yet by anchoring them in Natural Law 
parents do not have the freedom not to ‘take up’ their child, and consequently a child 
does not have the freedom not to pay reverence to her parents. Furthermore although 
Pufendorf names both parents as being responsible for childcare, reverence and obedience 
only falls onto the father who alone is able to exercise paternal authority.
Rights and duties in the three-generational contract
Pufendorf s English contemporary John Locke (1632-1704) likewise conceived of 
intergenerational relations in terms of rights and duties, which are anchored in Natural 
Law embodying the will of God. Locke extended the complementary relation of rights 
and duties temporally over three subsequent generations in a family lineage and 
qualitatively included the children’s duty to materially support their parents if they are in 
need. Although he used a contractual vocabulary Locke refuted the assumption of an 
implicit contract between parents and child, which he argued serves to justify lifelong 
paternal dominion. For Locke the purpose of civil society is to secure individual property 
by law and intergenerational rights and duties are linked to the universal and natural laws 
of passing on property down the generational line.
The first and strongest desire God Planted in Men, and wrought into the very 
Principles of their Nature being that of Self-preservation.... But next to this, God 
Planted in Men a strong desire also of propagating their Kind, and continuing 
themselves in their Posterity, and this gives Children a Title, to share in the 
Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions.
(Locke 1698/1988, p. 224-25)
In Locke’s account the duty to ‘preserve’ one’s children is not innately grasped but is 
rather a duty embedded in law that has to be recognised and understood so that parents 
can act upon it. As in Pufendorf s scheme rights and duties of parental care and filial 
reverence complement each other in the absence of the assumption of a freedom of
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choice. Given their initial dependency children ‘have by the appointment of God himself 
... a Right to be nourish’d and maintained by their Parents’ (Locke ibid.). According to 
Locke the right of care and education then is a privilege of children and an indispensable 
duty of parents. Reverence and gratitude, equal to what ‘the Father’s care, cost and 
kindness in [their] Education has been more or less’ (Locke op. cit., p. 330) is the 
indispensable reciprocal duty of children and the privilege of parents. The term 
‘privilege’ refers to the fact that these rights of care and reverence are not enforceable by 
law.
Paternal power to ‘govern the Minority of their children’ (Locke op. cit., p. 327) as long 
as the child does not ‘have any Will of his own to follow’ (Locke op. cit., p. 324) on the 
other hand is such a right. According to Locke it is derived from the parental duty of care, 
‘in which the Mother too has her share with the Father’ (Locke op. cit., p. 328). But this 
authority is temporal and does not include the ‘Dominion over the Property or Actions of 
his Son’ (Locke op. cit., p. 334) past his minority including the right to vote for a 
particular commonwealth. Hence Locke’s account marks the shift from the absolute 
power of the paterfamilias over his dependants to modem guardianship as his protection 
of minors (Chapter 1). For Locke paternal guardianship ends when the child reaches 
maturity; henceforth father and child are equally free. Locke (op. cit., p. 332) held that 
‘these two Powers, Political and Paternalare so perfectly distinct and separate’ because 
only political power is based on contractual consent. Whether the mother can be a 
guardian of her children, Locke argued, is subject to civil law.
The end of paternal guardianship and provisions does not, however, end filial debt. 
Because the parental duty to provide care and education to their own children is 
indispensable and property has to be passed on down the generational line, fathers cannot 
usually inherit the property of their sons. Thus indirectly the ‘Score of Education received 
from a Man’s Father, is paid by taking care, and providing for his own Children... unless 
present necessity of the Parents require a return of Goods for their necessary Support and 
Subsistence’ (Locke op. cit., p. 225-26). From the fact that (only) when a child does not 
have any children of his own a father legitimately inherits his property Locke argues that 
it follows that children too have to directly provide for their parents in specific instances.
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Material support of older parents is a specific incidence of their ‘perpetual Obligation of 
honouring their Parents' (Locke op. cit. 329), if parents are in need and this duty can be 
reconciled with their primary duty to support their own children, which is ‘made by 
Nature preferable’ (ibid.).
Like Hobbes, Locke did not categorically rule out women’s owning property, providing 
education and obtaining parental power. But although he insisted that women have equal 
part in procreation and require equal honour and support from their children as is laid 
down in the Scriptures, he presents parental care as paternal care, and filial duty as an 
obligation of sons towards their fathers. His account of the conjugal contract in which it 
is ‘necessary that the last Determination, i.e. the Rule ... naturally falls to the Man’s 
share, as the abler and the stronger’ (Locke op. cit., p. 337, emphasis added), suggest that 
in cases of dispute, paternal authority is decisive. Even though mothers are explicitly 
included in the duty to provide care, women are less fit to obtain maternal authority in 
their own right.
In Locke’s account intergenerational relations are thus explicitly relegated to the private 
realm, which is distinct from political society. Yet, as Makus (1996) has suggested these 
relations have a political relevance in so far as the property-lineage nexus is likely to 
ensure political continuity. Children of property owning parents can be assumed to have a 
vested interest in opting for the continuity of a society that guarantees them their parents’ 
inheritance. These relations are supposed to be based on Natural Law, acted upon by 
reason and rational deliberation and they are constituted as being reciprocal over time in a 
three-generation model. Thus while the family is (still) not one governed by sentiment 
and altruistic fulfilment of need, it has incorporated the contractual idea of equal 
exchange, of a quid pro quo. In this way the idea of self-interest is re-introduced into a 
moral scheme (in the pervasive guise of a Natural Law) without supposing -  as the 
commercial contract would -  a free negotiation of equal partners that brings legally 
enforceable rights into existence. In so far as Locke held that the relationship between 
parents and children is derived from conjugal relations in which authority is assigned to 
the husband on the basis of status and ability, women's parental ‘privileges’ remain 
subject to their husband’s authority.
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Of habit and nature
The writings of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), sometimes 
considered as the last proponent of classical social contract theory, mark a somewhat 
ambivalent turning away from the Natural Law tradition. Rousseau was sceptical about 
the attempts of (contract) theorists to conceptualise Natural Law and their assumption 
that people in the state of nature were able to understand and act upon such a law. 
Whereas the recourse to Natural Law meant for Pufendorf and Locke that 
intergenerational relations were the same in the state of nature as in civil society, 
Rousseau considered a fundamental difference between intergenerational relations in the 
state of nature and in civil society.
In his account individuals in the state of nature are ‘equal strangerfs] to war and to all 
ties’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 79). Social and sexual bonds are not lasting and devoid of 
domination and sentiment. In terms of intergenerational commitments mothers take on 
responsibility for their children, evidence of their natural amour-propre, an enjoyment in 
breastfeeding them and their compassion once ‘habit had made them dear’ (Rousseau op. 
cit., p. 65) to them. Yet as soon as the children are old enough to provide for themselves 
they leave their mothers and would not recognise them if they meet again. With the 
development of sedentariness and property, Rousseau held, the family emerged as the 
‘most ancient’ and the only ‘natural society’ (Rousseau 1761/1997c, p. 182), united by 
‘liberty and reciprocal attachments’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 88).
The sexes, whose manner of life had been hitherto the same, began now to adopt 
different ways of living. The women became more sedentary, and accustomed 
themselves to mind the hut and their children, while the men went abroad in 
search of their common subsistence.
(Rousseau ibid.)
Similar to the gap I highlighted in Hobbes’s argument between the dominion of mothers 
in the state of nature and their subjection in civil society, Rousseau failed to explain why 
the family gave rise to feelings of ‘conjugal love and paternal affection’ as well as a 
gendered division of labour. However, once the existence of the family and gender 
difference is thus posited in the later stages of the state of nature, the logical foundation is
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laid for the establishment of civil society as an expression of the general will of all men. 
Against Locke and Pufendorf Rousseau held that conjugal and paternal authority only 
come into being and can only exist in civil society. ‘Instead of saying that civil society is 
derived from paternal authority, we ought to say rather that the latter derives its principal 
force from the former’ (Rousseau op. cit., p. 103). Yet as demonstrated by his 
naturalising account of gender difference this insight is not taken to suggest that civil 
society has produced conjugal and paternal authority as inherently unequal relations.
Paternal authority is justified first by the necessity o f‘one preponderant voice to decide’ 
(ibid.) over family affairs and the ‘natural’ incapability of women to do so. Although the 
duty to nurture children naturally falls to the mother, ‘however lightly we may regard the 
disadvantages peculiar to women, yet, as they necessarily occasion intervals of inaction, 
this is sufficient reason for excluding them from this supreme authority’ (ibid.). More 
explicitly than any of the other classical contract theorists before him Rousseau 
elaborated sexual difference in terms of complementary gender characters that he sees as 
grounded in nature. Sexual difference is not presented as hierarchical but as a 
complementary distribution of faculties in men and women, which ‘is the work not of 
prejudice but of reason’ (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 361). According to Rousseau the
first assignable difference in the moral relation of the two sexes [is that] one 
ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak... Once this principle is 
established, it follows that woman is made specially to please man ... and to be 
subjugated.
(Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 358)
At the same time Rousseau argued that the stronger sex depends on the weaker and to 
fulfil his desire a man must please a woman so that ‘she will consent to let him be the 
stronger’ (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 360). As Sarah Kofinan (1992, p. 50) comments ‘an 
elaborate feminine strategy is required to actualize his potentiality’ and to re-introduce 
the notion of voluntary consent in women’s subjugation that is realised in the conjugal 
pact. Marriage ensures fatherhood as well as paternal commitment that I interpret as a 
primary requirement of society, not merely of individuals. According to Rousseau, 
authority is assigned to the husband who is thus ‘able to superintend his wife’s conduct 
... to be assured that the children, whom he is obliged to acknowledge and maintain, 
belong to no one but himself (Rousseau 1758/1997b, p, 129). Paternal and conjugal
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authority is thus not merely justified by women’s lesser capability but by the necessity of 
men to ensure and enact their corporeal fatherhood. Indeed the order of civil society 
depends chiefly on the faithfulness of women, as for Rousseau the unfaithful woman
dissolves the family and breaks down all the bonds of nature. In giving the man 
children who are not his, she betrays both. She joins perfidy to infidelity. I have 
difficulty seeing what disorders and what crimes do not flow from this one.
(Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 361)
In civil society intergenerational relations are conceived of as a complementary reciprocal 
giving of parental care and guardianship and filial gratitude, albeit in a gender specific 
way. As in other classical accounts the grammatical gender suggests that the child is 
always taken to be a male child. Rousseau exemplified filial gratitude as the son’s duty to 
love his mother and to materially support his father. Yet, because it is not based on 
contract gratitude is merely a moral duty ‘which ought to be paid, but not a right to be 
exacted’ (Rousseau 1755/1997a, p. 103). Parental responsibilities are strictly divided 
between maternal care and paternal authority. With recourse to Locke, yet contrary to 
Locke’s insistence that paternal guardianship is subject to civil law, Rousseau held that 
‘by the law of nature, the father is the child’s master’ (ibid.) and that the duties of his 
temporally limited guardianship ‘are dictated to him by natural feelings’ (1758/1997b, p. 
129). The mother, according to Rousseau, physically nurtures, cares and educates the 
child and also has to foster ‘his’ love and respect from an early age: ‘The child ought to 
love his mother before knowing that he ought to. If the voice o f blood is not strengthened 
by habit and care, it is extinguished in the first years’ (Rousseau 1762/1979, p. 46-7, 
emphasis added). Even though gratitude is merely a moral duty, if a child does not 
reciprocate kindness and respect Rousseau exclaimed that ‘one should hasten to strangle 
this wretch as a monster unworthy of seeing the light of day’ (Rousseau 1979, p. 38).
From a contemporary point of view it is not difficult to identify Rousseau’s recourse to 
nature as a way of justifying gender difference as inequality that results in women’s 
confinement in the private sphere and their exclusion from the social contract. As 
Kofinan (op. cit., p. 53) has argued ‘under the pretext of giving back Nature her 
suppressed voice and of defending Nature’s end, what is really being advocated, as 
always, are the phallocratic ends of men’. At the same time I have argued that Rousseau
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was aware that ‘natural’ family feelings and duties have to be ‘institutionalised’ in 
individuals. Thus women have to be educated to care for men, husbands have to 
‘superintend’ their wives’ conduct and children have to be taught to love their mothers. 
Gendered intergenerational relationships and fatherhood in particular have to be 
established for the orderliness of a gender-segregated civil society. Kofinan has pointed 
to the fact that Rousseau himself has acknowledged the structuring force of institutions in 
some of his supposedly minor texts. ‘Let us give women their due: the cause of their 
disorder is less in themselves than in our faulty institutions’ (Rousseau, Entertien sur les 
romans as quoted in Kofinan op. cit., p. 47).
Perfect and imperfect duties
In his moral and political theory the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
put the status of intergenerational relationships on a fundamentally new legitimating 
basis. Rights and duties are based neither on Natural Law nor on God’s will, nor on 
individual self-interest but derived from the self-legislative power of practical reason. 
Arguing that human reason can only assign validity to rules and norms that stem from its 
own lawgiving, Kant sought to establish a priori principles and ideas of reason.
For Kant, the ‘categorical imperative’ is the metaphysical principle of morality. It is a 
generalising principle and formal rule of procedure that puts the individual in the role of a 
lawgiver. In one of its formulations, the categorical imperative reads: ‘Act only on a 
maxim by which you can will that it, at the same time, should become a general law.’ 
Freedom, that is, the autonomy of the individual, is considered both to justify and be 
justified by the categorical imperative. This idea is extended in the social contract, a 
rational principle that seeks to establish the rightfulness of public laws. The social 
contract, Kant wrote
is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical 
reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they 
could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation, and to regard 
each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within 
the general will. This is the test of the rightfulness of every public law.
(Kant 1792/1997, p. 79)
According to Kant laws first make an action a duty and, second, can make duty the
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incentive for the action. In the Metaphysics o f Morals he distinguished two kinds of 
lawgiving, ethical and juridical lawgiving. Ethical lawgiving ‘makes an action a duty and 
also makes this duty the incentive’ whereas juridical lawgiving likewise makes an action 
a duty but ‘admits incentives other than the idea of duty itself (Kant 1797/1996, p. 20). 
Kant drew the conclusion that juridical lawgiving creates only ‘external duties’, which he 
calls ‘duties of right’. Ethical lawgiving encompasses also ‘internal duties’, or ‘duties of 
virtue’ (Kant op. cit., p. 21). To keep apromise made in a contract, for example, is a duty 
of right, enforceable by law. Keeping promises where no coercion can be applied is a 
duty of virtue. Kant distinguished thus the political ‘doctrine of rights’, i.e. perfect duties 
which are regulated by law and evidence of the principle of outer freedom from the 
‘doctrine of virtues’, i.e. imperfect duties which are regulated merely by self-constraint 
and evidence of the principle of inner freedom. Individuals prove their freedom when 
they freely adopt the duties imposed on them by their own rationality.
Intergenerational relations in the Kantian scheme are regulated both by duties of virtue 
and duties of right, and they include innate rights and acquired rights. In the state of 
nature every willing subject is free to ‘follow(s) its own judgement’ and insofar as there 
is no supreme authority to judge the merits of the case when rights are in dispute this 
condition is ‘devoid of justice’ (Kant op. cit., p. 90). The conception of rights regulating 
the ‘relations of persons in the domestic condition’ (Kant op. cit., p. 61) he argues is a 
product of the social contract, that is they are derived from ‘the particular wills of each’ 
active property-holding male citizen. Women and dependent men remain principally 
excluded from the right to vote in the original contract on the grounds that active 
citizenship requires self-dependence. Despite his unprecedented emphasis on the freedom 
of the will Kant discussed conjugal and parental rights in civil society under the rubric of 
the acquisition o f another person ’s status which is more reminiscent to the repertoire of 
the status contract (Chapter 1) than commercial exchange. ‘A man acquires a wife, a 
couple acquires children’ (Kant ibid.), that is he or they acquire the right to make 
arrangements for them.6 In Kant’s conception these acts are ‘rights to persons akin to 
rights to things’ in that they allow and necessitate the possession of a person as a thing
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and his or her use as a person.
Similarly to Locke Kant maintained that children, who as persons are endowed with 
freedom, have ‘by the law of humanity’ an innate right to the care of their parents until 
they are able to look after themselves. According to Kant this right is not acquired by a 
(quasi)-contractual relation because the child is brought in the world without her consent 
on the initiative of her parents. For this deed ‘the parents incur an obligation to make the 
child content with his condition so far as they can’ (Kant op. cit., p. 64). At the same time 
this obligation limits parental freedom to destroy or abandon their child. Thus people 
have the choice to have sexual relations for which Kant argued they must enter 
indissoluble matrimony where the (sexual) acquisition of the partner as a thing is 
counteracted and restored in the mutuality of the act and life-long commitment. But from 
the standpoint of practical reason they do not have a choice not to bring up their children.
The parental duty ‘to manage and develop the child’ (Kant op. cit., p. 65) includes the 
duty to provide education. It includes the same right to a person akin to a right in the 
thing in respect to a child as spouses have to one another, namely a right of ‘taking 
control of them and impounding them as things’ (ibid.). With the emancipation of the 
child, however, the father not only renounces his right of guardianship but also any claim 
for compensation of his efforts. Again we can assume that Kant talks about the male 
child. The tutelage of wives ‘based only on the natural superiority of the husband’ (Kant 
op. cit., p. 63) on the other hand does not contradict the alleged mutuality in conjugal 
rights and is indissoluble.
Whereas parental rights are conceived as duties of rights, derived from the will of all 
men, the filial duty of gratitude is a duty of virtue. For Kant, the fulfilment of imperfect 
duties of virtues is merit and their transgression not culpability but deficiency in moral 
worth. The duty of gratitude consists in the duty to honour the benefactor and can include 
‘active’ and ‘affective’ gratitude (Kant op. cit., p. 203). Gratitude is always temporally 
unlimited because the child can never redeem the debt of being raised and educated as
6 The term acquisition is derived from Roman contract law and this discursive frame has been criticised as 
a ‘fusion of Roman dominion, absolute property, with modem subjective rights’ in a usurpatory notion of
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moral superiority according to Kant always remains with the first benefactor, the parent. 
Furthermore, filial duty cannot include the duty to love as love ‘is a matter offeeling, not 
of willing ... so a duty to love is an absurdity’ (Kant op. cit., p. 161).
Kant continues the line of thinking of Rousseau on a new justifying basis when he 
distinguishes filial and parental duties as being based on different forms of self- 
legislation. Parental duties to raise the child are perfect duties and include and rest on the 
authority of the father. They are temporarily limited and derived from a doctrine of rights 
and thus can include other incentives than duty itself and are enforceable by law. Filial 
duties on the other hand are imperfect duties and temporally unlimited. They are derived 
from a doctrine of virtues, which have gratitude as an incentive and are directly 
dependent on a person’s free will. We can assume that filial care for older frail relatives is 
not considered to be a duty of right because contrary to conjugal and parental duties, 
which are ‘acquired rights’ care needs of older family members cannot be logically 
derived from an act of the child. Yet the continuing significance of conjugal and paternal 
authority is expressed in the husband’s and father’s right of ‘acquisition’.
‘Generational contracts’ in the philosophical imagination of classical contract 
theorists
The preceding exploration of the status of intergenerational relations in the accounts of 
classical social contract theorists has shown that intergenerational commitments were 
solely considered within family lineages constituted by heterosexual reproduction in 
matrimony. This cultural interpretation of the family as an ‘intimate association based on 
matrimony’ (Kaufmann 1990, p. 148) shapes western thinking to the present day. In 
various ways theorists justified the idea that parents must raise and guide children and 
children ought to obey them and express gratitude because paternal authority and 
generational order is vital for the stability and continuity of civil society. Because social 
contract theories were established against the claims of classical patriarchists that 
patriarchal rule is derived from the status of the father as a prime genitor, they did not 
merely draw on status relationships or on natural solidarity derived from blood ties. 
Obligations derived from status or force are always at risk of being overthrown.
freedom (Rose 1984, as quoted in Caygill 1995, p. 46).
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Instead classical contract theorists used a contractual vocabulary of rights and duties 
between parents and children and rationalised the idea of intergenerational solidarity, 
although they did not deploy the term ‘generational contract’. By applying the dominant 
repertoire of contract (Chapter 1), however, I have shown that (with the exception of 
Hobbes) although assuming the self-responsibility of individual members of different 
generations and the equality of generations the authors did not directly refer to self- 
regarding rationality and the free bargaining power of parents and children to make 
mutually advantageous agreements. For natural law theorists such as Pufendorf and 
Locke obligations are pre-determined in nature, for Kant they were established through 
the practice of procreation. Even Hobbes’s conception of generational dominion based on 
self-interest does not assume contractual freedom. According to Hobbes children owe 
their life to the parents and are always rationally obliged to pay obedience.
Because of the initial dependency of infants and the involuntariness of their entering 
these relationships, intergenerational relationships are asymmetrical. I suggest that the 
persuasive power of the contractual language of rights and duties rests first on the 
presumption of reciprocity and second on the assumption that intergenerational 
commitments are freely willed. Reciprocity works by presupposing that the commitments 
or duties exchanged between parents and children, such as obedience for protection, 
reverence for education or care given (down the generational line) for care previously 
received, are somehow equal to one another or equal over time. This, however, is not the 
case. Because children are bom helpless there is always a power differential between 
filial and parental commitments, which is further highlighted by the fact that women were 
(with the exception of Locke) categorically excluded from parental authority in civil 
society but not from filial reverence (which cannot be enforced by law). A consequence 
of the assumption of reciprocity and equality is that individuals are considered to freely 
assume these duties. This is well illustrated by theorists like Pufendorf and Locke who, 
although they assumed that duties are given by the Law of Nature, held that individuals 
have to recognise rationally duties and rights for them to become ultimately binding 
‘voluntary’ commitments.
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Furthermore I argue that whether derived from implicit contract, Natural Law or reason, 
classical social contract theorists used a contractual language to establish fatherhood as 
an attractive domain for adult (property-owning) men to engage in. Dominion, the 
inheritance of property and the acquisition of another person’s status were deemed 
necessary for the continuity of civil society. Fatherhood ensured men (as a prerequisite 
and by-product of procreation) sexual control of and authority over their wives in 
supposedly consensual marriage contracts as well as obedience, reverence and in the 
accounts of Locke and Rousseau also material support by their children. Insofar as 
inheritance was linked to lineage it also ensured fathers the prospect of ‘continuing 
themselves in their posterity’. This line of argumentation is different from Pateman’s 
assumption that men necessarily ‘desired’ to engage in conjugal contracts, subjugate 
women and exercise conjugal and paternal power. Being themselves divorced from 
family caring responsibilities the theorists tacitly (in the case of Pufendorf, Locke and 
Rousseau explicitly) assumed that the day-to-day responsibilities to provide for younger 
and older family members are fulfilled by women as wives and daughter-in-laws, whilst 
honour and power are assigned to their husbands.
From a historical perspective the analysis has shown that -  in line with the actual 
development of German law (Chapter 1.2.) -  the absolute power of the father is limited 
from being ‘the Sovereign’ in ‘a little Monarchy’ (Hobbes 1651/1997, p. 142) to a 
temporary guardian whose paternal power is ‘privatised’. Whereas property and 
citizenship rights always exceeded the ‘private’ domain, boundaries were drawn between 
the public and the private realm. The term ‘private’ originally denoted the absence of 
political power (Frankenberg 1996). More emphasis was given to the ‘perfect’ duty of 
parental authority that is enforceable by civil law than to the ‘imperfect’ duty of filial 
gratitude. Filial and parental duties increasingly appeared as different registers, the 
former of the nature of ‘ought’ the latter as a ‘must’. Children ought to care for their 
parents but parents do not have a right to exact this. Here the social policy of the German 
welfare state will show a different state of affairs (Chapter 3). That the authority over 
children just as conjugal authority in civil society falls to the father and not the mother, 
on the other hand (with the exception of Locke), remained a historical constant, viewed 
ambivalently as a superiority by nature and convention. The alleged inferiority of women
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and the insistence of their equality before the law always has to be seen in the context of 
her reproductive ‘potential’ and fears that the disorderly and unfaithful woman could 
mislead men as to their paternal status and threaten political continuity. I will now turn to 
the exploration of intergenerational responsibilities in neo-contractarian theories.
2.4. INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND JUSTICE IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT THEORIES
The ‘just saving principle9 as the embodiment of intergenerational justice
The philosopher John Rawls tackles the issue of justice between contemporary and non- 
contemporaneous generations in his conceptual framework of justice as fairness that 
draws on Kant’s conception of the social contract as a regulative idea. His idea of 
‘procedural justice’ (Rawls 1973, p. 136) is based on the autonomy and rationality of 
self-interested individuals who agree on principles of distributive justice that regulate 
social cooperation in a ‘just’ society. These principles provide a basis to assign rights and 
duties and regulate social cooperation over time. To ensure an impartial choice Rawls 
constructs an ideal universal choice situation (‘original position’) in which all power 
relations are eliminated and individuals are situated behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. 
Individuals are postulated to be mutually disinterested and denied all knowledge of their 
personal attributes such as class, ability, generation and fortune as well as of the 
characteristics of their society such as its level of economic wealth, civilisation and 
culture. But they know that these conditions and differential positionings as well as ‘ties 
of sentiment and affection’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 129) between individuals hold outside the 
veil of ignorance.7
The principles of justice chosen concern the distribution o f ‘primary social goods’, such 
as rights, opportunities and income. They reflect a fundamental distinction and lexical 
ordering of basic liberties and socio-economic distribution of wealth such that restrictions 
of liberties cannot be legitimised by an increase in socio-economic wealth. Rawls’s
7 In fact, as the same conditions in the original position apply at all times and individuals are considered 
equally rational and situated 'we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one 
person selected at random' (Rawls 1973, p. 139).
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principle of equal liberty states that ‘each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for all* (Rawls op. cit., p. 60). 
The principle regulating social and economic distribution is constrained by the principle 
of equal opportunity and the ‘difference principle’, which specifies that better 
expectations of the well-off can only be justified if they give an advantage to the position 
of the least well-off. It postulates that ‘social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality and opportunity’ (Rawls 
op. cit., p. 83).
One of the questions that interests Rawls is how a fair agreement on the proper 
distributive shares can be attained over time between temporally removed generations, 
given that to maintain a realistic perspective, the parties in the original position are 
contemporaries. In this case a contractual agreement is constrained by the fact that 
present generations can make their successors worse or better off, but the successors 
cannot help or harm their predecessors. With respect to an ideal choice situation Rawls 
(op. cit., p. 128) suggests the inclusion of a ‘motivational assumption’ of the parties in the 
original position according to which ‘their goodwill stretches over at least two 
generations’ to come. This motivational assumption draws on the dominant repertoire of 
generation (Chapter 1.4.). We must, Rawls writes, ‘think of the parties as heads of family, 
and therefore as having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest descendants’ (ibid.), 
just ‘as fathers say care for their sons’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 288). Such a motivational 
assumption will then rule out the possibility that contemporaries in the original position 
disregard the interest of succeeding generations. Choosing the principle of equal liberty, 
for example, includes the liberties of their descendants through the motivational 
assumption of ‘paternal’ concern.
Feminist theorists have rightly argued that in assuming that the parties in the original 
position are heads of families Rawls has reintroduced sexual relations in the initial state 
of equality and assumed that the family is a just institution (Pateman 1988,1989; Okin 
1989). Moreover in positing that the rational deliberator has a paternal motivation to care 
for his son Rawls draws on the existence of natural affection that for his predecessors had
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been highly doubtful. Whereas classical contract theorists were aware that paternal 
concern had to be institutionalised by the conception of rational rights and duties, Rawls 
draws on paternal care as an ahistorical constant and grounds his rational account on a 
feeling-state. As Brian Barry (1989) has rightly argued, this would make the welfare of 
future generations dependent on the degree of goodwill of the contemporaries.
Regarding the principles of intergenerational justice thus chosen Rawls suggests that the 
parties in the original position would agree on a ‘just saving principle’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 
285). The underlying idea of the saving principle is that to promote the full realisation of 
just institutions ‘each generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but it 
must also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital accumulation’ 
(ibid.). Drawing on the Lockian three-generation model these investments or savings are 
to be passed on to the next generation in return for what had been received from the 
previous generation under the assumption that other generations save at the same rate 
over the whole span of accumulation. It is the task of the parties in the original position
to piece together a just savings schedule by balancing how much at each stage 
they would be willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they 
would feel entitled to claim of their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining 
themselves to be fathers, say, they are to ascertain how much they should set 
aside for their sons by noting what they would believe themselves entitled to 
claim of their fathers. When they arrive at an estimate that seems fair from both 
sides, with due allowance made for the improvements in their circumstances, then 
the fair rate (or range of rates) is specified. Now once this is done for all stages, 
we have defined the just saving principle.
(Rawls op. cit., p. 289)
The problem Rawls encounters with this saving scheme is that the first generation would 
save without receiving benefits because there is no way for later generations to improve 
the situation of their predecessors. This, however, is prohibited by the difference 
principle according to which better expectations of the well-off members can only be 
justified if they advance the position of the least well-off. Rawls tries to accommodate the 
interests of the least well-off in any one generation by assuming that the just saving 
principle is always defined from the standpoint of the least advantaged in each 
generation. ‘In any generation their expectations are to be maximized subject to the
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condition of putting aside the savings that would be acknowledged’ (Rawls op. cit., p. 
292).
In terms of the metaphor of the generational contract Rawls’s conception suggest that the 
generational contract is quite literally a social contract whose contracting parties are 
conceived as members of different societal generations and take intergenerational justice 
into account by virtue of acting as fathers. Yet, the motivational assumption of paternal 
care is taken to justify a rational formula on the distribution of ‘primary social goods’. 
The distribution and justification of intergenerational responsibilities of support with 
which classical contract theorists have taken issue (even though its day-to-day practices 
were always assumed to be taken on by women) falls outside the discursive frame of 
procedural justice. Issues of justice such as environmental pollution, disposal of nuclear 
waste or the destruction of species also fall outside of the frame of a just saving scheme 
based on natural affection. As Barry (op. cit., p. 193) has argued the consequences of 
environmental degradation could be neutral in the short-term but disastrous for 
generations remote in time. If care for the welfare of successors only extends over two 
generations there would be no injustice in profiting from such actions.
But even within the economic framework, in which family work is not counted as 
productive, Rawls encounters some logical problems. According to Rawls, generations 
removed in time practically cannot enter the original position at the same times, so that 
strictly speaking, Barry (op. cit., p. 192) argues, Rawls develops not justice between 
generations but ‘justice with respect to future generations’. An inclusion of all people 
who will ever live poses the problem that who will live depends on the principles of 
justice chosen. Consequently the principles of justice paradoxically would have to be 
already chosen. Including all people who ever could live, on the other hand would mean 
choosing principles of justice to advance the welfare of people, most of whom will never 
live. Barry holds that Rawls’s insistence on the contemporaneity of the parties is 
therefore not merely a practical consideration but necessary to the presentation of the 
deliberations in the original position as mutually advantageous.
Rawls’ dilemma is that because successor generations cannot affect their predecessors,
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justice between non-contemporaneous generations cannot be mutually advantageous. The 
interval of time precludes any possibility of interdependence or reciprocity between non- 
contemporaneous generations. A limitation of the difference principle on the other hand, 
which is prohibited among contemporaries, ultimately justifies the implication that poor 
generations must make themselves poorer to make others richer. Thus Barry argues that 
self-interested and mutually advantageous choices that are generally considered to secure 
consistent rational moral choices in contract theories can not be the sole basis of securing 
justice between temporally removed generations.
Tricontract and intracohort trust
Whereas Rawl’s just saving rate attempts to hold for both contemporary and non- 
contemporary generations Peter Laslett (1992) has suggested that the distributive 
mechanisms in both cases are based on different foundations. Laslett proposed to 
distinguish what he calls ' i n ter generational tricontract' from ’^ ^generational 
intercohort trust', although they are not completely theoretically distinct. He defines a 
generation as an assemblage o f coevals. Contemporaries are thus the ensemble of 
different birth cohorts living at any one time. Cohorts form different age groups at any 
one time, which by drawing on the repertoire of generation are conventionally marshalled 
into a dependent 'child generation', an economically active 'parental generation' and an 
economically dependent 'grandparental generation’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 30-31). Thus a 
generation is at the same time an assemblage of coevals and of three mayor age groups. 
Whereas intercohort trust regulates relations within such an assemblage of coevals, the 
tricontract potentially regulates relations between temporally removed groups of coevals.
Similarly to the just saving rate the intergenerational tricontract gives expression to the 
conviction that ‘each generational entity must deliver the world to its successors in the 
condition in which it was received’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 29) and, if possible, improve it. 
But unlike Rawls who insisted that rights and duties agreed upon in the social contract do 
not presuppose any conception of the good, Laslett exactly starts from this premise. The 
principle regulating transfers in the tricontract is likewise mapped onto Locke’s three- 
generation model. Each of the three (non-contemporaneous) generations are conceived of 
having rights and duties which according to Laslett have a temporal dimension: ‘duties
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point always forward in time and downward in the procreative succession... and rights 
point always in the opposite direction’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 37).8 Thus the rights that a 
generation x, or more precisely all members of this generation, have in their predecessors 
are met by the duties they perform for their successors.
By implication ‘any duties [that members of the generation x  have] to those anterior to 
them, or any rights in those posterior to them’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 31) are excluded in the 
tricontract. This includes moral duties to take responsibilities for past wrong doings of 
their predecessors. Such moral liability of succeeding generations, according to Laslett, is 
necessarily vague because it is not clear how far it stretches out in historical time and 
place. Instead reparations and redistribution following, for example, dispossession and 
racial discrimination must be sought in a political dialogue of the groups concerned on 
the basis of historical knowledge. In other words these duties have to be negotiated 
among contemporaries. Individuals under the tricontract are, however, morally obliged to 
their contemporaries and future removed generations for actions taken during their 
lifetime. Thus if predecessors have failed to do their share in maintaining, e.g., the 
environment, members of generation* are still obliged to better the damage if they can or 
at least not to worsen it.
The intragenerational intercohort trust refers to the rights and duties subsisting between 
cohorts, age groups and other collective institutions including the state, which share the 
same time space. These rights and duties regard the distribution o f ‘social goods’ and are 
characterised by a trust relationship between cohorts, which characterises contemporary 
welfare states (see also Thomson 1992). Whilst the trust remains constant, the terms of 
the distribution may change over time. Intercohort trust regulates welfare flows ‘upward 
in the generational order’, such as transfers regulated by pay-as-you-go pensions given by 
the economically ‘active’ parental to the ‘inactive’ grandparental generation. Thus it 
seems that among contemporaries, as Locke has suggested, duties can point upward in 
the procreative succession. In the absence of the ‘quid pro quo character intrinsic to 
contract’ (Laslett op. cit., p. 33) Laslett, however, insists on using the term trust.
8 This is different from Locke's model where duties down the generational line (to one's children) did not 
cancel out duties up the line (to one's parents).
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Intracohort trust is not a contract. Contributions are not made as a repayment for benefits 
received earlier (as in Locke’s scheme), but given in advance in the expectation that 
succeeding cohorts will do the same. While in the intergenerational tricontract a 
generation is already indebted by having received benefits from the previous generation, 
the maxim of the intercohort trust in its institutionalised form is thus ‘What you give to 
your father your son will give to you one day’ (Schultheis 1993, p. 431).
According to Laslett the state that is part of the trust relationship can be conceived of as a 
trustee that legislates and administers a trust fund in so far as the social goods to be 
redistributed are derived from taxation. In the case of pension transfer, contributions of 
the trustors, i.e. those in regular employment, are managed to the advantage of the 
beneficiaries, i.e. those retired. Problems arising from the ‘“greying” of the welfare state’ 
(Johnson et al. 1989, p. 1), that is the shifting balanced between contributors and 
beneficiaries that allegedly leads to a competition over resource allocation, in terms of 
intracohort trust can be conceived of as a mismanagement by the trustee, the state. As 
Laslett puts it (op. cit., p. 35), ‘the trustees have failed to levy from the cohorts in 
possession of wealth and to put aside the resources necessary to even out the flow of 
transfers in the face of anticipated demographic vicissitudes’.9
As in Rawls’ just saving scheme, in Laslett’s conception neither the tricontract nor the 
intercohort trust can be conceived of as a mutually advantageous contract. Generations 
cannot influence their (non-contemporaneous) predecessors and they cannot force their 
(contemporary and non-contemporary) successors to adhere to a redistributive 
mechanism they designed that is based on trust not investment. And as in Rawls the 
redistributive mechanism has an unquestioned gendered basis in so far as both practice 
and distribution of unpaid work is ignored. Importantly Laslett suggests that the so-called 
‘welfare contract’ according to which ‘people pay contributions during the productive 
phases in their life cycle, and draw benefits during childhood, in periods of sickness, and 
after retirement’ (Johnson et a l op. cit., p. 5-6) is not a contract at all. This redistributive
9 Norman Daniels has suggested applying a modified Rawlsian choice situation in order to design a fair 
allocation o f scarce resources behind a 'veil of ignorance1. In his 'prudential lifespan account' Daniels 
(1988) argues for an institutionalised prudent allocation of resources over the life course. A pmdent saving
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gendered mechanism that is neither a contract nor insurance in Germany is called the 
generational contract. Because it remains always taken for granted and is not taken to be 
‘productive work’, women’s work within families and their unpaid contributions to 
welfare always remains outside of the dominant framework of justice between 
generations.
2.5. CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to explore how social contracts theories inform the 
understanding of how the concepts of contract and generation are related to one another 
in the concept of the generational contract. This exploration was motivated by my 
assumption that those modes of justification provide important cultural repertoires in 
western societies in and against which individuals and groups articulate their legitimate 
demands, anticipations and evaluation of (familial) welfare provision and thus need to be 
decomposed to highlight processes of naming and framing. By applying the repertoire of 
generation outlined in the previous chapter I have shown that there is no one 
‘generational contract’, because the concept of generation in social contract theories is 
taken to refer to family lineages, coevals and contemporaries. Moreover, the application 
of the repertoire of contract as a reciprocal cooperative device serving mutual advantage 
has shown that strictly speaking there are no generational contracts at all. To be fair 
neither classical nor neo-contractarian theorists have used this exact term. But a number 
of them have used the idea that members of ‘generations’ are parties who enter a 
(hypothetical) contract of cooperation.
Classical theorists have referred to generations defined by the genealogical grid of decent 
and gender based on marriage contracts. The language of generational rights and duties is 
a prevailing theme in these theories because it justifies paternal authority by referring to 
reciprocity, rational deliberation and freely willed commitments. At the same time the 
theorists ruled out absolute freedom, self-regarding rationality and excluded the issue of 
family care practices and gender power differentials. Thus in the context of
scheme would allow for differential treatment by age, as this would be consistent with equality of 
opportunity in the sense of equal treatment of persons over time.
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intergenerational relationships contract works as an inter-textual operator that, while 
associating freedom and equality with filial rights and duties, rules out freedom and 
equality. Solidarity is ambivalently viewed as given in blood and grounded in (freely 
chosen) human practice.
None of the modes of justifications presented above has remained uncriticised. The 
foundation of intergenerational commitments in an implicit ‘procreative contract’ (Laslett 
1992, p. 29) between father and children has been disputed since Kant on the basis that 
children do not give their consent to be bom. Similarly, Norman Daniels (1988, p. 29) 
has argued that their need for care ‘cannot be the sole basis for claiming that they have 
‘implicitly consented’ to being bound by the duty to care for their parents’. Nor is it 
conceivable ‘that a child would justify a claim to that [parental] generosity on the 
grounds that if parents denied that claim they would forfeit the right to support later on’ 
(Laslett op. cit., p. 29). Grounding generational obligations in Natural Law has been 
denounced as arbitrary: according to Jeremy Bentham’s famous dictum positive law can 
give rise to positive rights but Natural Law can only give rise to imaginary rights. 
Deriving filial obligations from the imperfect duties of gratitude derived from practical 
reason fails to hold as a clear-cut prescription. Daniels (ibid.) has argued that a duty to do 
good things for somebody generally does not incur the obligation to return an equivalent 
good. An appeal to the principle of reciprocity has to presuppose that goods are given as 
favours, but raising a child is more than a mere favour. Furthermore, as parental support 
in old age may be strenuous for the adult child, it exceeds what can be generally expected 
from the duty of beneficence. Help that requires considerable personal sacrifices is 
regarded as admirable but not obligatory.
Although there are thus no compelling philosophically principled justifications of 
intergenerational commitments the idea that parents must raise their children and that 
children ought to be grateful and that this relation is symmetrical, reciprocal and 
rationally willed and grounded in nature appears as a socio-symbolical system of 
tremendous cultural force. This can be shown, for example, in the argument of the 
German conservative minister of family affairs Wurmeling (1956) who argued that the 
‘arch-responsibility’ of education and upbringing of children is a good enough reason to
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justify the claim that children have a duty to care for their parents. For the family 
therapist Boszormenyi-Nagy, cited in the introduction, these modes of justification were 
‘natural’ and indisputable facts.
Moreover, the idea that filial obligations (downwards and upwards the generational line) 
are a corollary to parental duties and their interchanges symmetrical over time is an 
important metaphorical basis onto which intergenerational relationships between cohorts 
and age groups in society at large are mapped. This is shown in contemporary social 
contract theories where the intuitive idea is that just as the modem state is founded on a 
hypothetical agreement of all members of society, the redistributive mechanism of the 
welfare state is based on a hypothetical agreement of different generations or cohorts. 
Rawls conception of the just saving rate shows how, in order to conceptualise justice over 
time, the theorist has to turn to a rationale outside of his rational contract framework, 
drawing paradoxically on the notion of intergenerational solidarity given by blood ties, 
which classical theorists have rejected as the sole basis of commitment.
Thus even if lineage and cohort contracts were to work logically in the way they claim to, 
familial and societal generational contracts never could be considered as complementary 
because they are grounded on different foundations: one assumes what the other denies. 
As such generational contracts appear to be both grounded in nature and rationally willed. 
Apart from evoking freedom and reciprocity, one of the persuasive characteristics of a 
‘generational contract’ in contemporary debates about resource competition is that the 
generational perspective identifies different generations in the sense of age groups as 
actors in the competition. Peter Laslett has rightly pointed to the role of the state as an 
important ‘actor’ in designing the redistributive mechanism of the welfare state. At the 
same time his emphasis on institutions reinforces a public/private divide that once again 
‘forgets’ the institution of the family. That neo-contractarians continue to use the 
language of father and son relationships is not accidental. Women reappear, however, in 
contemporary social policy debates in Germany about the generational contract ‘at risk’, 
which I shall explore in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
GENERATIONAL POLITICS AND DISCOURSES IN 
THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
The following chapter explores in a historical perspective the institutionalisation of policies 
and discourses that have framed intergenerational relations in the German welfare state as 
well as producing and maintaining particular ‘gender regimes’ (Orloff 1993). To what 
extent and by what means has the cohesion between generations conjured up in the 
philosophical master narratives been institutionalised in Germany? A recapitulation of these 
forms of institutionalisation is necessary in order to critically evaluate political 
recommendations of new forms of (intergenerational) solidarity (Kaufrnann 1990, p. 149; 
Busek 1997). Using the repertoires of contract and generation as well as gender as an 
heuristic tool, the chapter focuses first on some of the policies and legislation adopted, and 
second, particularly with respect to the post-WWII welfare state, on the rhetoric of the 
generational contract, in which they were framed. The chapter thereby provides a socio­
political background for the subsequent empirical study of two contemporary family 
generations in two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. Furthermore, it 
historicizes the idea of social solidarity, which underwrites the notion of the generational 
contract, whose normative implications I explored in the previous chapter. Particular 
emphasis is given to its changing imagery and connotations in 20th century social policy 
discourse. After the introduction of pay-as-you-go pensions in the midi950s the 
generational contract was the cipher par excellence for the embodiment of social solidarity. 
Only recently has the morally charged metaphor of the generational contract come to stand 
for fraud and immorality.
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German sociologists have suggested distinguishing collective intergenerational relations 
regulated by social institutions (‘Generationenverhaltnisse') from potentially observable 
social interactions between members of different generations in a family lineage 
(‘ Generationenbeziehungen’) (Leisering 1992 as quoted in Kaufinann 1993). Informed by 
the contemporary feminist critique of distinct ‘welfare state regimes’, I will focus on the 
ways in which policies have regulated what has been constructed as public and private 
intergenerational relations. A persuasive tale in western societies is that with the emergence 
of the modem welfare state at the turn of the century a shift occurred from private provision 
in the household and in the market to public provision (Thomson 1991). In the context of 
rising public expenditure and the identification of the public sector with waste and 
inefficiency the opposite trend towards privatisation is seen. However, more recent 
enquiries into the history of welfare point to a complex mix of public/private welfare 
production throughout the history of welfare states (Conrad 1996) as well as highlighting 
the role of families and households. The production of welfare then is conceived as a multi­
level process that involves the state, the market, the welfare sector and the 
individual/household.
Conceptions of welfare are contested and changing, and the categories of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ are socially contingent. In the context of welfare provision pubic and private have 
different connotations referring to distinct loci of welfare responsibility and organisation.10 
Still, most issues cut across public/private boundaries and the distinction itself changes with 
the location of the interpreter (Twigg 1999). From the point of view of the government, 
private refers to nongovernmental organisations: churches, charities, associations, firms 
etc., whereas from the point of view of the individual only family and household are 
private, market and services are considered to be public (Conrad 1996). Income from 
savings, rent and earnings can be seen as private as well as public and much of the ‘welfare 
sector’ is currently private provision and public finance.
10 According to Frankenberg (1996, p. 76-77) criteria of public and private responsibility refer to (i) the agent 
who expresses public concern (public institutions vs. private associations); (ii) the resources used to finance it 
(taxes, governmental infrastructure, municipal services vs. private savings, charity or self-organised
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In view of these changing connotation of public and private, social historians have 
advocated a de-centring and breaking down of the common dichotomies of public and 
private, family and state to make the heterogeneity and interrelations of welfare provision 
visible. Social welfare can then be conceived of as a ‘problem formula of public 
communication... that refers to the mediation between particular forms of life style and the 
state or the development perspectives of a polity’ (Kaufmann 1994, p. 364). A focus on the 
interrelations between public and private intergenerational relations highlights not only the 
embeddedness of public policies in their social milieu but also impacts on the 
conceptualisation of the welfare state itself. As Katz and Sachfie (1996, p. 10) have 
suggested, restructuring the welfare state would essentially mean ‘to renegotiate the 
boundaries of public and private and reconsider their meaning’.
The standard genealogy according to which the German welfare state originates in the 
Bismarckian social legislation at the end of the last century has been challenged by Dorwart 
(1971) who takes the regulating and policing power of the state to promote ‘welfare’ as the 
defining criteria of the welfare state. On this basis he distinguishes three stages of welfare 
state development in the German speaking territories over the past 500 years. The first stage 
of the paternalist Policeystaat began in the later Middle Ages and continued into the 18th 
century. It was influenced by secularisation and Enlightenment philosophy of good 
government. The second stage is characterised by 19th century political democracy and 
liberalism. In the phase of liberal reform and a new self-regulating (self-policing) civil 
society, paternalistic state intervention was rejected and groups that were excluded from 
national political power began to self-assert their interest (Rosenhaft 1994). The third stage 
of the modem welfare state started with the social insurance legislation of Bismarck but 
obtained its characteristic form in the 20th century. Feminist scholars have identified this 
form as a gendered and racially structured two-tiered system of (male) wage earner 
entitlements based on labour market participation and (female) means-tested social 
assistance (Lewis 1993; Salisbury 1994; Fraser 1997).
This differing genealogy of the welfare state has inspired the following investigation into
networks); (iii) the type of organisation (institutionalised, legal vs. personal) and (iv) the underlying motives 
(compensation for risks, solidarity contributions vs. motives such as charity, benevolence).
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the histories of the conservative-corporatist legacy of the German ‘social state’ and the idea 
of social and intergenerational solidarity. Drawing on socio-historical texts I begin by 
exploring the changing codified responsibilities of family lineages for support provision in 
Prussian and early German poor relief. Next I explore agrarian German retirement 
contracts, which appear to exemplify quite literally contracts between generations. I then 
consider Bismarck’s social security legislation in its relevance for intergenerational 
relations in the discursive context of the ‘social idea’, developed in the 19th century by 
economists, socialists and social philosophers. The second part of the chapter inquires into 
20th century development of social security, particularly the pension system, in the context 
of the emergence of the discourse of intergenerational solidarity in the Weimar Republic 
and in the Federal Republic but also the long term-care insurance. Emphasis is given to the 
changing imagery and connotations of the generational contract, its promises and 
challenges and current devaluation in the FRG. Here I will principally draw on public 
discourse in the German print media.
3.2. ENFORCING INTERGENERATIONAL SUPPORT ALONG THE LINES 
OF INHERITANCE: EARLY GERMAN POOR RELIEF
Medieval Germany was at the same time a supra-national Empire and a conglomerate of 
provincial, feudal and culturally and religiously diverse states bound together in the 
institutional reality of the kingdom. Early bourgeois forms of living first emerged in the 
medieval Free Cities where from the 11th century onward municipalities were formed and 
administered by city councils (SachBe and Tennstedt 1980). New problems arose in the 
later Middle Ages through commercial expansion, urban growth, widespread poverty and 
the affluence of a new middle class, which challenged traditional morality and class 
structure. Dorwart (1971, p. 3) argues that these cities, whose legislative and regulative 
functions were later taken over by territorial and ‘national’ states, were ‘the microcosm of 
the future welfare state’. Emperor Charles V introduced the termpolicey from the French in 
the early 16th century to designate the responsibility of public councils for preserving ‘good 
order in society and to promote the general welfare’ (ibid.). It referred to a range of regional 
policies and institutions directed at regulating areas of individual and community activity. 
Good Policey embodied the new bureaucratic ethos of a state that was committed to rational
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and predictable principles of governance (Rosenhaft 1994).
Subsidiarity that is the assignment of primary support responsibilities to the individual and 
family before communes and state organisations was the first principle of poor relief, 
organised and administered by the municipalities, paid through local taxes and 
complemented by private charity. The second basic principle was individualisation: in- and 
outdoor relief was given temporally in crisis situations without giving individuals any legal 
entitlements to support. On the contrary, relief often entailed social disciplining, such as the 
enforcement of labour and the loss of civil rights. The third principle of poor relief was the 
Heimatprinzip (‘homeland principle’), whereby responsibility for public assistance was 
assigned to municipalities of birth, later of residence, so that non-local paupers could be 
expelled (SachBe and Tennstedt op. cit.). Like the principle of subsidiarity the assignment 
of responsibility to the Lander rather than to the Federal state is codified in the 
contemporary German Civil Code.
The grading of responsibility according to degrees of kinship and generation is exemplified 
in the Prussian General State Law (APL) of 1791/94 in which the patria potesta was 
abolished and support obligations between generations and family members were codified 
as part of civil law. The APL comprised the modem liberal ethos expressed in social 
contract theories, but although quite progressive in terms of divorce rights and women’s 
legal competence, familial duties were meticulously regulated (Gerlach 1996). Whereas the 
law turned individual family members into legal subjects (see 1.2.) it codified the so-called 
Nahrpflicht (‘duty to feed’) between spouses, parents and children and siblings. Duties of 
support were explicitly ‘directed according to the rules of legal inheritance’ (APL 1794 as 
quoted in Conrad 1996, p. 345), evidence of the discourse of reciprocal rights and duties, 
even when in practice no inheritance could be expected. In 1855 liabilities were extended to 
include illegitimate children who had to provide for their mothers and in the Code 
Napoleon in the German Rhineland even sons- and daughters-in-law were legally liable for 
family support. The important characteristic of the APL is not only that it assumed and 
created family obligations by means of private law, but that it considered failure to support 
relatives as a violation of public duties, which were enforceable by the police and could 
lead to detention in poorhouses and reformatories. As SachBe and Tennstedt (op. cit., p.
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246) succinctly put it 19 th century Prussian poor relief legislation codified ‘the principles of 
the bourgeois family by means of public law’.
After German unification the German Civil Code of 1896 (Bundes Gesetzbuch, BGB) 
ensured the status of the family as a ‘moral institution’. It did not include the detailed 
regulation of intra-familial relationships, but through the absence of regulations promoted a 
restoration of patriarchal structures (Gerlach 1996, pp. 85-87). Support obligations for 
spouses and relatives in direct descent were maintained. By the end of the 19th century the 
conception of the family by legislative authorities had thus contracted horizontally, whilst 
reinforcing duties over three generations in a lineage with descendants being ‘obliged to 
provide support before the relatives of the ascending line’ {BGB 1896 as in Conrad op. cit., 
p. 345). A BGB directive in Cologne in the same year imposed the support duties that were 
explicitly class-specific, for
spouses towards one another, parents, grandparents and great-grandparents toward 
their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren; children, grandchildren etc. 
toward their parents and grandparents; then also, under certain legal conditions, 
parents-in-law and sons- and daughters-in-law toward each other... In this way more 
than any other the consciousness of the duty towards impoverished relatives among 
the lower classes of people should constantly be kept alive.
{BGB directive 1896, as quoted in Conrad op. cit., p. 346)
Although there are no representative German studies it is important not to extrapolate from 
the legal codification to the actual enforcement of intergenerational support obligations. 
Regional studies in Britain, where the Poor Law of 1601 codified less extensive family 
obligations down the line of descent, suggest that enforceable obligations amounted to 
monetary payments only and showed great regional and temporal variations (Thomson 
1991). A case study of Cologne also shows that laborious and often unsuccessful 
enforcement procedures were directed predominantly against husbands and fathers, not 
wage-earning children (Conrad op. cit.). Yet, adult children are legally responsible to 
contribute to their parents income to the present day. Walter (1997) has analysed 
contemporary actions for maintenance and shows how restrictive procedures that left 
children only a minimum income for themselves have only recently liberalised, 
interestingly with the argument that children already contribute to the maintenance of the 
older generation through the PAYG scheme (3.6).
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3.3. RETIREMENT CONTRACTS AMONG THE PROPERTY-OWNING 
CLASSES IN AGRARIAN GERMANY
A long-standing legal mechanism to ensure filial support in old age among the property- 
owning classes was the so-called retirement contract. At least since the Middle Ages it had 
been common for men and women of the upper classes to secure their maintenance in old 
age by donating their fortune to a monastery or convent (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982; 
Wemple 1992). These institutional arrangements of a ‘soul gift’ (Gaunt 1983, p. 254) 
made well-off older people independent of their children and other relatives and appear to 
embody contractual freedom. However, the German 13th century legal code 
Sachsenspiegel, for example, required that legitimate heirs consent to the donation. In the 
late Middle Ages these quasi-contractual agreements with religious bodies were replaced 
by more secular ‘life annuity contracts’ (Mitterauer and Sieder 1982, p. 161) that 
guaranteed permanent pension entitlements in exchange for the donation of a certain 
amount of property.
Retirement contracts, in which elderly property holding farmers transferred their 
holdings, and by implication their patriarchal power, to an heir, usually a son, were more 
directly concerned with generational politics. In return the older couple received 
accommodation, food and clothing. These retirement contracts emerged in the early 
Middle Ages, particularly in central and northern Europe (Gaunt 1983) and in some rural 
regions in Germany survived until the 1930s (Wilke and Wagner 1981). Elaine Clark 
(1990, p. 191), referring to similar arrangements in medieval England suggests that 
‘rights in property gave householders the necessary leverage to obtain labour and support 
from children, and thus to bargain for... maintenance in old age’. Retirement contracts 
thereby appear to quite literally have been ‘intergenerational contracts’ (Smith 1991, p. 
41) that exemplify contractual freedom.
Social historians have shown, however, that peasant retirement contracts were not only 
regulated by individual negotiation and peasant custom but also by public law. Pelling 
and Smith (1991) hold that legal institutions, such as manorial courts, exemplified state
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interest in managing potential hardship in their supervision of the retirement of elderly 
tenants and in guaranteeing their material support. Apart from parish records and census 
data, court testimonies are a major source for the analysis of retirement contracts. Berkner 
(1976) argues that although legal records often concerned disputed rights over retirement 
agreements and are therefore to some extent a distorting lens, they indicate what was 
negotiable and what obligations were fulfilled or neglected. This may be true for the 
obligations of men. But in so far as women’s legal affairs were traditionally managed by 
their husbands, ‘the role of women in these transactions is difficult to see,... apart from 
releasing their husbands to act for them, they do not come into the records’ (Sabean 
1984b, p. 182). In German agrarian retirement contracts women appeared, if at all, as 
dependant parties to their husbands or as representative parties who substituted for their 
sons.
Transfer agreements or parental settlements were often laid down in so-called 
Ubergabsvertrage (literally, ‘handing over contracts’) (Gaunt 1983) and differed 
according to ‘the formal and informal structures of people who practice (or are forced to 
practice) particular ways of passing down rights over material objects’ (Goody 1976, p. 
1). Agreements were dependent first on the size of the property and the form of land 
tenure. In 17th Germany, for example, land could fall under full manorial control 
(Meierland), it could be a kind of copyhold for which manorial dues were paid 
(Erbzinsland) or a freehold (Eigenland). Leaseholders could not set up retirement 
contracts because they had no claim to the land (Berkner op. cit.). Mitterauer and Sieder 
(op. cit.) point out that the lord of the manor who had a prime interest in replacing older 
tenants with the more physically able introduced retirement agreements. Lords of the 
manor had the legal right to approve every transfer of land laid down in marriage 
contracts, inheritance settlements and sales. With respect to the legality of forced 
evictions of older farmers (Abmeierung) in the 13th century, the authors were therefore 
sceptical that the retirement of the farmer had been ‘in its origin, a voluntary matter’ 
(Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 164).
Second, the transmission of the farm differed according to whether inheritance was 
partible, as in the southwest of Germany or impartible as in the northern and eastern
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regions. Impartible inheritance, where one child inherited the holding and had to pay 
other siblings’ shares as ‘marriage portions’, was often linked to the stem family, that is 
the co-residence of the parents and one married child. Retirement of the parents often 
coincided with the marriage of the heir. Inheritance that was partible opened a wide range 
of strategies and was often linked to nuclear household formation. Even if the laws 
prescribed equal inheritance among siblings, in practice often one heir, usually a son, 
managed the farm and bought out the others. David Sabean (1984b, p. 184) shows how 
the process of transmission in a partible region in 17th century Germany was ‘protracted, 
with many tentative moves and reversals, and a complex intertwining of use-rights and 
obligations’. Parents frequently gave their children land to work, promoting their 
cooperation rather than their full independence.
In accordance with different practices, arrangements for the ‘lawfully regulated form of 
care’ (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 162) had regionally specific names often 
designating the relocation of the old farmer, such as Altenteil (literally, old person’s 
portion), Ausgedinge (stipulated right to maintenance), Leibzucht (smaller plot of land 
with dwelling) or Leibgedinge (stipulated income for life). Retirement contracts 
traditionally involved little or no cash transfer. Until the eighteenth century retired 
farmers often had a residual claim to ownership of their farms and thereby had power to 
control their situation (Gaunt 1983; Berkner 1972). Alternatively provincial laws 
meticulously specified what each party owed the other (Lee 1981). According to one of 
the oldest German legal codifications of retirement contracts (early 14th century), older 
parents were entitled to take ‘the best bed, the best kettle, the best pot, the best plough, 
the best horse, the best wagon’ from the former dwelling (Gaunt op. cit., p. 254). 
Smallholders had to enter into much less generous agreements and complemented the 
transmission of property with labour services in exchange for support in old age. 
Accommodation for the retired parents varied from a designated cottage or plot on the 
farm to a room or comer within the communal family room in the house. Apart from the 
parents’ right to live on the farm rent-free, contractual agreements included the use of a 
piece of land, animals, furnishings and the exact provision of grain, fodder and wood. 
Furthermore, regulations could include specified rights of the old farmer to enter the front 
door or to use a particular chair (Mitterauer and Sieder op. cit., p. 167). This reallocation
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of living space is evidence of the symbolic order of the peasant household and the 
patriarchal power attached to it.
Court testimonies give much evidence of disputes concerning retirement contracts. At the 
same time as these contracts emerged, complaints about the callousness of the younger 
generation, fighting, cursing, and parricide were reported by priests and civil servants 
(Gaunt 1982). The precariousness of retirement is expressed in the Old German word for 
retire Ableben, to give up living, and in a series of peasant proverbs such as ‘To hand 
over is no longer to live’ or ‘Do not take off your clothes before you go to sleep’. 
Conflict arose from the resentment of the father at handing his power of decision making 
to his son and from the offence of the son when the father had delayed the handing over 
of the farm or threatened to disinherit the son. Structurally the cost of keeping the older 
generation often caused the inheriting son, who already paid high taxes to the lord of the 
manor and/or to the state district, to fall into debt. As a result of these structural conflicts, 
evictions of old farmers were forbidden in the German territories of Saxony, Hesse and 
Baden in the 18th century, and in 1798 plans were discussed to establish a moral court of 
justice (Moralgericht) to settle intergenerational disputes (Gaunt 1982). Conflict 
concerning retirement contracts continued into the 20th century. Wilke and Wagner (op. 
cit.) report that apart from legal disputes, parents in Hesse in the 1920s brought the matter 
before the village in the form of malicious gossip or placed a curse on the defaulting 
household if obligations were not honoured.
The role of women in the practices and conflicts of retirement contracts is concealed not 
only by the fact that if a daughter was the only heir to the farm, responsibility was 
transferred to her husband but also through a male bias in historiography. Thus Berkner 
(1972) in his seminal essay on the Austrian stem family described ‘the phases of the 
individual’s cycle’ in the Austrian peasant society of the eighteenth century as ‘son and 
heir; head of household; retired parent’ (Berkner op. cit., p. 418, emphasis in orig.). 
Descriptions of a gendered division of labour in peasant households where cooking, 
infant care, cleaning and mending clothes were a female preserve, suggest that the day-to- 
day practice of support of older relatives fell to women as daughters-in-law. This goes 
unmentioned in the normal course of events, as illustrated in the passive gender-neutral
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formulation that the older farmer ‘was taken care of when the need arose’ (Mitterauer and 
Sieder op. cit., p. 167). Like other taken for granted aspects of gender relations this 
responsibility is revealed in tales of the proverbial daughter-in-law who did not care for 
her mother-in-law and ‘persuaded her husband to throw the widow into the street (where) 
the widow died soon after’ (Gaunt 1983, p. 261).
Feminist historians have pointed to the fact that women’s inheritance rights varied widely 
in Germany. In the early Middle Ages, for example, a woman could inherit land 
purchased by her parents and the personal belongings of a female relative but not her 
parents’ patrimony (Wemple op. cit.). In the 13th century widows inherited property from 
their husbands and served as guardians of their children, rather than falling under their 
sons’ guardianship as was reinstated at end of Middle Ages (Opitz 1992). In areas of 
impartible inheritance a woman’s dowry in the 17th century was merged into the 
impartible estate, and she became sole heir to the farm when childless or a ‘residual heir’ 
(Goody 1982, p. 88) for as long as surviving children were under age and she remained 
unmarried. These arrangements served to maintain the farm as a tax-payable unit with no 
more than one retired couple at the time, not to promote women's independence.11
Applying the repertoire of contract (1.4), retirement contracts are peculiar hybrids of 
purposive and status contracts. In their quid pro quo character and detailed listings of 
exchanges of property for means of sustenance they appear as purposive and 
quantitatively delimited contracts, enforceable by law. In so far as this exchange is based 
on age and the heir gains power, and changes his ‘universal position’ on the basis of a 
legally codified bloodline, independently of his own conduct, they are status contracts. 
Retirement contracts were not freely negotiable, but neither were they based on trust and 
affection. Importantly, the gendered part of the purposive agreement, the provision of 
care and support over and beyond material sustenance, remained uncodified (Lorenz- 
Meyer 1996). Women were excluded as formal agents in both the exchange and the status 
contract: excepting those periods where widowed women could inherit the estate from 
their husbands, women could not hold own land and thus lacked the power to negotiate
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retirement agreements as mothers, wives and daughters-in-law. Gender relations were 
thus at the same time implicitly depended on and yet explicitly discounted. Given that 
these gender relations were assumed and buttressed by ‘welfare legislation’ it may not be 
accidental that these household communities have been characterised as ‘miniature 
welfare republic(s)’ (Hajnal 1982, as quoted in Smith 1991, p. 40).
3.4. THE ‘SOCIALE IDEE’ AND BISMARCK’S SOCIAL INSURANCE
LEGISLATION
Bismarck’s introduction of social insurance legislation (1883-1991) is usually taken as 
marking the beginning of the modem German welfare state as a conservative-corporatist 
regime with its characteristic linkage of rights to class and status through a variety of 
insurance schemes. While on the one hand as a reform from the top it continued the 
tradition of paternalistic state intervention, social insurance legislation introduced the 
(retrospective) coverage of defined risks of workers. By pooling risks, insurance benefits 
were transferred from a gift to a legal right (Baldwin 1990). Insurance was not restricted to 
certain professions but applied nationwide. Benefits did neither entail social or political 
discrimination nor were they dependent on the worker’s family situation nor. Social 
insurance was therefore initially criticised for jeopardising family and intergenerational 
solidarity. At the same time it privileged the industrial worker over ‘the poor’ and women 
who were not regularly employed. Welfare assistance remained a residual system of strictly 
means tested, individualised, subsidiary public assistance (Ritter 1989). According to 
Frankenberg (1996, p. 85) the new regime ‘translated the distinction between deserving and 
undeserving poor into the selectivity of clients and the dualism of compulsory social 
insurance and the “casuistry” of welfare’. Feminist analysis has shown that this 
welfare/insurance dualism was inherently gendered (Salisbury 1994; Lewis 1993).
The ‘transition from “guter policey” to “socialer Politib?” (Pankoke 1986, as quoted in 
Ritter op. cit., p. 46) of the German monarchy was the result of particular economic and 
political factors, but also rested on an idea of social justice that was shared to some extent
11 In fact the APL attempted to limit women’s right over disposal of their dowries. One of its codifiers 
forewarned the public that ‘the woman thereby, against nature and God’s commandments, would gain
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by members of the working class and the bourgeoisie (Kaufmann 1997). The mortal 
foundation of the ‘social idea’ (Schmidt 1998) emerged in the intellectual climate of 19th 
century German civil society.
Influential ideas of social reform and a policy framework for nation-building (that has been 
described as the ‘third way’ between liberal economy and state socialism (Schmidt op. cit.) 
were developed by members of the German Historical School of National Economics, 
whose leader Gustav Schmoller later became an economic advisor of Bismarck. One of its 
key thinkers was the social historian and social scientist Lorenz von Stein. Von Stein 
developed the idea of a ‘kingdom of social reform’ (Konigtum der sozialen Reform), 
referring to the institutionalisation of a social reform by public administration based on the 
corporate interests of industrial relations outside and above social movements. By the mid- 
19* century von Stein had coined the terms ‘social state’ and ‘social democracy’. The social 
state was conceived as a productive compromise between capital and labour, which aimed 
to create a social infrastructure in order to integrate workers into society. As a Rechtsstaat, a 
state under the rule of law the state had to secure the equality of law, but it also had to
promote with its power economic and social progress of all its members, because 
the development of one is always the condition and just as much the consequence 
of the development of the other; and in this sense we speak of a societal or social 
state.
(von Stein 1876, as quoted in Ritter op. cit., p. 11)
Whilst the efforts to provide a theoretical foundation for the intervention of the social state 
focussed on industrial workers, Friedrich List, another member of the Historical School, in 
his critique of economic liberalism appeared to question the inherent division of productive 
and unproductive labour. Adherents of liberal economics, List wrote, considered ‘bodily 
labour as the only productive power. According to it, he who raises swine is accounted a 
productive member of society; he who raises men is unproductive’ (List 1856, p. 220). His 
view that both individuals were productive, the former by producing exchangeable values, 
the latter by generating ‘productive power’, was far from a challenge to the gendered 
division of labour on which the social state rested. For List the valuable producers of 
productive power were teachers, scientists and musicians. Women’s work in the home was 
considered unproductive and fell outside of the domain regulated by social insurance.
independence from man’ (Grollmann, date not given, quoted in Beer 1990, p. 173).
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Von Stein’s work suggests that the economic-political vision of the social state firmly 
rested on the normative assumption that the family was -  and had to be -  organised by a 
natural and complementary division of labour by gender. Not unlike some of the classical 
social contract theorists he argued that
outside o/the family there is no absolute difference in the determination of a man 
and a woman, nay without the idea of the family for the economic world of working 
life there is no man and woman at all but only humans albeit of different power but 
with essentially equal tasks.
(von Stein 1878, p. 230, emphasis in original)12
The turning away from 18th century economic liberalism and the emergence of the ‘social 
idea’ was furthered by the Great Depression (1873-1885), which after decades of rapid 
industrial growth had discredited liberal economic policy and strengthened the labour 
movement. The informal networks of neighbours and family were strained in the context of 
population growth, urbanisation and fast economic and social change (Ritter op. cit., p. 98). 
In the second half of the 19th century agrarians, industrialists, artisans, philanthropists, 
academics and workers formed interest groups, which constituted forms of collective self- 
help. The emergence of the ‘third sector’ (private, non-profit organisations) beyond market, 
the family and the state included a range of bourgeois social reform associations, such as 
the Verein fur Socialpolitik founded in 1872. Baldwin (op. cit.) argues that as individuals 
and groups subjected to misfortune surpassing their capacity for self-help, the middle 
classes too had a pressing interest in social reform.
Bismarck’s social insurance legislation is often regarded as a counter-policy to the 
restrictive anti-socialist laws, which outlawed organised labour organisations. It traded on 
the idea of social solidarity and aimed to convey the view that the state was also a beneficial 
institution for the property-less classes. Yet social insurance legislation did not advance
12 The question why women and men would live in families, described as unions in which ‘according to 
their character unequal producing economic forces are joint and are dependent on each other’ (von Stein 
op. cit., p. 230, emphasis in original) could only be answered with respect to a inherent gender inequality, 
which Stein had just refuted. The answer to his (rhetorical) question ‘How is it possible that nobody doubts 
the immeasurable significance of the household economy, and yet it has not found its place in any 
economic theory?’ (von Stein op. cit., p. 236) lies exactly in the familial division of labour by gender he 
advocated and assumed. According to their different gender character men were identified with production 
outside the home and women with consumption inside the home. Women’s work was conceived as
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labour protection and coalition rights, and was built on gender and intergenerational 
inequality. As Bismarck argued in referring to freedom of (employment) contract,
It was repugnant to my convictions and my experience so far to encroach upon 
the independence of the worker, in his professional life and his rights as the head 
of family, as to forbid him by law to exploit his own working capacities, and 
those of his family, according to his own judgement.
(Bismarck 1971/1921)
Thus there is consensus that ‘Bismarckian statutory paternalism’ (Baldwin op. cit., p. 10) 
was not motivated by a vision of solidarity. Hockerts (1983) has argued that liberal 
democracies lacked both the paternalistic mode and the authoritarian power of the German 
state to initiate similar welfare state reforms. At the time, ‘insuring’ workers against loss of 
earnings due to invalidity and old age was an unprecedented and controversial idea 
(Hockerts ibid.). Reformers were accused of implementing insurance benefits that would 
destroy intergenerational solidarity. In response it was argued that a small pension income 
would make old parents attractive members in a joint household with their children and thus 
would ultimately strengthen family solidarity (Conrad 1996). The obligatory insurance 
systems built on previous bureaucratic structures were financed by different ‘mixes’ of 
employer/employee contributions and were administered by non-state associations13. The 
Health Insurance Bill of 1883 offered protection against illness. Workers paid two-thirds of 
the contributions and received sickness benefit from the third day for up to 13 weeks with a 
co-insurance of dependent family members. The no-fault Accident Insurance of 1885 was 
solely financed by employers’ contributions and offered benefits after the 13 weeks covered 
by the Health Insurance. Finally, the Invalidity and Old Age Pension Insurance of 1891 was 
financed through covering funds from equal contributions of workers and the employers 
and a state subsidy. Workers received a ‘supplement to their living’ from the age of 71 after 
24 years of contributions, independently of their family situation. Contrary to the means 
tested basic pension introduced in England in 1908, the Old Age Pension incorporated the 
principle of individualisation by relating benefits to previous earnings.14
housework and described as creating a kind of emotional surplus by rendering ‘the common dear, the 
unusual pleasurable’, (von Stein, op. cit., p. 238).
13 Social security had already been institutionalised for civil servants, the military and miners. In Prussia one 
million workers were insured against illness, and partly against accident and invalidity in 1883 (Fischer 1985, 
quoted in Schmidt 1998, p. 23).
14 Social insurance did not include unemployment insurance, which in Britain was introduced in 1911 and 
in Germany only in 1927, despite the fact that in 1913 German labour unions were the largest in the world.
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As a result of low wages and massive resistance by employers contributions initially 
amounted only to 1 to 2% of the wage and benefits covered around 18% of average net 
earnings (Hockerts 1980). These low benefits were justified with reference to the family 
and household economy, which was considered to provide the bulk of material and non­
material support. Until 1912 bereaved family members were not covered. Women’s access 
to first-class (insurance) benefits was limited by structural and cultural discrimination in the 
labour market. While potential or actual motherhood provided the justification for 
employment restrictions and lower wages, it was as wives rather than as mothers that 
women qualified for derivative social security benefits (Lewis op. cit.). Overall poor relief 
remained crucial. Instead of a shift from municipal to central government spending there 
was a de facto increase in poor relief recipients, the majority of which were women (Conrad 
op. cit.).
3.5. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DISCOURSE OF INTERGENERATIONAL 
SOLIDARITY IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
Solidarity between generations as cohorts was explicitly invoked when the funds of the 
Miners’ pension insurance were lost in the Weimar Republic. The Weimar constitution 
from 1919 marked a shift from the formal concept of the legal state (Rechtsstaat) that was 
limited to protecting negative freedom, to a substantive concept of the socially responsible 
legal state (sozialer Rechtsstaat), and from the state paternalism of the monarchy to the 
‘social state’ of a parliamentary democracy. Social rights were incorporated in a 
constitution that was considered the most democratic in its time. They included the right to 
work (not legally enforceable), and the guarantee of social insurance, labour protection, the 
right to form trade unions and the legal acknowledgement of collective bargaining, which 
marked a breach with the liberal concept of individual work contracts. At the same time the 
belief in the power of the welfare state to promote integration and social harmony 
tenaciously persisted (Frankenberg 1996). With the social democrats as part of a coalition 
government, the social insurance legislation (Reichsversicherungsordnung) in 1924 was a 
step towards transforming traditional poor relief into a social right of (low) means-tested 
assistance. Free voluntary associations were expanded as part of the process of
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organisational restructuring and individualisation of welfare services (Ritter op. cit., p. 105).
Yet, the situation of pensioners in the Weimar Republic was devastating with pre-WWI 
resources such as savings and occupational pensions lost or drastically reduced. In 1923/24 
the social insurance nearly collapsed due to inflation and the loss of covering funds. Income 
was increasingly acknowledged to be the main source of income in old age while 
pensioners, widows and orphans essentially lived of a special form of social assistance 
(Hockerts 1983). Debates about the future of social insurance ranged from proposals to 
interrupt insurance payments altogether in order to re-accumulate covering funds, to 
propositions for universal ‘citizen support’. The latter was rejected on the grounds that it 
undermined the individualising principle of equivalence between earnings and insurance 
benefits. The idea that was favoured by both unions and employers’ associations, because it 
was cheaper in the short-run and was expected to guarantee an adjustment of pensions to 
economic growth, was the replacement of covering funds by the so-called cost-splitting 
procedure [Umlageverfahren], that is the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Ritter (op. cit., p. 
135) argues that the first references made to what was later called the generational contract 
were with respect to PAYG that was introduced in the Miners’ Pension in 1923. The 
Christian leader of the miner’s association Heinrich Imbusch advocated the principle of 
solidarity between generations, referring to the distribution of burden between different age 
cohorts.
The current generation has given blood and material sacrifices. These great 
sacrifices can hardly be bom by one generation. I believe that the distribution of 
material sacrifices among different generations is necessary.
(Imbusch 1928 as quoted in Geyer 1987, p. 153)
Although this utterance may have evoked associations with family solidarity, the explicit 
reference point of intergenerational solidarity was the pension insurance system. This 
appeal for solidarity between societal ‘generations’ drew on ‘Christian solidarity’ (Ritter 
op. cit., p. 124), that is on a romantic anti-contractual ideology.15 Baldwin (op. cit., p. 33)
15 The influential representative of social Catholicism Oswald von Nell-Breuning however, has pointed to 
the legal origins of the term solidarity. In legal theory ‘in solidum’ denotes the joint liability of several 
debtors. According to Nell-Breuning (1957) the relationship between the debtors and the creditor is ‘one for 
all’, the relationship between the debtors is ‘all for one’. Solidarity transfers a particular legal arrangement to 
the level of society and social groups. As a principle of social philosophy solidarity attempts to codify this 
mutual responsibility and interdependence (‘all for one and one for all’) as a normative basis of the state, 
delineating it from pure individualism and collectivism.
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has argued that the interdependence of societal groups need not necessarily generate 
solidarity, but for a shared predicament to prompt mutual aid, solidarity requires some 
form of collective identity or community. As solidarity on the aggregated level of age 
cohorts is likely to lack this prerequisite, what later came to be called the generational 
contract is perhaps more adequately characterised as an ‘ersatz solidarity represented and 
bureaucratically dispensed by the welfare state’ (Frankenberg op. cit., p. 88). The 
inherent gendered welfare/insurance dualism of the German welfare state remained 
unquestioned by the solidarity discourse in the Weimar Republic.
Given the continuity of a conservative bureaucracy, the organisational structure of social 
insurance was widely maintained during the National Socialist regime, whilst liberal and 
social rights were gradually demolished. During the Allied Occupation (1946-48) the 
western occupying forces had intended to restructure social insurance, expand it to all 
employed people at the level of benefits for blue-collar workers and give unions a two- 
thirds majority in its administration. Yet, as social insurance was one of the few bourgeois 
traditions with which Germans identified after the national socialist policies of 
collectivisation, the plan was eventually dropped and an adjusted form of social insurance 
was maintained in the western occupation zones (Hockerts 1983). I shall suggest that the 
maintenance of the old style social insurance illustrates the degree to which solidarity was 
identified with a differentiating principle that tied benefits to labour market participation.
3.6. GENERATIONAL CONTRACTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: 
PROMISE, CHALLENGE AND DISASTER
The generational contract as the embodiment of social solidarity
The specific welfare arrangement of the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1948, 
has been called ‘ Sozialstaaf. The political and juridical term ‘social state’ is codified in the 
Basic Law and defines the Federal Republic as a democratic and ‘social federal state’ 
(sozialer Bundesstaat) and a ‘social state under the rule of law’ (sozialer Rechtsstaat). As in 
other western countries the German welfare or ‘social’ state is not a separate institution but 
a characteristic and objective of the state that is in competition with other aims (Kaufinann 
1997, p. 22). Its social and moral order is codified by the principles of subsidiarity and
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solidarity. The subsidiary function of societal or state activity vis-a-vis the initiative of 
individuals and families was developed in the nineteenth century political economy of 
social Catholicism in opposition to state centralism and collectivism. According to the 
principle of subsidiarity, responsibility for support as well as decision-making should 
remain at the lowest organisational level possible, ascending only when necessary (Tester 
1994). The principle of solidarity codifies mutual responsibility and is incorporated in the 
social insurance system, where people in employment contribute on equal terms with 
their employers to current health and pension benefits.
In the immediate post-war years with the high rates of women’s labour market 
participation, divorce and illegitimate births, a central aim of social policy was to 
reconstitute the bourgeois family with a rigid division of labour between the 
breadwinning husband and homemaking housewife. As the German demographer 
Mackenroth put it ‘in place of class, today the family must become the object of social 
policy, across all classes and strata’ (Mackenroth 1953 as quoted in Collmer 1956, p. 54). 
Numerous family organisations were formed Tike worker’s associations in the political 
situation of the 19 th century’ (Neundorfer 1956, p. 32) and the model of the Hausfrauenehe 
[housewife marriage] was codified in family law and institutionalised in a gender- 
segregated labour market. It was maintained by female ‘labour protection laws’ and the 
promotion of the male ‘family wage’, which reinforced the assumption that women were 
and should be financially dependent on a man (Ostner 1993).
In order to reconcile the male family wage with the capitalist principle of the 
performance wage [.Leistungslohn] (the paying of wages according to economic 
performance, not to need) the theologian and political advisor Nell-Breuning suggested 
that
if necessary one has to reserve the higher valued and paid work for men -  because 
the support of the family is the man’s responsibility -  until all fully productive men 
have found such workplaces and salaries, at least those who actually have to 
maintain a family.
(Nell-Breuning 1960, p. 170)
Complementary roles were an ‘assumption of normality’ characterising the familism that 
was supposed to secure the German nation (FRG) against the ‘heartless’ collectivist
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practices in the east. Women’s full-time motherhood and housework was naturalised, taken 
for granted and enthusiastically appraised.
What these 7 million ‘full-time housewives’ [.Nur-Hausfrauen] do ... is real 
economically valuable work! ... If we try to calculate in market prices everything 
that our housewives naturally do on a day-to-day basis, without making any fuss, 
our gross national product would be infinitely increased.
(Neundorfer op. cit., p. 34, emphasis added)
After having dealt with the immediate consequences of the war the ruling Christian- 
Democrats had announced a ‘great social reform’ for the second parliamentary term. This 
terminology emotionally drew on socialist and Christian social values whilst the 
government merely aimed to reform the social security system (Zoellner 1981, p. 142). 
Given the hardship of pensioners whose average pension was only worth 30% of the 
average wage, their expected numerical increase and the prevalent normative view that 
older people should participate in economic growth and be able to maintain their achieved 
standard of living, the reform of pension insurance became its most important part. The 
proceedings of the voluntary association Deutscher Verein fur qffentliche und private 
Fiirsorge on ‘welfare and social reform’ give a comprehensive overview of debates 
between social policy experts, politicians and family activists on pension insurance and 
intergenerational family relationships. They show that in view of rising social expenditure, 
pejorative notions of the ageing of population [Uberalterung, literally, ‘over-ageing’] and 
the labelling of older people as ‘social baggage’ [Sozialgepack] were common currency, as 
were notions of ‘generational interests’ (Ohl 1956), commonly associated with 
contemporary debates. Intergenerational solidarity was advocated not only in material but 
also in moral terms of gratefulness -  ‘despite everything! ’ (Depuhl 1956), an allusion to the 
responsibility of the older generation for the Third Reich.
Justifications of generational politics such the expansion of child-care institutions, domestic 
and residential care and adequate pensions frequently referred to the romanticised image of 
the pre-industrial multi-generation family that was considered as a solidarity care 
association [Sorgeverband]. This image was used both to argue for individual responsibility 
and for responsibility of the state. Contrary to the view of the conservative family minister 
Wurmeling that it was the ‘arch-responsibility’ (Wiirmeling 1956, p. 77) o f‘the family’ to
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provide care16, the social policy expert Falkenberg argued that someone who had been 
employed all his life should not have to rely on his children in old age. Falkenberg made an 
analogy between the pre-industrial responsibility of the family and the responsibility of the 
state in industrial society.
The duty of material support in the pre-industrial extended family... was based on 
its co-operative economy. As everybody took part in the generation of the family 
income he [sic] obtained a right to enduring maintenance ... Increasingly, in the 
modem economy only society itself is an autonomous economic unit to which the 
duty of care is transferred in return for the use of human labour.... The right to full 
maintenance as a return from the family economy corresponds today to the right to 
comprehensive social security from the communally generated gross national 
product.
(Falkenberg 1956, p. 58-9)
For the social policy expert Arps (1956) on the other hand, the subsistence economy of the 
peasant with his separate plot on the farm, evidence of the ‘natural’ direct solidarity 
between father and son without any ‘monetary detours’, served as a model to justify 
individual responsibilities in industrial society. According to Arps the peasant knew what 
his farm could produce and in a timely manner planned for his needs in old age by building 
the cottage and securing long-lasting goods. In industrial society, wages should therefore 
allow for the possibility of building a house that can become a source of income when sold 
or rented out in old age. ‘It is natural that a person who is no longer employed consumes his 
savings’ (Arps op. cit., p. 299).
These images of the pre-industrial multiple-generation household illustrate both the 
naturalness and the rationality of the ‘generational contract’ (see Chapter 2) according to 
which simultaneously living generations always live off the goods produced by the middle 
generation. ‘The three stage life course [childhood, employment, retirement] is only 
possible because a society consists of all three generations: it is a social contract, a 
continuous restocking of the gross national product’ (Nell-Breuning op. cit., p. 191) where 
the productive generation gives support both to the young and the old. The emerging 
generation receives benefits in advance; the older generation receives benefits for their 
lifetime achievements. For this reason Nell-Breuning argued that those who do not
16 Wurmeling’s claim that family rights were pre-state rights which therefore had to be protected against 
state intervention did contradict his condemnation of female employment: mothers who took up ‘foreign
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reproduce in order to ensure the circle of give and take evade their societal responsibilities 
and (indirectly) fail to secure their own future.
This conception of the generational contract as a ‘contract of solidarity between two 
generations at the time’ (Schreiber 1955, p. 28) was advanced by the Catholic entrepreneur 
and economist Wilfrid Schreiber and gained the attention of Chancellor Adenauer who 
chaired the social reform committee. For Schreiber too this ‘contract of solidarity’ was 
realised in the pre-industrial family: ‘The parents raised the children and thereby gained the 
entitlement to receive support from their children in old age’ (Schreiber op. cit., p. 31). The 
task of social policy in modem society accordingly was to distribute life-long earnings over 
the economically ‘unproductive’ periods of the life course. Schreiber suggested that old age 
pension should no longer be funded but based on PAYG, and introduced a new formula for 
the calculation of pensions. Benefits were not calculated as nominal money equivalents of 
contributions, but as ‘pension entitlement points’ calculated as the percentage of the 
individual salary to average earnings. The yearly quotient of the sum of actual contributions 
and the sum of entitlement points constituted the yearly pension value of each entitlement 
point. In so far as the contribution revenue reflected the development of earnings, pensions 
were automatically tied to the standard of living of the employed. The ‘dynamic pension’ 
thereby guaranteed the continuing purchasing power of pensions. Schreiber was opposed to 
state subsidies and covering funds, which he argued, would aggravate cyclical effects when 
used in times of crisis to finance benefits.
It is rarely mentioned that Schreiber’s contract of solidarity included a second pact: 
symmetrical to the provision in old age, Schreiber suggested the introduction of a youth 
pension to allow (families with) children to participate in the dynamic increase of 
production. Whereas older people could in principle plan ahead and save for their old age, 
income could logically only be transferred to childhood via the ‘active’ generation. Holding 
that this transfer was insufficiently secured through the performance wage of the male 
breadwinner and tax-financed child allowances [Familienlastenausgleich] Schreiber 
suggested
that workers make a contract of solidarity amongst themselves which allows the
work’ \fremde Arbeit] were accused of evading their family responsibilities.
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worker’s child an advance on its own future income. This children’s pension is 
financed by the entity of all adult workers at any one time and is naturally paid to 
the guardian as the trustee of the child.
(Schreiber op. cit., p. 32)
According to this contract, a child is entitled to this pension up to the age of 20 and from the 
age of 35 the adult (child), who is encouraged to start his own family early, has to start 
paying back ‘his’ pension until ‘he’ retires. Schreiber held that the specific rates of 
repayment should depend on family status. A married person with two children only paid 
half of what an unmarried person has to pay, and a married person with four children paid 
only half of the repayment of a person with two children. Thereby the youth pension gained 
an element of pro-natal and family politics. But Schreiber insisted that it was neither a 
premium for procreation, nor a recompense of married persons with children as each 
individual only paid back the pension ‘he’ has received as a child. Furthermore 
contributions and benefits of the two pensions did not have to be determined once and for 
all but could be altered if the ‘numerical bases of the contract’ changed. Private insurance, 
savings and provision were to complement the publicly administered state pension.
I consider the ‘Schreiber-plan’ as a quite remarkable idea. On the one hand the author in a 
Christian-Catholic tradition took the institution of the family and its gendered division of 
labour for granted. On the other hand he did not attempt to strengthen or encourage ‘natural 
solidarity’ but built his redistributive mechanism on economic rationality. Schreiber drew 
on the device of the social contract (2.2.) when stating that workers freely make a contract 
about the distribution and allocation of resources whilst conceiving of the state as a designer 
of intergenerational politics (Laslett 1992). As in the social contract the actors and 
deliberators were obviously conceived as men. Once they agreed on the formula he 
suggested, contributions were automatically subtracted from wages so that repayment 
becomes compulsory for all people in full employment. One could also imagine that those 
who did not pay back their youth pension did not qualify for their old age pension. 
Schreiber did not spell out that his model of solidarity requires that people in full 
employment pay dual contributions towards both the youth and the old age pension. His 
redistributive mechanism thereby relies heavily on a growing economy and a stable 
numerical relation between the three generations involved. Neither does he conceive of the 
consequences that his model could have on gender relations, namely that with the youth
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pension parents could buy in child care and women could contribute towards their own old 
age pensions in participating in the labour market.
Whereas a modified version of Schreiber’s old age pension as a PAYG scheme was passed 
in 1957 with the support of the Social Democrats, the youth pension was omitted against 
Schreiber’s fierce resistance. ‘People always have children’, Adenauer reportedly had said, 
tacitly assuming women’s unpaid childcare responsibilities.
PAYG was implemented in 1957 with a covering fund of a year’s contribution revenue. 
Pensions were tied to average gross earnings. Furthermore, pension credited periods were 
introduced, which covered unemployment, illness and further education but not periods of 
child rearing or familial care giving. Neither was there a substitution for low lifetime 
earnings and/or irregular contributions because the pension insurance was explicitly not 
designed as a means to correct the wage structure of the labour market. On the contrary 
with the principle of ‘contribution equivalent benefits’ the pension system reproduced 
labour market stratification, which became a main characteristic of the conservative- 
corporatist welfare regime.
In many respects women were therefore structurally disadvantaged in the very system that 
was meant to embody social solidarity because of their ‘private’ intergenerational 
responsibilities, particularly child care that was not credited for pensions until 1986 and 
elder care that was not credited until the introduction of the long-term care insurance in 
1995. Because of structural wage inequalities and the casualisation of predominantly 
‘female’ labour market sectors, women’s earnings were likely to be both in absolute and 
percentage terms below the average wage. A reform that tied pension benefits to average 
earnings without differentiating between the average of men and women’s earnings resulted 
in substantially lower pensions for women. At the same time the reference to women’s 
lower average wage was used to justify the fact that women only received 75% of the 
credits given to men for periods of further education. In addition voluntary insurance during 
periods spent outside of the labour market, which had mainly to be taken by housewives, 
was no longer possible. The newspaper (1956b) claimed that in the PAYG scheme
both individual women and widow pensions were lower than they were according to the old
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formula of pension calculation that had included a basic state subsidy.17 The fact that 
periods of family care-giving were not credited for pensions is of importance because 
according to the German principle of contribution density, other periods like unemployment 
or sickness were only credited when at least 50% of contributions had been made.
Although the ‘generational contract’ never made up for women’s lost earnings due to 
family responsibilities, and its combination of patriarchal welfare and market mechanisms 
magnified gender inequalities, the main objections to the dynamic pension did not come 
from women’s organisations. Opposition to the linking of the pension to gross average 
earnings came from the employer associations, the organisations of banks and building 
societies and private insurance. A representative of an insurance association, for example, 
using the generative metaphor referred to the dynamic pension as ‘the worst deformity 
[.Miftgeburt] that a stork ever put into a mother’s cradle’ {Die Zeit 1956a). Not without 
irony the German Press Agency {Deutsche Presse Agentur 1956) noted that the 
representatives of the workers, known for their preference for collective solutions, 
demanded benefits equivalent to individual contributions, whereas the employers and 
representatives of private insurance suggested a collective basic state pension.18
Despite old and new disparities between the genders and between those in receipt of an 
additional occupational pension, who were usually already employed in the more secure 
and better-paid sectors of the economy, and those who were not, the pension reform was 
immensely popular. It was said to have had positive material and psychological effects on
171 gained access to articles in newspapers and magazines by consulting the German print archive of the 
public broadcasting agency Nordeutscher Rundfunk (NDR). Since 1949 the NDR has collected and 
chronologically filed articles from a wide range of German newspapers and magazines. My analysis of 128 
articles from 16 different newspapers and magazines is based on the collection relating to ‘social security’, 
‘family politics’ and ‘intergenerational relations’ and focuses on the periods from 1955-57 and from 1988- 
98. Unfortunately no detailed information about the scope of the print archive was available.
18 The criticism of these organisations first concerned the threat of inflation. It was assumed that the dynamic 
pension would jeopardise the stability of the German Mark and create a ‘double currency’: a ‘soft saving 
Mark’ and a ‘hard pension Mark’ (Hockerts 1980, p. 379). Prices would increase as a result of the sudden gain 
in purchasing power of the pensioners and would lead to new demands for pay raises setting off a wage-price 
spiral. Secondly, the critics pointed to the threat to investment: Private savings as an important means of 
capital accumulation would drop and the necessary decrease of current covering funds would lead to cutbacks 
in state investment in social welfare. The third and currently most relevant objection concerned the projected 
long-term costs of the reform, particularly in die light of projected demographic change. The image of 
‘grandpa as breadwinner’ (Siideutsche Zeitung 1956 as quoted in Hockerts 1980, p. 384) was evoked: families 
will have to rely on the pension of the grandfather in the future because the son’s diminished income will no 
longer be sufficient.
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both pensioners and on the expectation of people in regular employment. Although 
contributions increased from 11 to 14% pensions never reached 60% of gross earnings. The 
reform led, however, to an increase of the average pensions for blue-collar workers of 
65.3% and for white-collar workers of71.9%, which was considered restitution for previous 
restraint on consumption (Hockerts 1980, p. 422). As intended by Adenauer, whose 
policies, like Bismarck’s, were strategic rather than merely based on solidarity, the reform 
contributed largely to a consolidation of the state (Zoellner 1981). Christian Democrats won 
a landslide victory in the election of 1957.
The generational contract as fraud and immorality
Like other western and non-westem societies the German social state faces the demographic 
challenge of population ageing. Generations reproduce themselves only at a level of 65% 
and the so-called dependency ratio, that is the relation of people aged over 60 to those 
between 20 and 60 is expected to rise from currently 35 to a 100 to 68 to a 100 in 2015 
(Hohn 1996). Social expenditure in Germany has risen from 29.2% in 1990 to 34.4% in 
1997 when the individual gross salary included 42% of social security contributions jointly 
paid by employer and employee (Kaufinann 1997). Considering present demographic and 
economic developments, an increase in contributions and/or a decrease in benefits appear 
inevitable if the social insurance system is to be maintained in its present form, which 
threatens economic performance and/or the standard of living of pensioners, respectively.
Although there had always been critical voices referring to an ‘abuse [of] the interests of the 
whole nation, whose fate is not dependent on the standard of living of its pensioners but on 
the educational standards of its children’ (Handelsblatt 1967), since the recession in the 
1980s, rising mass unemployment and a related increase in social expenditure the 
institutionalised generational contract has been characterised as a ‘time fuse’ (GeiBler 1980, 
p. 166). But only since the late 1980s have ‘new discourses of burden’ (Dinkel 1997) 
emerged, which, based on the differential positions of generations (as age groups) in the 
distribution of benefits and contributions to the welfare state, cross-sectionally locate a 
conflict between generations as competing interest groups.
Discourses of burden are characterised by the combination of rational-economic cost-
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benefit analysis and model calculations with emotionally loaded scenarios of bellicose 
confrontation between ‘young’ and ‘old’: ‘Grey Panthers against contribution payers’ 
(iSiiddeutsche Zeitung 1996). Individuals on the one hand are seen as cost factors in an 
insurance economy that threaten national competitiveness (Dinkel op. cit., p. 1). On the 
other hand they are seen as ruthless protagonists in a struggle around ‘jobs, pensions, 
positions’ {Focus 1996 as quoted in Dinkel ibid.). In political statements, media reports and 
popular science publications the generational contract is identified as both a major cause 
and symptom of the new confrontation between age groups. Thus problems of distributive 
justice are perceived as a consequence of welfare state development itself. Yet, they 
frequently cast ‘the old’ and more recently the childless members of society as the makers 
and beneficiaries of an unjust contract.
The analysis of the discourses of generational struggle suggests that it is politicians and 
journalists rather than organised representatives of different age cohorts, who are ‘actors’ 
and ‘makers’ of this confrontation. Particularly where they link the ‘burden’ of social 
insurance with environmental damage, the alleged decline of the family and the changing 
age and power structure of society (e.g. Textor 1994; Schuller 1996), the critique of the 
generational contract turns into scapegoating of ‘the old’. As Allport (1959 as quoted in 
Binstock 1994, p. 158) has stated, ‘an issue seems nicely simplified if we blame a group or 
class of people rather than the complex course of social and historical forces’. The fact that 
economic growth and employment are of primary importance to demography for the 
sustainability of generational contract usually is ignored (Dinkel 1997).
Critics of the present system have questioned whether the generational contract is 
constitutional. Thus the director of the Institute for Economy and Society Miegel has posed 
the question ‘Can and may the legislator constrain citizens to contribute to a system where 
it is certain from the beginning that they will lose a part of their money?’ {Die Welt 1997). 
And the judge and family activist Jurgen Borcherts has asked: ‘By what right.. .does the 
state coerce children via its transfer systems to provide more for foreign childless people 
than for their own parents?’ {Tagesspiegel 1996b).
Youth organisations of the major political parties in Germany are adamant critics of the
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generational contract. Liberal and Christian Democrat youth organisations have suggested a 
return from the PAY G scheme to covering funds. Drawing on the repertoire of contract, the 
leader of the conservative youth organisation Escher has denounced the generational 
contract as an ‘immoral agreement chargeable to a third party’ (Escher 1996 as quoted in 
Dinkel op. cit., p. 6) that is therefore invalid. The youth organisation of the Green Party has 
demanded a ‘solidarity contribution of well-to-do elders’ in a paper entitled ‘Give me my 
future, grandpa, and I give you your pension’ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996b). 
Indeed press reports frequently cast the elderly as ‘master consumers’ (see critically 
Jamieson and Victor 1997):
Because the welfare politicians 40 years ago fancied giving voters the most money 
when they least needed it -  in old age when mortgages are paid off and the children 
have left home -  pensioners developed into a class of consumers... who have in 
abundance those goods at their disposal that are scare for most others: money and 
time.
(Frantfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1998b)
Critics have suggested extracting so-called ‘insurance-external benefits’, such as costs for 
WWn reparations, credits for periods of child raising and subsidies for East German 
pensioners from social insurance payments. Other reformers have suggested the inclusion 
of a ‘demographic component’ of life expectancy in the calculation of pension entitlement 
points, which would effectively decrease benefits (Der Spiegel 1997). More radically, 
politicians have favoured a return to covering funds and/or the introduction of a basic 
pension. Interestingly, the interests of women are suddenly taken into account in the 
argument that tax financed basic pensions would increase their pensions (Miegel 1997, as 
quoted in Der Spiegel 1997).
Both major political parties, the Social and Christian Democrats, on the other hand are 
committed to maintaining the current social insurance system against recommendations of 
the World Bank that recommended a three-pillar model of a (contribution dependent) basic 
state pension based on taxation in conjunction with occupational and private pensions 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1996a). A major objection to the three-pillar model is that 
the transition from PAYG to a funded scheme would be impossible to finance. Contributors 
to the present system have gained entitlements, which according to the German Basic Law 
are considered as quasi-property and cannot legally be reduced to a minimum basic
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pension. Consequently the younger generation would have to make dual or triple 
contributions to pay into the present and future system and ensure their own provision. Yet 
media commentators have suggested that the two large ‘people’s parties’ merely adhere to 
the current social insurance system to gain votes from ‘the old’ (Rheinischer Merkur 1996).
The debates have also opened new fault lines alongside old lines of argumentation. Apart 
from the antagonism between young and old, childless persons are set against families with 
children ‘who in contrast to the childless fulfil their part in the generational contract’ (Die 
Zeit 1999). The influential Catholic charity Caritas has characterised an alleged continuing 
discrimination and impoverishment of families as a ‘social time bomb’ (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 1998a). Every sixth child in the FRG currently grows up in households 
that rely on social assistance. According to Caritas redistribution must not occur from richer 
to poorer families but ‘from non-parents to parents and from old to young’ (ibid.). 
According to the motto ‘pay or procreate’ (Der Spiegel 1996b) numerous suggestions have 
been raised to calculate insurance contributions according to the number of children (Die 
Zeit 1999; Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt 1997; Breyerandv. d. Schulenburg 1990). 
The German judge Borcherts has even suggested annulling the newly introduced long-term 
care insurance on the grounds that it allegedly disproportionately burdens families with 
children. ‘One mustn’t continue to shell out money and give it as a present to singles and 
older people’ (Borcherts 1996 as quoted in Tagesspiegel 1996).
At the same time the decline of intergenerational family solidarity is deplored. Here it is the 
middle generations, and more or less explicitly women, who are blamed for having 
neglected both children and elders. As a result of separations and divorces children ‘have 
grown up subjected to a constant erosion of values’ (Neue Ziiricher Zeitung 1992), 
experienced family disharmony and are therefore likely to have fewer children themselves. 
Older family members are said to be treated as mere ‘care objects’ and the German Press 
Agency speculates about a further increase of so-called ‘granny dumping’ following the 
alleged practice in the United States (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1993, p. 14).
The Christian Democrats had long heralded a ‘moral and political offensive for the family’ 
(Geifller 1980, p. 168). Policies such as the introduction of parental leave and the increase
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in pension-credited periods from one year to three years per child have targeted women and 
consolidated the breadwinner model. Pro-natalist efforts have often been bluntly sexist, 
illustrated by the statement of the economist Engels who claimed that the institutionalised 
generational contract contributes to low fertility rates and that
we must plan in the long-term in this area because the product that we turn out, a 
young girl, needs 20 years until she becomes a mother. And consequently we 
have to provide for the mothers of tomorrow ... already today.
(Engels 1984, p. 48)
In response, the Social Democrats have denounced pro-natal policies as simplistic in the 
assumption that (further) childlessness is not a choice but merely a consequence of 
economic restraint.
Interestingly, although commentators have occasionally claimed that the new long-term 
care insurance repeats the mistakes of the pension system by disadvantaging people with 
children (Habisch 1998) the metaphor of the generational contract is not directly evoked in 
the context of care insurance. After more than two decades of debate long-term care 
insurance (Pflege-Versicherungsgesetz) was introduced in 1995 as the fifth pillar of the 
German insurance system. For the first time the need for care is legally codified as a 
‘function of protection’ (Tatschutzbestand), evidence of changes in the ‘politics of need 
interpretation’ (Fraser 1989). Yet, the insurance does not offer comprehensive, but only 
partial basic cover of specified care needs and explicitly aims to strengthen self-help and 
family care (Bundesministerium fur Arbeit 1998; Meyer 1996). With the introduction of the 
care insurance family and intergenerational solidarity are no longer seen as threatened by 
social security but are to some extent acknowledged and supported by social security. 
Contractual relations encompass the insurance contract between the person insured and the 
care insurance scheme, the service provision contract between insurer and service providers 
and the care contract between service provider and client (Schulz-Godker 1996). In contrast 
to the notion of the intra-familial caring contract (Walker 1996b) these contractual relations 
do not regulate the relationship between informal carer and care-receiver.
Prior to the introduction of the care insurance system, the need for social care was not 
covered by any of the existing insurance schemes. Medical aspects were covered by
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health insurance; non-medical aspects were regulated by means-tested social assistance. 
The existence of hierarchies and the fragmentation of different systems and funding 
sources, as well as the emphasis on self-reliance and family care, prevented the 
development of integrated community care services geared to meet individual needs 
(Tester 1994). Whether and how integrated, need-orientated and self-determined care 
provision is furthered by long-term care insurance is subject to ongoing debate (see n. 
19).
The care insurance system offers insurance based (partial) support designed primarily as 
services (Sachleistungeri) to those who ‘because of the severity of their care needs have 
to rely on solidaristic social support’ (§ 1 Abs. 4 SGB XI as quoted in Griep and Renn 
1997, p. 92). Contributions of 1.7% of the gross salary are jointly paid by employers and 
employees after abolishing a public holiday to compensate for the employers’ 
contribution. Spouses who are not regularly employed and children are co-insured 
(Meyer op. cit.). All those who were insured under public or private health insurance are 
covered, that is currently more than 80 million people. In the maxim ‘ambulant vor 
stationar’ domiciliary care is defined as taking precedent over residential care 
(Bundesministerium fur Arbeit op. cit.; Mager 1997). Walter (1997, p. 84) has argued 
that whereas legally codified financial support obligations between parents and adult 
children have recently been ‘de-familialised’ social support provided under the care 
insurance system is ‘re-familialised’.
Health care professionals are employed to assess individual need in terms of basic 
activities of daily living (bADL) and instrumental activities for daily living (iADL). 
Support is based on three levels of disability and only provided if a person needs help at 
least once a day in two or more bADLs and several times a week in iADL. He or she can 
then choose between supports in kind or in cash or a combination of the two. In the first 
case private or voluntary sector services are arranged under contract by the insurance 
scheme, in the second a substantially reduced care allowance is paid to buy informal 
support. The monetary allowance is substantially reduced because of the non-professional 
character of informal support. Family members or friends must provide care for at least 
14 hours per week to receive the care allowance and are then entitled to training, qualify
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for paid leave (up to four weeks per year) and are covered by the Accident and Pension 
Insurance if they work less then 30 hours a week (Mager op. cit.). If informal support is 
not available and domiciliary or day-care care is more expensive than residential care the 
insurance pays set amounts for care in residential institutions while care receivers have to 
pay for food and board (Haug 1995). So far 80% of people cared for in their own homes 
have opted for the care allowance and requests for residential care have decreased (Griep 
and Renn 1997). As a result of the care insurance scheme, expenditure on social 
assistance has decreased but remains crucial for all supplementary services not required 
on a daily basis or not covered by the insurance (Bliim 1997; Hein 1997).19
Gender equality is usually not explicitly addressed in scenarios of an alleged confrontation 
between the old and the young or between people with and without children, or in the 
debates about restructuring the social security system, such as the long-term care insurance. 
Yet, women constitute the majority of people in advanced old age, and by implication 
constitute the majority of those who receive benefits and services in old age and the 
majority of an ageing electorate. According to current legislation women retire two years 
earlier and due to intra-familial responsibilities and resultant discrimination in the labour 
market pay fewer lifetime contributions. But just as ‘solidarity’ was not questioned when 
the generational contract was institutionalised in the PAYG scheme, the question of how 
women would fare in a restructured social security system is not publicly debated.
Women (as well as pensioners) are, however, addressed as potential saviours of
19 There are a range of problems associated with the care insurance, notably its restrictive definition of care 
that is based on a (medical) deficiency model and largely excludes needs for communication, counselling 
and the promotion o f social participation (Meyer op. cit.). Jansen and Klein (1997) have argued that the 
pre-professional notion of home care and the one-sided emphasis on domesticity (Hauslichkeit), qualified 
as adverse for the development of young people, negates the significance of semi-public and public spaces 
for the dignity and identity of care receivers and informal carers. Eligibility practice is restrictive and the 
insurance is said to promote expert dependency rather than considering care as cooperation and 
coproduction. It is often argued that the insurance scheme was introduced for economic reasons to decrease 
expenditure on social assistance (Backhaus-Maul 1996), which indeed has decreased. The care insurance 
includes the principle of a set budget and contribution stability independent of actual need as well as 
promoting competition between service providers through provision contracts, which is said to lead to a 
decrease services quality (Griep and Renn op. cit; Meyer op. cit.; Haug 1995). Despite the new language of 
pluralisation, marketisation and consumer sovereignty measures of quality control, particularly in home 
care arrangements, remain inadequate and choices de facto  limited because services are not an ‘experiental 
good’ (Heinze et al. 1996, p. 49; Busch 1996). Backer (1991) has argued that receipt of the care allowance 
is class-based and poorer families may not be able to afford to lose it whether or not they would want to 
provide care.
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generational contracts and bearers of a ‘new solidarity’ both as mothers and daughters, and 
as paid and unpaid workers. Whereas retired men and women are considered for all kinds of 
community work and payers of solidarity contributions (Thomson 1992; Schuller 1996), 
women across age groups and class are targeted to bear and raise the number of children 
needed to meet the requirements of the pension system (Schunter-Kleemann 1991). They 
are targeted as the ‘daughter care potential’ (Klein and Salaske 1996) by the long-term care 
insurance. Women’s age of retirement has been successively increased (to 65 years in the 
year 2000) and voluntary services professionalised to make them more attractive for women 
(critically Backes 1985). The introduction of a year’s compulsory community service for 
women has been demanded (Wessels 1994). These suggestions indicate a consensus that it 
will not be possible to remunerate what Kaufmann (1990, p. 149) has called ‘shadow work’ 
in market prices and that it will not be sufficient to appeal to women’s altruism alone. But 
they also confirm that ‘policies emanating from a the welfare state “in crisis” represent not 
so much a break with past practice as an intensification ... of elements of a familism, a 
nationalism and a variety of racism inherent in the development of the welfare state’ 
(Williams 1989, p. 12).
Taking these policy recommendations together they point to the impossibility of women 
playing a positive role in the generational contract, and consequently they point to the 
contradictory structure of generational contracts themselves. If they engage in the labour 
market and contribute to the institutionalised contract women are held responsible for 
neglecting their family responsibilities. If on the other hand they engage in the family they 
are not considered as contributors to the social insurance system, as is shown in the recent 
discussion to cut out the ‘free’ co-insurance of not regularly employed family members as 
insurance-external benefits. Even though it reinforces family care-giving by including 
informal carers in social security the long-term care insurance is a step towards mitigating 
these contradictions, without however promoting full economical independence of women 
with caring responsibilities. Importantly Lister (1995, p. 29-30) has suggested the criterion 
of ‘defamilialization’ to assess the extent to which welfare state policies alter power 
relationships between men and women and allow adult individuals to maintain an 
acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships.
116
3.7. CONCLUSION
By focussing on both welfare regulations of support relationships within families and of 
relations between generations as age cohorts, this chapter has explored institutionalised 
generational contracts and their constitutive inequalities in the German welfare state. The 
investigation of early German poor relief has shown that the codification of duties of 
intergenerational support drew on the repertoire of generation as ‘blood line’ and conceived 
support responsibilities as a corollary to the rights of inheritance, thereby presupposing 
reciprocity and symmetrical exchanges. However, what was defined as bloodline 
historically contracted and changed according to the needs of the state to limit its subsidiary 
function. Agrarian retirement contracts drew on the repertoire of contract, even if 
contractual freedom was absent and retirement and filial support not necessarily voluntary. 
Women were excluded from the contractual agreement as negotiators, but not as tacit 
suppliers of intergenerational support.
This taken for granted aspect of a division of labour by gender also continued to underwrite 
the institutionalisation of social insurance in industrialised Germany at the turn of the last 
century. The regulation of relations between societal generations of workers was initially 
conceived as jeopardising intergenerational relationships within families, an argument that 
reappears in contemporary discourse (Gronemeyer 1991, Engels 1984). Drawing on the 
idea of social solidarity, solidarity referred to the cohesion of different generations of 
workers whilst the ‘solidaristic’ social insurance constituted and maintained a gendered 
dualism between first class insurance and subsidiary social assistance. As in modem 
political theory solidarity refers to both Christian values of supporting those in need and to 
a voluntary mutual taking of responsibility of self-interested individuals. As Kleinhenz 
argues it is rational for people to enter into collective ‘insurance contracts’ because 
everybody can principally get in situations of need and disadvantage (Kleinhenz 1997, p. 
72). The post-war mechanism of the generational contract as the PAYG scheme was 
ideologically mapped onto the pre-industrial solidaristic multi-generation household, ‘an 
association of mutual insurance’ (Engels 1984, p. 36) with its gendered division of labour, 
albeit ignoring the degree of its actual state regulation. The contractual vocabulary of the 
generational contract similarly was used as an analogy to the moral obligations within
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families, drawing on Christian social values of mutuality and altruism as well as on the 
contractual repertoire of self-regarding rationality. But as in the agrarian retirement 
contract, the practice of family support remained a taken for granted female preserve 
whereas ‘social solidarity’ remained a predominantly male domain. This hierarchy is to 
some extent challenged by the long-term care insurance. Although discussed outside the 
framework of the generational contract the care insurance effectively acknowledges caring 
work by incorporating specified care needs into a social insurance and insuring informal 
care-givers while re-familialising (gendered) social support.
Meanwhile the generational contract institutionalised in the pension system is currently 
heavily criticised by turning the contractual and solidaristic association complexes of 
fairness and mutuality against the generational contract in changing contextual conditions. 
But as my analysis of articles that have appeared in the German print media shows, this 
critique is not based on its inherent status and gender inequalities, but cast in ageist and 
familialistic terms of a confrontation between age and social groups. It is precisely the 
moral ‘flavour’ of the contract terminology that ‘backfires’, resignifies the generational 
contract as an immoral agreement and feeds the harshness of the present debates that 
scapegoats older and childless members of society for having unduly enriched themselves 
in the German social state. In these debates the hypothetical deliberators of the generational 
contract have turned in ‘real’ actors in the scenarios of resource competition.
Women’s contradictory role in generational contracts, or more precisely in intergenerational 
family relationships and aggregated intergenerational relations, is most clearly shown by 
policy recommendations to maintain the current system which simultaneously demand their 
participation in two ‘contracts’ that undermine each other. But whereas the contradictory 
structure of generational contracts in social contract theories has posed logical problems, the 
contradictory structure of generational contracts has ‘real’ material effects for those who are 
dual contributors as will be shown in the empirical analysis.
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Chapter 4
RESEARCHING THE MICRO-POLITICS OF 
INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS: 
THE HEURISTIC FRAMEWORK OF KINSCRIPTS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters have shown that intergenerational contracts in Germany have 
always been at the intersection of changing legal definitions, economic and welfare 
policies, moral discourse and family practices and custom. This chapter aims to develop a 
heuristic framework for the empirical analysis of what philosophical and socio-political 
conceptualisations of the generational contract have been implicitly depended on and yet 
largely ignored: intergenerational commitments within families or what in Germany has 
been labelled the ‘“small” generational contract’ (Bien 1994, p. 5). The heuristic 
framework aims to guide the empirical analysis, while at the same time holding open the 
possibility that the empirical data will further qualify the conceptual formulations and the 
theoretical discussion. As outlined in the introduction, the empirical investigation of the 
intergenerational commitments of members of two family generations in West Germany, 
members of the welfare and baby-boom generation, will ask if, and to what extent, the 
generational contract provides repertoires and images for social actors to describe and 
interpret their intergenerational relationships.
From the preceding analyses I delineate three criteria that a conceptual framework of 
intergenerational family commitments must accommodate. The first criterion is historical 
specificity. Intergenerational relationships get their meaning in historically specific social 
contexts. Hence, I suggest that the framework must account for a) the generational
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politics shaping intergenerational relationships (Chapter 3) and b) the dominant cultural 
meaning systems which provide orientation and interpretation patterns of 
intergenerational commitments (Chapter 2). The second criterion is practice. 
Intergenerational commitments get their meaning in practice and these practices and their 
subjective interpretations may change over time and circumstance (Chapter 1). 
Furthermore the fact that generations are always constituted in relation to one another 
suggests a third criterion, the accounting for intergenerational legacies. Intergenerational 
commitments build on (historically specific) family legacies, which they reproduce or 
transform.
Despite an increasing interest in intergenerational relationships in the course of the 
ageing of populations and the expectation of an increase in care needs of older family 
members, relationships between generations remain an under-theorised field in the social 
sciences (Liischer 1998). A dominant theoretical model has been the theory of 
intergenerational solidarity (Roberts and Bengtson 1990) and in a more psychological 
perspective the attachment model (Cicirelli 1986), both of which attempt to measure 
quality of parent-child bonds. More recently, work has begun on a theory of 
intergenerational ambivalence (Liischer and Pillemer 1998). Feminist scholars on the 
other hand have provided more localised accounts of the micro-politics of 
intergenerational relationships but rarely integrated them in a theoretical framework. 
Most significant is the work of Finch and Mason (1992) whose focus on commitment, 
identity and implicit and explicit negotiation and time has informed the framework 
building. Yet, perhaps because the authors focussed on wider family networks too much 
emphasis was given to the idea that commitments are always created and negotiable to 
apply it straightforwardly to the analysis of the accounts of parents and adult children. I 
therefore decided to build on the framework of kinscripts (Stack and Burton 1993) that 
conceptualises intergenerational commitments as kin work and gives emphasis to cultural 
and family scripts, albeit at the expense of the broader economic and social political 
context. I suggest that the framework has an unexplored theoretical and sensitising 
potential to guide the analysis of historically specific intergenerational practices.
After briefly reviewing the dominant theoretical models I will rework the framework of
120
kinscripts by first delineating three socio-historical dimensions inherent in the theoretical 
traditions Stack and Burton draw on, in relation to which kin work has to be analysed. 
Each dimension encompasses aspects of generational contracts elaborated in the previous 
chapters. Next I will highlight some of the functions and conceptual dimensions of the 
concept of kin work that pose questions to be addressed in the empirical research.
4.2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERGENERATIONAL
COMMITMENTS
In the sociological tradition solidarity has been considered the ‘glue’ of group 
cohesiveness ‘which overcomes the centripetal tendencies of human self-interest’ and 
drives ‘the pursuit of the common good’ (Roberts etal. 1991, p. 12) both in families and 
society at large. In its initial formulation, the solidarity model conceptualised 
intergenerational solidarity as a linear-additive composite of the interdependent 
dimensions: association (interaction), affection (positive sentiment) and consensus 
(similarity in values and beliefs) between parents and adult children (Bengtson et al. 1976 
as quoted in Roberts and Bengtson 1990, p. 13). The model posited five direct predictors 
among which shared socialisation was considered as a predictor for consensus, residential 
propinquity for association and helping behaviour for affection.
This model has found little empirical support. Testing its five direct predictors, Atkinson 
and colleagues (1986) found that only ‘objective solidarity’ (<association) could be 
predicted by residential propinquity and helping behaviour. The statistical insignificance 
of the predictors for ‘subjective solidarity’ (affection and consensus) on the other hand 
suggested that the three factors were independent, rather than different dimensions of the 
same construct. Roberts and Bengtson (op. cit.) proposed a reformulation of the model in 
which attitudinal consensus was omitted and normative orientations o f familial closeness 
and balanced exchanges o f assistance and support were integrated as predictors of 
mutual association and affection. Furthermore the new model separated the perspective 
of parents and children and thereby allowed for differing perspectives. Although 
normative solidarity potentially integrates dominant cultural meaning systems, the model 
remains ahistorical and decontextualised.
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The same holds for the attachment model, which posited that the emotional or affectual 
bond (constituted in childhood) is an explanatory factor for adult children’s helping 
behaviour rather than the other way around (Cicirelli 1986, pp. 56-9). The causal path 
model distinguished the independent variable ‘feeling of attachment’ from attachment 
behaviour such as contact and communication. In contrast to the solidarity model, 
negative feelings such as frustration and resentment were separated from feelings of 
attachment and could result from adult children’s helping behaviour. A strong bond of 
attachment was said to temper negative feelings.
The positive bias towards solidarity and attachment is one target for criticism of these 
models. With respect to the solidarity model, critics have pointed to the built in 
assumption that positive feelings serve to maintain the family system and negative 
aspects of intergenerational relationships are interpreted as the absence of solidarity 
(Liischer and Pillemer 1998). A conceptualisation and measurement of contradictory 
feelings between parents and children is thereby ruled out. Liischer and Pillemer (op. cit.) 
have suggested that a focus on the role of ambivalence generated in intergenerational 
relations is a more fruitful theoretical perspective for understanding the dynamics and 
commitments between generations.
Feminist scholars in particular have pointed to the complex interplay of emotions, moral 
identities and family practices, which are incorporated in the histories of intergenerational 
relationships. For example, in their influential study of British families, Finch and Mason 
(op. cit.) have argued that the negotiation of intergenerational commitments is not only 
about material provision and sentiment but also about the personal and moral identity of 
family members, their moral investments and ‘reputation’ of being a good mother or 
daughter. Abel has addressed the shortcomings of quantitative studies by pointing out 
that
if we learn only that a women prepares meals for her mother, we know very little 
about her work as a caregiver. Is she assuming this task despite her mother’s 
objections? Is she trying to please her mother? Is she cooking in order to avoid 
talking with her mother?
(Abel 1991, p. 62)
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Yet, qualitative findings have rarely been integrated into a conceptual framework. The 
framework of kinscripts is an attempt in this direction. It was developed from studies of 
low-income African-American families in the US to facilitate the analysis of the 
assignment and negotiation of the work of constituting and maintaining families across 
life spans and generations. In particular it focussed on tensions that were produced and 
negotiated between individuals in the families in response to scripts. Scripts were 
understood as ‘mental representations that guide the role performances of family 
members over the family life course’ (Stack and Burton op. cit., p. 160). The authors 
proposed three related concepts, in relation to which tensions were analysed. The concept 
of kin work conceptualised the labour of constituting families and kin groups in response 
to the economic, social, physical and psychological needs of the family. Kin time referred 
to the sequential ordering of family events according to so-called family timetables, 
defined as expectations regarding the timing of transitions generated and transmitted 
within families (Hagestad 1986a). And finally kinscription described the processes of 
assigning and negotiating kin work over time.
I consider the idea of conceptualising the labour involved in the constitution of 
intergenerational relationships as kin work, and a focus on both assignment and 
negotiation (usually considered as sequential in the process of modernisation (Kaufrnann 
1990) as highly productive for the analysis of intergenerational commitments. The 
concept of script allows for a conceptualisation of dominant scripts or meaning systems, 
as well as of intergenerational family traditions and their reproduction or transformation. 
Yet, the framework in its original formulation is confined too narrowly to the context of 
the immediate kin group at the expense of broader social and historical circumstance. 
Thus it does not allow for a conceptualisation of the interrelations between generational 
politics, dominant cultural scripts, family legacies and the micro-politics of 
intergenerational relationships. I will therefore revisit its theoretical constituents, namely 
sociological life course approaches, anthropological kinship studies and script theories, 
which I argue provide the necessary ingredients to develop a historically grounded 
framework.
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4.3. REVISTING LIFE COURSE, KINSHIP AND SCRIPT THEORIES
Life course approaches
Conceptualisations of the life course have reintroduced the dimension of time (in the 
triple sense of individual time, family time and historical time) into sociological enquiry 
by focussing on the individual life cycle, continuity and social change (Thompson 1981). 
The life course is conceived as a series of life events and turning points or transitions that 
structure the life cycle temporally, in a sequence of phases such as education, 
employment etc. Whilst requiring individual agency, life course transitions are shaped by 
socio-historical contexts and are often regulated by social institutions or institutional 
jurisdiction (such as compulsory school attendance or mandatory retirement). They are 
therefore subject to social change.20 At the same time the social structuring of the life 
course -  what Kohli (1985) has termed the ‘institutionalisation of the life course’ -  
entails standardisation and provides normative frames of orientation and practice. 
Parameters of social inequality such as gender, class, ethnicity and so on produce 
different effects, that is, they open or close off possibilities of social participation at 
different phases of the life course. In a life course approach transitions or status passages, 
such as the ones between family work and waged labour, are considered to be both sites 
of the reproduction of social inequality and sites of social change. They can serve as units 
of analysis that allow for an investigation of the reproduction of social institutions as well 
as the ways in which they are maintained or challenged by innovative practice at the level 
of the individual (Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1993).
Life course approaches thus emphasise temporal and contextual distinctions in life 
histories and the cumulative impact of historical processes that influence life transitions 
across generations. They highlight individual decisions ‘which cumulatively, not only 
give shape to each life story, but can also constitute the direction and scale of major 
social change’ (Thompson op. cit., p. 299). In particular life course approaches can 
further the analysis of the impacts, the interrelations and the gendered logic of social
20 Cross-cultural studies have shown that this concept of the life course is bound up with the western 
context shaped by an industrial economy. Thus for the !Kung in Botswana, for example, ‘age, per se, is not 
as salient in organising their lives nor is the life course perceived as a series of stages’ (Fry 1995, p. 138).
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institutions. Institutions such as the family, the law, the health care system and the labour 
market often present contradictory and simultaneous demands and cross-pressures, 
particularly for women (Kruger 1995; Okin 1989). Consequently what can appear as an 
individual choice and product of interpersonal negotiation is always shaped by solutions, 
which suggest themselves by a cumulative institutional logic. For example, the ‘choice’ 
of a woman to temporarily leave the labour market and look after her child is in part a 
product of unequal labour market prospects for men and women and the time-tables of 
schools, kindergartens and nurseries, which often require the part-time availability of a 
person in the home.
I therefore suggest that social institutions, conceived of as multiple and often 
contradictory culturally consolidated systems of order that are materialised in 
organisations and organisational practice and incorporate social norms (Kruger 1995), 
constitute the first dimension in relation to which intergenerational commitments have to 
be analysed. Life course approaches open up a novel perspective for the analysis of social 
institutions by focussing on the ways in which the law, the labour market, social policies 
and the family in conjunction regulate and shape intergenerational commitments over 
time, as well as providing biographical orientation patterns. As has been shown in the 
previous chapter the institutionalised generational contract can be considered as a social 
institution as well. Methodically, the impact of social institutions can be assessed at the 
level of life course transitions and counter-transitions, that is, transitions brought about 
by turning points in the life of another family member such as grandmotherhood 
(Hagestad and Neugarten 1985).
Theories of kinship
The significance of social institutions is highlighted further by anthropological theories of 
kinship. Kinship theories have contributed to overcoming the conceptual habit of 
reducing the family to an institution with visible (household) boundaries in favour of 
conceptualisations that focus on the ‘political significance of the ties of kinship beyond 
household boundaries’ (Casey 1989, p. 2). As elaborated in Chapter 1 kinship has no 
‘natural substance’ but is constituted, modified and reproduced by individuals and 
institutions, and can include adoptive and ritual kinship (Needham 1971; Schneider 1984;
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Collier and Yanagisako 1987). Ritual kinship is usually excluded from the juridical 
domain, which regulates the institution of kinship, for example, in the allocation and 
transmission of property and resources down the generational line. Feminist 
anthropologists have called attention to the fact that it is not only the politico-juridical 
domain that is subject to social change but also the meaning of reproduction and what is 
constructed as the mother- or father-child bond (see Chapter 2). Rather than presupposing 
the reproduction-lineage nexus, kinship theories in a feminist perspective attempt to 
explain ‘how reproductive functions come to be cast as the enduring core of the family’ 
(Collier and Yanagisako op. cit., p. 3).
Bourdieu (1996) has focussed on the construction of family bonds. He delineated 
dominant cultural meaning structures, such as the assumption that the family exists, as ‘a 
separate social universe’ (Bourdieu op. cit., p. 20) that maintains its boundaries towards 
the outside, and is oriented towards the sacred sphere of ‘privacy’, where calculation and 
interest are allegedly suspended in favour for solidarity and mutuality. For Bourdieu the 
family is a social construction produced by statisticians21 and the state. At the same time 
it is ‘a realized social fiction’ (Bourdieu op. cit., p. 21), maintained by habitus and ‘a tacit 
law (nomos) of perception and practice’ (ibid.) and the various social conditions by which 
families are enabled to enhance their economic, symbolic and social capital (see Chapter 
1).
To understand how the family turns from a nominal fiction into a real group 
whose members are united by intense affective bonds, one has to take account of 
all the practical and symbolic work that transforms the obligation to love into a 
loving disposition and tends to endow each member of the family with a ‘family 
feeling’ that generates devotion, generosity and solidarity.... The forces offusion 
(especially the affective ones) must endlessly counteract the forces offission.
(Bourdieu 1996, p. 22, emphasis in orig.)
This approach re-emphasises the contextual, dynamic and temporal perspective that life 
course approaches suggest by focussing not on life course transitions but on everyday
21 Statisticians are actors in constructing families, which they usually equate with households with children 
under the age of 18. Borchers and Miera (1993) have pointed to the fact that family members have a life 
expectancy of over 75 years and during the majority of these years neither live as minors nor with under 
age children in a ‘family household’, and therefore are not defined as family members. Recurrent 
diagnoses of the withering of the family often rest on these statistical definitions and ignore the fact that 
even though the proportion of so-called family households in relation to all households is less than 50%, 
almost twice as much people live in family households.
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practices. I propose that in a temporal perspective material and symbolic intra-familial 
legacies, as a resource and liability, constitute a further dimension in relation to which the 
practical and symbolic work of the ‘making’ of intergenerational commitments has to be 
elaborated. Intra-familial caring traditions as enacted and lived intergenerational 
solidarity can be such a personal liability. Vierzigmann and Kreher (1998) have argued 
that the continuing narration of the family history across generations with its eloquence 
or silence around specific family events and experiences is a process of transmission by 
which generations are constituted. Rosenthal (1997, p. 59) has suggested that values and 
experiences are not simply ‘transferred’ from one generation to the next but ‘mutually 
enacted and thereby interactively experienced’.
Conceiving kinship as an institution constituted by law, culture and politics as well as by 
day-to-day practice and interaction is a productive approach to the exploration of 
potentially ‘complex kinship configurations’ (Hareven 1994, p. 457) that are emerging in 
contemporary ageing societies through rising rates of divorce, remarriage and 
cohabitation. These configurations have been described as a ‘latent web of continually 
shifting linkages that provide the potential for activating and intensifying close kin 
relationships’ (Riley and Riley 1993, p. 173). As Hareven (op. cit.) has argued little is 
known about the rules and principles by which support is activated in the contemporary 
condition, where the family has lost the structuring force it had among the pre-industrial 
property owning classes.
Script theories
Kinship theorists have already pointed to the need to analyse cultural meaning structures 
of the parent-child relationship. I suggest that approaches to script theory offer a fruitful 
conceptualisation of a further dimension of the framework of kinscripts: the concept of 
cultural scripts. They also offer a development of the dimension of intra-familial 
legacies mentioned above.22 Introduced in cognitive psychology, scripts are defined as a
22 As the following discussion of script theory shows, the concept of script bears resemblance to Bourdieu’s 
(1972/1985; 1996) concept of habitus. Habitus is conceptualised as a set of (culturally and materially 
incorporated) dispositions, which incline actors to act and react in certain ways. It is an enduring 
orientation to action, which, in turn, is constitutive of social structure. One of its constituents is ‘a mental 
structure which, having been inculcated into all brains socialized in a particular way, is both individual and
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specific form of knowledge structure, one that governs the behaviour and interpretation of 
routinised everyday life activities. Scripts are context-specific, complex, and multi­
functional: they set expectations, aid comprehension and organise memory (Galambos et 
al. 1986). Operating largely outside conscious awareness, scripts are both based on 
‘experience’ and practice, and structure them. The work of Tomkins (1987) on personal 
scripts has drawn attention to the role of affect, which he considers the most important 
dimension along which individuals co-assemble experience in the process of individual 
script formation. Scripts are thus conceptualised as ‘ideo-affective construals’ (Demorest 
and Alexander 1992, p. 645), a set of ordering rules developed to predict, interpret and 
respond to interpersonal experiences. Importantly they are also a ‘base for designing 
strategies and/or tactics’ (Tomkins op. cit., p. 151) in responding to ‘experiences’.
The malleability and changeability of scripts make script theory an attractive heuristic 
concept in practice (family therapy) and research (discourse analysis). According to the 
family therapist Byang-Hall (1995, p. 24) the concept of family scripts refers to scripted 
family roles and ‘posits that everyone has the whole family drama encoded in their minds 
but identifies more with certain roles, and, in turn, is identified by others as playing 
particular roles’. Family scripts include ‘intergenerational scripts’ regulating the 
interaction between generations and ‘transgenerational scripts’ where patterns from the 
previous generation are transferred (replicated/re-created or modified) to current 
interaction (Byang-Hall op. cit., p. 32). Byang-Hall (op. cit., pp. 58-9) explicitly locates 
family scripts in the context of broader cultural scripts (‘cultural mythology’) which, 
mediated by ‘family myths’, that is transgenerational scripting and (unspoken) family 
expectations, provide meaning structures for individual family scripts.
In so far as transgenerational scripts (or what I have called intra-familial legacies in order 
to distinguish the concept from broader generation scripts such as the solidarity script) 
can be constituted in contradistinction to dominant cultural scripts I suggest keeping the 
two conceptually distinct. Family timetables, shared understandings about on-time and
collective’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 21). Moreover, through its link to practice habitus is the embodiment of 
cultural principles, cultural values ‘made body... beyond the grasp of consciousness and hence cannot be 
touched by voluntary transformation’ (Bourdieu 1972/1985, p. 94). A particular practice is always a
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off-time transitions can be part of an intra-familial legacy. Seltzer and Troll (1986) have 
pointed to a further aspect of intra-familial legacies which they call ‘expected life 
history’, i.e. a sequence of events and conditions that is expected to occur at different 
ages. The authors argue that expected life histories are shaped by the experience of family 
members. Thus they found that the expectation of people’s own death was less dependent 
on general life expectancy than the time of death of their own parents. Expected life 
histories influence courses of action in the present and shape reconstructions of the past. 
If expected events occur they are integrated into the ‘life script’ whereas unexpected 
events tend to be viewed negatively and independently of their outcome.
The multiplicity of scripts on an interpersonal level underlies the concept of 
‘counterscript’ (Gutierrez et al 1995) that in discourse theory refers to particular social, 
spatial, and language patterns, which evolve in response to, and in an appropriation and 
‘re-keying’ of, dominant (cultural, moral and gender) scripts. Gutierrez and colleagues 
consider social roles as ‘frames of reference that lead to patterned ways of being and 
doing’ (Gutierrez et al op. cit., p. 449). Members of a community acquire a ‘repertoire of 
strategies as well as content and socio-cultural and linguistic knowledge’ (Gutierrez et al 
p. 468) in interaction and practice. The authors suggest using the notion of script and 
counterscript as a heuristic tool to explore power and intersubjectivity in social 
relationships. Both scripts and counterscripts consist of ‘internal dialogizations’ of a 
particular cultural experience. They are constituted in relation to a broader dominant 
script, which is invoked and re-invoked. Yet in institutional contexts scripts and 
counterscripts are often not available to one another. Social change can occur in the 
confrontation and dynamic interrelation between the official and the unofficial script by 
which the larger societal script is contested and disrupted.
The element of practical embodiment of locally specific scripts tends to be lost in 
approaches to discourse theory, which consider scripted versions of personal experiences 
as ‘rhetorically designed, or interactionally constituted constructions of events’ (Edwards 
1994, p. 214, italics in orig.). Thus, Edwards argues, scriptedness can be built into events
product of habitus, the specific social context and the actor’s ability to play the game of social interaction. 
The concept of scripts is a more individualised, plural and fluid form of habitus.
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through their reporting in order to render them intelligible and normalise them. The aim 
of script analysis, then, is to reveal the ‘conceptual resources that people use in producing
and understanding event descriptions’ (ibid.).
!
To sum up, in reconsidering some approaches to life course, kinship and script theory I 
have suggested that social institutions, intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts are 
relevant interrelated conceptual dimensions for the development of a historically 
grounded analysis of the micro-politics of intergenerational relationships (see Figure
4.1.). All three dimensions capture aspects of the generational contract, namely the 
institutionalised pension system as an social institution, the normative script of 
intergenerational solidarity as a cultural script and family caring as lived solidarity as an 
intra-familial legacy. The dimensions are actualised in events and transitions, everyday 
practices and interpretations o f kin work that maintain or challenge institutions, legacies 
and scripts. The cumulative logic of institutions as social systems of order that entail 
normative orientation patterns can be analysed around the life course transitions of 
members of the kin network, such as taking on or declining full-time support 
responsibilities. Intra-familial legacies as the material, practical and symbolic heritages 
that generations pass on to their successors are a resource and liability, which are 
reproduced or transformed in practice and interaction. Cultural scripts as dominant
Figure 4.1 Socio-historic dimensions of the framework of kinscripts
Social institutions
Consolidated systems o f  order, 
materialised in organisations and 
organisational practice, incorporating 
social norms
KINWORK
Intra-familial legacies 4 -
M aterial, practical and 
sym bolic heritage
Cultural scripts
Dominant meaning systems 
providing conceptual resources 
and repertoires o f  practice
meaning systems, such as the assumption that kin networks are a sphere of solidarity, 
reciprocity and trust, are broad reference frames in relation to which the micro-politics 
and counter-politics of kin work are interpreted. They can be analysed as conceptual
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resources that underwrite subjective interpretation pattern as well as strategic repertoires 
of practice and interaction.
Conceiving of scripts as knowledge/meaning structures and practices entails a shift of 
perspective from viewing them merely as ‘mental representation(s)’ that guide kin work 
(Stack and Burton op. cit., p. 160). The refined framework of scripts suggests an 
analytical focus on affect and conflict and on the multitude and changeability of scripted 
practices and their narrative construction over time. Individuals need not be consciously 
aware of the impacts of social institutions, intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts.
I suggest that a refined conceptualisation of kin work can accommodate and specify these 
focuses on affect and conflict of a multiple and changing scripted kinship practices.
4.4. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF KIN WORK
Insofar as I have interpreted kin time as one aspect of intra-familial legacies the following 
sections only consider the concept of kin work and the category of kinscription proposed 
by Stack and Burton (op. cit.). The concept of kin work was introduced by Di Leonardo 
(1987) to conceptualise the work of maintaining family bonds within and across 
household boundaries through communication and contact. Rather than being merely a 
descriptive category, kin work as an analytical concept opened new paths of enquiry by 
challenging the conventionally perceived dichotomies of private/public, subject/object 
and emotion/reason.
While Di Leonardo (op. cit., p. 443) brought into focus publicly invisible symbolic 
activities, such as gift-giving, the ritual celebration of family events and the mediation of 
a ‘sense of family’, I use kin work as a generic concept for all activities between people 
who are considered to be kin. Kin work thus includes what has been termed ‘social 
support’ (Antonucci 1985, Borchers and Miera 1993), that is, practical and economic 
support; accommodation; personal care; (grand)child care; and emotional and moral 
support. This conceptualisation of potentially supportive practices as activities of 
‘making’ or maintaining the kin group allows for a more comprehensive analysis of
131
intergenerational relationships. Visits, telephone calls, kindness and attention 
continuously create ‘family feeling’ or the ‘affective principle’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22) of 
intergenerational cohesion by which a latent web of connections that may be activated in 
times of need is symbolically constituted and maintained. Not separating support from 
other forms of family relationships also reflects the view of family members, who regard 
care-giving ‘as an extension of family or personal relations’ (Twigg et al. 1990, p. 3), and 
do not perceive themselves as ‘carers’.
Challenging the public/ private divide
In relation to the concept of care the generic concept of kin work is thus more 
encompassing and at the same time narrower. It is more encompassing in including ritual 
and symbolic activities. It is narrower in excluding a broad range of institutional and 
organisational settings, in which care is given by professionals (Twigg et al 1990; 
Thomas 1993) as well as by volunteers (Abel and Nelson 1990, pp. 17-22; Bagilhole 
1996; Jamieson 1990). Kin work is necessarily embedded in personal relationships, 
which are considered as kin relations, although the mediating role of family members in 
establishing contact with formal (voluntary or statutory) services is a key activity of kin 
work. Inasmuch as ‘home-based kin-care’ (Graham 1991, p. 74) can be considered to be 
the most intense form of kin work much insight can be gained from the 
conceptualisations of caring work and the ways in which it ‘trespasses and re-orders’ 
public/private distinctions (Twigg 1999, p. 381). In particular the view that because 
‘caring depends for its accomplishment on resources, the allocation of resources is always 
a political process’ (Tronto 1996, p. 146) offers a fruitful approach to analysing conflict 
and power in the allocation of resources and the ‘politics of need interpretation’ (Fraser 
1989) in kin work. In the context of kin work, resource allocation tends to not match 
perceived responsibilities.
I suggest further that the theoretical concept of welfare production 
[ Wohlfahrtsproduktion] (Kaufmann 1994) can serve to locate kin work in a broader 
societal context. While the value-laden term ‘intergenerational solidarity’ presupposes 
cohesion, consensus, stability and a commonality of interest, kin work, by naming work, 
‘denaturalises’ solidarity by emphasising labour, investment and the production of
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‘value’ in the creation and maintenance of kin and quasi-kin networks. Economically the 
movement and cooperation between households and their members has been considered 
‘an extended productive unit o f social welfare’ (Netten 1993), which promotes a change 
of perspective from the family as a site of welfare consumption to the family as welfare 
producer.
As elaborated in Chapter 3, the production of welfare is located in and across different 
institutional contexts and simultaneously involves the state, the economy, the welfare 
sector and ‘private’ households. According to Kaufmann (op. cit.) this multi-level process 
of ‘welfare production’ is normatively framed by the right to self-organisation and 
opportunities of action, and the right to participation in the results of publicly mediated 
welfare production. On an institutional level, welfare production involves the definition 
and (state) regulation of welfare programs, which in turn depends upon the degree of 
institutional independence and self-regulation. On the individual level, welfare 
production involves the forging of a fit between personal dispositions and (given and 
perceived) opportunity structures. Individual welfare production therefore is a 
competence to mobilise resources and to interact with formal (and informal) structures 
rather than a function of disposable income.
The kin group as a producer of welfare is implied in Kaufmann’s contention that welfare 
production includes all activities, which maintain and develop human capabilities 
[Humanvermogen]. Human capabilities, he argues, connote both (paid) work and ‘vital’ 
(non-profit) capabilities at the micro-level of individual competence and at the macro­
level of collective social resources. Yet ‘individual’ and ‘collective welfare’ do not 
necessarily reinforce each other. An increase in welfare, Kaufmann argues, has to be 
obtained through a simultaneous increase of state intervention and societal self­
regulation. If one conceptualises welfare as an aspect of generating and maintaining 
human capabilities, kin groups and families are of central importance in developing and 
promoting a range of competences, which potentially spill over to other contexts. Within 
kin groups the level of available resources consists not only of time, income and capital 
(Netten op. cit.) but also of ability factors such as skill, knowledge, emotional strength 
and improvisation. Fisher and Tronto (1990, p. 43) have pointed to the fact that women
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often have little command over resources but have to create and improvise them -  a 
process that has its limits and its price in shortages of time and available resources for 
other activities.
Kin networks thus constitute a Schattenwirtschaft, a hidden economy of non- 
bureaucratic, non-monetary and untaxed service provision which increasingly 
complements or substitutes for public sector services or formal ‘opportunity structures’ in 
the provision of social support (Pitrou 1993). In its emphasis on the necessary capabilities 
of persons to interact with formal and informal structures kin work as welfare production 
cuts across the divide between public and private spheres and goes beyond the concept of 
‘household production’. Household production refers to ‘the nonmarket use of household 
time (including volunteer work) employed in conjunction with non-market capital and 
land, to produce goods and services that could be, but are not, marketed’ (Snooks 1994 as 
quoted in Bryson 1996, p. 210). At the same time excessive demands on the kin group 
can ‘foster exclusivity and privatism rather than a sense of collective responsibility’ 
(Abel and Nelson op. cit., p. 7).
Beyond the subject/object and the emotion/reason dualism
Apart from challenging the boundary between public and private economic realms, the 
concept of kin work also aims at cutting across the boundaries between the conception of 
the kin worker as subject or object, actress in solidarity or victim of patriarchy. Kin-work 
in western societies is organised largely along the lines of a gendered division of labour. 
Considering kin-workers as victims places their practical and symbolic work in the 
context of the exploitation of women's unpaid reproductive labour, into which they are 
compelled by a variety of material and ideological forces. This lack of viable alternatives 
has been expressed in the notion of women’s ‘compulsory altruism’ (Land and Rose 
1985). Womens’s taken for granted responsibilities for the kin group are further assumed 
to justify their unequal position in the labour market (see Chapter 3). Time out of the 
labour force or reduced working hours have negative impacts on women's future earning 
capacities by reducing their experience and seniority (Bryson 1996; Okin 1989), which in 
turn furthers women’s availability as kin workers. The victim perspective thus 
emphasises the structural context over and above individual agency.
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The solidarity perspective of the kin-worker on the other hand, promoted in particular by 
adherents of a female ‘ethics of care’, focuses on women’s moral orientation, motivation 
and particular skills to be in and create close relationships. Women are considered more 
open, receptive and other-directed, and able to set aside their own views and 
preoccupations and attune to another person's inner world and to attend to her needs. 
Whether grounded in women’s practice, their moral attitude or their ‘pre-moral’ basic 
sympathy with others and longing for relatedness, the ethics of care is not based on 
abstract moral principles and rules. It highlights a central aspect of a mutuality of giving 
and taking, empowerment and fulfilment. This ‘psychological-cum-moral’ perspective 
(Bubeck 1995, p. 152), conversely, can exclude socio-structural inequalities and 
constraints, as well as interpersonal conflicts of interest and needs, between the kin 
worker and other members of the kin group.
I suggest that a focus on kin work in relation to the socio-historical dimensions, social 
institutions, cultural scripts and intra-familial legacies outlined in the previous section, 
will go beyond the victimisation/solidarity divide, insofar as kin work is conceived as 
embedded in a social context, which it both reproduces and challenges. Kin work can 
entail empowering and disempowering aspects. Further, although gendered 
responsibilities are a major theme in any kind of family work, the concept of kin work 
must not reify gendered responsibilities but must be held open to include ‘male’ forms of, 
and participation in, kin work. Kin relations among men have been a widely neglected 
area of investigation and Boxer and colleagues (1986, p. 95) argue that existing studies 
have frequently used ‘a deficit model... including an implied feminine standard of what 
constitutes a “close” or “nurturant” bond’ in intergenerational relationships. Providing 
access to employment after migration, for example, is a typical male working class 
variant of kin work. Moreover, British representative surveys have shown that men do 
engage in caring work (Arber and Gilbert 1989). Yet, the majority of male caregivers are 
aged over 65 and provides z«£ra-generational support for their frail spouses. If men are 
primary caregivers for their elderly parents they are usually young and unmarried. In 
either case they are more likely to receive support from formal services (Qureshi 1996;
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Twigg and Atkin 1994).
The subject/object divide is also challenged by multiple and contradictory emotions and 
rationalities, which underlie and drive kin work and are often linked to normative 
frameworks. Its most intense form, personal care-giving, has famously been characterised 
as a ‘labour of love’ (Graham 1983) that requires rational planning, judgement, 
knowledge, skill and emotional commitment. At the same time the formula ‘labour of 
love’ implies nonnativity. In his contention that kin work continuously creates ‘the 
obliged affection and affective obligations of family feeling’ (Bourdieu 1996, p. 22), 
Bourdieu has indicated that emotions and morality are deeply intertwined. This link of 
emotions and morality bears the potential for conflict. Care has been characterised as a 
‘labour of love, in which the labour must continue even where the love falters’ (Graham 
op. cit., p. 16), a labour where the love must falter in order to continue the labour 
(Ungerson 1987) and as a labour in order to get love (Dressel and Clark 1990).
Guilt and ambivalence can become the ‘motor’ of kin work, sometimes reinforced by a 
family member in need (Nydegger 1983; Aronson 1992). It has been argued that 
women’s refusal to provide kin work, their assertion of independence and pursuit of self­
defined goals can induce guilt. But even if they take on kin work, guilt is often a 
concomitant feeling because the support provided is never seen as sufficient (Purtell 
1963; Walker et al. 1992). Equity theorists have explained caregiver’s guilt as the 
impossibility of reciprocating enough to compensate parents for their child rearing 
activities and other past sacrifices. As reciprocity is considered a universal norm for 
interaction, receiving more than what one gives leads to the feeling of guilt and shame 
(Rook 1987). Psychologically, denial or repression of negative and unacceptable feelings 
towards other members of the kin group can cause guilt (Brody 1985), as does the 
perceived discrepancy between the feeling of no substantial affection and the cultural 
metaphor and norm of closeness and love in the family (Jarett 1989). All these examples 
point to a link between emotions and normative scripts, particularly the potent idea of 
reciprocity and natural affection (see Chapter 2).
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Reconsidering the category of kinscription
Stack and Burton (op. cit.) have put forward the concept of ‘kinscription' to 
conceptualise the process of ‘recruiting’ or conscribing certain family members to take on 
kin work but also to exclude or release them. Positing that responsibilities are created not 
predetermined, kinscription focuses on individual strategies and processes of negotiation 
of kin work over time although negotiation is never ‘structure free’. As Elder argues 
‘instead of viewing family norms as “givens” we can see them as agreements worked out 
through family interaction’ (Elder 1987, p. 186). The literature on social support has 
suggested that women must take negotiation more seriously because they are more likely 
to have to rely on the kin network for assistance (Nestmann and Schmerl 1989).
Negotiation always has a transformative element. According to Bruner (1986 as quoted in 
Hansson 1993, p. 69) it is ‘the art of constructing new meanings by which individuals can 
regulate their relations with each other’. Similarly Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have argued 
that people construct social meanings through the process of negotiation. In this sense 
negotiation is a human capability and competence, not merely a means to an end. Boxer 
and colleagues (1986) have argued that the negotiation process can be more important 
than its content insofar as conflicts are acknowledged and resolutions attempted. It can be 
a way of developing problem-solving abilities and in the context of intergenerational 
relationships often serves to maintain the proper balance between dependence and 
independence. Yet, in the absence of perceived alternatives, responsibility can be 
assigned ‘through a process of non-decision-making’ (Finch and Mason op. cit., p. 159). 
The authors have shown that the ‘reputation’ of kin members provides a structure for 
negotiations about assistance, in that they offer guidelines about whom to approach and 
whom to leave alone. They argue that people invest something of themselves in particular 
relationships and that their personal and ‘moral identity’ and reputation (of being 
‘generous’, ‘reliable’, a ‘good daughter’ etc.) is at stake, which can make it difficult to 
retreat or acknowledge conflict once one becomes locked into a set of commitments. 
Taking on particular commitments means often being more likely to attract further 
commitments. Negotiations therefore have to be understood both in the horizon of the 
past and anticipated future.
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The analysis of kin work negotiation (or kinscription) thus has to focus on implicit and 
explicit processes, on what is said and what remains unsaid, keeping in mind that 
resistance can remain a closed and silent process.
Revisiting the literature around kin work, i.e. the personal, symbolic, material, emotional 
and practical activities of constituting kinship and generation, and its negotiation and 
assignment over time (kinscription) has highlighted some analytical and sensitising 
dimensions that have to be addressed in the empirical research. Functions and conceptual 
dimensions of kin work are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2. Functions and heuristic dimensions of kin work
Kin work
Practical, symbolic, emotional and material work o f  kinship
‘Functions’
> Creates and maintains intra- and intergenerational cohesion and
family feeling
> Secures intra- and intergenerational support
> Produces welfare and human capabilities
> Constitutes personal (generational) identity
‘Heuristic dimensions’
♦ Processes of need interpretation
♦ Politics of the allocation of resources
♦ Competences to mobilise resources
♦ Empowerment and disempowerment
♦ Emotions and normative scripts (such as reciprocity and solidarity)
♦ Explicit and implicit processes of negotiation and ascription
Empirically these conceptual dimensions have to be developed in relation to the 
interrelated socio-historical dimensions outlined above.
4.5. CONCLUSION
I have suggested that a refined framework of kinscripts can guide a historically grounded 
analysis of kin work, it strategies, assignments and negotiations overtime. This modified 
framework of socio-symbolic kinscripts aims to link local practices and macro-structures. 
It draws attention to the social and symbolic practices of men and women across
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private/public boundaries in the context of intergenerational relations. The framework 
first delineates the socio-historical and interrelated dimensions of social institutions, 
intra-familial legacies and cultural scripts, which can be in a state of tension at the level 
of the micro-politics of inter-generational commitments. The concept of kin work opens 
new paths of enquiry by crossing the boundaries of conventionally perceived dichotomies 
such as family and work, subject and object, and emotions and normativity. It calls 
attention to the political process of welfare production and the allocation of resources, 
empowerment and disempowerment as well as to the competences, emotions and implicit 
and explicit negotiation processes involved.
Although not included at a conceptual level by Stack and Burton (1993), contracts can be 
one organising principle at the level of practice, negotiation and interpretation to ease 
potential tensions between self-interest and the interests and needs of other kin members. 
From a contractarian perspective kin work could be organised as a negotiated exchange of 
support and cooperation over the life course, coordinating family related transitions in a 
way that mutual help can be given in congruence with other roles. Kinscription can 
strategically incorporate forms of recompense to facilitate the recruitment of kin workers 
or to make up for their release. The possibility of contractual agreements requires a shift 
of perspective to incorporate the practical and interpretative agency of individuals more 
saliently than in the original formulation of the framework albeit without obscuring 
structural forces and constraints.
While the refined heuristic framework gives the research a heuristic orientation, the idea 
is to empirically enhance what Strauss and Corbin (1994, p. 274) call ‘conceptual 
density’, that is ‘the richness of concept development and relationships’ as well as to 
explore the significance of generational contracts. Conceptual dimensions are conceived 
of as sensitising: ‘whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, 
sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look’ (Blumer 1986, p. 
148). They lay open the researcher’s pre-knowledge and prejudices, which have to be put 
at risk. As Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 102) have suggested ‘by the very act of naming 
phenomena, we fix continuing attention on them [and]... can begin to ask questions 
about them’.
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Chapter 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the research design, the sampling strategies and specific 
generational positionings of the younger and older research participants, the socio­
cultural context of the research and the methods and the analysis. The data collection was 
organised within two research projects at the University of Bremen23. Both projects 
combined studies of the life course, conceived of as a sequence of life phases structured 
by significant turning points and institutionally regulated transitions, and studies of 
‘biography’, that is, the actors’ subjective interpretations of their lives. Methodologically 
they combined different ‘types of data’ (Bom et al 1996) in an innovative way. Life 
course transitions such as the age of obtaining an educational qualification, age at 
childbirth or grandmotherhood, are often officially registered in birth certificates or 
employment records and were investigated in a quantitative survey. Biographical 
interpretation patterns or the ‘world of imagination’ [ Vorstellungswelt] of the research 
participants were investigated in face-to-face semi-structured interviews.
Yet, for the analysis of kinscripts this multi-method design could not be applied because 
kin commitments initially had not been a sampling criterion and periods and transitions 
of kin work were not explored in the quantitative survey. Not choosing research 
participants by virtue of their being ‘kin-keepers’ or family caregivers, however, allowed
23 The research projects ‘Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family’ (1989-1991) 
and ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’ (1994-1996) were directed by Helga 
Kruger at the Special Research Centre 186 ‘Status Passages and Risks in the Life Course’ at Bremen 
University, Germany.
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for the exploration of a range of intergenerational commitments as well as ‘ordinary’ 
processes of assuming or declining kin work responsibilities over the life course. I attach 
an overview of the objectives and the sequential sampling procedure of the two studies in 
Appendix A. The sampling procedure for the qualitative interviews aimed to include a 
range of theoretically relevant socio-structural variables for the older and younger 
research participants based on the results of the analyses of the quantitative surveys.
I joined the research project ‘Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the 
Family’ after the sampling, the interviewing and coding for the analysis of the 
interweaving of paid work and family work were completed. For the purpose of the 
analysis of kinscripts in the lives of the older women I listened to the tape-recorded 
interviews and recoded the material with respect to kin work. I also drew on the life 
course graphs and protocols of the interviewers (see below). In the project ‘Patterns of 
Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’ I was involved in the qualitative 
design from the onset. I developed the sampling criterion of ‘intra-familial caring 
traditions’ and the part of the topic guide focussing on those experiences, as well as on 
care giving anticipations illustrated in Figure 5.4.1 interviewed 15 of the 49 younger 
research participants included in the qualitative sample, coded the interviews and 
produced life course graphs.
The interview method in both studies was based on the ‘problem centred interview’ 
(Witzel 1982). The text analysis was ‘theme-centred’, aiming at the exploration of the 
‘social logic’ of kin work rather than the reconstruction of individual cases. In the 
sections that follow I will describe and reflect upon the research design and context in 
more detail. Much has been written about reflexivity and the specific location of the 
researcher, which is seen as guiding and constraining research. Although there is a 
consensus that ‘the unavoidable task of the genuine methodological treatment is to 
identify and assess these premises’ (Blumer 1986, p. 25) the procedures for accounting 
for a researcher’s partiality and location are less clear. Reay (1996, pp. 68-70) has 
suggested the need to focus upon emotive ‘non-intellectual’ responses, seductive 
alliances with some research participants and distance from others in order to ‘address the 
difference my difference made’. I will address some of these issues in section 5.5.
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5.2. SAMPLE CHARATERISTICS AND GENERATIONAL POSITIONINGS 
OF THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
As is described in Appendix A the sequential sampling procedure followed the principle 
of a deliberate sampling for heterogeneity. The group of older women was not selected on 
the basis of their kin commitments but their vocational training, apprenticeship, in two 
culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. The women had all completed secondary 
school and had finished their vocational training around 1948. They were thus bom 
between 1928 and 1931 and currently at the actual or potential transition to retirement. 
All 52 women included in the qualitative sample had married and had between one and 
five children. In terms of family events this group can be considered as typical for women 
of this birth cohort in Germany. The sample further included women trained in the five 
most common occupations after the war as well as four dominant status configurations: 
women who had permanently left the labour market and were homemakers; women who 
had predominantly worked in their trained occupation; women who mainly worked in 
other occupations and women who had predominantly worked in temporary positions 
without paying social security contributions.
This form of sampling allowed for a systematic comparison of different (sub)groups to 
investigate the relevance or irrelevance of theoretically significant structural 
characteristics for specific interpretation patterns. For example, it was possible to explore 
whether women who were predominantly homemakers developed different practices and 
views on kin work from women who were mostly employed. It also allowed accounts 
that the women shared and which may relate to dominant cultural scripts to be 
distinguished from those shared by specific subgroups, which may refer to contextually 
specific modes of perception and coping.
In terms of the diverse use of the term generation (Chapter 1.3.) women at the transition 
to retirement can be assumed to occupy (or to recently have occupied) a position ‘in the 
middle’ of their family lineage (Brody 1981). Brody has argued that the position of 
having both adult children and a surviving parent entails competing role demands and
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kinship obligations. (She has not, however, taken into account the caring role of 
grandparents.) Support given to older relatives might be added to employment as well as 
commitments as wives, mothers and grandmothers. The notion o f‘women in the middle’ 
intended to call attention to agency and conflict in this lineage position as well as to the 
impacts of social policy in shaping it (Brody op. cit.). In the German context the so-called 
‘sandwich generation’ is also associated with the position of the middle generation in the 
institutionalised generational contract, which provides for those who are not yet or no 
longer in regular employment (Borchers and Miera 1993, pp. 20-21). Older women, 
however, tend to be associated exclusively with the lineage position.
On the basis of their birth cohort the group under study are members of the ‘pre-war 
generation’ (Becker and Hermkens 1993). During their childhood and adolescence the 
pre-war generation experienced economic crisis, restricted options for secondary 
education and WWII. Most of their adult lives fell in the decades of economic growth 
characterised by the reconstruction, the ‘economic miracle’ and the building of the post­
war welfare state. The economic recession of the late 1980s coincided with the actual or 
potential retirement of the pre-war generation.
In terms of their position in an inter-age group or generation conflict, Becker and 
Hermkens note that the pre-war generation contributes to the ‘problems experienced or 
foreseen with regard to the “greying of the nation’” (Becker and Hermkens op. cit., p. 
22). According to David Thomson (1989) it is not merely their increased life expectancy 
but more saliently their actions that define the position of this generation in a conflict of 
interest. As members of the so-called welfare generation, defined inclusively as cohorts 
bom between 1920 and 1945 (Thomson 1991 as quoted in Hills 1996, p. 57) members 
are said to constitute ‘the prime beneficiaries of the welfare state throughout their adult 
lives’ (Thomson 1989, p. 35). Generalising from his analysis of the New Zealand welfare 
state Thompson argues that the welfare generation, whose members were young adults in 
the first 25 years of the modem ‘youth-centred welfare state’, gained greatly from highly 
subsidised property purchase, family benefits, family health services and education for 
their children. Growing older however they ‘revealed (no) interest in sustaining the 
youth-state’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 40) but -  out of self-interest, ‘though not... in an overt
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or even conscious manner’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 36) -  furthered a restructuring of the 
welfare state that benefited the aged over other age groups.
The qualitative sample of the women’s adult children was equally selected on the basis of 
a life course survey and included women and bom between 1953 and 1964 (see Appendix 
A). The 49 participants for the qualitative study were selected so as to represent 
heterogeneity with respect to their education and family status (skilled training vs. 
university degree and children vs. no children) but also to represent similarities and 
differences with respect to the life courses of their mothers, namely their employment and 
elder care-giving histories. Ten sibling dyads of different gender and three sibling triads 
were included. In comparison to representative studies the group was educationally more 
qualified than the national.
In terms of their generational positioning, men and women aged between 30 and 41 (at 
the time of study) may occupy the second position in a three- or four-generation family. If 
the young adults have children competing role demands are more likely to occur between 
family and paid work than between different kinship obligations because parents are 
likely to live independently and in relatively good health. In terms of their birth cohort 
people bom between 1953 and 1964 have been defined as the Tost generation’ (Becker 
and Hermkens op. cit.). The predicate Tost’ refers to their unfavourable position in the 
labour market. In childhood and adolescence, members of the lost generation are said to 
have grown up better housed, fed, clothed and educated than any generation before them 
and did not experience war or depression. They went through their formative years in the 
mid-1970s, a period of fundamental social change and a destandardisation of living 
arrangements in Germany.
In terms of family patterns, the mid-1970s were characterised by the first radical decline 
in birth and marriage rates and a sharp increase in cohabitation, divorce rates and one- 
parent families. Furthermore, part-time work expanded on a large scale and, through 
educational reform, higher education became more accessible to all social classes, with a 
subsequent increase in women’s participation in higher education and in the labour 
market. The mid-1970s were also a time of the expansion and legitimisation of the
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kindergarten as a pedagogic institution. Compared with the pre-war generation the lost 
generation thus faced a multitude life style choices and a larger degree of sexual self- 
determination, but also tardy careers, longer periods of unemployment, and the 
deregulation and retrenchment politics of the welfare state.
Regarding their position in an inter-age conflict, members of the lost generation are 
expected to cease to care if their older parents are in need (Becker and Hermkens op. cit., 
p. 23) and are thus to some degree held responsible for the erosion of family solidarity. 
As members of the so-called baby boom generation they are projected to lose out in the 
institutionalised generational contract. Due to their number, high life expectancy and low 
fertility rate, members of the baby-boom generation are the obvious losers in Thomson’s 
scenario of an inter-age conflict. While they support and contribute to a redistributive 
mechanism of the welfare state, which secures the pensions of those currently retired, 
they do not have the guarantee of equivalent benefits in their own retirement (Chapter
3.6.). The more numerous ‘late boomers’ (1955-1964) additionally also have to 
contribute to the pensions of the ‘early boomers’ (1946-1954).
Figure 5.1. gives an overview of the qualitative sample characteristics of the two groups 
under study.
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FIGURE 5.1. Characteristics of sample of older German women and
their adult children
Older German women Adult sons and daughters
(Age 58-61) (Age 30-41)
no. no.
Sample size 52 49
Gender
Men - 21
Women 52 28
Level of occupational 
qualification
Skilled 52 24
University degree - 24
None - 1
Current employment 
status
Employed or self- 98
employed
Housewife/ ^ g 
maternity leave
Student - 1
Unemployed 3 2
Pensioner 12 -
Current family status
Married 38 33
Cohabiting 1 13
Single - 4
With children/ 52/ 32/
grandchildren 26 -
Widowed 10 1
Divorced 4 8
5.3. THE SOCIO CULTURAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
As elaborated in section 5.2., the older women research participants were recruited from 
two culturally contrasting regions in West Germany. The actual distribution in the
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qualitative sample of women bom around 1930 was biased towards the Protestant city. 
Thirty-three women lived in the city of Bremen (0.54 million inhabitants) in the north­
western Land Bremen, 19 women in the rural and small-town administrative district of 
Koblenz (1.52 million inhabitants) in the south-western Land Rhineland-Palatinate. 
Similarly 33 of the younger research participants were bom in Bremen, 16 in the district 
of Koblenz. Due to social mobility however, more than half of the younger research 
participants had moved away (13 from Bremen, 11 from Koblenz), although mobility, as 
the map (Figure 5.2.) shows, is somewhat regionally bound.
Together with Saarland and Bavaria, the Land Rhineland-Palatinate has a predominantly 
Catholic population, whereas Bremen in the Protestant north is overwhelmingly 
Protestant. Based on the analysis of German census data and representative family 
surveys of the German Youth Institute (DJI) that allow for differentiation at regional 
level, Bertram and colleagues (1993) have found that confessional differences are still 
correlated with differences in attitudes and behaviour. In comparison with the Protestant 
north and even mral Protestant areas, the valuation of children and marriage is much 
higher in rural Catholic districts, where most children live and households therefore tend 
to be larger. Women’s labour market participation rate decreases with an increase in the 
Catholic population, whereas support for the German conservative party CDU/CSU 
increases proportionally.
Research participants who were interviewed in the district of Koblenz, one of the three 
administrative districts in Rhineland-Palatinate, all lived in villages and small towns of 
between 600 and 40,000 inhabitants. The major city in the district is Koblenz. Most 
people in the district of Koblenz are employed in trade and industry. Although the service 
sector is the second largest employer, employment in this sector does not even account 
for one fifth of all jobs (LandesinformationssystemRheinland-Pfalz 1999). The proportion 
of family labourers is relatively high. Six per cent of the people in the district do not hold 
a German passport. Politically Rhineland-Palatinate used to be a heartland of the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). From its foundation in 1947 to 1991 it had a 
Christian Democrat government that held an absolute majority between 1971 and 1987. 
Conservative voting is associated with its agrarian and (particularly in the northern part)
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Catholic milieu where the support of the CDU was considered to be a social norm 
(Arzheimer and Weins 1997).
The Hanseatic City of Bremen has the second largest port in Germany after Hamburg. 
Together with the city of Bremerhaven, Bremen is the smallest Land in Germany and an 
enclave in Lower Saxony. In view of its history as a member of the Hanseatic League and 
its strong support of the Protestant Reformation, the city prizes its ‘Hanseatic republican 
consciousness’ (Senatskanzelei 1996). As in other urban centres and in contrast to the 
rural Catholic region the perceived importance of marriage is relatively low, and the rate 
of single households is high (Bertram et al 1993). Over 12% of the population do not 
hold a German passport. Most people in Bremen work in the service sector. Employment 
in industry rose sharply in the first decades after the war, but since the mid-eighties 
Bremen has been hit by the recession and has above average rates of unemployment. 
Politically Bremen has been a heartland of the Social Democrats, who have been in 
government since 1970.
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5.4. THE PROBLEM-CENTRED INTERVIEW
Interviews are at the same time a tool for exploring views and interpretation patterns and 
a practice that produces situated meanings grounded in specific interactional episodes -  a 
process that itself requires analysis and reflection. From the multitude of interview 
techniques available (e.g. Flick 1995; Fontana and Frey 1998) we adapted the method of 
the ‘problem-centred interview’ (Witzel 1982), that builds on elements of 
ethnomethodology, symbolical interactionism and biographical methods and was 
developed in focus groups, for single face-to-face verbal interchanges. The problem- 
centred interview consists of a brief standardised questionnaire by which socio­
demographic information is separated from the conversational interview, the interview 
itself that follows a flexible topic guide to explore themes and ‘structures of relevance’ in 
the interpretation of social actors, and an interview protocol. In the protocol the 
interviewer after the interview notes down her impressions of the communication, the 
environment, the respondent and her own behaviour and feelings. In different ways the 
questionnaire and the protocol thus provide contextual information in addition to the 
audiotaped interview. Although qualified as a contextualisation of the emerging data the 
systematic use of data from the questionnaire and protocol in the interview analysis has 
not been conceptualised by Witzel.
According to Witzel (op. cit.) the method is characterised by (i) an orientation towards a 
‘socially relevant’ problem and must explicate the views of the respondents in order to 
develop theory; (ii) an orientation towards the subject matter: methods and their practice 
must be developed and modified in relation to the subject matter; and (iii) an orientation 
towards process: ‘understanding’ and analysis develop gradually and impact on further 
research strategies. In terms of research strategies the pre-knowledge of the researcher has 
to be organised in a flexible topic guide. The topic guide should sensitise and direct but 
not close off perception in the exploratory interview procedure that aims to unfold the 
views of the research participants through immanent and ‘external’ questions and probes. 
As with other kinds of semi-structured interviews this method addresses some of the 
problems encountered in structured and unstructured interviews while also making use of 
their strengths. Structured interviews, whilst being economic and seemingly 
unambiguous, do not enable respondents to develop their own versions of the social
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world and unfold their narratives and concerns. Unstructured interviews, on the other 
hand, give ample room for the unfolding of the individual narrative, but are seen as 
uneconomic, unsystematic and ambiguous. Both interview strategies have been seen as 
prohibiting the engagement of the interviewer who is committed to standardised friendly 
and non-judgmental behaviour. Critics point out that this lack of engagement contributes 
to the researcher’s invisibility and conceals processes of interpretation and construction 
within the interview process (Fontana and Frey op. cit.).
Witzel (op. cit.) on the contrary holds that the questions and active engagement of the 
interviewer are evidence of her genuine interest. Interviewers are required to listen 
actively but also to bring in their problem-centred interests, initiate thematic changes and 
probe. The topic guide is organised in a spectrum of thematic fields, key words and open 
narrative incentives, which aim at generating narratives both on the level of description 
and evaluation. The topic guide and the conversational techniques should enable research 
participants to express and assert their views also in contrast to the interviewer’s 
preconceptions. Witzel distinguishes general and specific probes. General probing aims at 
additional information and details, whereas specific probing aims at clarifying the 
understanding of what has been said through reflection and feedback by the interviewer 
who is requested to address contradictions and ambiguities in the accounts. Thus the aim 
is that problems of understanding encountered in the interview should be addressed and 
explored rather than glossed over. According to Witzel this is an attempt to increase 
clarity, generate shared understanding and thereby increase the ‘validity’ of the 
interpretation already in the interview process.
Although Witzel himself has characterised the interview as an interactive ‘text 
production’ (Witzel op. cit., p. 108) his assumption of the self-evidence and presence of 
understanding in the interview is problematic. This assumption is built on the conception 
of language as a ‘means of reason’ (Witzel op. cit., p. 61). Yet, in arguing for the need to 
transcribe the entire interview Witzel has pointed to the fact that some interview passages 
gain significance only after the interview. I therefore suggest that the task of the 
interviewer is to question her own instant understandings and to enable the research 
participants to express ambivalences and contradictions in the interview, rather than
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closing those off and encouraging the research participant to present rationally congruent 
views. For the same reason (that is the presumption of a presence of shared 
understanding) it is not justified to privilege spontaneous narratives over and above 
descriptive and evaluative utterances. An example of such privileging in the German 
phenomenological tradition is provided by Schutze (1983), who argued that narratives 
offer a more direct access to the inner world of research participants. Schutze suggested 
that biographical interviews should aim at generating narratives because social actors are 
experts in their own lives and have a lot of implicit experiential knowledge that is not 
integrated in subjective theories or available in argumentative form.
Life Course Graphs
Although the method of the problem centred interview involves problematic assumptions 
and critics have argued correctly that the combination of elements of different research 
traditions in the problem-centred interview has not been acknowledged and developed 
systematically (Flick 1995, p. 108-109) the method does generate some productive ideas. 
In the research design of the Bremen studies socio-structural information had been 
investigated before the actual interviews (see Appendix A). As a ’memory aid' for both 
the interviewer and the research participant a novel technique was introduced in the 
interviews: information provided in the standardised questionnaires was visualised in 
individual life course graphs. For each respondent a graph was produced that marked the 
participant's employment periods chronologically as horizontal bars on a time axis, 
differentiated according to the kind of employment and social security status. Family 
events such as marriage and the birth of (grand)children were marked as vertical lines. In 
addition, as a reflection of the increasing plurality of life courses, graphs for the younger 
generation also depicted changes in living arrangements and partnerships (see Figure
5.3.).
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FIGURE 5.3. Life course graphs of mother, son and daughter
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Insofar as the interviews spanned decades of adult life, the graphs were used to relieve 
research participants from the strain of dating life course events and transitions in favour 
of the in-depth exploration of experiences and meaning systems around the life course 
transitions. At the beginning of the interview the individual graph was presented and 
checked for accuracy. Interview accounts increased the validity of the survey data insofar 
as the majority of older women confirmed that employment details had been given by 
consulting their pension related employment records. At the same time the narratives 
revealed that one third of the women had worked informally as family labourers, home 
workers or in ‘cash in hand’ jobs which had not been included in the questionnaires and 
graphs based on them. Adding these periods into the graph during the interviews 
generated additional explanations of why they had not been considered as ‘work’. The 
life course graphs also initiated discussions when some of the older women stated that 
they had not been employed when they had young children while the life course graphs 
indicated that they did. Again discussion produced insights in perception and evaluation 
patterns. Overall -  and quite unexpectedly for the researchers -  the presentation of the 
life course graph had a positive motivational effect on both older and younger research 
participants to engage in the interview.
The construction of the topic guide
For both sub-samples theoretically relevant dimensions of the research topic were 
organised in a topic guide that consisted of thematic fields, key words and ‘narrative 
incentives’ that introduced these themes and initiated thematic changes. Key words 
reminded the interviewer to check for relevant theoretical dimensions if they were not 
brought up by the research participants. In order to integrate them into the conversation 
while allowing for flexibility they were not formulated as questions (see Figure 5.4.). 
Following Witzel the topic guide aimed at generating descriptions and narratives but also 
evaluations of practices and decisions and what he called ‘taking stock’ of the life course. 
In the topic guide for the study of older women, themes included the women’s 
apprenticeship and status passages between employment and family as well as the overall 
evaluation of the family and employment history. Although the topic guide did not 
include direct questions referring to kin work, questions referring to the women’s
154
apprenticeship, family formation or exits from the labour market -  unforeseen by the 
researchers -  ‘demanded’ that the research participants situate themselves in the socio- 
historical and intergenerational context of their families of origin. These accounts became 
the basis of the empirical analysis in chapters 6 and 7.
The topic guide for the younger generation aimed to address dimensions of social change 
in life styles across two family generations. These dimensions included: the structuring 
impacts of family traditions vs. social institutions; the reproduction vs. transformation of 
the parental legacy; and gender-specific differences with respect to possible discrepancies 
between normatively accepted and actual lifestyle and were organised in five thematic 
fields. The first theme in the topic guide addressed the recalled experiences and 
retrospective evaluation of the mother’s employment and family care-giving. The second 
theme addressed the life style of the younger generation; the third addressed life course 
events and decisions with respect to changing structures of relevance in an intra-familial 
comparison; the fourth anticipated life changes; and the fifth gender equality.
In contrast to the study of older women, I explicitly included kin work and anticipated 
family care-giving responsibilities in the topic guide for the younger generation. These 
issues had points of connection with other parts of the interview, such as the perceived 
caring responsibilities of the mother (thematic field I), questions about intergenerational 
differences in norms and obligations (thematic field II) and gender equality (thematic 
field V).
The narrative incentives were formulated so as to address different ‘modes of knowledge 
and depiction of experience’ (Flick op. cit., p. 115), that is description, spontaneous 
narratives and evaluation. On the level of description, research participants were asked to 
describe courses of events or status passages, or give concrete examples of their more 
abstract statements. On the level of evaluation they were asked for a range of 
comparisons. First, in an intra-generational comparison with people of the same 
‘generation’ (friends, classmates, colleagues etc.) they were asked to assess the 
subjectively perceived conformity or non-conformity of their practices and views. 
Second, in an intergenerational comparison with members of younger and older
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generation (parents, children etc) they were asked to assess perceived processes of social 
change. On the level of stocktaking the research participants were asked to summarise 
and condense their experiences. Building on their role as experts the older women were 
asked to give advice to younger women on the basis of their experiences in order to 
explore the evaluation of their lives as a model for the younger generation. Conversely 
the younger generation was asked to assess in what ways the lifestyle of their parents had 
been a model for their own lifestyle.
The topic guide thereby encouraged research participants to shift their location of 
perception to allow for a different accentuation of their views in different contexts/against 
different backgrounds. Becker-Schmidt (1980) has called this interview strategy ‘topical 
change of perspective’.
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FIGURE 5.4. Illustration of the topic guide (thematic field IV)
Themes Key words/cues Narrative incentive
Wishes/plans/changes for the 
near and more distant future
Areas of change
- Employment (different, 
more, less)
- Family
- Free time
- Other activities
If you imagine your life in 
the future, do you plan any 
changes?
Support of and care-giving 
for parents
Anticipated commitments
- Own contribution
- Home care vs. institutional 
care
Family caring experiences
Perceived expectations
Negotiations with 
parents(in-law), siblings, 
partner
At some point in the future 
you might encounter the 
situation that your parents/ 
mother is in need of care. 
Have you ever thought 
about how you would or will 
deal with it?
Perceived norms
- Intragenerationally
- Intergenerationally
Desired institutional 
changes
Do you think that your way 
of dealing with this is 
typical for men (women) of 
your generation?
Anticipations of old age Anticipated sources of 
support
- Children
- Institutions 
Politics and policies
How do you visualise 
yourself in old age?
In your view, what policy 
measures have to be 
implemented to allow for an 
adequate life style in old 
age?
In the interview encounters the conversation was much less orderly than suggested by the 
illustration of the topic guide. An example for a probe on the level of intergenerational
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comparison in the topic guide of the older women was the following narrative incentive 
that aimed at addressing a dimension of social change: ‘I f  you compare the relationship 
between you and your daughter to the relationship between you and your mother, is it 
rather similar or is it different? ’ The flexible handling of the topic guide, whereby 
questions should be addressed in the flow of the conversation, meant that this dimensions 
of social change was adapted to themes that emerged in the interview. This is illustrated 
in the following example, where a woman had spoken extensively about her care-giving 
responsibilities. The interview passage illustrates the extent to which questions of the 
woman interviewer (a colleague in Bremen) shaped the interview although she 
purposefully attempted not to pre-structure emerging views. In contrast to Witzel’s claim, 
the passage shows that contradictions, such as the simultaneous foregrounding of the 
obligatory and voluntary nature of the participant's family commitments, could not be 
‘clarified’ or ‘solved’ in the interview. Such contradictions may not be perceived as 
contradictory by the research participants and they may be grounded in contradictory 
societal demands, which cannot be reconciled at the individual level. They must, 
however, be opened up and discussed in the interview analysis.
Int: Do you think that this relationship between you and your mother, this obligation
that you had, seemed to have felt, that you have to care for your mother 
Resp: yes, yes I had to 
Int: -care because nobody else is there
Resp: Nobody is there
Int: Do you think that young women today see this similarly? Or is this something
that always
Resp: I wouldn’t count on that. I mean, our [daughter] is - when something happens 
somewhere - when I’m still upset, then she is so practical, well that she instantly 
does the right thing... but I wouldn’t assume that she would over a longer period- 
Int: do it in that way
Resp: would say: I have to do it this way....
Int: And how do you see this - well, I call it ‘a bit more distance’ - or I don’t know,
how you should call it that they say, well 
Resp: more egoistic you mean or 
Int: No, I don’t know whether I would
Resp: No, you can’t 
Int: I don’t want to say it negatively
Resp: No no
Int: only this change ... do you think it is better? Or would you wish that in this
respect it should rather stay the same?
Resp: I really can’t say. Because I went through it twice. You can’t demand it of 
someone. If someone doesn’t do it voluntarily - you can’t force it.(0) (ID no. 003,
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bom 1928)
Interview protocols
The third methodical strategy of the problem-centred interview was the interview 
protocols in which the interviewers noted contextual information and their own feelings 
about the interview. The protocols suggested the importance of recording information on 
the arrangement of the interview, the length of the visit, interruptions, tape recording, 
environment and appearance of the research participants, atmosphere and conversation, 
age relation, own feelings and ‘other noticeable things’. All three women interviewers in 
the study of older women filled in these protocols and discussed their feelings in the 
team. In the study of the younger generation, however, the other two interviewers were 
reluctant to put down their personal impressions and feelings in writing so that only my 
own protocols were available. Because I interviewed the younger research participants 
separately and lived in London, whereas I had lived in Bremen during the study of the 
older women, I had more personal information about the interviewing experiences from 
the interviewers of the older women even though I did not take part in those interviews. 
Yet, the collaboration with Bremen University meant that I received extensive interview 
training in the problem-centred interview technique when I interviewed younger research 
participants in and around Bremen. Training was provided by members of the research 
team in Bremen who listened in detail to my tape-recorded interviews and assessed my 
questions as well as suggesting different kinds of questions by which contradictions in 
the account could have been addressed.
5.5. THE PROCESS OF THEME-CENTRED ANALYSIS
The theme-centred analysis drew on three sources of data: the interview protocols, the 
socio-structural information of the life courses generated in the survey and illustrated in 
the life course graphs, and the transcribed interviews. Working with and through 
interview transcripts is based on the assumption that two to three hour long conversations 
can give entry into the concerns of research participants and their perceptions of their 
practices. At the same time not only are the narrative and its interpretation a construction
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but also the ‘time-manipulative structure of the recording’ of the interview, which 
separates the conversation from its social and temporal context, has a constructive 
moment. As Flick argues with reference to Bergmann (1985 as quoted in Flick 1995, p. 
188) the fact that the interview can be listened to over and over again not only enables 
new insights but also constructs a new version of the interchange. This raises questions 
about the construction of meaning. Indeed, several of the older research participants 
initially appeared uncomfortable with the recording of the conversation, which might 
indicate insecurity and perhaps a feeling of powerlessness about how the researchers 
would interpret their testimonies and what they would do with them. Whilst the 
researcher can assure confidentiality, the question arises of how to discuss with the 
research participants the interpretations and research findings of the researcher.
Interviews were generated in what has been called a ‘research bargain’ (Warren 1988, p. 
39): the research participants were paid a small ‘expense allowance’ and in turn 
‘provided’ their stories. But the research bargain entailed much more: the interviewers 
were invited into the research participants’ homes, coffee or tea was offered, time was 
exchanged, a readiness to listen, to talk, to remember, to engage. Given that the 
allowance was not very high and several research participants did not know they were 
receiving one, money alone cannot be regarded as the primary motivation of people to 
participate in the research. In his study on welfare organisations Flick (1995, p. 74) has 
pointed to the symbolic status of ‘ scientific research’, which in his study had made it very 
difficult for public service organisations to refuse their participation. On the individual 
level it is difficult to assess the factor o f‘participating in the generation of “knowledge”’. 
The interview protocols show that older women in particular were aware of and 
concerned about making aspects of their lives (semi) public, which was at the same time 
a reason for participating in the research. Thus one research participant was reported to 
have told her neighbour who came by during the interview ‘“I’m sorry I have an 
important talk with a woman from the university’” and then to the interviewer ‘“It’s so 
nice to talk with an adequate interlocutor’” (Protocol 525).
On the other hand women were concerned about confidentiality and wanted reassurance 
that they did not have to sign anything and only had to say what they wanted to say.
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Referring to the state authorities they maintained however, ‘“well why should they be 
interested in my life’” (Protocol 516) or “‘I don’t have anything to hide’” (Protocol 073). 
In contrast to the younger generation, several of the older women were interested in 
receiving the transcribed interview and some results of the study. For the Bremen 
participants we therefore organised a meeting to report some of the findings, which was 
well attended and seemed to receive very positive feedback.
Working with (my own and others) transcripts and protocols generated at least two 
different experiences (or interpretation of experiences), the ‘interviewing experience’ and 
‘the text experience’. Both experiences were different for the two groups or ‘generations’ 
I was researching. I will elaborate on them in turn.
In the study of the older women, the women interviewers had often come back from their 
interviews dejected. Looking back on their lives for the older research participants had 
also meant reflecting on missed chances, losses and feelings of powerlessness and 
‘voicelessness’ often encountered also in their immediate environment. Yet, life histories 
showed a considerable degree of independence and strength that the interviewers found 
difficult to reconcile with positions of subordination in the family and which sometimes 
produced feelings of anger:
The Xs have moved into this new flat only a fortnight ago. [The interview was 
interrupted several times due to renovation work of the husband and son-in-law] 
The husband who kindly drove me back to the station made a few remarks such 
as ‘when we are gone, you can clean up where we have drilled’. Whereupon she 
[the research participant] winked at me and said ‘Yes, yes that’s the women's 
fate’ ... I found it astounding how little a woman, who has lived and worked so 
self-confidently, manages to get her way with her husband. It makes me angry if 
this man then speaks of dirt that has to be cleaned up.
(Protocol 550)
The impression of subordination was reinforced by the fact that in 10 of the 38 interviews 
with married women their husbands were present periodically or were ‘semi-present’ 
(e.g., reading the paper). This meant that they were often in a position to ‘overhear’ the 
interview and did at times present their own views to the interviewer or ‘corrected’ the 
accounts of their wives. Although elements of melancholy and sadness were ‘present’ in 
the interview transcripts, my in-depth reading of the narratives brought into the
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foreground the women’s humour, their struggles and fights and attempts to break out and 
make changes to their life-style. Moreover, the interviews had also opened up a different 
historical period to me that incited my interest and made it easier to contextualise the 
narratives.
Most of he younger research participants on the other hand were still in the process of 
establishing their lives and felt that a large part of their lives was still before them. 
Overall, they seemed much less melancholic but those who had children in particular 
appeared to be ‘caught up’ in their everyday-lives of establishing (or cutting back) their 
careers and committing time to their children. Listening to their accounts I often felt 
disappointed by what I perceived as an exclusive retreat into their private existence and 
noted down their ‘dreamlessness’, that I found ‘terribly tiring’ while interviewing. 
Members of the younger generation not only lived in the same ‘age’ as me, but also were 
in a life stage that I myself was approaching. The traditional division of labour between 
the husband as breadwinner and the wife as homemaker and part-time worker of those 
research participants who had children confronted me with a discomforting feeling of 
‘deja vu’. Whilst conducting the interviews I felt that the resistance that I had 
encountered in reading and listening to the narratives of the older women was absent. 
Both women and men saw gender equality not only as non-existent but also as not 
attainable (see Chapter 8). I found that the Tack of outrage with which this is presented 
outrageous’. At the end of an interim summary of my interviewing experience I asked 
frustratedly ‘why should I go and re-search if the people themselves do not search for 
anything. What am I looking for?’
These notes highlighted my different positioning with respect to the two groups of 
participants. Because of my age, the lives of the older women had less bearing on my 
own life, although their sadness and reported frustration affected me. By contrast, the 
lives of the younger generation, and in particular the implications of children on 
possibilities of engaging in broader ‘political’ as well as personal issues, were more 
threatening so that I initially distanced myself more.
Yet, working with the textual material into which the research is inevitably transformed,
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shifted my focus. The theme-centred interview analysis proceeded from the identification 
of specific themes, which were then analysed across all research participants. Not having 
to cope with the ‘whole’ biography of the research participant at once allowed me to 
focus in more depth on the things said and the way they were said. For example, I came 
to realise that ‘the retreat into privacy’ and moments of enjoyment of the younger 
participants could be interpreted as resisting the work ethics and discipline of their 
mothers.
After a full transcription of all interviews, ‘categories’ were developed on the basis of 
especially ‘rich’ and complex interviews in a process of close reading and discussion in 
the research team. Categories were thematic units, such as (for the older generation) the 
family of procreation, and specified in categorical fields such as birth of the first child, 
negotiations around re-entries into the labour market and the meaning of family after 
retirement. Categorical fields could be part of more than one thematic field. The hand- 
coded passages including those passages that did not fit into any of the existing 
categories were read into the computer program Ethnograph. To make use of the 
theoretical composition of the sample, a heading of socio-structural characteristics was 
attached to each coded passage. In the case of the older women the heading denoted 
region, occupational training, number of children, dominant status configuration 
(predominantly homemaker, employed in vocational area, other occupations or without 
national insurance) and current marital status. In the case of the younger generation, it 
denoted gender, sibling position, educational level (skilled, academic degree and no 
occupational training), family status, current employment status and number of children. 
As stated above the emerging focus on kin work led me to recode the interviews of the 
older women.
I started the interview analysis for the kin work project with a thematic comparison of 
older women’s accounts of family care giving, and the care anticipations of the younger 
generation. These medium-range themes were a point of entry into the analysis of kin 
work. Within these thematic units accounts were first compared for similarities and 
differences in interpretation patterns, tone and emotional content. To correct my own 
perception I frequently counted patterns and looked for counter-examples. Within and
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across interpretation patterns, I looked for potential differences between descriptive and 
argumentative utterances. I also applied my theoretically informed focus on the 
repertoires of contract and other modes of justification in order to asses to what extent 
they provided images, vocabularies and symbols which shaped thinking on what is 
desirable and thinkable. Attention was given to ‘negative’ cases and the contradictory, 
marginal, and quantifiably insignificant.
Second, to increase an understanding of what respondents meant by certain concepts, 
such as ‘self-evidence’ I searched for other contexts in the interview, in which these 
terms were used. Here I deployed a simple search function in the word processing 
program. Third, guided by the framework of kinscripts emerging pattern were re- 
contextualised in the context of social institutions and socio-economic context and of the 
histories of relationships. The analysis proceeded thus on several levels, moving between 
the ‘microanalysis’ of terms and concepts to a contextualisation within the history of 
family relationships and a focus on institutions, legacies and cultural scripts. At each step 
I checked whether interpretation patterns changed across (sub)groups with similar socio­
demographic characteristics to explore the impact of variables such as region, gender or 
marital status on the interpretation pattern. The process-orientated approach also allowed 
the analysis of subgroups; for example, whether employed women use different 
arguments than homemakers.
Overall the analysis was orientated towards the structure and ‘social logic’ of kin work in 
different contexts, rather than to the reconstruction of individual biographies. Interview- 
protocols and further (historical) sources provided additional means of re- 
contextualisation. At the end of the three major parts of analysis (Chapters 6-8) I reflected 
on how the findings suggested the need to modify or transform the framework of 
kinscripts. The themes identified in the narratives have a claim to reliability, yet my voice 
and research interests as unfolded in the previous chapters shape their specific 
presentation. Although the analysis attempts to bring out differences, contradictions and 
tensions between competing accounts and voices, this interpretation inevitably produced 
new points of closure and fixation that have to be addressed in further research.
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5.6. CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapter I have accounted for the design and methods used for the 
empirical study of two family generations in two culturally contrasting regions in West 
Germany, particularly the sample characteristics, the problem-centred interview 
technique and the theme-centred analysis. Interview techniques encompassed a 
visualisation of socio-structural data on life course transitions in individual life course 
graphs, a flexible topic guide that focused on specific themes while allowing the concerns 
and views of the research participants to be expressed, and contextual interview 
protocols. The process- and theme-orientated text proceeded from the identification of 
broader themes, which emerged in the interview, to an identification of a range of 
interpretation patterns and their re-contextualisation in social circumstance. Attention was 
not only given to what the research participants had said but also to how it was said. 
Interpretation patterns were compared with respect to their correlation with socio- 
structural characteristics of the sub-groups in the samples.
The method of the problem centred interview structured the research in several ways. 
Investigating socio-structural characteristics before the interview, and illustrating them in 
life course graphs had meant that as an interviewer I already had some foreknowledge of 
the research participants and often had developed questions about particular coincidences 
of turning points in respect to, for example, the coincidence of childbirth and an exit from 
the labour market. At the same time in the absence of representing kin work, the graphs 
pointed to the researcher’s blind spots in the construction of the quantitative 
questionnaire. Graphical representations were productive insofar as they initiated 
discussions in the interview. Research participants appeared to feel positive about 
attempts to represent their social ‘life courses’ and were encouraged to correct and add to 
them. Periods of kin work were re-integrated in the graphs where they concerned unpaid 
work in family businesses. Despite the absence of questions on kin work both in the 
survey and topic guide for the older generation women addressed these commitments and 
thereby encouraged me to integrate these issues in the topic guide of the younger 
generation. I suggest that the extent of productivity of the presentation of graphical 
material in the interview situation does therefore not depend on its ‘accuracy’ but on the
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extent to which they are discussed as social scientific constructions and enable the 
generation of discussion, disagreement and possibly consensus. Establishing agreement 
about socio-structural variables is a crucial ingredient for an analysis that is committed to 
linking interpretation patterns to socio-historical contexts.
Deploying an interview topic guide, however much it aims at allowing open conversation 
and the possibility of the research participant’s maintaining her view against the 
researchers preconception, means nevertheless that researchers/interviewers have 
predefined areas of interests. In addressing and introducing thematic fields during the 
interview, power is located on the side of the researcher. Although the older research 
participants particularly were at times overwhelmed by painful memories that came up 
unexpectedly, interview transcripts and protocols suggest that research participants had 
an irreducible power of framing their narratives and sharing or withholding ‘information’. 
Aspects of kin work practices that were of personal significance were repeatedly brought 
up in the interview although the topic guide did not address them. At the same time a 
number of research participants also conveyed through body language that they did not 
want to talk about particular family relationships. In the interview encounter and the 
arrangements that led to it, some of the younger research participants appeared to attempt 
to re-balance power inequalities by presenting themselves as local specialists, 
recommending accommodation, deciding on places to meet.
To increase transparency of the ways in which I have used the narratives I will have to 
disseminate the findings and interpretations of my research to the research participants. 
Carrying out this uncodified part of the research bargain must be a central concern in 
future research.
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Chapter 6
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN 
CONTRACTS OF NEED BETWEEN MOTHERS AND 
DAUGHTERS IN POST-WAR GERMANY
6.1. INTRODUCTION
The following analysis focuses on intergenerational kin work practices and the 
mechanisms of its assignment and negotiation in post-war Germany as depicted in the 
narratives of women bom around 1930. As elaborated in Chapter 4, the framework of 
kinscripts with its socio-historical dimensions of social institutions, cultural scripts and 
intra-familial legacies and the sensitising dimensions of kin work, as well as the 
repertoire of contract, provided a heuristic orientation for the analysis of kin work in the 
interwoven life courses of members of different family generations. At the same time the 
empirical accounts were used to render specific and possibly modify the framework. By 
shedding light on the histories of family relationships, the chapter also contextualises the 
analysis of the kin work commitments of this group of women in later life (Chapter 7).
In post-war Germany a number of qualitative family studies were undertaken to 
determine the state of the family and its alleged ‘disintegration and disorganisation’ 
(Schelsky 1953, p. 17) particularly the suspected decline of the patriarchal authority of 
the father. The diagnosis of the ‘crisis of marriage and the family’ (Seeler 1984, p. 96) 
had a long history. As early as 1912 Muller-Lyer referred to the ‘disintegration of the 
family’, the economic and personal emancipation of women in the course of which ‘the 
old form of marriage, the indissoluble patriarchal coerced monogamy is more and more
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perceived as outdated’ (Mtiller-Lyer 1912 as quoted in Baumert 1954, p. 187). During 
and directly after WWII ‘fathers’ had been absent from families while women as heads of 
households had maintained, provided for and represented the family. Marriages were 
frequently jeopardised by alienation and conflicts of authority between wives and 
homecoming husbands who ‘had lost the war’. Divorces and illegitimate births increased. 
1948 has been described as the ‘record year’ of divorces (Ruhl 1988).
Although the focus of the post-war family studies was primarily on conjugal relationships 
and on ‘disorientated youth’ they were principally concerned with family solidarity. 
Adorno in a preface to Baumert’s (op. cit.) family study stated that the equality of the 
Notgemeinschaft [need related community], that is the suspension and levelling of social 
status after the collapse of the Reich, had only been temporary. Schelsky (op. cit., p. 260) 
referred to the primacy of family solidarity ‘vis-a-vis the demands and threats of the 
outside world’. In Schelsky’s interpretation, the demands of solidarity led to a decrease in 
intergenerational conflict as different views on politics, morals and lifestyle were set 
aside to secure survival. The views and concerns of women were not investigated in their 
own right.
Yet, given the numerical shortage in men, part of the solidarity discourse in the 
immediate post-war referred to single mothers. Measures for strengthening the position of 
single and unmarried women were discussed, most spectacularly perhaps being the 
proposition by Dorothea Klaje to institutionalise and legalise the ‘mother family’ as an 
economic unit between an employed woman and her children and a single homemaking 
woman. Klaje’s legal draft was published in 1947 and submitted to the parliamentary 
committee in 1949 (Seeler 1984). Although the proposal was rejected, the openness of 
the public debates, illustrated in the continuing discussion of the proposal in women’s 
magazines, is remarkable against the background of the cultural and structural restoration 
of the bourgeois family that was to follow.
Feminist historians have highlighted the primary significance of women’s dual 
contribution to production and reproduction for the capitalist reconstmction in Germany. 
They have criticised the conventional conceptual divide between politics and everyday
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life in analyses of the post-war period. Annette Kuhn (1984, p. 197), for example, refers 
to the contradictory simultaneity of capitalist (primary) production and ‘archaic forms of 
subsistence economy’. After the war, there were 7.3 million more women in Germany 
than men. 3.7 million soldiers had died and 11.7 million men were prisoners of war. As 
in the war, women often were heads of households and lived together in families 
consisting of women and children. Apart from compulsory community services and a 
continuation of employment in the formal sector, including work in traditionally ‘male’ 
occupations, women were constantly trying to obtain food through foraging, black market 
activities and barter. Social differences, the German Institute for Economic Research 
noted in 1947, were no longer maintained by differences in income but by differing 
possibilities for accessing means of consumption (Schubert op. cit., p. 240). Feminist 
historians argue that women’s work after (and during) the war had been heroicised but 
de-historicised and never supported or acknowledged as a politico-economic factor. On 
the contrary, ‘housewives’ in the immediate post-war years received the lowest category 
of food-ration cards. Reports from this period indicate that women were often 
underweight, had a high rate of miscarriages, were unable to breastfeed and suffered from 
gynaecological disorders, nervousness and irritability (Ruhl op. cit.).
To date feminist approaches to uncovering the importance of material housework and the 
subsistence economy for the capitalist reconstruction in Germany have not included an 
analysis of the significance of intergenerational kin work as a form of welfare production 
within and across household boundaries. How did women who were around 15 years old 
at the end of the war conceive of the ‘matrilineality’ (Hagestad 1986b, p. 156) of family 
cohesion as well as the solidarity and constraints it entailed? What were the impacts of 
cultural scripts, social institutions and intra-familial legacies in what has been termed 
Germany’s ‘coerced matriarchy’ (Kuhn 1984, cit., p. 171)?
The following four sections are organised around specific themes such as the contribution 
of daughters to the survival of families and childcare provided by grandmothers. 
Although the narratives show that kin work commitments did not follow any predictable 
order, the re-assemblage of the narratives loosely follows a chronological order to 
maintain a sense of the history and development of intertwined intergenerational
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trajectories, particularly of mothers and daughters.
Based on narratives where the research participants positioned themselves in the context 
of the post-war and their families of origin, as well as on accounts systematically 
generated through a focus on parental support for the women’s vocational training and a 
comparison between their relationships with their mothers and daughters, sections 6.2. to
6.4. explore kin work in the so-called Frauenfamilien [‘mother families’] (Schubert op. 
cit., p. 243) of the war and particularly the post-war period. Intergenerational 
relationships in these families are viewed from the position and recollection of the older 
women as young women and daughters. Although none of the women’s mothers could be 
included in the research, the much criticised ‘exclusively daughterly stance’ (Hirschberg 
1989 as quoted in Ruddick 1994, p. 30) in research of mother-daughter relationships is to 
some extent counteracted by the subsequent perspective of the older women on their 
positions as mothers (6.5).
The text that follows is assembled by a ‘reading together’ of narrative accounts on a 
range of different constellations of kin work. To highlight the social structure of kin 
work, ‘gaps’ in one narrative can be illuminated or problematised by other narratives in 
cross-case comparisons. Interview passages have been included to illustrate the ways in 
which practices and views were reported. In order to highlight differences and 
commonalties I have attempted to include a maximum variety of accounts of research 
participants from both cultural regions. To increase the transparency of my translations of 
the narratives, the German quotations are listed in Appendix B, in order of appearance. 
Where possible, I have tried to contextualise the narrative accounts by providing 
additional historical information, information from the interview protocols and the 
quantitative surveys, and by referring to other findings on the extracted themes.
6.2. KIN WORK OF DAUGHTERS: OBLIGATIONS AND EMOTIONAL
DISTANCE
Post-war Germany was an ‘austerity society’ (Ritter 1989, p. 9), marked by the 
fundamental Zusammenbruch (breakdown) of the socio-political system on the one hand
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and personal as well as politico-economic continuities of a patriarchal-capitalist society 
on the other. For civilians the distribution of supplies worsened considerably between 
1945 and 1947 (Ruhl 1988). In 1945, 45% of houses and flats in the western occupied 
zones were completely destroyed. Capital and labour were primarily put into primary 
industries. Thus in 1946 in the British and American occupied zones, where the research 
participants lived, the production rate of electricity and gas had reached 85% and of 
mining 78% of the production in 1936 (Abelshauser 1975, as quoted in Schubert 1984, p. 
237). At the same time there was a fundamental shortage of basic consumer goods, such 
as food, heating material, and clothing. The production rate in the textile industry in 
1946, for example, only reached 20% of the production in 1936 (ibid.). Like gas and 
electricity, food was rationed and fell to between 1150 to 950 calories per person per day. 
In Hamburg, the daily rate of death from malnourishment in 1946 was 1.2 and some 
people froze to death in their flats in the harsh winter of 1946/47 (Kuhn 1984).
The families of the research participants, who predominantly came from a working class 
or lower middle class background (10 parents were running a family business or were 
self-employed), had often been displaced. None of the women came from a Jewish 
background. Two women had fled with their mothers from the former Eastern territories 
(in Poland), three fled over the border from the Soviet occupied zone, one of them on her 
own. More than half of the research participants’ homes were bombed out. The women’s 
personal and family situation depended on their means of access to food supplies and 
accommodation with relatives. Due to the war-related absence of fathers and older 
brothers, the majority had first hand experiences with ‘women headed households’ either 
consisting of their mothers and siblings, and/or of other relatives, particularly 
grandmothers or grandparents who temporarily accommodated eleven of the 52 women 
interviewed.
On the other hand the women had also spent considerable amounts of time apart from 
their families, mainly through the evacuation of children for safety to the rural areas 
(Kinderlandverschickung (KLV)) where they stayed in families or camps. Furthermore 
girls had to undergo a year of compulsory community service (Pflichtjahr) both under the 
Nazis and the Allied occupation. In 1941 14.5 million girls, organised in the Nazi youth
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organisation Bund Deutscher Madel (BDM) did compulsory community services in 
Germany (Reese 1981 as quoted in Wiggershaus 1984, p. 45). The Pflichtjahr was bound 
to food ration cards and to the possibility of obtaining vocational qualifications.
Descriptions of the relationships to mothers (and sometimes grandmothers) were an 
important and integral part of the self-presentation of the research participants, which was 
confirmed in a range of interview protocols. Against the background of the vivid 
descriptions of insecurity and deprivation in the war and post-war years, I had expected 
narratives of particularly ‘close’ mother-daughter relationships. Henwood and Coughlan 
(1993), however, have rightly pointed out that an unquestioned equation of positive 
affection with practical support often underlies the construct of ‘closeness’ in mother- 
daughter relationships that requires critical investigation. Indeed whilst pointing to the 
existential necessity o f‘close’ cooperation, the characterisations of this relationship from 
the viewpoint of the daughters seem to refute the assumption of emotional closeness.
‘I had to - my mother was always out and about, as you say, to get us something to 
eat. She was in the country a lot. And then sometimes I had to cook for the older 
ones and for my little sister too... My mother didn’t think about us too much really. 
We pretty much grew up - without anything, right.’ (1)
126, p. 1/3, city, mother divorced and employed, 3
siblings24
From the standpoint of an uninvolved observer, it is plausible to define the mother’s 
foraging as a form of maternal care. The phrase ‘growing up “without anything’” does 
indeed leave the exact referent unarticulated. In the context of ‘not think about’ the 
expressed lack with respect to the mother could refer to personal interest and caring about 
(as opposed to caring for), whilst literally connoting a complete absence (‘without 
anything’) that may include, for example, the absence of bodily contact and material 
security. The substitution of an unspecific term for a concrete one (‘that time is missing’) 
or the quantity of something for its quality (‘I’ve seen too much’) to refer to something 
that the women do not want or cannot speak about is not uncommon. This reading of a 
more encompassing lack in the relationship with their mothers gains weight in the context
24 In order to provide a minimum of contextual information, socio-structural information is attached to the 
interview passages. Here it denotes the interview identification number, region, marital and occupational 
status of the mother and numbers of siblings referring to the post-war period, in later accounts also the 
women’s occupational status, their dominant status configuration and the number of their children.
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of other narratives. Time (together), talking openly, emotional sharing, warmth and 
physically shown affection were identified and felt as missing, even though some of the 
mothers were perceived as having done ‘everything for us’ (525, see below). The lack of 
emotional closeness was presented in the context of the strains and multiple obligations 
of mothers in the survival work of the family, but also in the context of historically 
specific cultural scripts of respect and obedience towards the older generation (see, for 
example, Forster 1934 on the Nazi ideology of maternal ‘education work’) and long 
periods of absence and separation during evacuation.
The other side of maternal absences is that the women frequently introduced themselves 
as providers or co-providers for the family. Rather than presenting themselves as 
receivers of maternal care, the women reported that -  in the absence of institutional 
support -  as girls and adolescents they ‘had to’ contribute to the survival and welfare of 
the ‘women headed family’. As they described it, family responsibility developed in and 
through practice. From the perspective of the women interviewed, their contribution 
consisted of work that was done in the place of the mother, such as looking after younger 
siblings or organizing refugee permits or monetary exchanges as well as work that was 
done in cooperation with the mother or grandmother, like foraging for food. Occasionally 
the research participants were providers, for example when they obtained access to 
agricultural products whilst working on farms during the Pflichtjahr.
‘My mother didn’t have much time for us. She had seven children, she had the 
business, there wasn’t much time to look after the children. We were dressed, we 
had enough to eat, we had to help. ... We were fond of our mother, and she did 
everything for us. But there was no warmth between the parents and us. To give a 
hug sometimes, to give a kiss and say ‘well done’ there wasn’t any time, we were 
too many. And we missed that.’ (2)
525, p. 12/26, country, mother married and self-employed, 6 siblings
Resp: Well, the whole flight, we were in a reception camp for four months, in X. There 
I had to look after the family. My mother was ill and I had to carry the main 
burden ... and that’s why you felt responsible for the whole family. I mean that 
was big in our family anyway. All siblings really. Later on, also now. That one 
cares for the other... I could never talk to my mother. I think I went straight from 
being a child to being an adult. The time in between is missing. And, and I 
believe that something was always missing between my mother and me. You see, 
I was never actually at home during the war years, never with my mother. First I 
was at the KLV camp at Y, then I was at Z - both for six months or so. Then I
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was at U, then in the V. And all the time I was away from my mother. You can 
say what you want, but something’s missing there.
Int: You became alienated from one another?
Resp: Oh yes. And even today, I still wonder sometimes how she could do that. How 
could she do that, how can anyone - 
Int: Did you feel pushed out?
Resp: Oh yes, that time -  it’s missing.... On the other hand I say, God, the times were 
so hard, maybe she couldn’t do otherwise. The war ... And through this people 
hardened. And that’s how my mother was, rather than a cuddle, I got hit with a 
stick. That’s how it was.(3)
822, p. 26, city, mother married and not employed, 4 siblings
Both the absence of emotional closeness and the necessities of what I shall define below 
as daughterwork were strongly anchored in the socio-historical context of the war and 
post-war period. These contextualisations forestall narratives o f‘mother blame’ (Walters 
1992, p. 37). While adult intergenerational relationships came to be characterised as 
‘intimacy at a distance’ (Rosenmayr and Kockheis 1963) mother-daughter relationships 
during and after the war from the perspective of the research participants were 
characterised as ‘distance in proximity’ -  at least for those periods when the women 
headed families were physically together. With reference to Patricia Hill Collins’s (1994, 
p. 59) notion of motherwork this form of kin work can be called daughterwork. 
According to Collins, motherhood for women of colour is closely linked to the concerns 
of racial ethnic communities and quests for physical survival and empowerment. The 
term ‘motherwork’ challenges the conventional divides between work and family, public 
and private, individual and collective. Yet, the question of whether the research 
participants viewed their practices as a social political practice and thought about it as 
empowering needs further exploration.
From the perspective of the research participants, grandparents and in particular 
grandmothers were viewed as a source of stability, dominance, authority and care. 
Grandparents provided shelter, food and care for many women headed families and/or the 
children. This support however, was usually seen as support for the respondents’ 
mothers. As one research participant put it ‘I was with granddad and grandma, they kept 
me then so as to make it a bit easier for her [her divorced mother]’ (022). For those 
women who remained alone with their mothers and siblings the absence of fathers was 
described as a loss in two respects: directly, as a loss of a potential source for love and
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support for the women themselves, both in adolescence and in later life; and indirectly, as 
a loss of support of their mothers, whom the women saw as overburdened, hardened and 
sometimes in despair in the struggle for survival. Apart from practically taking over 
family responsibilities, the women tried to make things as easy as possible for their 
mothers in sparing them from their personal worries. This can be regarded as a further 
invisible aspect of daughterwork. The narratives often point to a tension between the 
mothers’ hardness, their perceived strength that frequently was a source of positive 
identification, and their fragility.
‘I often thought if my father were still alive then I think some things perhaps would 
have gone differently, I might have broken out. But my mother - 1 always wanted 
not to worry her.’ (4)
857, p. 32, country, mother widowed and employed, 3 siblings
‘In any case we didn’t dare to clarify our positions towards our parents. We always 
tried not to hurt them as well, and always were anxious that we hurt them.’ (5)
814, p. 25, city, mother married and not employed, 2 siblings
As to the practical help they had given, no respondent spoke of having negotiated the 
extent of her contributions. On the contrary the formulations ‘I had to cook’ (126), ‘We 
had to help’ (525), ‘I had to look after the family’ (822) suggest that those practices were 
required by socio-economic circumstance and need. In times of existential insecurity 
women had to rely on each other; analytical categories of self-interest or bargaining 
power become obsolete. Just as some of the grandmothers provided for the children of 
their daughters, the research participants cooperated or stood in for their mothers. This 
cooperation is thus not necessarily an act of solidarity or free will, but the feeling of 
responsibility evolved through practice (‘I had to carry the main burden... and that’s why 
you felt responsible’ (822)). If one were to employ a contractual vocabulary, 
daughterwork in the post-war can be defined as an exchange, not in the sense of giving 
something for an equivalent good, but in the sense of replacing someone with another 
(woman), as an act o f substitution which promoted a ‘new’ intergenerational division of 
labour.
In the kin work narratives referring to their childhood, family obligations appear as an all 
or nothing commitment. Resisting family responsibilities is visible and articulated only 
when women as adolescents left the family household altogether to pursue their own
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interests, in which case a younger sister was likely to stand in for the one who left. This 
practice of substitution appeared as a natural and self-understood kinscript that did not 
need further explanation.
Resp: I was her oldest daughter and Dad hadn’t come back ... and I was practically 
Mum’s main support as it were. Everything that she needed, we went to the 
forest, sawed up trees so that we had any heating material at all and had a wood 
collection card 
Int: So that you were a bit -
Resp: She needed a bit - but then I was very selfish and said, I’m still going to Bremen!
[from the Soviet zone]
Int: Which you managed too
Resp: Yes, but then, my sister is three years younger than I. Then it was her turn. Right, 
well, that’s how it goes.(6)
073, p. 8, city, mother alone and not employed, 6 siblings
Notwithstanding the woman’s courage and desire ‘to make something out of my life!’, 
evoked in the dramatic account of her illegal crossing of the border between the Soviet 
and British zone, her exit from family responsibilities in her family of origin was enabled 
not only by her sister’s substituting but also by quasi-family relationships in Bremen. 
Thus, the chance to accept an offer of an apprenticeship in Bremen depended on the 
possibility of being accommodated by a close friend of her mother who was the 
godmother of her brother. As the research participant herself indicated, if she had wanted 
to leave with no particular goal, her mother would not have allowed it.
The narratives of women bom around 1930 thus suggest that women were bom into 
intergenerational relationships that required their help as daughters. Daughterwork was a 
self-understood part of growing up in wartime and post-war Germany and was neither 
based on a free choice nor on emotional closeness. Women of all ages substituted for the 
absence of institutional support and other family members without necessarily following 
an intra-familial tradition. The question of whether vocational training was more 
generally seen as a step towards a more independent, less family bound lifestyle, or 
whether kin responsibilities empowered women to pursue occupational training is 
considered in the next section.
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6.3. WOMEN’S APPRENTICESHIP AFTER 1945: BETWEEN THE QUEST 
FOR INDEPENDENCE AND PLACEMENT IN THE KIN NETWORK
Standing on their own two feet
The women’s narratives about their vocational training in the post-war period indicate 
that an apprenticeship was not necessarily their desired goal. At least 18 women had 
wanted to obtain higher school education, which in most cases they failed to do because 
their mother or parents were not able to raise the money for school fees, clothes and 
books. In any case the women’s school careers were interrupted by frequent evacuations; 
schools were often destroyed or temporarily closed in 1945 and some families had fled 
from the districts in which the girls were registered. If a child could be sent to school it 
was most likely to be the research participants’ brother(s). Only three women obtained 
their A-level equivalents. For those who did not, an apprenticeship was the ‘very least’ 
that they had wanted. Finding a place, however, proved difficult. Newspaper reports from 
the post-war period show that the demand from girls and young women for skilled 
training was much higher than the offers available. Women’s difficulties in finding an 
apprenticeship have to be seen in the context of economic collapse and high rates of 
unemployment in the post-war years, particularly in the traditionally female occupations 
(Schubert 1984).
Political, cultural and legislative initiatives were directed at (re)establishing the bourgeois 
family model as a unit of bread winning husband and homemaking wife. As soldiers and 
later the 11.7 million German war prisoners came back to Germany, women were banned 
from jobs, such as, for example train conductors and builders, that had been considered 
legitimate female occupations during the war (Bom 1989). In dual income families, 
wives employed in the public sector were sacked on the grounds that they were taking 
jobs from men. Labour protection legislation was used to exclude women from certain 
occupations but usually was repealed when women were needed for (unpaid) 
reconstruction work. With respect to compulsory community services, after 1945, the 
authorities explicitly stated that this service should not lead to a vocational qualification 
for women: ‘the use of women is almost exclusively restricted to unskilled labour.... In 
general women’s commitment to typical male occupations that develops with training is 
unwelcome’ (President of Westphalia 1946 as quoted in Ruhl 1988, p. 50).
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Despite the fact that unskilled factory work or domestic work was more easily available 
and sometimes better paid, a number of women reported that they went in search of an 
apprenticeship on their own. Firsthand experiences of the unreliability of male provision 
during and after the war, aggravated by the so-called ‘marriage squeeze’ in this age 
group, but also the feeling of responsibility for contributing to their family’s 
reconstruction, and the hope of escaping the confines of poverty, were given as motives 
to pursue an apprenticeship. As one research participant said you wanted to ‘have 
something in your hands’ (006), a qualification which in the medium-term was 
considered to provide access to more qualified and better paid work.
‘Well, behind it for me was that I had an occupation, that I was independent, that I 
could earn my own money, that I stood on my own two feet. That was behind it for 
me.’ (7)
546, p. 10, country, mother married and family labourer, 3 siblings
‘I didn’t like it at home that much. [My parents] had a lot of problems with each 
other. And that was bad.... And then I went there and got this [training as a shop 
assistant]... But it was somehow - that was natural for me because my parents had 
to start all over again as well, and then I thought: they lost this and it wasn’t their 
fault, so I have to help there.’ (8)
071, p. 12/27, city, mother married and at home, no siblings
Formulations such as these seem to refute the idea that the actual assumption of kin 
responsibilities during the war had empowered the research participants. Their lack of 
self-confidence as young girls is frequently brought up in the interviews and often stands 
in contrast to the responsibilities that the women had taken on. Over half of the 
respondents reported that they sought occupational training for better income prospects 
and personal worth. The contradiction between their wish to leave the family household 
and the perceived obligation to contribute to the family finances, however, did not pose 
itself in practice. For structurally, even ignoring the severe housing shortage, the 
women’s apprenticeship earnings were too low to enable them to leave the parental home 
in the short-term, a desire articulated by a substantial minority of women. On the other 
hand the kin network was not only considered as a restraint and a liability but also as a 
source of support (and at times pressure) for the girls in obtaining occupational training.
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Mothers (and sometimes other female relatives) were perceived as a mainstay of support 
in finding an apprenticeship, sometimes against the explicit resistance of the research 
participants’ fathers who did not see the need for women to obtain vocational 
qualifications.
Generating human capabilities
On the basis of their own experiences of hard and underpaid work and the realisation that 
marriage did not necessarily provide economic security, and occasionally also with 
reference to their positive experiences with having received skilled training, the majority 
of mothers saw the provision of occupational training as a substantial part of their 
motherwork. Often it was they who accompanied their daughters to the employment 
exchange and sometimes placed their daughters in an apprenticeship that they thought 
would fit in terms of the needs in the family. In the case of the trained childminders who 
had to pay school fees during their training, the women reported that their mothers raised 
this money. In providing access to the formal sphere of employment this form of 
maternal support illustrates a particular aspect of kin work, namely the generation of 
human capabilities (see Chapter 4.4.).
‘Especially my mother, she was very talented in sewing, but girls didn’t get 
occupational training in this generation. All her brothers were trained for some 
occupation and she had to ‘go into service’ as you said at the time. And then she 
vowed that if she ever had a girl she shouldn’t have to do that. She should get some 
training.’ (9)
115, p. 10, city, mother married and not employed, no siblings
Resp: My mother initiated it, yes.
Int: Did she go without you [to the exchange], or?
Resp: Yes, she must have gone without -  well, I didn’t go with her, I only
introduced myself to the master... I was just 14, right. Well, at that time
you didn’t have [confidence], like a child is today with 14 years, you 
didn’t have that then.(10)
034, p. 2, city, mother married and not employed, 4 siblings
As all the women interviewed underwent vocational training it is likely to be a 
characteristic of the sample composition that those women who said that their mothers 
openly opposed their training found support from other relatives, notably aunts and 
grandmothers. These female relatives were seen as ‘standing in’ for missing fathers and
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supporting the overburdened mothers.
‘I have to say, I had a lot of support from my aunt, regarding the vocational 
training. If it had gone by my mother, if she would have decided alone -  my aunt 
really interfered ... we never had much money at home, and my mother always 
said: if I send you all to X, that was this paper factory, we would have more money. 
Then we wouldn’t have to count [money] that much. And then my aunt was always 
there and said: but the children need to get training.... Well at home it was that my 
mother or rather my aunt, who mainly looked after us, because my father wasn’t 
there anymore, felt a bit responsible for us.’ (11)
549, p. 8, country, mother widowed and not employed, 4 siblings
Transforming intra-familial legacies
An intra-familial tradition could consider apprenticeship as a promotion of women’s self- 
sufficiency -  at least in time of crisis. This expected life history or kinscript, which 
positioned women in the kin network that supported them, included the daughter’s 
continuation of the family business as well as gender specific expectations of her support 
of her older parents. Here regional differences come into play. The practice of keeping 
one daughter in the parental household or family business as a source of parental support 
seemed to be particularly (but not exclusively) widespread in farming families. Such 
kinscripts were characteristically formulated in the passive (‘it was planned’, ‘it was 
thought’), highlighting the subordinate role of negotiations of women’s family 
responsibilities in the war and post-war period. Instead it seemed as if these plans became 
part of the personal identity of the women in question.
Resp: I have to say in advance, I myself have grown up in a grocer’s shop
Int: Ah, your parents
Resp: My parents had a grocer’s shop and as a child I worked there from early on, also 
when my father was drafted in the war... Well, it was actually thought: I would 
train as a shop assistant, would take over the business of my parents and would be 
as it were the life insurance of my parents.
Int: Yes. Were you the only child?
Resp: I was the only child. That’s how it was planned and I loved that job but it just
wasn’t possible after the war.(,2)
805, p. 1/3, city, mother widowed and self-employed, no siblings
‘For me it was actually planned that I should remain at home. Like it used to be in 
families where there was farming, that one daughter remained at home and 
supported the parents. My older sister stayed with my aunt whose husband was the 
first here in the village to die in the war and she had nine little children. And 
naturally my sister had to stand in at my aunt’s. She was 16/17 at the time. Well,
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and if I wanted to stay at home, I had to undergo an agricultural apprenticeship.’ (13) 
516, p. 1, country, mother married and in family business, 3 siblings
These pre-war gendered intra-familial kinscripts are noteworthy because they combine 
‘traditional’ and ‘modem’ elements: on the one hand daughters were designated to be the 
traditional family carers but at the same time they ‘had to’ obtain occupational 
qualifications in order to take over the family businesses. For both respondents quoted 
above the war-related destruction dismpted these plans -  yet, the women both became 
self-employed for most of their working lives and temporarily or permanently lived with 
their mothers. Thus the socio-economic Zusammenbruch, whilst often taking away the 
accumulated bases of family support (the family business), opened up possibilities for 
women to detach or divert from familial arrangements or scripts, as well as modifying 
and redesigning them.
Following intra-familial legacies in changing circumstances could change their meaning, 
as is illustrated by the case of a woman who lost her parents and decided to maintain the 
family business for her bother. Whereas subordinating her own interest (in not pursuing 
higher education, as she had wished, but rather vocational training) and taking 
responsibility for the future of her brother conforms to women’s traditional gender role, 
the courage and initiative in taking over the business with the help of relatives and her 
father’s employees fundamentally challenged conventional gender and age norms. Again 
kin support was a liability but also opened new possibilities.
‘And because my parents weren’t alive anymore, and the company was there, and I 
had a younger brother who was supposed to take it over one day, something had to 
happen to maintain the company for him. And well then I had - completely 
spontaneously - decided: I will go into the company. And that was only possible 
with vocational training.... We had to take in a partner of course. I was too young... 
Well, I think that was - it simply was in the air so to say. It was like this: you 
started again with nothing. Everything was over and you couldn’t - at least I as a 17 
year-old -  couldn’t predict what would come next. It was - the only thing that 
remained was the family. Well, my grandparents were still alive, they 
accommodated us at first, and then there was the business.... But things had to go 
on... it was clear to me that now I had to provide for the livelihood for the two of 
us so to say.’ (14)
027, p. 1/4, city, orphan, 1 sibling 
Substitution arrangements did not follow predefined scripts but were made up as the need
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arose. Yet, the fact that they tended to be seen as ‘self-evident’ or natural responses to 
crisis situations and seemed to have had the support of the wider kin network, gives them 
a predictable character which turned the extraordinary into the ordinary. In so far as new 
employment opportunities were defined as beneficial for the family or kin network and 
natural responses, this view contributed to both the obfuscation of social (and kinscript) 
change and the invisibility of kin work.
As has been shown in the example of the accommodation of children by grandmothers, it 
is not exclusively daughters who substitute. In three cases the research participants’ 
mothers too as ‘quasi-kin’ took children of friends who either died or lived in a different 
occupation zone as foster children into their households and provided for their education.
The moral power of money in assigning family responsibilities
With respect to these kinscripts of substitution none of the research participants referred 
to the idea of reciprocity or exchange. Particularly in the rural areas, when there were 
several siblings family traditions suggested that one daughter took over major family 
responsibility and thereby released the other siblings. As an exchange of labour and time 
(in the sense of the generational or procreational contract (Laslett 1992)) these 
arrangements can only appear from the point of view of the mother/parents. For siblings 
the formula of solidarity was ‘one for all’ -  which did not usually include ‘all for one’. 
Thus the benefits of occupational training for one daughter sometimes occurred at the 
expense of another daughter who worked in the family household.25 Yet, families did not 
renounce the idea of equality and fairness. At this point, what Weber (1922/1978) 
considered to be the contractual element par excellence -  money -  comes into play. In the 
process of kinscription or assigning of kin responsibilities, money served both as an 
incentive and recompense to the person who was thought to be under-benefited in the 
arrangement. This ‘compensation’ was either paid by a third party who benefited by 
virtue of being released from kinship obligation or by the party who felt over-benefited 
by an arrangement that was never ‘freely’ negotiated and was not always perceived of as
25 At a time when women’s demand for vocational training largely exceeded the availabilities the same can 
be said about the female apprentices. Four of the research participants got their apprenticeship in the post­
war period after other young women had died or dropped out because they had to support their families.
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fair.
‘There was the agreement at home, because my younger sister wasn’t allowed to 
get training - there my mother got her way: yes, the youngest, one daughter stays at 
home and later has to be there for me - 1 had to share everything with her. My sister 
always got half of my wage... I would have liked to give her more, if I’d had more, 
very much so. Because I always had a guilty conscience about her. What are 40 
Marks if I can’t get trained in anything? It is a pittance.’ (15)
851, p. 13/14, country, mother married and not employed, 2 siblings
It is apparent that the speaker, despite her monetary payments to her sister, did not 
perceive the exchange of money for time and labour as fair. The interviewer had noted in 
the protocol that at the time of the interview the mother was widowed and had moved to 
and was being taken care of by the research participant’s sister ‘which mother had always 
wanted’ (Protocol 851). Contrary to Weber who explicitly conceived of the money 
contract as non-ethical and quantitatively delimited, the power of money does not seem to 
lie so much in its material but in its ‘moral’ value: it appears as an instrument of 
reinforcing support arrangements by enforcing the idea of equality. In the following 
account the payment of insurance appeared as a strategy that made refusal of kin work 
more difficult, but likewise did not guarantee fair and equal bargaining in accordance 
with the women’s well-considered interests.
‘I came back in April 48 and then I first looked after my grandmother for half a 
year who was very ill. My mother couldn’t do it, because she had the household 
and we also had a little farm with it.... My grandparents said ‘no, please stay and 
we will pay for your insurance.’ But only later when we listed everything for the 
pension did we realise: well, where is it then? Yes, yes, during that time only health 
insurance was paid but no social security contributions. Well and that wouldn’t 
have made up much either. I didn’t earn anything anyway because I didn’t want 
that either.’ (16)
118, p. 8/9, city, mother married and self-employed, 1 sibling
The women’s accounts indicate that kin work in the post-war years was a two-sided 
legacy. On the one hand motherwork facilitated access to the formal sphere and 
vocational training as a resource and competence outside the family network to enable 
their daughters to lead a more (economically) independent life than they had. At the same 
time the apprenticeship could be embedded in or be part of an intra-familial legacy, 
which limited (or jeopardised) personal independence and career development. The 
narratives suggest that kin work was passed on both collaterally and vertically to
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descending or ascending female relatives if a woman or man could not fulfil their family 
responsibilities. None of the women mentioned that their brothers substituted in this way. 
These pathways of kin work were constructed situationally in response to need and 
availability, usually targeting female kin. Moreover, the reliability of substitution has the 
character of an inbuilt pledge or guarantee that if a woman can temporarily or 
permanently not fulfil her part of kin work, a close female kin in the family lineage will 
substitute for her.
In the context of the Zusammenbruch, where as one respondent said, ‘you couldn’t rely 
on the traditions anymore’ (805) intra-familial legacies were both activated and 
transformed. Insofar as they were reported, strategies to deal with kinship demands did 
not consist of an outright resistance or rejection of kin commitments but rather of a 
partial continuation of those legacies, combined with novel ‘quasi-contractual’ elements 
such as the payment of insurance contributions for periods of familial care. Yet the 
involvement of money or its equivalent (such as insurance payments) does not allow us 
to infer a woman’s self-interest: none of the women said that she took on kin 
responsibilities in order to receive money.
If occupational training did not release women from family responsibilities, what room 
for manoeuvre did the women’s subsequent employment after the 1948 monetary reform 
open up when the German economy began to recover?
6.4. THE REORGANISATION OF NEED RELATED HOUSEHOLDS: 
DAUGHTERS AS BREADWINNERS
Women’s need related shared households remained a common phenomenon in Germany 
particularly in the cities. In Bremen 52.2% of women lived without a male partner in 
1946 (Census 1946 as quoted in Hoecker and Meyer-Braun 1988). In the sample of 
women bom around 1930, slightly more than a third of the research participants’ mothers 
lived without a male partner in the 1950s. The narrative accounts indicate that these 
women were in a vulnerable economic position: as family labourers or in informal 
employment, they often had not paid social security contributions and after divorce did
184
not receive allowances in their own right. Widow’s pensions took a long time to be 
granted, particularly when husbands were ‘missing’, and on the whole did not cover basic 
expenses. But also on a personal level some of the mothers were seen as needing support. 
In this situation, 18 out of 52 women in the sample continued to live in need related 
communities with their mothers, another eight lived with their parents due to a continuing 
housing shortage. This section looks at the significant subgroup of women who lived 
with their mothers in need related shared households.
The intergenerational division of labour often shifted after the research participants had 
finished their apprenticeship and their actual or potential earning power exceeded that of 
their predominantly home working mothers. Given the insufficiency of institutional 
support in situations of severe financial need all respondents continued to contribute their 
wages to the household income. Although they had rarely chosen their vocational 
training, the overwhelming majority of women had identified with their jobs as they 
obtained more responsibilities and half of the women interviewed had developed some 
kind of career plans (Bom et al 1996). The need to contribute to their mother’s income 
was an additional incentive to career development for some respondents.
At the same time, however, the limitations of typical women’s occupations became 
apparent. Women were at most considered to be additional earners, not breadwinners, and 
wages in those occupations structurally remained relatively low (see Chapter 3). Ten of 
the 18 women who lived with their mothers ‘decided’ to leave their occupation and 
(temporarily) take up better-paid factory and piecework. Perceived responsibility was 
particularly high when there were no other siblings to contribute. Interestingly, it was 
often the same mothers who had supported their daughters practically and sometimes 
financially during the apprenticeship who now accepted or suggested that their daughters 
gave up qualified work to do unskilled factory work. Fathers too were supported through 
factory work in the larger sample, but their need was never said to be the purpose of 
taking up this work in the first place.
Where women substitute for male earners waged labour becomes another form of kin 
work in the post-war period. The assumption of financial responsibility evolved
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unplanned in response to need, but contrary to subsistence work it was discussed and 
negotiated in the women headed families. The research participants usually emphasised 
that their mothers had not demanded their financial contributions. Given their positive 
identification with their occupation on the one hand and the perceived need of their 
mothers on the other, the accounts oscillate between perceived constraint (‘I had to’), the 
insistence on ‘self-evidence’ or naturalness and conscious solidarity (‘I did this of my 
own free will’, ‘I wanted to’). These expressions are underlined in the following 
narratives to highlight the women’s ambivalent motives. Formally, the narratives vary 
between description and the inclusion of direct speech, by which discussions are ‘re­
enacted’ for the interviewer/listener. In this sense, the narratives are less ‘theorised’ than 
the descriptions of kinship obligations in their childhood. Direct speech is often used to 
literally express differing voices. At the same time the marked ‘and then’ structure in the 
narratives, highlighted in italics, conveyed the impression of an inevitable sequence of 
action, which superseded potential doubts and debates.
Resp: My father died in an accident at his workplace in 1951. And then my mother got 
very little money, a very small pension. And then I had to hand over [my wage], I 
didn’t have to but it was natural that did i t . ... And what did my mother get as a 
pension then? She started with 35 Marks per month, when I got 95 per month as a 
salary. ...it was very difficult to get along on this. That’s why you thought about 
earning a bit as well... If I had more siblings it might have been different perhaps. 
I did this of my own free will.
Int: But also have simply accepted this difficult situation.
Resp: Saw it and then well, you lived together and you had to live together.(17)
055, p. 10/16, city, shop assistant, mother not employed, no siblings
Then I was told by the company that I should take over the branch in X. I was 19 
years old then, the youngest branch manager in Y !... And then when my father died 
in March ‘50, I wasn’t even 20, and my mother didn't get a widow pension 
immediately, that took several months. And we had no savings.... and we didn’t 
get along with the money and then someone, an acquaintance said ‘you know 
where you have to go? You have to go to Z, there you can do piece work and earn a 
lot of money to make a good living with your mother.’ And then I said to my 
mother ‘Do you think I should do that, so we can live better?’ Then she said ‘Child, 
well, I don’t know whether you can start there again later.’ I said ‘it doesn’t matter, 
then I can also work somewhere else’. And then I did piece work at Z .(18)
071, p. 3/4, city, shop assistant, mother widowed and not employed, no siblings
In contrast, the following research participant described the intergenerational division of 
labour between her home working mother and herself, particularly her assumption of
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factory work as a voluntary and obligatory sacrifice. This underlying conflict was still so 
emotionally upsetting that the woman started to cry in the interview and the recording 
was stopped. The research participant had worked in a factory for ten years and also 
financially supported her husband who took a university degree.
Resp: Yes, I had to hand it over [her wage]. There was no other way, right. But then it 
often happened - 1 still remember there was a hairdresser in our house and she 
always got such tremendous tips and she gave a lot of presents to her mother and 
I couldn’t do that. And I always found that sad that I couldn’t do that. And then 
sometimes there was ‘Yes, she earns so much and you earn so little.’
Int: Did your mother say that?
Resp: Yes, yes. And then I thought, man, you can’t really afford this, you have such a 
wonderful job and only work part-time. Sure, I had to continue at home because 
she was at the sewing machine, right, and run the household there, we had a huge 
garden. And I did work into the night, but not in my occupation and for cash, you 
know. And then I felt sometimes a bit shabby and was sad too. Yes, with a heavy 
heart I -  but I didn’t want to tell them in the kindergarten that I wanted to go into 
the factory. — I didn’t want to tell them. And I still have the proverbs that the 
children wrote me. They all knew that I suffered enormously from this.
Int: Did this have to do with a different status
Resp: No, not status but - 1 was so attached to my job, right. And today I reproach my 
{cries} today I say to my husband, man that I did that, right.
Int: Uhm. So you always had to support your family there?
Resp: {cries} Yes. — Always. I did it later too. And I liked doing it too.
Int: Uhm. — Should we have a short break?(19)
130, p. 21, city, child minder, mother self-employed, 2 sisters
This is not the only account where research participants started to cry when expressing 
both their desire and obligation to provide for members of the family (see Chapter 7.3.). 
As the narrative indicates, the boundaries between mere financial need and the wish to 
live more comfortably were not clear-cut. Indeed other accounts suggest that it was not 
merely ‘economic need’ that tied women together in need related households. Phrases 
such as ‘she [the mother] needed me so bad’ (857) might also allude to personal need 
that some of the women referred to when they spoke of the unfortunate position they felt 
their mothers were in, having lost husbands and sometimes sons and forced to do hard 
and low- or unpaid work over years. In the process of need interpretation, feelings of 
compassion and responsibility were expressed as feelings of guilt and obligation, or to 
use Mauss’s (1924/1993, p. 52) term as ‘quasi-culpability’, only when the research 
participants reported that mothers had ‘used’ references to their misfortune to make their 
daughters stay with them.
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The notion of quasi-culpability refers to a feeling of guilt, which motivates reparation, 
without actual misdemeanour.26 According to Mauss quasi-culpability is the binding 
power of (ancient) contracts where the giving of a loan or gift was not considered as a 
loss but on the contrary put the giver in a position of moral superiority and power 
(Chapter 1.2.). In contrast the war-related losses of the respondents’ mothers had 
occurred involuntarily and did not entail a position of moral superiority but need. Yet 
losses could be turned into capital and used as a trump card to exercise power. In my 
reading of these accounts power was exercised by instilling in the women the hope, 
desire and obligation that they could and must ‘make good’ or ameliorate their mother’s 
misfortune. The interviews of very entangled mother-daughter relationships indicate that 
this reparation could never work fully. One way in which dependency was created and 
maintained, it seems to me, was by keeping final and durable reparation on the horizon as 
a possibility. In retrospect, these research participants described their mother-daughter 
relationship as dependency relationships. One respondent expressed mutual dependency 
and need in terms of ‘growing together’ [ Verwachsung], which in German also has the 
meaning of ‘deformation’. ‘Growing together’ was strongly grounded in the historical 
circumstance of wartime and sometimes considered as a generation fate.
Resp: You know, I’ve always had a guilty conscience about my mother. I would - 
although I’m not for it - 1 was always sorry that she -  that Dad didn’t come; the 
others came back then. And then you were happy that one or the other came back 
to the family, and she always just cried and cried. I had such a dependency 
relationship with my mother that was so bad... Well, this growing together 
[Verwachsung] with my mother, the flight, and then the loneliness here. I think it 
was the same for many of my generation. The husband never came back and then 
the mothers just clung to their children.... You see, also my husband later could 
have bettered himself in his work... And he didn’t do that either because of my 
mother. Because then she said: ‘yes, then I’m alone and I’ve never had anything 
in my life.’ But she has - 
Int: Did she blackmail you a little bit with that?
Resp: Yes. Above all, I always had the feeling everything was my fault.
Int: If you hadn’t been there, you mother could have married again or
Resp: No, that’s not it. I - 1 was so sorry that she was always alone and she- and she 
took advantage of that, right.(20)
26 For conceptual clarity it seems helpful to follow the German etymology of Schuld and distinguish 
between culpability (from Latin culpa) as the actual offence that requires atonement and guilt as the 
accompanying feeling (Siebers and Vetter 1992). Quasi-culpability refers to indebtedness (from Latin 
debitum), the obligation for repayment in the absence of culpa.
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016, p. 10/11, trained childminder, mother not employed, 0 siblings
‘Well, really I had such a dominant and despotic and -  well, a mother who put 
incredible pressure on me. I can only formulate this today. Because with respect to 
being independent, yes, when I got married, it was like this I -  my husband wanted 
me to move out here... my mother was on her own in the meantime. Everybody had 
left... and we -  my husband and I -  had already rented a flat... And then my mother 
came and said: ‘You won’t do that, will you, to leave me here alone with the 
house?’ And then we rented here, I persuaded my husband that we rent here. And 
then I was stuck here again. We did renovate however... I had already finished my 
apprenticeship when I finally had my own room. I always had to sleep together 
with my mother. My father died in the war. And this was the bedroom. I had to go 
to bed when she wanted and I had to stay up as long as she wanted. Yes, well until 
you realise this. I, at least I was a twit, I was a stupid girl.’ (2l)
037, p. 11, city, trained dress maker, mother employed, 2 siblings
Focussing on processes of need interpretation problematises any romantic or harmonious 
picture of women’s need related households and give a different emphasis to the notion 
of Germany's ‘coerced matriarchy’. But they do not denigrate the immense support that 
women voluntarily and involuntarily gave to each other. The narratives indicate that the 
research participants had indeed an active part in shaping need related households -  but 
their perceived room for manoeuvre and negotiation, as they presented them, were 
narrowly confined by severe economic need and a perceived loyalty and dependency. 
Economic need could create an unprecedented ‘script’ of the daughter as the family wage 
earner in substitution for an absent father. This script often remained ambivalent and was 
not based on emotional closeness. Economic need could, but did not need to be, 
intertwined with personal dependency. Personal dependency was sometimes underpinned 
by a quasi-culpability that entailed the daughters’ inclination to reparation. I suggest that 
the -  historically contextualised -  mutual personal dependency referred to an emotional 
need for connection and support in both mother and daughter. Its inherent power 
frequently manifested itself in the continuation of co-residence rather than the payment of 
subsistence. The research participants indicated that to work through this dependency 
relationship could take a lifetime (see Chapter 7.3.).
Other research participants reported that they cut family ties without much difficulty. 
Thus in contrast to the previous accounts, for the following speaker marriage was the 
‘exit card’ from responsibility in the family of origin. Interestingly, the research
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participant likewise referred to her mother’s losses, which were, however, made 
perceived as lessened by a history of the mother’s ‘unfair’ behaviour. Thus, references to 
the mother’s unfairness were used to justify the respondent’s leaving.
‘One year before the marriage I went to X ... And I also used this somehow as a 
springboard to get away from home. My mother had made it very difficult for me. 
She let my siblings go, but she didn’t want me to go. And then I really practically 
cleared out... And I didn’t find that difficult either. But I have to say I never had a 
good relationship with my mother. Well, it was all so - 1 think because my father 
died so early a lot went differently from when a family is together. I mean it wasn’t 
easy for her with five kids and very little money. But still I felt treated unfairly all 
those years... Then she gave way to her feelings - 1 mean always only to me -  she 
unburdened everything onto me: ‘If I didn’t have you, I’d be much better off. I 
didn’t want any of you’ and so on.’ (22)
549, p. 55/60, office clerk, country, mother not employed, 4 siblings
Insofar as it affected the continuity of the research participants occupational trajectories 
daughterwork, like other forms of kin work usually remained invisible, but it contributed 
to much of the greater complexity, variability and discontinuity of women’s life courses 
in comparison with the continuous employment careers of their husbands (Erzberger 
1993). In any case, although more than a third of the research participants had first-hand 
experiences with the insufficiency of public provision, daughterwork was not interpreted 
as a political economic activity but as personal fate.
The focus on daughterwork must not conceal the fact that the respondents’ mothers did 
their share too in the reorganised women headed families. They were the ones who 
provided accommodation, cooked and washed for their daughters and in more than one 
third of the women under study had also looked after the research participants’ children, 
which not rarely reproduced an intra-familial (wartime) tradition.27
27 The circumstances of the research participants’ family formation are analysed elsewhere (Bom et al. 
1996). In the present context it is of interest to note that contrary to common perceptions it was the 
husbands-to-be who initiated and pursued marriage (a finding that is confirmed by the husbands who were 
interviewed in a follow-up study (see Braemer 1994)). Although none of the women actively opposed what
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6.5. THE CONTINUATION OF WOMEN’S COOPERATION WITHIN AND 
ACROSS HOUSEHOLD BOUNDARIES: MOTHERS AS GRANDCHILD
MINDERS
Childcare facilities were rare, under-funded and controversial in post-war West Germany. 
Whereas in the German Democratic Republic the creation of nurseries and day-care 
centres was part of the first five-year plan, the institutionalisation of childcare in the 
Federal Republic was associated with communist attempts to undermine the family. 
Although they protested against the lack of childcare institutions, even women trade 
unionists did not oppose the view that day care was always deficient in comparison with 
mother care (Moeller 1993, p. 175/176). Despite the western ideal of the full-time mother 
and structural discrimination against the employment of women and mothers, the 
quantitative analysis showed that more than a quarter of the 220 women surveyed had 
continued to work beyond of the birth of the first child. In the light of the women’s 
narratives this finding is likely to be an underestimation. Twelve of the 17 women who 
stated in the questionnaires that they had left the labour market with the birth of their first 
child reported that they had actually continued to work as family labourers, home or 
temporary workers after their children were bom.
The interview analysis clearly indicates that the vast majority of the research participants 
did not consider employment merely as an economic necessity but overall as an 
enjoyable and rewarding activity that provided gratification, self-esteem and increased 
their power of decision making in the family (Bom et al 1996). If women wanted and/or 
had to remain employed after their children were bom they usually relied on their 
mothers and/or mothers-in law to look after their children as their own mothers had done. 
Nineteen out of 52 women in the qualitative sample had benefited from childcare by their 
mothers at some point in their lives; only two women stated that they had put their pre­
school children in a kindergarten. The extent to which grandmothers were considered as 
an almost ‘natural’ substitute and support for working mothers both in the urban and rural 
areas was expressed by those women who stated that ‘I didn’t have a granny’ (841) or ‘I 
had to raise my children myself! ’ (069) because their mothers were not available.
they largely saw as a biographical certainty, those who did not ‘fall’ pregnant often postponed marriage in
191
Where they occurred grand-maternal childcare arrangements in the post-war period 
varied in time and extent. They included temporarily or permanently shared households 
that were also initiated when a daughter became widowed or divorced, as well as day 
care, or full-time childcare during the week. Depending on availability and need, 
childcare was provided by one or both grandmothers. There was no case where a woman 
reported that her father had taken over major (grand)childcare responsibilities. In her 
study of intergenerational transfers Wilson (1987), however, has suggested that due to 
gendered perceptions and categorisations of men’s activities in the family, grand-paternal 
child caring responsibilities may be underestimated.
Childcare arrangements between employed mothers and home-working grandmothers 
became one further link in the continuation of women’s need related shared households. 
In so far as the respondents’ need for childcare was complemented by their mother’s need 
for financial support these practices were sometimes depicted as an exchange or ‘circle’ 
(130). Mothers looked after their grandchildren and thereby enabled their daughters to 
pursue paid work who in turn contributed to their mothers’ keep. At the same time it is 
evident that both practices were not necessarily correlated: research participants 
supported their mothers without, or prior to, their having children and mothers looked 
after their grandchildren without receiving financial support. Although arrangements 
might have been more comfortable when they appeared mutually beneficial, respondents 
also characterised them as Notldsungen (805), ‘emergency solutions’ that resulted from 
severe economic need and so combined necessity and benefit, rather than being planned 
and negotiated on the basis of self-interest.
‘I lived together with my mother. And she was alone too and she was completely 
wrapped up when we had the baby. And she looked well after my child, right. ... 
And I still could do a lot. If I hadn’t had her, I don’t know how I’d have coped. I 
wouldn’t have given the child away. I wouldn’t have done that. Then I would have 
had to look for another husband. Somehow. But this way you remained 
independent and I didn’t want to anymore either.’ (23)
849, p. 13/24, dressmaker, country, divorced, 1 child 
(Permanently joint household with mother)
Resp: Well, that was also a transitional phase, when we were very badly off financially.
When I was supposed to pay for my mother and didn’t want to let her down. And
time in order to remain in the sphere that was associated with pleasure: paid work.
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then for that reason she lived with us for one and a half or two years. Then it was 
help to her and she helped me in looking after the boy... But I did it somehow, so 
it had this circle... And then my mother had to go back to Bremen. There was my 
nephew who needed looking after. Because then problems arose with the illness 
of my sister. And that was the reason, that she -  she was needed there more than 
with us. Then we gave her money secretly. And this -  was not supposed to be 
known...
Int: Known by the authority?
Resp: Yes. She received assistance... And we didn’t need to provide for her. And what 
we did privately was nobody’s business, right.(24)
130, p. 23/26, childminder, city, married, 2 children 
(Temporarily joint household with mother)
The theme that grand-maternal childcare was indispensable for the continuation of 
employment is a thread that runs through the majority of the narratives of those women 
who had remained in employment. Whether or not this is seen as a family tradition,28 the 
availability of mothers and mothers-in-law was the crucial factor for the initiation of 
these arrangements that required flexibility, reliability and responsibility on the part of 
the grandmother. In the same way as they perceived support by their grandmothers as a 
form of motherwork, grand-maternal childcare was conceived of as a support of adult 
daughters. As with other forms of kin work, it was not free from conflict. From the point 
of view of the research participants conflict evolved when the women felt that their 
mothers(in-law) were not temporary stand ins but personally substituted or attempted to 
substitute for the mother so that children became more attached to their grandparents than 
to themselves. In no case, however, did these conflicts directly end childcare 
arrangements.
‘I didn’t see much of my child. My mother-in-law had bound it to her so much.... I 
collected the child on Saturday and on Sunday lunchtime my mother-in-law had 
come already and took her back.... I stayed at home on Mondays. But then I had to 
fight for my child. And then she said: “well, you have housework to do. Take your 
time to do that.’” (25)
513, p. 18/19, hairdresser, country, 3 children 
(Eldest child lived at grandmother’s during the week)
But even when grand-maternal childcare was perceived as unproblematic and wanted, 
and employment was successful and fulfilling, some women reported a feeling in
28 The woman who said that on the basis of her own experiences as a child of a working mother raised by 
her grandmothers she did not want this kind of care arrangement for her daughter is indeed the exception 
among those mothers who had mothers or mothers-in-law available.
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retrospect of having missed ‘the best years’ with their children. Consequently, the advice 
that the research participants gave to their adult daughters could divert from their own 
practice.
‘The children didn’t miss me. The grandmother was in mother’s place and 
everybody knows how a granny is with her grandchildren. They didn’t lack 
anything. But I always say: keep your children yourselves in the first years. I don’t 
know.... If you get older you think: you didn’t have the best years with your 
children, like other women did, right.’ (26)
516, p. 28, shop assistant (self-employed), country, 5 children
(Joint household with mother)
The questions of how the research participants viewed grand-maternal child care when 
their own children had children and childcare facilities expanded and considered as 
valuable pedagogic institutions is explored in the next chapter (Chapter 7.2).
6.6. CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections, I have explored intergenerational kin work in the post-war 
period as it was unfolded and produced in the interviews with women bom around 1930. 
Although women’s subsistence work and the resources and competences it required were 
publicly visible and sometimes idealised before the founding of the Federal Republic in 
1948, they disappeared from public discourse and perception thereafter. By playing the 
women’s accounts against the framework of kinscripts the analysis suggested that on the 
contrary, need related shared households and cooperation across household boundaries 
particularly between mothers and daughters, were of lasting significance in Germany 
during the 1950s. In the narratives, intergenerational kin work appeared not primarily as a 
symbolic and emotional practice but as a flexible tissue of material provision and support 
in which men were physically or practically absent.
In the interaction with the younger interviewers, the research participants described and 
anchored their kin relationships and practices firmly in a historical-economic context of 
material deprivation and subsistence economy in which they became meaningful. The 
historical-economic context of the war and post-war period was rendered concrete in the 
narration of its material and personal effects. The impact of social institutions was
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principally depicted as a lack ofprovision, more specifically as an insufficiency of means 
of consumption, of education and employment opportunities and (women’s) wages, 
childcare institutions, pensions and other allowances. The kin work of women as 
mothers, grandmothers and daughters encompassed household related work, the 
provision of accommodation and childcare, as well as waged labour and the facilitating of 
access to the formal sphere, particularly vocational training. In its household and 
subsistence related aspects, kin work was a taken for granted aspect of women’s work 
that developed in and through practice and did not necessarily enhance the women’s self- 
worth. It was not based on emotional closeness, although emotions played a role in the 
interpretation of need of their mothers.
The women interviewed interpreted kin work to a large extent as acts of substitution for 
absent or missing family members, not for public and private institutional provision. 
‘One for another’ according to Lacan (1977, p. 157) is the formula of metaphor, where 
one signifier replaces another one that remains associatively linked to the chain of 
signifiers. It is this dual process of replacement and association, Lacan argued, that sparks 
off new meaning in a metaphor. Similarly, the substitution for absent family members 
often initiated a novel intergenerational division of labour in which the ‘unavailable’ 
(father) or non-responsible (brother) relative was released from family responsibilities, 
but gave meaning and justification to new arrangements such as the role of daughters as 
breadwinners. Areas of tension were identified as the obligation to contribute to need 
related shared households vs. the wish to leave the family household, the (grand) 
childcare of their mothers vs. the alienation of their children, and the entangling of 
economic and personal needs of their mothers. This interweaving of structural and 
personal dependency could foster the continuation of need related shared households 
between mothers and daughters that characterised interrelated life courses of more than a 
third of the women interviewed.
Debates and contrasting voices around processes of kinscription were sometimes 
conveyed by the use of direct speech. But foregrounding the ‘hard times’ meant that 
wilfulness, independence and rational deliberation -  elements of the repertoire of contract 
-  did not feature in the kin work narratives. The women reported that quasi-contractual
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strategies such as money or insurance payments for care-giving activities were sometimes 
deployed to balance or mitigate inequalities in kin work arrangements. These practices 
point to a cultural script or repertoire of reciprocity and fairness in family interaction, but 
the presence of contractual elements did not suggest that practices evolved as a result of 
self-regarding rationality or were necessarily fair.
More explicitly the research participants referred to cultural scripts of obedience and 
respect towards parents, a further ingredient of the assignment of kin work. A regionally 
specific script was the practice that one daughter remained in the household or family 
business to support parents in old age. This script could also be part of an intra-familial 
legacy, where the family business embodied the material, symbolic and practical legacy. 
Yet, in the context of a fundamental societal rupture, family arrangements often failed to 
follow unmodified intra-familial legacies. The narratives suggest that the political and 
economic breakdown, apart from underwriting support liability, offered new possibilities 
for re-keying or modifying family scripts. Taking the example of daughters as main 
family providers and wage earners, the notion of kin scripts may be misleading insofar 
these practices were not a predefined continuation of scripted family practice but became 
an innovative yet common response to unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstance and 
need. The commonality and predictability of women as ‘stand ins’, conveyed in the 
frequent ‘and then’ structure which linked narrated events in terms of an inescapable 
linear sequence, however, concealed processes of social change and contributed to the 
invisibility of women’s kin work.
Put differently, although the research participants were aware of insufficient resource 
allocation and reported that state support had not been adequate for the survival of mother 
and children, and frequently used the phrase that female relatives had ‘had to stand in’, 
women’s kin work was not considered as a political-economic factor of welfare 
production, but privatised as work for the family. Neither was kin work perceived in 
terms of the generation of competences and human capabilities. I suggest that a crucial 
element of this ‘privatised’ and partial view was the (retrospective) reflection on the 
interdependence of structural and personal dependencies between daughters and mothers. 
Intertwined with material need in some accounts was the need and desire for personal
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togetherness, which sometimes was underpinned by a ‘quasi-culpability’ of the daughter 
if relatives used their misfortune to elicit support. Furthermore, although kin work 
practices were implicitly characterised as women’s experiences, in and through the 
references to the historical context they were often interpreted as a ‘generation fate’. 
References to a historical generation on the other hand, even though they were based on 
the research participants’ positions as women, tended to obfuscate the significance of 
gender in the micro-politics of intergenerational commitments.
The narratives suggest that the historical-economic, social-institutional and cultural 
context were the constitutive outside of kin work practices in the post war period, 
promoting ‘contracts of need’, evoked in expressions such as ‘that’s how it was’. 
Contracts of need are not interpreted in terms of enhancing competences and entailing 
empowerment. Kin work practices appear as variations of a broader cultural script across 
the two regions, namely that ‘the family’ holds together with a subtext of women's 
responsibilities for creating cohesion through practical and personal support. Insofar as 
cultural scripts and institutions incorporated assumptions of women’s taken for granted 
kin work practices, the ‘unofficial’ script of women’s substitution could not be 
confronted with a dominant counterscript.
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Chapter 7
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN OLDER WOMEN’S 
KIN COMMITMENTS IN THE GERMAN WELFARE
STATE
7.1. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter has presented an analysis of the kinscripts of a group of women 
bom around 1930 in post-war Germany and shown how kin work operated as acts of 
substitution in the context of severe material need. This chapter continues the analysis of 
kinscripts in the narrative accounts focussing on intergenerational commitments in mid 
and later life when the German welfare state had expanded. The research guiding 
question is whether an extension in public and private provision in an expanding 
economy had provided resources to open up perceived room for manoeuvre for 
negotiating and delimiting older women’s intergenerational commitments. Furthermore, 
would the introduction of the discourse of intergenerational solidarity in the context of 
the implementation of the PAYG pension scheme in the late 1950s provide new images, 
symbols and vocabularies with which the research participants could describe and 
interpret their family and kin commitments in mid and later life? Notions of contract, 
reciprocity and exchange were almost completely absent in the interpretation patterns 
referring to kin work practices in the war and post-war period.
German social theorists have argued that life styles since the mid 1960s are no longer 
embedded in traditions and regulated by prior obligation, but increasingly structured by 
requirements of the labour market and the welfare state, which draw on and create 
individual agency and strategic planning (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim 1993). As life
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choices, networks and identities become, in principle, open to negotiation for both men 
and women, opportunities for choice and negotiation are seen to finally have penetrated 
the ‘social backwater’ of the family. Hareven (1994) speaks of an increasing 
individualisation of intergenerational relationships and Hess and Waring (1983) have 
argued that intergenerational relationships have shifted from the obligatory to the 
voluntary.
The social science literature on family and kin relationships in later life has to some 
extent corroborated the thesis of an increased mutual independence between parents and 
adult children and a decrease of fixed normative rules of family obligation between 
members of different generations. I will briefly illustrate some of the shifts in debate 
around support of grandchildren and older relatives, which have been key themes in the 
narratives of the older women and will be explored below.
In North America the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren has been 
rediscovered as a ‘vital connection’ (Komhaber and Woodward 1985) that links people 
across generations. Much attention has been drawn to the diversity and increased length 
of the relationship (Hagestad 1986b). It has been argued that grandparents have lost their 
roles as mentors, models and caretakers, and that authority and feelings of obligation 
have decreased so that the relationship is increasingly voluntary and based on affect and 
friendship, initiative and negotiation (Wilk 1993). Grand-matemal childcare appears as 
merely one possible ‘style’ of grandparenting. German studies show substantial regional 
differences in this respect with the percentage of grandmothers looking after 
grandchildren much higher in the small town rural areas than in the cities (Sticker 1991). 
Overall, however, grandparents are assumed to remain free of parenting responsibilities, 
which interfere with new mid-life opportunities as well as with time for themselves after 
retirement (Jerrome 1996). In Germany the ‘fun-seeking style’ is found to predominate 
for grandparents with grandchildren under the age of 12 (Sticker op. cit.).
Interestingly, those North American writers who deplore the break up of the ‘primordial 
bond between grandparents and grandchildren’ have invoked the concept of a ‘new social 
contract’ (Komhaber and Woodward op. cit., p. 92), according to which parents decide
199
whether and to what extent grandparents are involved with their children. By interpreting 
giving and receiving support in terms of interference and dependency, this new contract 
allegedly aims to maintain mutual independence between parents and grandparents, at the 
expense of grandchildren. At the same time, however, there is much evidence both from 
Europe and the United States that grandparents continue to be the ‘second line of 
defence’ (Jendrek 1993) who actively engage in the life of their grandchildren if and 
when they are needed. Their emergency valve function for the family includes the 
provision of temporary shelter for divorced daughters and their children (Furstenberg and 
Cherlin 1991) as well as financial support and childcare (Hagestad 1986b; Wilson 1987).
In a similar vein, just as the grandparent-grandchildren relationship is seen as dissolving, 
the relationships of adult children and their parents are perceived to be under severe 
threat (see also Chapter 8). The contract metaphor is invoked in a different way when it is 
argued that the ‘interpersonal caring contract’ (Walker 1996b, p. 12/13) is currently being 
renegotiated or, more drastically, that even Turkish migrants in Germany will ‘coercively 
and one-sidedly terminate the (generational) contract’ (Nauck 1990, p. 117). Whereas 
grandparent-grandchildren relationships are depicted as originally organic and then 
replaced by contract and regulation, solidarity in adult parent-child relationship is 
considered to be regulated by contract from the onset and subsequently ‘deregulated’ in 
the course of individualisation.
Studies of intergenerational elder care have repeatedly found that caregivers feel 
obligated to provide care, and that obligation often underlies the characterisation of care- 
giving as ‘natural’ (Dohner et al. 1992; Lewis and Meredith 1988). More recently, 
emphasis is put on power and processes of negotiating care-giving responsibilities (Finch 
and Mason 1992; Twigg and Atkin 1994). Caregivers, as King and Chamberlaine (1994) 
rightly point out, are not victims of oppressive relationships but persons with their own 
strategies and power. In both expert discourses and narratives of care-givers Thompson 
(1995) has identified an emerging counter-discourse that challenges the ‘imperative to 
care’ by acknowledging the responsibility of the state, as well as care givers’ rights to 
choice, independence and self-determination.
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The following sections focus on these themes in the narratives of women bom around 
1930. Subsequent to the analysis of kinscripts I consider the women’s own expectations 
of support in old age and the evaluation of pension entitlements in order to assess 
whether the research participants linked the entitlements they have received from labour 
market participation with family and kin commitments.
7.2. AMBIVALENT SUPPORT FOR THEIR CHILDREN: MINDING
GRANDCHILDREN
When interviewed at the actual or potential transition to retirement half of the research 
participants were grandmothers themselves of up to eight grandchildren who were bom 
between 1970 and 1990. The overwhelming majority reported that they felt attached to 
their grandchildren and welcomed their increased self-confidence. Regarding the 
employment commitments of their daughters, sons and/or daughters-in-law, however, the 
research participants found themselves in an ambivalent position. On the one hand they 
shared the dominant view that children need a ‘person to relate to’ (074) and argued that 
mothers should stay with their children at least for the first years. This is justified not 
only with respect to the children but also for the benefit of mothers. The recommendation 
that ‘those are the years you should take with you in life! ’(516) was put forward even if 
the research participants themselves had made considerable efforts to remain employed 
after their children were bom, sometimes by hiding part-time work from their husbands. 
On the other hand, the research participants were not only understanding and sympathetic 
to their daughters’ (-in-law) employment interests but, on the basis of their own 
experiences of loss of qualifications and small pension entitlements, often actively 
encouraged their employment. Opposing voices were often presented in direct speech.
‘And I often told her [the daughter], right, I say, “man”, I say, “particularly now, 
these years”, right, I say, “you miss the best time!” I say, “once he goes to school 
it’s different. Then you can go to work again”. “Well, but now I have a good job 
and I should give it up? Who knows whether I will get it back again” and that’s 
how it goes - well, it’s very difficult to say anything.’(27)
809, p. 30, city, employed after childbirth, 1 grandchild,
not employed
‘Well I also recommend -  well, our son has for 6 months -  we have a grandchild 
now, and the wife is a civil servant, she works with the railway. And because they
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live in a house with her parents, I always say: “don’t give up your job!” 
Particularly not because she is a civil servant. She’ll profit from that later on, 
won’t she? She can work with a child. Sure, I mean she doesn’t need to. Our son 
earns well, but anyway.’(28)
840, p. 21, country, family labourer after childbirth,
1 grandchild, employed
Like their own mothers, the research participants at times supported their daughters in 
finding a suitable ‘mother substitute or grandmother substitute’ (118). However, when it 
was not possible to place the child in kindergarten or find a suitable day mother, more 
than half of the grandmothers in sample (18/26) once again ‘stood in’ for female relatives 
and the lack in adequate childcare provision.
‘I mean we looked for a day mother for him. I have to say that I’m at home at the 
moment [on sick-leave], which is lucky ... Well, and then when she said she 
couldn’t find anyone, I went with her and then we really saw some day mothers, 
where I said: No. Never in my life!’ (29)
822, p. 23, city, employed beyond childbirth,
3 grandchildren, employed
Childcare arrangements varied in extent and duration. ‘On call’ engagements alternated 
with or complemented regular day care arrangements that ranged from the coverage of 
fixed days (in alternation with the other grandmother or institutional childcare) to full­
time care in their own homes. Childcare was given regardless of whether it was a 
daughter or son’s child, whether the women were employed or wanted to re-enter the 
labour market, or whether they had other plans and ambitions.
As grandmothers, the research participants did not see themselves as a first resort for 
childcare and they did not consider their involvement as an opportunity to relive 
parenting, as has been suggested in a psycho-dynamic perspective (Thomas 1986). On the 
contrary, the narratives confirm earlier findings of Albrecht (1954) and more recently of 
Cotterill (1992) that neither grandmothers nor grandfathers desire extensive care-giving 
responsibilities. Like their own mothers and grandmothers, the research participants 
considered grandchild care as a part of their motherwork, which enabled their sons and 
daughters to study or be employed. Grandfathers, even after retirement, rarely took on 
childcare responsibilities, although they sometimes helped with transport. The narratives 
suggest that the research participants did not demand their participation either. In fact
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some respondents ‘explained’ their husband’s lack of commitment in this respect with the 
same individualised and gender-neutral argument that ‘he is not that type of person’ (022) 
as they used to ground their own sense of responsibility in the context of parental care 
(‘They’d have to find out for themselves how to manage. But I'm not that kind of person, 
I can’t do that’ (068)).
How were childcare arrangements negotiated and evaluated? The research participants 
reported that they frequently got drawn into childcare even if they had set time limits or 
explicitly ruled out the possibility that they would ‘raise children’ in the first place. It 
seems that only when their wage labour was necessary for their own subsistence did 
women feel that they had a legitimate reason to refuse regular childcare. Although the 
respondents enjoyed spending time together with their grandchildren and seeing them 
growing up, they also felt ‘boxed in’ by having to organise their own activities around the 
arrival and departure of grandchildren -  or foregoing them entirely. The simultaneity of 
perceived solidarity with their children in the context of precarious employment 
prospects and the felt obligation to support them is illustrated in the shifting of the 
narratives between their insistence on their self-determination and passive constructions 
that ‘it was fixed’ (060) that they would look after their grandchildren.
Resp: Today I do in many respects what I want to do. Although I rather have locked 
myself in at the moment. I have my grandchild in the mornings...
Int: But it sounds as if that’s a bit much, having your grandson here every day as well.
Resp: I don’t have much time for myself. Not at all. And I feel a bit -  boxed in. They’ve 
asked me first for a year...
Int: But it’s OK for you that your daughter-in-law works now?
Resp: That’s OK, yes. Y es, well, I’ve thereby locked myself in, it’s a long time from 7 
in the morning til half 12.... I can’t go to any seminars or anything. I always have 
to be there, right.
Int: And your husband [retired], he wouldn’t be confident being alone with him in the
morning?
Resp: No, he wouldn’t like that. — My husband wouldn’t like that. He’s not that type of 
person.
Int: And you don’t want to say that sometimes you’d like to-
Resp: I’ve already said, I already said. It’s like this: the children asked me if I would
take the lad for longer than a year. Then I thought that with him being four in 
May that then he’d start kindergarten. But it doesn’t work that way. Until 
autumn, and that’s too long.
Int: And how do you want to-
Resp: Now I’ve said A, I have to say B
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Int: So that means you’ll carry on until autumn?
Resp: Yeah, right, I have to. I have to carry on!(30)
022, p. 34, city, worked beyond childbirth, 
1 grandchild, part-time employed
Given the lack of ‘legitimate’ excuses to limit or end regular childcare it is doubtful 
whether the research participants will be ‘retiring’ from these responsibilities, which a 
number of women articulated as their plan after retirement. But even if they were to 
succeed, women did not, as Komhaber and Woodwood (op. cit.) have suggested, ‘follow’ 
their husbands into retirement. Rather the women felt that after years or decades of 
employment and/or childcare responsibilities (depicted in the descriptive ‘and then’ 
format) they have ‘earned’ the right to time for themselves.
‘My eldest daughter got married and then I looked after my granddaughter again 
for three years, from half eight to half three/three, and again we had a small child 
in the house. Then came the accident with the 16 year old, the child bride. And 
there I did everything too, practically brought up the child alone. And straight 
after that came the third, and I had the children again.... And that was so until the 
present day -  well, let’s say until last Saturday that I was always there for the 
grandchildren. Always was available via telephone: Mum, are you free?... Only 
now I have to say that I will turn 62, I’d like to get some peace. Well, for an hour 
or two it’s O.K. but I’m not keen. All of a sudden that’s enough, don’t want to 
anymore.’(31)
126, p. 34, city, not employed after childbirth, 
4 grandchildren, not employed
The narratives thus show that as with the childcare provided by their mothers and 
grandmothers the research participants frequently had stood in if and when the need arose 
and substituted for inadequate childcare facilities. Even though the personal relationship 
between grandmothers/parents and grandchildren might have changed to be more 
egalitarian, as the respondents suggested, it is not evident that motives for childcare, that 
is their daughter(in-law)’s need for support, have changed as well. Like their mothers, by 
taking over child care responsibilities the research participants continued to be agents of 
social change -  with respect to the generation of younger women who they enabled to 
combine family and occupation in the absence of sufficient day care institutions. But 
from the perspective of the women concerned room for manoeuvre had not expanded: 
these responsibilities were neither freely negotiated nor entirely determined by the 
younger generation, as the metaphor of a ‘new social contract’ suggests. On the contrary 
the old ‘contracts of need’, whereby women felt that they had to substitute for each other
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on the basis of a family relationship, appeared to remain unchanged over three 
generations of grandmothers. The fact that some of the research participants planned to 
reduce regular child care after retirement may indeed be evidence of a new counter­
discourse of women’s right to self-actualisation.
7.3. THE FALLACY OF SELF-EVIDENCE: CARE FOR RELATIVES OF
THE OLDER GENERATION
The imperceptibility of support for older relatives
The previous chapter on the continuation of need related shared households has already 
shown that patterns of intergenerational support over the life course in this group of 
women were more varied than is suggested by the two-phase model of the procreational 
contract where support is given merely at the ends of the life course. Households 
frequently had been separated and temporarily rejoined. Need for assistance by older 
relatives was one further reason to maintain or recreate shared households, move them 
geographically closer together, or intensify cooperation across household boundaries.
At least 25 of the 52 research participants had shared a household with their 
mothers/parents or in-laws at one point in their adult lives. Twenty-three women from the 
rural and the urban area reported that they had given some form of regular assistance to 
their older relatives, including 11 women who had given intensive personal care to 
relatives confined to bed. As with other forms of kin work, timing, extent and duration 
varied enormously. Support for household chores could turn into, alternate or overlap 
with full-time personal care, which was usually co-residential. A substantial minority of 
the research participants had been primary and/or secondary carers for different relatives 
and the (often unforeseeable) need for assistance by older relatives could occur at the end 
of their occupational training, at the point of marriage or later in life. Assistance given 
coincided with employment or lead to its temporary reduction. Given that this theme had 
not been part of the topic guide and women tended to underplay their caring 
commitments and strains (see also Dohner et al. 1992) it is likely that the extent of care 
for older relatives is underestimated. This is confirmed in the interviews with the 
women’s adult children.
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The narratives indicate that the identification of periods of support for older relatives was 
difficult not only because the need for support developed gradually but also because, as 
routine or commonplace activities, kin support often remained below the threshold of the 
respondents’ perception. The research participants frequently only considered periods 
where they looked after a relative who was bedridden as care [Pflege]. If mentioned at all, 
regular help with household chores, gardening, transportation or short-term care-giving 
after illness were considered as ‘trivialities’ or ‘natural things’ [<Selbstverstandlichkeiten] 
(860). Although differently elaborated, regular personal care was often introduced with 
the same casualness (‘I sometimes stood in’), as practical assistance. To emphasise this 
underplaying, the relevant expressions are underlined in the following transcripts.
‘I only helped with the laundry. Well, 20 years the laundry [of her mother], for 
my father-in-law almost 15 years ... My God, I don’t count that really. First she 
still ironed it and darned it. Then this got, you didn’t really realise it, little by 
little always something got less. Then she couldn’t drive anymore and do the 
groceries. Then the shop at the comer closed and then to the supermarket and 
then that was that. Then she only went to the butcher and to the cemetery on 
Saturdays. Well, and then gradually this got less too. And then she only cooked 
stew, and I prepared the meat at the weekend. And then she let everything get 
burned, then this didn’t work anymore either ... Other people always say, well, 
they only get dependent because you do everything for them. But could you do 
that -  when you come home and upstairs everything is burnt? ... The time when 
Mum was bedridden was very bad. Then I slept for 3 to 4 hours, at most. That 
brought 20 pounds [weight loss] in this half year until Mum passed away. And I 
ate normally. Only this not getting any sleep, that for me is the worst.’(32)
003, p. 42/24, city, 1 sister, married, part-time employed,
j oint household with mother
‘The mother of my husband is still alive, she is turning 90. And she lives next- 
door upstairs, but is fully supported by us and cared for too. And because of this I 
sometimes stood in ... It naturally got always a little more over the past months.’
(33)
093, p. 17/23, city, no siblings, married, not employed, 
attached house with mother-in-law
The interviewers mentioned in the interview protocols that the histories of living close to 
their relatives and the demands and burdens placed on these research participants, who 
not rarely had been primary and secondary carers for different relatives, had depressed 
them. While the women managed to integrate the provision of support with transport, 
household chores and short-term care into their every day lives, day-to-day personal care
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changed this structure completely if relatives’ needs were to be met. Intensive personal 
care was therefore not compatible with other full-time commitments unless an additional 
formal or informal helper was available. Because it often included the ‘all round 
organisation’ of the relative’s life, personal care was by far the most intense form of kin 
work. The narratives confirmed that despite the physical strains -  paradoxically 
expressed as having ‘brought’ (not lost) 20 pounds -  the emotional strain, constant 
worries and the compassion for their relatives’ deteriorating well-being were experienced 
as at least as stressful (Bowling 1989; Dohner et al. op. cit.).
Deconstructing the notion of self-evident care-giving
The descriptive sequential and matter of fact format of the narratives around elder care is 
concordant with the repertoire of self-evidence or naturalness that was invoked implicitly 
and explicitly. Whatever their family commitments a substantial number of the research 
participants maintained that providing support for older relatives was self-evident (natural 
or obvious) [selbstverstandlich], a pattern of interpretation also found in British, North 
American and Canadian studies about family care (Ungerson 1987; Qureshi and Walker 
1989; Cantor 1983; Aronson 1992). Literally the German Selbstverstandlichkeit means 
something that is understood in and by itself, self-explanatory. To give care and 
assistance self-evidently or naturally is described as standing in without hesitation if and 
when a need for support arises. It is a spontaneous but predictable way of doing what has 
to be done.
‘I don’t know, that was all so self-evident for us. It wasn’t really talked about or 
thought about for long. If there was a need, it was natural for us that everybody 
put back [their own interests] and that we helped there, just as when we were in 
need my mother was there. My sister [ill] would do it as well if she could. And I 
mean my father was a completely different type I unfortunately have to say, right. 
He wasn’t concerned.’(34)
130, p. 35, city, married, employed, 2 sisters,
temporarily joint household with mother
‘And then I have to say, she always was very faithful and good to me. And then it 
was self-evident that I had my mother here until she died.(35)
849, p. 25, country, employed, 1 brother, 
separate households in joint house
A closer reading reveals that usually a context was evoked in which a practice appeared
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as ‘self-evident’ or ‘self-explanatory’. A contextual qualification is first indicated through 
the preposition for. Thus, ‘self-evident for us ’ in the above account seems to refer to a 
specific gendered intra-familial legacy of mutual support. From this established practice 
the father is explicitly excluded with reference not to his gender but to his personality 
(‘my father is a completely different type’ (130)). ‘Self-evident for me’, can likewise 
refer to a shared history of support but also connotes an individual ‘natural’ caring 
disposition or character that is defined in contradistinction to the unconcerned or self- 
concerned personality of other men and women (‘I’m not that sort of a person’ (068)). 
Self-evident can also refer to a specific ‘generation’ of women connoting a specific 
gendered socialisation and in particular the socio-historical circumstance of war and post­
war (see Chapter 6): ‘If I look at my children - it’s quite different. I think this will die out 
with our generation’ (016). In all three contexts ‘self-evident’ or ‘self-explanatory’ 
referred to something taken as both normal and taken for granted, as well as, through the 
differences highlighted or implied, particular and special. This need to contextualise self­
evidence challenges the idea of a universal and natural norm of exchange or reciprocity.
Apart from being embedded in a personal and/or social history, self-evidence was also 
linked to situational aspects. It is not the gendered/generational/individual injunction to 
care per se but the (perceived) unavailability or ‘non-responsibility’ of other possible 
carers or care arrangements, which made the personal commitment ‘obvious’ (Quereshi 
and Walker op. cit.; Twigg and Atkin op. cit.). In the interviews several of these 
explanatory contexts were often called forth at the same time. Self-evidence thereby 
paradoxically encompassed both voluntariness and obligation: on the one hand the 
women maintained that the support they gave ‘naturally’ was not (and logically could 
not) be prescribed by any norm or contract. Neither was it to be claimed nor expected by 
relatives in need. Family support, the women unanimously agreed, had to be given 
voluntarily: ‘I think they would notice if you do it only by constraint. And this isn’t that it 
becomes something good’(36) (003). Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have pointed to the script 
that kin support can neither be expected or nor claimed since this would impinge on the 
right of the donor to give or withhold support. Only if there were fixed duties of family 
obligation could there be complementary rights to claim family support. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the stated voluntary nature, the women assumed that their relatives
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had hidden hopes for assistance. Importantly, references to the absence of alternatives, to 
obligation through benefits received previously and importantly, the allusion to the very 
‘nature’ of their (caring) personality connoted the absence of a voluntary or freely willed 
commitment.
Resp: I cared for my parents-in-law later on. They were ill. My mother-in-law had a 
heart attack, then my father-in-law was with us for 8 weeks, and later I always 
went there three times a week, cooked for them, I did everything for them. We 
also made sure that they moved here close to us, so that I could get there at least 
with a bike. But that was also self-evident for me that I did it. And they were very 
happy of course, right, because they didn’t have any other child, daughter or 
anything.
Int: Yes, was he the only son?
Resp: Yes.... My mother died. Then I had my aunt, my mother’s sister-in-law and she 
didn’t have any children. We always were at Christmas - we always had extended 
family. Then I looked after her... Or they would have had to see by themselves 
how they could cope. But I’m not that sort of a person, I can’t do that.
Int: Well that you would have thought more about yourself at that moment?
Resp: Uhm, no, I can’t do that.
Int: And was it also expected that you did it?
Resp: Oh no, I don’t think it was, they didn’t expect it. Maybe they would’ve been sad, 
the parents-in-law, if I hadn’t done it, but they didn’t expect it.
Int: And was it was completely clear to you, when this situation arose, that you would
go there?
Resp: Yes, that was completely obvious to me. I did it. I saw it was necessary and there 
wasn’t anyone else either. And my husband was very close to his parents. And 
they’d done a lot of good to us. Well, it was obvious for m e.(37)
068, p. 25/26, city, 1 sister, married, not employed, 
separate households with parents-in-law
In the interview protocol the interviewer noted that although the research participant did 
not seem very interested in theme of an interweaving of employment and family work, 
she had asked at the end of the interview whether her life course was quite normal in 
comparison to other women who were interviewed. Read in the context o f‘self-evidence’ 
this highlights the tension between stated normality and the compulsion for its 
explanation. In terms of processes of kinscription her paradoxical utterance 'they didn’t 
have any other child, daughter or anything’ indicated a dominant gendered script of 
hierarchical caring responsibilities, similar to the ideal hierarchy of preferences of 
primary carers found by Cantor (op. cit.) in the US and Qureshi and Walker (op. cit.) in 
Britain. This scripted hierarchy reflects both peoples’ beliefs about what it is right to do, 
as well as their conviction that they have followed this model. In the British study
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spouses were ranked first, a relative in a lifelong joint household second, daughters third, 
daughter-in-law fourth, then sons, other relatives and finally non-relatives (Qureshi and 
Walker op. cit., p. 126).
In the present study when both parents were still alive and one spouse was in need of 
support spouses were indeed reported to have cared for one another. To complement or 
substitute for spousal care, daughters in general were expected to be primary carers and 
they actually felt primarily responsible. They were also most likely to live in the same 
household with their mothers/parents ‘and when you live together, you care too’ (813). If 
there was no daughter (available), daughters-in-law were principal caregivers. In the 
sample an equal number of women cared for their parents and parents in-law. Seven 
research participants permanently lived with their mothers/parents or in-laws. Apart from 
parental support, care for (often childless) aunts who might have supported the research 
participants previously (see Chapter 6.3.) was the second most common support 
relationship. But personal care was also given to a cousin and to a stepmother.
It has to be emphasised that this scripted hierarchy of caring responsibility that included 
the mechanism of substitution explored in the previous chapter, not only assigned 
responsibility but was also strategically used by research participants to refuse 
responsibilities. Thus, daughters-in-law or more distant female relatives rejected caring 
responsibilities with the reference to the availability of a daughter, when a daughter was 
available. Among women ‘blood ties’ and the rights and duties attached to them were 
thus considered to be more binding than relations created through marriage -  but this did 
not include sons. Both in thought and practice, men as sons(-in-law), brothers, nephews 
and husbands were presented as largely freed from caring responsibilities and assisted at 
most with transport or bureaucratic issues around the organisation of formal helpers. Yet, 
given the strains on family life that care-giving sometimes entailed, men’s practical help 
or at least their consent to women’s caring responsibilities were emphasised and highly 
valued by the research participants. Finch and Mason (op. cit.) correspondingly note from 
their British study that the symbolic significance of male help was at least as important as 
its practical value.
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Within the scripted hierarchy of support responsibilities, marriage became a major 
distributive mechanism of obligation: while men were largely released from parental care 
through marriage, for women, caring responsibilities potentially doubled. However, 
female responsibility could be passed along the marriage chain downward and 
horizontally in the generational line to include, for example, the assistance of a 
respondent’s daughter-in-law or sister-in-law. That the respondents’ daughters or 
daughters-in-law were reported to support their mothers (-in-law) confirms Qureshi and 
Waker’s (op. cit.) finding that additional or secondary helpers were often chosen on the 
basis of their relationship to primary caregivers. Additional helpers also included female 
friends of the research participants. But friends were usually reported to offer their help. 
Whereas female assistance thus at least in part was obtained through the marriage 
contract of brothers and sons, the absence of a marriage contract normatively released 
women from caring responsibilities for their in-laws and increased the likelihood that 
sons would get involved.
Care receivers were presented as persons with their own strategies and power. Decisions 
about what kind of support was given and received, how it was given and for how long, 
were a co-product of situational aspects, cultural scripts and the material and 
psychological resources of the parties involved. In the following section I will focus on 
three kinds of strategies: strategies for reinforcing care-giving, initiated by the care 
receiver, strategies for providing and coping with care-giving and strategies for resisting 
caring responsibilities by actual or potential caregivers.
Strategies of reinforcing, maintaining, renegotiating and resisting elder support
The narratives suggest that actual or potential care giving was reinforced by what I 
consider to be ‘quasi-contractual strategies’: inheritance of property, payment of money 
and the assurance of support by promise. I call these strategies quasi-contractual because 
they evoked fairness in exchange but in a concrete situation appeared to merely have 
reinforced, not causally determined responsibilities assigned within the kinscript of a 
gendered hierarchy of primary carers. The strength of the cultural script exchange and 
reciprocity lies in its association with fairness and equity (see Chapter 2).
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The transmission of inheritance and property to adult children during the older person’s 
life-time is an old contractual strategy to secure filial support in old age (Chapter 3.3.). 
The research participants reported that adult children (or other relatives) were invited to 
move into or remain in the parental house with the prospect of inheritance. In return for 
‘taking over the parental house’ (845) the parents were granted a lifelong ‘right of 
residence’ [Wohnrecht] (003), i.e. aright to remain in the house rent-free. Implicitly this 
right included the privilege of assistance and support in the case the parents needed care. 
Although the hierarchy of carers by Qureshi and Walker (op. cit.) included the binding 
power of co-residency, a number of interviews suggested that if a more distant relative, 
such as a cousin or grandchild, shared a house with an older parent and a daughter lived 
nearby, the daughter still was supposed to carry primary responsibility.
On the other hand property was not always given to an adult child but in cases of 
hereditary leasehold was bought by the child. Even if the home was given as a gift or 
inheritance the child still had to compensate other heirs who were at the same time freed 
from primary caring responsibilities. At times the accounts suggest that older people 
gained the right of residence and support by virtue of having lived in a place for decades 
rather than by bequeathing property.
More directly connoting the idea of fairness and exchange, but rarely mentioned in family 
caregiver studies, is the payment of money for familial support by the care receiver (see 
Chapter 6.3.). The narrative accounts, however, suggest that none of the research 
participants provided support in order to receive money. Rather money appeared to have 
been given symbolically by the person in need of support to achieve ‘a proper balance’ in 
the relationship. In two cases money was also used strategically to make it harder for the 
potential care provider to decline support with reference to wage-earning necessities.
‘She had already been ill for a long time, then I came home from the farm for four 
days every fortnight and helped to care for my mother, right. Because my sister 
who lived in the house [parental house of mother] said “I won’t do it on my 
own”. She couldn’t do it on her own, right. And later when she was bedridden, 
that year I came more often. But then we had a nurse at night who slept with 
mother and when I came I slept with mother. And then she gave me every time, 
every month 100 Marks and always 20 Marks for the fare when I came. If I 
hadn’t taken it she would’ve been angry. Then I couldn’t have come anymore,
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right.’ (39)
834, p. 25, country, 4 siblings, married, family labourer,
separate households
Not only when a father wanted to secure support for the research participant’s 
stepmother, but also in cases where mothers had lived together with their daughters all 
their lives, the ultimate binding strategy of the potential care receiver was to make a 
relative promise that they could die at home. This promise implicitly entailed the promise 
of personal support. Philosophically the promise principle has been considered as the 
moral basis of contract, by which persons impose morally compelling obligations on 
themselves where none existed before. This implies the assumption of a freedom of 
choice over whether to promise or not (Chapter 1.2.). In the context of intergenerational 
relationships however, their scripts and family histories but also the anxiety and 
helplessness on the side of the older relative, the ‘choice’ to promise was never ‘morally 
neutral’ (Fried 1981, p. 8). Not to give this promise when approached by an older relative 
is like declining a last wish.
‘She [mother] was completely in need of care. Then she had the wish if it’s 
possible to die at home. Then I said, granny, I grant you this wish. Only when I 
can’t take the responsibility [any longer], but she was so calm, she passed away 
like that.’ (40)
849, p. 23, country, 2 stepbrothers, full-time employed, 
joint house with mother but separate households
Resp: If you think about it, five times a day I had to go out of the house, over there- 
Int: To your father-in-law?
Resp: Yes. And him only in diapers, and wash and everything, and a whole house there 
also by himself 
Int: But you wanted him to stay in the house?
Resp: Uhm. I had promised him that sometime. As long as it is at all possible, he could 
stay there.
Int: Goodness me.
Resp: You’d managed it somehow.(41)
003, p. 25, city, 1 sister, part-time employed, joint household 
with mother, separate household with father-in-law
‘And I had said [to her mother]: when it isn’t possible any longer, you come 
here... Also my stepmother, I have to say, like I promised my father, right... and 
my stepmother was very hard, really, a real stepmother, never had children, which 
you perhaps can’t reproach her for, right. But it was self-evident for us, also for 
my children. When my stepmother was in hospital my children regularly went 
there in turn to visit her.’ (42)
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130, p. 36, city, 2 sisters, married, employed, separate
households
Even though from the position of the potential care receiver, there appeared to have been 
a need to secure a caring relationship, from the point of view of the research participants 
these quasi-contractual strategies did not usually stand in opposition to their emphasis on 
the self-evidence of their (actual or potential) support provision. If taken out of context, 
inheritance, money and promises may suggest equality and negotiation, while the 
accounts indicate an emphasis on fairness in the absence of unconstrained negotiation and 
choice. On the contrary, the ways in which these elements were deployed and operated 
suggests that family support is not a series of choices about the proper and rational 
allocation of time and resources (apart perhaps from the point of view of the state) 
(Twigg and Atkin 1994).
For those 23 women who provided support as well as for the minority who declined to 
give it, strategies were necessary to maintain, limit or rule out caring responsibilities. 
Contrary to the dominant view that parental support is a recompense for care received 
previously, a number of women bom around 1930 did not feel that they had reasons to be 
grateful to their mothers who they saw as hardened, bitter and ‘unjust’. To provide 
support despite, sometimes very negative memories and experiences that should have 
prevented them ‘paying back’ previous care-giving, sometimes required them to ‘forget’ 
and ‘put aside the past’. The strategy of forgetting is illustrated in the following account.
Resp: And that’s how my mother was -  rather than a cuddle, I got hit with a stick. 
That’s how it was.
Int: And that didn’t change later? Sometimes when one gets older and has more
distance then one says- 
Resp: No, no, no. Couldn’t. I cared for my mother at the end. And sometimes my 
children said to me ‘how can you?’ I said, ‘come on, don’t remind me of the past. 
If I think about those times I can’t do it.’ That time, I just have to forget it/ push it 
aside.
Int: Did she live with you in the house?
Resp: She lived here with me at times. And then I cared for her with love, I have to say.
(43)
822, p. 27, country, 4 siblings, employed, 
temporarily joint household
Against the background that the majority of research participants felt that in relation to
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their mothers/parents ‘you always remained the child’ (813), the more pro-active 
strategies for maintaining shared living arrangements and support aimed at renegotiating 
the relationship with their mothers in order to create more equality and self- 
determination. In the same way as some of the research participants tried to limit their 
(grand)child care responsibilities at the time of their retirement, those women who felt 
entrapped in ‘dependency relationships’ with their mothers described strategies of 
asserting themselves, particularly their right to self-determination. Transferring tacit 
arrangements into explicit ones, expressing feelings and making them available to one 
another, potentially also empowered the mother who could articulate her feelings and 
wishes more specifically.
‘She always saw me still -  well, she was always a bit dominating as w ell... And 
then we had, that was about four years before -  she was 86, 87, then we really 
had a row. It wasn’t nasty. But then I said, “I’m still treated like a child! Do this, 
do that”. She always had it good here too. That now I’m a granny too myself, and 
also want to be a free person sometime. And I said, “I feel as if I’m in chains!”’
(44)
849, p. 30, country, 2 stepbrothers, divorced, employed, 
shared house with mother but separate households
‘Well, I turn 59 next Monday and only now I am starting to get independent from 
my mother, right. Although she still lives in the same house... Well, I’m always 
exercising. For example I said to my mother: “Listen, I can’t read your mind! I 
can do it, but I don’t want to anymore. You have a mouth, you can say if you 
want something! I won’t do anything anymore, if you don’t tell me that you want 
it.” I say, “and then I will still consider whether it’s appropriate that I do it!” (45)
037, p. 12, city, 2 sisters, retired, widowed, 
life-long shared household with mother
As with the practice of kin work more generally, these practices of changing and 
renegotiating personal relationships, despite their empowering and political character, 
usually remain below the threshold of public discourse and perception.
Although several research participants mentioned that their older relatives at the end of 
their lives had to go to a nursing home, only three women in the sample who were almost 
continuously employed reported that they overtly declined to care full-time for their 
mothers. As Finch and Mason (op. cit.) have pointed out, not to provide care for parents 
(-in-law) is seen as requiring ‘legitimate excuses’, such as ‘objective’ inability to provide 
intensive care due to other commitments, physical incapacity or geographical distance. In
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the absence of such ‘objective’ hindrances the decision of a daughter (-in-law) not to be a 
full-time caregiver requires resources and strategies. Personal and institutional/expert 
support as well as a continuous employment career can be resources in this sense, but 
they sometimes were re-keyed as legitimate excuses. In the following account a reference 
to a hypothetical hindrance helped to view the situation as i f  there were legitimate 
excuses.
Resp: And I went there every night [to her mother-in-law]. We [with sister-in-law] put 
her to bed together. She had to be carried from one chair to the next. But it wasn’t 
my main responsibility. I’ve only helped.
Int: But if you’d had to do it, it wouldn’t have been possible to combine it with your
job?
Resp: You can’t, you can’t and I wouldn’t have done it either. If I’d have sent her 
somewhere and then continued to go working. I wouldn’t have done that. 
Although that would’ve been really tough for me. My mother-in-law has 
criticised me for carrying on working when my mother was old and not so fit 
anymore. Once she had a real go at me and said I mustn’t do that. Then I talked to 
the doctor, then he said “your mother could be alone and you could live in 
America. Then you wouldn’t be able to do anything either”. (46)
070, p. 39, city, 5 siblings, married, part-time employed,
attached house with in-laws
Strategies of coping with, renegotiating and declining caring responsibilities were always 
interpreted in their situational context. By focusing on the research participants’ strategies 
the question becomes not whether or not a woman has provided support, but how and to 
what extent it was given and assigned and negotiated over time. Despite the expansion of 
the welfare state the subjectively perceived room for manoeuvre of the group of women 
interviewed, however, remained narrow. Like other forms of kin work, care giving was 
not considered as a political economic factor and attempts to limit kin support were 
negotiated interpersonally although experts could provide crucial support. What did the 
research participants expect from their children with respect to support in old age against 
the background of their own commitments and experiences? This question also aims at a 
further exploration of how older women evaluated their own kin commitments in 
retrospect, in particular care given to older relatives.
7.4. EXPECTATION OF FILIAL SUPPORT IN OLD AGE
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Contrary to Hareven’s (1994) findings in the US that parents expected their children to 
assist them in old age, the research participants doubted that their children would be 
willing and able to care for them should the need arise. Overall, both sons and daughters 
were perceived as more independent and self-determined than they had been themselves. 
Not a single research participant said that she expected support in old age from her 
children. Even when children explicitly offered support, the women tended not to trust 
these assurances -  and importantly they did not want to jeopardise the emerging 
processes of self-determination by ‘new’ dependencies on their children. Despite the 
sinister scenarios that some respondents evoked in relation to elder care homes, fearing 
that they would become a burden and lose their independence, the majority of research 
participants planned to go into a home voluntarily.
‘Well, one thing in life was important for me: never become dependent on my 
children. ... How it’s going to be later, I don’t know. The youngest once told 
daughter-in-law, ‘mother is not going into a pensioner bunker.’ Like youth talks. 
... But I don’t get under their feet.... I’ve seen enough. If I’m ten years older one 
simply says, “mother, sit on this chair and don’t get up”. No, not with me! ’ (47)
069, p. 20, city, widowed, retired, 3 children
‘Even our youngest says -  I don’t know what they will think later -  he says, 
“Mum, you will never go to a nursing home”. He experienced the misery there 
now. They are good to them, I saw it myself. But they don’t have anybody to talk 
to. Well, and that’s the sad thing, the people need conversations and become 
stunted. He always says: “you never-” but you don’t know how they will think 
later on, when they have a family themselves. But I always say, I won’t become a 
burden on my children. We’ll go ourselves because we already know this from 
our club. They almost all go into a nursing home.’ (48)
026, p. 23, city, married, 2 sons, not employed
Overall, the research participants appeared to welcome their children’s increased choice 
of decision making with respect to family care-giving and particularly granted their sons 
the primary importance of their responsibility for their own families. The emphasis on 
choice is concordant with their insistence that care has to be given freely to be beneficial. 
This insistence on a voluntary commitment appeared to be necessary because the 
commitment that personal care demands is greater than could be enforced by mere 
obligation or constraint. As pointed out earlier Finch and Mason (1992) have argued that 
a right to demand family support would jeopardise the donor’s freedom to give or 
withhold support. I would suggest that if the family were a sphere of freedom and choice,
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as is suggested by notions of a new ‘social’ or caring contract, people would be able to 
freely ask for support and grant it or freely reject it. It is precisely because family 
members cannot ‘freely’ refuse to give support that relatives cannot openly ask for it. 
Thus, I suggest that the norm o f‘non-articulation’ (Patterson 1997) serves to conceal the 
absence of choice by seemingly maintaining it. For the women concerned, this norm of 
non-articulation and their lack of tmst in their children’s assurances meant that they could 
not count on the family and planned to rely on service provision for their own old age.
The preceding analysis has shown that even though the eleven women who did provide 
intensive personal care felt that they had little choice to do otherwise, they characterised 
their kin commitments as voluntary.
‘And I would say, I don’t hold anybody in contempt -  and if someone says they 
can keep the granny at home, I’m the first to say, “You can’t say that without a 
second thought”. If somebody can do it and wants i t ... but you can’t tell anybody, 
you have to do it. And as I said, I personally don’t expect it either... from my 
son, and from a daughter-in-law you can’t expect it anyway. But I wouldn’t have 
expected it from a daughter. You either have to go for it, to want it or else you let 
it be; one or the other. But not to be forced into it. And I’ll tell you, I volunteered 
for all that. Looking back I’d say, I’d do it again if I had to. Though I had my 
doubts for a while. When my son was very small and my mother very ill that 
wasn’t good for the little boy... But I couldn’t do anything else, I had to pull 
through ‘cos I had the feeling I had to do it.’ (49)
006, p. 48, city, 1 son, widowed, not employed, 
cared for both parents and parents-in-law
I argue that contradictory accounts such as this suggest that the research participants 
women did not merely refer to competing discourses of different acceptability and 
normativity but that they ‘wanted to help’ and ‘make it easier’ for their relatives -  while 
at the same time they felt that they had no alternative. Defining kin work as a personal 
choice, as they must, not only conceals the constraints that are at work but also 
individualises problems that can arise in the course of care giving. If social scientists 
speak either of choice or of obligation (Lewis and Meredith 1988) they perpetuate the 
concealment of ambivalent feelings and motives and the interweaving of explicit and 
implicit processes of negotiation.
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7.5. WOMEN’S PENSION ENTITELMENTS: 
‘WELL, BETTER THAN NOTHING...’
Given that the extent to which kin work in the group of women studied was considered 
largely as ‘private’ cooperation between kin members I want to conclude this chapter by 
asking whether the research participants conversely regarded their entitlements from the 
institutionalised generational contract as merely a ‘reward’ for their labour market 
participation or whether they considered those in conjunction with their intergenerational 
commitments. Furthermore, were their expected entitlements a sufficient base to 
realistically plan a life independently of their children?
Being around 60 years old, the research participants had started to search for their 
employment records and often quite painfully realised that their pension entitlements 
would be in many cases too low to allow for an independent life style in old age. 
Although only twelve women were selected on the basis that they were primarily 
housewives (among whom there turned out to be seven family labourers), only 23 of the 
52 research participants were expecting a (small) pension in their own right. To claim the 
minimum pension that is only paid from the age of 65 (instead of 60 or 63 when the 
women had more substantial credit records) women used to have been employed as 
National Insurance contributors for at least 15 years, later for five. The wish to reach this 
benchmark and/or to better their financial situation was one of the reasons, apart from a 
strong work orientation, that 18 research participants were still employed at the time of 
the interview. Other research participants knew that they would not qualify for a pension.
At the end of one of one of the postal questionnaires in the initial survey (see Appendix 
A), one of the respondents had attached the following note:
‘I think that women of my generation, as well as a family also wanted to have an 
occupation. My attempt has unfortunately failed. I regret this a lot. Also I would 
have liked to claim the small pension granted to me at 60 instead of at 65. For 
unpaid social commitments, we are of course particularly in demand.’ (50)
857, country, 7 years employed, married, pension
Another women had exclaimed in the interview
‘They dictate to us anyway what we [women] have to do. It doesn’t matter when, 
at what time and under what regime and so on. Because it was simply necessary.
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We needed them! And I say to myself, women have always worked! ’ (51)
011, p. 5, city, 28 years employed, married, pension
Accounts such as these allude to a consciousness of older women that ‘the state’ or 
society needed and took advantage of women’s lifelong paid and unpaid work 
commitments. Furthermore, the first account indicates that the woman considered low 
pension entitlements as a consequence of unpaid family and kin work. At the beginning 
of their work lives, however, few women said that they had thought about or were 
informed \aufgeklart, literally: ‘were told the facts of life’ (840)], about the significance 
to work with social security contributions. Here fathers were sometimes reported to have 
insisted on the importance of pension relevant employment. Yet, many women followed 
the then widespread practice of ‘paying out’ the wife’s insurance contributions to the 
married couple on the birth of their first child. These disbursements offered some capital 
for the young family to build up a household but also meant to make women give up their 
claims of an employment career and a pension in their own right. In retrospect the 
disbursements were characterised as ‘an unforgivable mistake’, often assigned to the 
research participants’ husbands.
The situation of family labourers who were neither paid nor insured was particularly 
precarious. The financial situation of the following widowed research participant who 
also looked after her disabled daughter was very insecure. Because the new owners of her 
house had already moved in and she was only ‘tolerated’ there, she came to the university 
for the interview. The interviewer noted how she was affected by the discrepancy 
between the impression of the participant as a long standing businesswoman and her 
apparent insecurity with respect to her living situation. Although the woman is one of the 
few who formulated claims to state responsibility, she laid the responsibility of the lack 
of insurance contributions primarily on her father-in-law.
Resp: Because my husband was the sole heir I was in the business almost the whole 
day, but also when the children were there later on, right? ...
Int: So practically you were also employed
Resp: Yes, you can say that, but without remuneration. My father-in-law, he did not 
even pay disability stamps for me. He said, give me your [insurance] card, and for 
himself he paid stamps for the maximum amount and when he gave me the card 
back after 12 years, nothing had happened with it once. ... Yes, and then my 
husband died so early and I don’t receive a pension yet, well, I will perhaps get
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around 300 Marks per month... well, I’ve already eaten half of my house, right? 
Yes well minimum pensions are simply too low. I think, so much money is 
pumped in everywhere, then they should do something there so that the people 
don’t have to go to the social assistance office. Well really, right?(52)
074, p. 13/14, 5 years employed, 20 years family labourer,
widowed, no pension
With respect to the lack of pension entitlements and security in old age, some of the 
research participants thus repeated in an uncanny way the ‘fate’ of their mothers by 
relying on the male breadwinner model.
‘My mother helped my father in the workshop ... And then my parents made the 
mistake, which my mother always regretted, that they didn’t pay contributions for 
her. Well, my father was self-employed. They thought if they saved and built a 
house that would be the old age insurance... And then it turned out that the house 
didn’t bring much rent at all... But my father at least got a small pension. And 
when my mother finally got it, then she kept saying “if we only we had paid in 
for me too”... Yes, I saw it with my parents how it goes when you aren’t insured. 
But at that time, when we married or shortly afterwards my husband became a 
civil servant. And then I always said to myself, well you, for you it isn’t that 
important. I also didn’t know what and how I could start [working] again. And I 
never thought that you’d be on the street, that this ends with a divorce.’ (53)
121, p. 25/26, 5 years regularly employed, 17 years employed 
without National Insurance, divorced, no pension
Overall, the research participants’ approach to and evaluation of their often meagre 
entitlements was incredibly modest, sometimes accompanied by sadness but not openly 
expressed anger. Depending on the women’s marital and financial situation, pensions 
were at times not only seen in terms of material remuneration but also in terms of public 
acknowledgement. Thus although she stated that she did not ‘want more anyway’, for the 
following married research participant receiving the minimum pension entailed the hope 
of finally receiving some acknowledgement by the state.
‘I have my months full now so that I get at least a pocket money of a pension. 
You don’t want more anyway. That perhaps later it will be acknowledged by the 
state, what you have done.’ (54)
126, p. 28, 5 years employed, 5 years temporary work 
without National Insurance, married, pension
The accounts show that the women rarely articulated a critique of the kin work they had 
provided intra- and intergenerationally or indeed of a social security system tailored to a 
male life-long employment career. Having themselves contributed to both the familial 
and the institutionalised generational contract the advice they give to their own daughters
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and women of the younger generation, similarly to their own mothers, was to work 
within the system more successfully.
‘But I always would say and say to every woman: “Continue to pay stamps for 
your minimum claims of pension, so that you won’t be dependent later or be so 
much worse off than the man/husband!” (55)
037, p. 36, 25 years regularly employed, widowed, pension
In so far as this recommendation (realistically) assumed that that structurally their 
daughters and daughters-in-law were more pressured to interrupt or reduce their 
employment when they have children, it had, as I have shown above, considerable 
repercussions on their own life-style. Once again the research participants felt that they 
had to stand in as grandchild minders to make up for the structural inequality of this very 
system.
7.6. CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections I have investigated the kinscripts of women bom around 1930 
in mid and later life, in particular the practical and personal support the research 
participants reported they had given to grandchildren and older relatives. These practices 
were contextualised, not primarily with reference to the historical-economic conditions 
and intra-familial legacies, but in the case of childcare with respect to a dilemma between 
the lack of adequate social institutional provision on the one hand and the need of their 
daughters (in-law) to remain in paid work (i.e. the requirements of the labour market) on 
the other. Providing for older continues to be based on the political question ‘But who 
else is going to do it?’ (Aronson 1992). Despite the general currency of the notion of the 
generational contract in Germany (Chapter 3) and the fact that social scientists use the 
contract metaphor of a ‘new social contract’ or ‘caring contract’ none of the research 
participants explicitly deployed a contractual vocabulary. Repertoires of the generational 
contract such as the cultural meaning systems of reciprocity and back payments 
(articulated only by three respondents) and emotional closeness had a minor role in 
justifying kin support.
Assistance and care-giving of older relatives were often characterised ‘self-evident’. Yet
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the notion of self-evidence or naturalness entailed a series of contextualisations, referring 
to the women’s personality and generational position, an implicit script of a gendered 
hierarchy of carers and last but not least to situational needs. Although the participants 
insisted that care had to be given voluntarily these contextualisations pointed to felt 
obligation and constraints. Thus the notion of self-evidence paradoxically encompassed 
both voluntary and obligatory aspects of kin work.
I have suggested viewing the dominant gendered hierarchy of support obligations as a 
cultural script. This script incorporates mechanisms of substitution analysed in the 
previous chapter and also the distributive mechanism of the conjugal contract, which 
tends to release men as husbands and sons from caring responsibilities while potentially 
doubling them for women (Lorenz-Meyer and Grotheer 1999). The narratives suggest 
indeed that the release of men as husbands and brothers from day-to-day responsibilities, 
as Conen (1998) has stated, remains legitimate and unquestioned. But women too used 
the script as a basis for designing strategies to reject responsibilities in particular by 
pointing to those relatives who were held responsible before them.
More generally, I have argued that a focus on strategies is a productive way of 
understanding how support relationships were created and upheld given the inherent 
tensions between felt solidarity and constraint. The notion of strategies as an important 
dimension of kin work would complement the focus on tension suggested by Stack and 
Burton (1993) in a modified framework of kinscripts. Pro-active and defensive strategies 
were used in contexts of constraint and show that negotiation and assignment of kin work 
responsibilities are not of an order of either/or. Elements of inheritance, money payments 
and promise could be interpreted as patterns of exchange and contract but the narratives 
suggest that these elements had rather a symbolic (and sometimes moral) than a 
straightforward material significance in reinforcing family care giving. Making a younger 
family member promise to be able to die at home implicitly entails an implicit assurance 
of support and together with strategies of renegotiating intergenerational relationships 
was an exception of a more general script of non-articulation of expectations or wishes of 
kin support. I have shown how this script whilst seemingly maintaining the freedom of 
potential caregivers to decline support concealed the stated need to present ‘legitimate
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excuses’ for this decline, that is the absence of ‘free’ choice.
The focus on strategies highlighted defensive strategies such as ‘forgetting’ previous 
conflicts, disappointment and anger as well as strategies of renegotiating family 
relationships. These strategies often required personal and institutional resources, such as 
the support by experts or a long established employment history. Renegotiations first 
concerned a decline of further regular childcare responsibilities as they were seen as 
conflicting with a demand of own interests after retirement. Second, they concerned 
renegotiations of dependency relationships between the research participants and their 
mothers described in Chapter 6.4. The important characteristic of renegotiations was the 
emphasis on the open articulation of perceived strains and an assertion of the women’s 
interests, that is, of transferring tacit arrangements into explicit ones. Where they 
occurred they appeared to have an empowering effect. In no case did the research 
participants report, however, that they renegotiated relationships with relatives confined 
to bed or with those who were normatively released from primary responsibilities.
Finally I would like to draw attention to the fact that the research participants at least in 
part interpreted intergenerational commitments as ‘work’, but only cautiously and 
indirectly formulated claims of acknowledgement and recognition by ‘the state’ as has 
been shown in the analysis of the evaluation of their pension entitlements. Put differently, 
being experts in the identification and interpretation of the needs of others does not 
necessarily entail an open articulation of their own needs. Approaching the final quarter 
of their lives this group of older women found themselves to be systematically 
disadvantaged by a pension system that linked entitlements to a continuous (male) 
employment biography. By providing childcare they (not always whole heartedly) aimed 
to secure this continuity for their daughters and daughters-in-law. Encouraging asking 
questions about the allocation of resources the framework of kinscripts helps to open up 
these contradictions. On this basis the framework more generally lends weight to a social- 
scientific focus on ‘generation’ that does not surpass but has to incorporate the axes of 
gender and class. This shift of focus then allows a re-keying and re-politisation of the 
term of the welfare generation by identifying women of the ‘welfare generation’ not as 
those who enriched themselves unduly from welfare state benefits, but as those who were
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chief contributors to the production of welfare both in the employment sphere and in the 
kinship network. From this new point of departure questions of intergenerational equity 
and accounting can and must be posed again.
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Chapter 8
NEGOTIATING AND TRANSFORMING 
INTERGENERATIONAL LEGACIES:
KIN WORK PRACTICES AND ANTICIPATIONS FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF ADULT CHILDREN
8.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter continues the analysis of kinscripts in the life courses of a group of the 
women’s adult children who were bom between 1953 and 1964. As elaborated in the 
previous chapter, in the context of welfare state expansion and an increasing economic 
independence of young adults from their parents, intergenerational relationships are 
increasingly perceived as be governed by sentiment and choice rather than by obligation 
(Jerrome 1990; Eckart 1989; Hareven 1994). Family care is widely believed to have lost 
its reliability (Liischer 1993, p. 42) and is said to have become a matter of personal 
discretion, with the older generation having fewer possibilities for reinforcing the 
provision of filial support in old age. In the context of an impending ‘care crisis’ this 
alleged ‘detraditionalisation of family bonds’ (Kaufmann 1993, p. 107) has a gendered 
subtext. It is primarily younger women who are seen as not willing or able to uphold the 
‘caring contract’ and held responsible for the erosion of family solidarities (Chapter 3.6.). 
As I have shown in the analysis of generational politics and discourses in the German 
welfare state this diagnosis is nothing new (and indeed, Skolnick (1993, p. 47) has 
pointed out that ‘every generation on record seemed to have believed it was witnessing 
“the decline of the traditional family’”). Counterclaims such as the assumption that 
individualism and a retreat from solidarity will occur in extra-familial relationships rather 
than within kin relationships, which continue to be ranked highest in value surveys 
(Pitrou 1993, p. 87), remain less audible.
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Against the background of these claims, this chapter explores the descriptions, 
evaluations and anticipations of intergenerational practices of German men and women 
aged between 30 and 41. Here it is important to recall that the research participants were 
selected by contact established through their mothers (Appendix A). Thus those children 
who have broken off contact or have a problematic relationship with their parents may 
have been excluded from the sample.
Applying the heuristic framework of kinscript and the focus on the repertoire of contract 
and gender I first explore the description of kin work practices and ‘family feelings’ or 
sentiments between the research participants and their parents, including the views of the 
younger generation on grand-maternal child care responsibilities. Next, I will look at the 
description and modes of dealing with material and immaterial transfers and family 
legacies, both in terms of personality/character and lifestyle. In the third part I focus on 
adult children’s anticipations and possible negotiations and plans for supporting their 
parents in old age. More specifically I analyse the models o f care provision the research 
participants anticipated and justified, taking into account possible intra-familial legacies, 
cultural scripts and social institutions. To explore whether scripts have changed across 
generations I examine the following questions: (i) what repertoires, vocabularies and 
symbols do younger Germans draw on to justify their anticipations of care-giving? (ii) 
How do their plans build on previous relationships with their parents and to what extent 
are they affected by intra-familial legacies and social institutions? (iii) To what extent is 
parental care giving part of reflective life planning and openly negotiated in families of 
younger Germans as the term generational contract and the theory of an individualisation 
of intergenerational relationships suggest? Finally, in the light of the emerging findings I 
will explore the views of the younger generation on gender equality in order to assess 
possible demands addressed to the welfare state.
8.2. KIN WORK COMMITMENTS AND FAMILY FEELINGS BETWEEN 
PARENTS AND ADULT CHILDREN
Given the unexpectedly high number of temporary or permanently joint households in the
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group of women bom around 1930, it is perhaps not surprising that 15 of the women’s 
adult children (including 3 brother/sister dyads) from both the urban and rural area had 
grown up with their grandmothers/parents in the same house. Five other research 
participants had lived temporarily with their grandparents. Among those who had 
experienced them, three-generation households were described as not uncommon. In 
comparison with the older women’s depiction of their childhood and youth (Chapter 6.2.) 
there was less emphasis on obligatory housework contributions and perceived 
deprivation. Yet, the introductory accounts of these research participants, generated by a 
question referring to the perceived scope of their mother’s employment, read quite 
similarly to those of the older women who grew up in three-generation households. A 
comparison of siblings’ narratives suggests that there were no systematic gender 
differences in the perception of household arrangements and the inter-generational kin 
work they entailed, apart from the fact that women appeared to have felt emotionally 
closer to their grandmothers.
‘We had a business at home. My mother was often there the whole day although 
she tried to balance that with the children somehow, in the afternoons at home. 
And because we had a granny in the household it wasn’t so much noticed, right. 
Well we children were not really directly deprived... and -  yes, granny covered a 
very big part: cooking, looking after the children... well, for me granny played a 
big role. She compensated a lot.’(56)
Woman 516, p. 1/2, country -> city, 4 brothers, skilled,
married, no children
Women often described their grandmothers as strong, the ‘centre point of the family’ 
(w845) who counterbalanced maternal absence. Independently of their own relationship 
to their grandmothers and in accordance with some of their mothers’ accounts, shared 
inter-generational living arrangements, and grand-maternal child care in particular, were 
sometimes remembered as problematic. Conflicts centred around the dominance of 
grandmothers and what mothers sometimes were reported to have considered as their 
interference in family and business affairs.
‘And I know of the conflicts that my mother had with her unloved mother-in-law 
in the same household which for years lead to terribly stressful situations and to 
heavy and great rows, both between my father and my mother and between my 
mother and my granny which we children were affected by too. You always had 
to take sides. And there was the mother and there was the granny whom you liked 
as well.’(57)
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Man 054, p. 42, city, 2 sisters, university, cohabiting, 1 child
Being between 30 and 41 years old at the point of the interview, the overwhelming 
majority of the younger research participants had established their own work and family 
lives. At this point households between parents and children were mutually independent. 
Yet, a substantial minority of both men and women in the rural and urban areas (8/49) 
had moved into or next to the house of their parents or parents-in-law and in four cases 
continued the family tradition of close intergenerational households. As with the 
generation of the older women, shared households entailed expectations -  but not 
necessarily the practice -  of kin support both with respect to help with child care and 
assistance in old age.
‘It’s expected of me because this house belongs to my husband and he got it 
shortly before our wedding with a life-long right of residence for the parents-in- 
law with the thought that when one dies, the other one -  they have their own 
room upstairs.’(58)
Woman 831, p. 10, city -> country, 2 siblings, skilled, cohabiting, 1 child
[grew up with grandmother]
Kin work practices between parents and adult children, however, were neither bound to 
co-residence nor did they follow set expectations or intra-familial legacies. Although 
patterns of contact and desired closeness varied, all research participants visited and/or 
were visited regularly by their parents. In line with empirical research on 
intergenerational relationships the overall flow of financial, practical and emotional 
support was reported to pass from the older to the younger generation (Attias-Donfut 
1995). Yet, although singular intergenerational practices such as financial advice or 
practical assistance given and received could be very similar, the narratives of the 
younger generation suggest that they attached a different quality to assistance given and 
received or expected. I will focus on these differences in turn.
Different perceptions of assistance given to and received by older parents
The research participants’ parents, who were in their 60s and (early) 70s when the 
younger generation was interviewed, were still perceived as largely ‘getting on by 
themselves’. Occasional or regular practical help by the younger generation was 
described as limited to set tasks such as dealing with bureaucracy, garden work or
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renovating, although it was more substantial in those families where mothers were 
widowed or divorced (12 out of 49). As in the narratives of the older women kin workers, 
this form of assistance was characterised by both women and men as not being expected, 
‘not an issue’ (Man 022) and ‘self-evident’ (Man 840) and, at the same time, sometimes 
as obligatory. The following research participant, who I met in the house of his widowed 
mother and co-resident brother, explained his decreasing family commitments to his 
family of procreation with his obligations to his mother and brother.
Resp: I also have a certain obligation let’s say. My mother has a huge thing [house] here 
and my brother has already been unemployed for a long time... I support my 
mother as much as possible... we have renovated the house here, downstairs, I’ve 
done that a lot on my own mostly at weekends and in the evening with a friend of 
mine, my brother helped. We have converted my father’s former business area 
and turned it into a flat.
Dim: For your mother 
Resp: No, to it rent out here ...
Dim: Is it also that your mother can live off the rent or is this not an aspect that she can- 
Resp: Yes, it’s a source of income... I support her in legal affairs and other matters 
where I know more than her because of my training... She doesn’t expect it, that I 
look a bit after her or my brother, she doesn’t expect it but it is self-evident for
me. (59)
Man 840, p. 19/38, country, 1 brother, mother widowed, 
university, married, 1 child [grew up with grandmother]
Likewise emotional support and exchange, and attempts to encourage a parent to live 
more socially after life events such as illness or widowhood were described by men and 
women as spontaneous and necessary interventions that did not require much thought or 
discussion. Apart from two women who provided regular personal care for an older 
relative (see 8.4.) these delimited ‘natural-obligatory’ kin work practices were not 
described as conflicting with other commitments.
By contrast, the assistance the adult children received from their parents, particularly 
where they involved long-term financial support, regular child care and temporary 
accommodation of a (divorced or widowed) daughter and her children, was interpreted as 
having a major impact on their parents’ lives. Once it exceeded the period of child raising 
this support was not explicitly termed ‘self-evident’. But adult daughters in particular, 
perhaps because they had a sense of their social vulnerability when they separated from 
male partners, characterised this form of parental support as reliable and actually or
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potentially unconditional. That is, parents were expected to stand in for their children and 
often did regardless of their own feelings and concerns.
‘And I knew if I had dared or taken this step [divorce] my mother would have 
been there for me. That I had known where to go, that I could have arrived with 
child and everything in front of her door - 1 still could stand in front of the door 
today -  and that without asking it would have been accepted that I were there. 
Yes, that’s how I see my mother.’ (60)
Woman 845, p. 24, country, 1 brother, mother widowed, skilled, married,
1 child [grew up with grandparents]
Two women in the sample reported that they had experienced exactly this kind of 
unconditional parental support. Furthermore, apart from receiving financial and practical 
advice, loans and support during periods of unemployment or study, 17 of the 32 research 
participants with children had relied on their parents or parents-in-law for regular or 
occasional child care. The respondents often were aware that regular child care 
commitments clashed with their parents’/mothers’ lifestyle and interests, which was one 
reason why a number of research participants explicitly rejected this form of child care 
even if they lived in close proximity or in a shared house. Yet other sons and daughters 
felt they had no alternatives to their mother(-in-laws) complementing or substituting for 
inadequate institutional child care. Here grand-parental childcare could be a point of 
contention among siblings when research participants felt that this assistance had not 
been equally distributed between the siblings.
The accounts of mothers and adult children corresponded in that childcare was 
interpreted as support of the adult child. Yet, in the following case the daughter also 
referred to her mother’s reproaches for her being employed and her commitment to the 
well-being of her grandchild, which had been left unsaid in the mother’s account (see 
Chapter 7.2.).
‘Well, if I didn’t have my mother, and let’s say if she hadn’t been willing to look 
after S, it wouldn’t be possible [to be employed]. Because I certainly wouldn’t 
have given him somewhere else, I’m away for too long for that because I work 
full-time... We have tried to put him in the kindergarten at three and a half to take 
some of the load off my mother, so that he doesn’t sit round in the living room 
there all day... Well she has her own interests too. And that didn’t work out, it 
was too much for him... And then she said well OK if it is necessary, right. 
Because she always has compassion for the child too because I’m such a bad 
mother so that the child isn’t harmed she was willing to do it. But I think maybe
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she was glad too that she had somebody, that she had a task again.’(6,)
Woman 809, p. 10/17, city, 1 brother, skilled, divorced, 1 child
[grew up with grandparents]
Family sentiments
The research participants not only considered the contact between grandparents and 
grandchildren as practical help but, on the basis of their own childhood experience, saw it 
as important for promoting a sense of family, continuity and communication between the 
generations. If mothers/parents appeared to have different priorities and/ or did not want 
to interfere with the family lives of their children, their retreat from intergenerational kin 
work was regretted and criticised. Here the younger generation appeared to become the 
bearers of family tradition.
‘I sometimes would like that she [mother] doesn’t come spontaneously when it 
suits her but arranged with us or at fixed times so that it’s easier for the children, 
that they know Wednesday granny comes.... It’s also my own interest that I want 
that yes, that the children have a granny, they already don’t have a grandfather 
and I think that it must be fun for her... Sometimes I think that her family is not 
that important to her... OK, for me granny and grandpa were very important, 
maybe it’s coming from there. And then I think my wife would have a bit of -  a 
break.’ (62)
Man 115, p. 39/40, city -» country, university, married, 3 children
[grew up with grandparents]
Although they were not described as unproblematic from the perspective of adult children 
intergenerational relationships often gained importance with increasing age and when 
they had children of their own. In the younger generation kin members were also seen as 
important in acknowledging each other’s life styles, histories and identities. If this was 
not possible contacts were reduced or temporarily cut off. Even though the research 
participants differed in how closely they believe intergenerational ties should be knit, 
these ties appeared to be symbolically and psychologically laden with feelings of 
connection. Family feelings in this sense did not presuppose positive affection but 
entailed a stable feeling of belonging, of being part of a generational line.
‘Well, family is, sometimes you can argue with them or discuss or something, 
also fall out and say nothing to for years. But it is family. They are always still 
somewhere to be reached or ... whereas everything else is often final, right.’ (63) 
Woman 857, p. 62, country -» city, 4 sisters, divorced, cohabiting, 3 children
Yet, rarely were parents sought as confidants. It may be a historically specific feature of
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these particular generations that feelings, sympathies and sometimes criticism were 
reported as almost never directly expressed in face-to-face contacts, but more often 
mediated through others.
Resp: When we meet we talk only about banalities but everybody worries an awful lot
about the other. Well when there was the story about the divorce of my sister the 
telephone lines ran hot and- 
Dlm: How you can support her or?
Resp: Yes, yes and then we think and talk and give our opinions... But when we meet, 
it’s very rare that we really have personal conversations.(64)
Woman 546d, p. 39, city -» city, university, cohabiting, 1 child
‘[In our family] nobody harasses the other with his feelings I would sum it up... 
What I see [also] with my friends is that the sense of family grows with age and 
also the closeness to the parents grows. Never really was terminated. Well, I 
hardly know anybody who completely broke off with his parents... People still 
travel to see their parents and there is a close connection... and with it also come 
feelings of responsibility.’ (65)
Man 011, p. 60, city, university, married, 1 child
These accounts suggest that research participants were aware that feelings of generational 
belonging and responsibilities were created through contact and practice. Although not 
without conflict intergenerational ties overall were perceived as indissoluble. In contrast 
to the narratives of the older women, where emphasis was put on making and maintaining 
the family through kin work, intergenerational bonds in the younger generation neither 
necessarily entailed geographical proximity nor continuous contact, but were conceived 
of as latent yet reliable caring about rather than caring for relatives.
The creation of family feelings as well as differences and conflict will be further explored 
in the narratives that refer to dealing with and working through intergenerational legacies.
8.3. INTERGENERATIONAL LEGACIES
Contextuaiisation of generational belonging in the historical context
Whereas the research aimed at exploring material and immaterial transfers and perceived 
similarities and differences in the lifestyles of the two generations on an individual and 
family level, the research participants often placed generational differences in their
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historical context. In fact the characterisations of different historical generations was one 
template in and against which the characteristics of their parents, sometimes 
grandparents, and their own, were interpreted. Very schematically and across possible 
working/middle class divides, the research participants identified the parental generation 
as the ‘reconstruction generation’ [Aufbaugeneration] with a predominantly materialistic 
orientation and lifestyle. This generation was juxtaposed with what was occasionally 
termed the ‘break out generation’ [.Ausbruchgeneration] (Man 814) with a post- 
materialistic orientation.
In comparison with the break out generation, members of the reconstruction generation 
were regarded as having lacked ‘development opportunities’ (Man 851) and as having 
had to respond to necessities. Because of ‘fear of impoverishment’ and ‘security needs’ 
(Woman Oil) they were seen as work oriented and striving towards social advancement, 
property and savings. Practically, this ‘will to work’ (Man 124) was organised to fit a 
normative division of labour by gender within which women’s employment and men’s 
household contributions were sanctioned and, where they occurred, had to be hidden or 
denied. Families in this context were considered as ‘purpose’ or ‘compulsory’ 
communities’ (Woman Oil) and leisure and pleasure activities confined to a marginal 
place.
As an ideal type, the break out generation was defined in contradistinction to the 
reconstruction generation. Members of this generation were seen as having more 
opportunities and the means to question and change materialistic and gender specific 
lifestyles. Family roles and responsibilities were seen as in principle negotiable: ‘nothing 
is definitely fixed’ (Man 508) anymore. Emphasis had shifted from work to leisure, 
money was more readily spent than saved, property rented rather than bought.
In contrast to the accounts of their mothers some of the younger women, who grew up in 
close proximity to their grandmothers, related this non-materialistic orientation to the 
generation of their grandmothers. The grandmatemal dominance that their mothers had 
seen as determined by hardship and need was interpreted by some of the granddaughters 
as female independence. Some younger women constructed these intergenerational
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continuities even i f  they had never been employed for longer periods.
‘Those were the so-called ‘women of the rubble’... who in this generation really 
often led their own lives, simply because they had to. ... That was what I admired 
in her [grandmother] the most, her independence, this to manage your whole life 
really alone without being orientated towards someone... I think my mother never 
understood my grandmother. She never felt about it that way. She only simply 
always saw the work she did, and my mother as a child had to suffer a lot from 
this of course and work a lot. My mother really wanted to do better, well that we 
as children would have a secure existence, materially, limited to material things. 
That is I think the difference between my granny, my mother and myself. For my 
mother it was about material things, with my granny and myself it is perhaps 
more about ideal things.’ (66)
Woman 508, p. 40/42, country, no training, married, 2 children, 
not employed [grew up with grandmother]
These differences in interpretation highlight not only women’s different generational 
positionality but also underline how legacies, traditions and intergenerational continuities 
were sometimes constructed as integral parts of younger women’s identities. That is, 
perceived similarities were affirmative of certain desirable aspects of their identities and 
lifestyles and at the same time linked the research participants to other women 
(predecessors) and turned them into bearers and preservers of family traditions. At times 
the legacy of female (grand) maternal independence was described as if it was passed on 
by blood relationships.
Dim: Would you say that there is something like a family tradition, if you-
Resp: From the side of my father yes. Those were all women, my grandmother too, who
were dominant, who, also from what I’ve read, always led their own lives... And I 
think I take after this side rather than the side of my mother.(67)
w845, p. 28, country, skilled, married, 1 child, 
Ft employed [grew up with grandparents]
When describing aspects of the lives of their own parents and their own lives and dealing 
with family legacies and scripts in more detail, the schematic characterisation of 
historical generations appeared to be far less clear cut, was explicitly gendered and more 
contradictory. The legacy of mothers from the perspective of younger women sometimes 
was considered as ambivalent. The research participants did describe their mothers as 
work-orientated, ‘always busy’ (Woman 845), ‘slogging way like a horse’ (Woman 546d) 
and not having time for leisure activities, but they also saw them struggling with their 
family and other work commitments, their sense of obligation, standards of perfection
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and the articulation of a woman’s ‘right’ to enjoyment. More often than their fathers, 
mothers were characterised as ‘dominant’, but this dominance often coexisted with a 
subordinate position in their marital relationship. In accordance with the older women’s 
own accounts, the younger research participants considered their employment or attempts 
to re-enter the labour market as attempts to ‘break out’ and ‘have something for 
themselves’. In contrast women who had been homemakers for the most of their lives, 
were often considered to be ‘unhitched from life’ (Man 700d).
Evaluating the maternal model, younger women often admired their mothers’ energy and 
commitment ‘to get down to it’; they sometimes longed for a set order of things and at 
the same time unanimously rejected marital inequality. Moreover, intergenerational 
legacies included parental ‘counter-recommendations’, that is mothers sometimes 
advocated a different model of combining employment and family or gave advice on 
handling conjugal conflicts differently than they had. At the same time mothers were said 
to try to enforce certain life forms, such as the desirability and reliability of marriage 
even when they had had contradictory experiences themselves.
Working through, modifying and repeating family traditions
The research participants described often in detail how working through these intra- 
familial legacies was a hard and ongoing process. Men and women differentiated between 
paternal and maternal legacies and between modes of practice and modes of thinking. 
Practices included the imparting of particular skills such as cooking or mechanical know­
how as well as passing down property. Drawing on the popularised psychoanalytic notion 
of the unconscious, the research participants tried to distinguish between what they 
consciously ‘liked’ and ‘chose’ to live and pass on, and what was ‘drummed into them’, 
‘sunk in’, what they have ‘internalised’ and repeated, sometimes against conscious efforts 
to counter-act family traditions.
‘I now start to sort: what do I like and what not... My siblings say I take after my 
mother a lot. I notice that too in some things, if it’s only household, little things. 
Whereas from the thinking I tend more towards my father. A little bit more in a 
liberal direction that I think you first have to look at everything, not simply take 
over all traditions because that’s the way it was done. But this is hard because 
through your upbringing it is in you, you can’t simply shake it off. The wish is
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there and perhaps you succeed too. But always accompanied by this comparison. ’
Woman 516, p. 20, country, skilled, married, 
f/t employed, no children
Although ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ reproduction and modification of 
intergenerational legacies were not always separable as the paradoxical formulation ‘I 
like having to have to continue this’ (Woman 093) suggests, I will explore four modes of 
relating to intergenerational legacies: conscious ‘choice’ of parental life-style or 
personality aspects; conscious rejection or change; unconscious wishes to maintain 
legacies; and unconscious or ‘natural’ rejection and counter-structuring of family 
traditions.
To describe a family legacy as a ‘choice’ seems to be a contradiction in terms unless one 
takes into account the constructive efforts of the heirs highlighted above. Perhaps it is 
more accurate to talk about aspects of the parental lifestyle and/or personal approaches 
that the research participants positively affirmed, ‘took over’ (Woman 707), 
‘appropriated’ (Man 508) and sometimes wished to pass on to their children. These 
qualities included the (grand) maternal tradition of female independence, education and 
employment, certain family rituals, making timely provisions for old age, as well as 
openness, tolerance and reliability. Intergenerational legacies in this sense appeared as 
assets and resources for living/shaping their own lives.
‘And this I have from my mother, that it’s clear: a woman has her own money. 
And from my father I got: a woman has an education, or my girls get the same 
education as my son... and that is important to me. And what I also take on/with 
me is the reliability of my parents. Well for all you can hold against them, if 
something goes wrong with their friends as much as with their children then they 
are there and you can rely on them. And then they help no matter what they think 
about it.’ (69)
Woman Oil, p. 22, city -> city, university, married, 1 child,
p/t employed
Attempts to consciously modify or change intergenerational legacies are equally 
numerous and expressed in the proverbial exclamation: ‘I never wanted to become like 
my mother!’ They include the almost consensual rejection of a hierarchical or unequal 
marital relationship, continuous full-time motherhood as the ‘only-purpose in life’ (Man 
700a), the injunction ‘to put your whole life last’ (Woman 831), Catholic beliefs and
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practices and the rejection of an ingrained lack of emotionality, open conversations and 
bodily contact. Modifying and changing these legacies was described as hard work. Both 
men and women sometimes made the disturbing discovery that ‘in the attempt to define 
myself as different I imitate them much more than I want to’ (Man 851). Yet, perhaps 
because maternal legacies were conceived as encompassing both dominance and 
subordination and were bound up with traditional gender roles, women respondents 
described this process of counter-acting legacies at more length, more emotionally and 
often as more painful than men.
‘I rebelled from an early age at being a girl and moaned at the thought that I could 
have breasts. Yes, and I didn’t want to admit that I was gifted in languages and 
against my mother’s instigation chose the natural sciences in upper school and 
not languages... It was always my mother who affected me badly... Particularly 
because I’m very similar to her in some respects, and I often found myself with 
inner conflicts when I was fighting sides, which are similar to my mother, in 
myself, right.’ (70)
Woman 700a, p. 7/26, country, university, married, f/t employed, no children
In contrast the narratives of the interviewed men, who become aware of unintended 
‘unconscious’ continuities and similarities with their fathers’ lifestyles, were much less 
full of consternation. As the formulation ‘playing the role of my father’ in the following 
account suggests possible similarities appeared to be divorced from questions of personal 
identity and more attributed to habit and external circumstance.
‘I would say that I’ve tried hard where it was possible, not to be an absent father... 
but I find that I rather tend to repeat the role of my father, whereas P. [partner] 
evens out more and she licks me into shape for example she says, you have to 
take the children more seriously, you can’t always play the authoritarian. Well 
there I have to say for myself that I have to watch myself that I don’t continue to 
play the role of my father.’ (71)
Man 054, p. 33, city, university, cohabit, f/t employed, 1 child
Interestingly, even where men had transformed family roles and legacies quite 
substantially in comparison to their fathers, by, for example, integrating periods of part- 
time child raising, male respondents did not necessarily define these changes in conscious 
contradistinction to their parents. Rather changes were considered to have happened 
‘naturally’ in changing historical circumstances.
‘Well, it wasn’t any conscious resolution, I want it differently from my parents, 
not like that. It was simply -  well I never had the feeling that I needed this
238
boundary-drawing, but it was logical for me. Well, I don’t have the feeling that 
I’m a particularly emancipated man because I do it like this [taking on childcare] 
because I find this natural and I don’t need a man’s group and P. [partner] doesn’t 
need a women’s group to somehow deal with it. It’s simply like that. ... I had a 
fixed world view that I followed for me but I didn’t see it in contrast to the life of 
my parents.’ (72)
Man 814a, p. 45, city, university, married, 1 child, f/t employed
As I have shown at the beginning of this section research participants often located inter­
generational change in its historical context. Many research participants referred to 
impacts of the state subsidised and politicised educational system in the 1970s, which had 
opened up new possibilities both with respect to working class children getting access to 
higher education and with respect to new models of lifestyle. Yet this ‘break from the 
outside’ (Woman 821) was not merely seen as providing resources to counteract and 
modify family legacies but at times as generating novel pressures and challenges that 
required a break with family traditions and produced new generational dilemmas. 
Enabling and discomforting aspects of intergenerational change are highlighted in the 
following two contrasting accounts of a woman who combined childcare responsibilities 
with part-time employment and a single woman who wished and feared to have children 
because they would put her job at risk.
Resp: My parents were strongly Catholic... and in this sense we were of course raised a 
bit strictly, whether it was relationships with boyfriends or no, we didn’t have 
open conversations at home... my daughter can ask questions [about 
menstruation, sexuality], she was willing to talk to me about it.
Dim: So the changes occurred in your generation although you were brought up that
way?
Resp: No, my parents have changed not me. I mean my parents brought us up in that 
way, but it wasn’t -  we wanted to talk about it, only we couldn’t. We were 
relatively free, even though our parents brought us up very strictly, but through 
the surroundings, the social area/climate where we grew up, friends and so on, 
school, it was relatively liberal. And there was also this radical change at the end 
of the 60s and that was basically the big outbreak where you liberated yourself 
from all constraints and so on. That everybody could express his views and that- 
that was really hard for my parents.(73)
Woman 546b, p. 54, city, skilled, married, 2 children, p/t employed
‘I didn’t want to live like my mother, on no account. That I knew from when I 
was little. I never wanted to be always at home, like she had shown it to me... 
Well at school in the 70s you should, wanted, had to break out. You were almost 
frowned upon if you didn’t. And I went along with it. But it is completely tom, I 
think this is also a dilemma of our generation that our parents and grandparents
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passed on quite traditional things, which we have somehow in us and wish for, 
but at the same time there is this break from outside. I think particularly as a 
woman you are completely -  at sea somehow. Because well yes, always this 
decision, occupation or mother. ... Those fine inner structures [of her mother], 
they are exactly like mine. I’m often shocked that it repeats itself so much.’ (74) 
Woman 821, pp. 11/18/31, city, university, single, f/t employed
This last account highlights perceived intergenerational similarities despite fundamental 
differences in lifestyle between this single and full-time employed participant and her 
married mother who had three children and was a housewife for most of her adult life. 
Moreover, it suggests that social and familial changes were not always perceived as 
complementary or mutually reinforcing. Even though the subject of intergenerational life 
course comparison was part of the topic guide and often introduced by the interviewer, 
dealing with and working through intergenerational legacies appeared to have been an 
issue for most research participants, particularly for women. Older women’s kin work 
commitments however, were not a point of reference with respect to a possible 
reproduction or transformation by the younger generation. This topic is therefore further 
explored in the following section, which deals with the parental care anticipations of the 
younger generation.
8.4. THE ANTICIPATION OF PARENTAL CARE:
‘WHY SHOULD THIS AGAIN BE UP TO WOMEN OF ALL PEOPLE?’
As elaborated in Appendix A one of the sampling criteria for the younger generation was 
the aim to include equal numbers of women and men whose mothers did and did not 
provide regular support for an older relative. I had expected that previous experiences of 
familial care giving would have a decisive impact on the models of dealing with parental 
care needs anticipated by the research participants. My assumption was that those who 
had previously experienced through their mothers the demanding nature of co-residential 
care would be less inclined to commit themselves, and that feelings of obligation 
therefore would be weakened for both men and women across socio-economic 
differences. The problem in determining intra-familial caring traditions had been that due 
to the absence of questions concerning kin work in the standardised questionnaires of the 
older women I only knew the family histories of those 30 adult children whose mothers
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had been interviewed. Aiming to include particularly these children, the interviews with 
members of the younger generation showed that I had finally included 28 research 
participants with and 21 without maternal care-giving experiences.
As with the perception of other household arrangements the accounts of siblings of 
different gender did not differ systematically in the recollection of familial care-giving 
arrangements for older relatives. Both men and women were aware of a multitude of 
arrangements. They included the ‘sharing’ of parental care-giving responsibilities 
between siblings and their spouses, arrangements involving a transfer of property and 
money payments, co-residential and residential care as well as an understanding of the 
strains that these arrangements often entailed particularly for their mothers. The 
narratives suggest that the research participants were also aware of a scripted hierarchy of 
care-giving responsibilities (Chapter 7.3.). But because periods of care-giving and their 
own presence at home had not always overlapped and their own contributions had been 
minor many of these ‘experiences’ were often merely based on their mothers’/parents’ 
accounts.
But detailed reports were passed to adult children also by siblings, friends and colleagues 
who had provided part- or full-time care for their parents (-in-law). Moreover, two 
women in the sample had first-hand experiences in providing co-residential care for an 
older relative. In an uncanny way these women continued the kinscripts of their mothers, 
releasing their brothers and/or husbands and substituting for female relatives and 
adequate social service provision. On the other hand the husband of the following 
research participant was said to have played a major role in providing hands-on care for 
his grandfather-in-law, support that as in the case of daughters-in-law was based on his 
marital relationship rather than a shared personal history with his grandfather-in-law.
Resp: My mother had a very negative attitude to her parents-in-law, very negative. And 
it was after my father died my grandfather lived with my grandmother at my 
mother’s, right? ... And there was always rage and quarrels, there was no point in 
it. And then the grandfather stayed with me.
Dim: Was it discussed that your grandfather could also stay with your brother or was it 
clear that when your mother dropped out, so to say, that you would take it over as 
a granddaughter?
Resp: I think, nobody thought about that {laughs}, it simply was like that. I know I can
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remember very well, once my husband really went on strike and said ‘you know, 
your brother can just as well do it sometimes.’ And he came that same evening. 
And then he said ‘K. now you come with me and then we get granddad out of 
bed! ’ Well my brother went with him and all of a sudden somebody came down 
the stairs. I thought he -  as if someone was after him. And then he jumped under 
the shower in full gear.
Dim: In full gear? {laughs}
Resp: In full gear. The urine bottle had fallen over and over his shoes. ... I will never 
forget this, right. That was an example, right. And from that moment my husband 
has never asked him again. It simply was like that. He can’t do it and there is no 
point in i t .(75)
Woman 845, p 38/39, country, 1 brother, f/t employed, 1 child
[maternal caring tradition]
(Not) Approaching the issue of parental care
Independently, however, of their familial experiences, their gender or occupational status, 
the research participants were very reluctant to reflect on the issue of potential care needs 
for their parents. This does not mean that they were merely threatened by the frailty and 
eventual death of their parent(s) or had not thought this issue through. On the contrary the 
narratives confirm that the anticipation of parental care needs had become a normative 
event (Comway-Tumer and Karasik 1993) and suggest that the respondents were worried 
about the extent of help that they might be called on to provide. Their concern appeared 
to focus simultaneously on two extremes: to put them in an ‘Anstalf (institution), a word 
that connotes confinement and constraint, or to provide care themselves in their own 
home, thereby ‘sacrificing [their] personal freedom’ (Woman 700a). In the light of these 
options, which often entail what Cicirelli (1988) has termed ‘filial anxiety’ participants 
not rarely drew on the popularised psychoanalytic notion of repression, suggesting that 
they rather ‘forget’ about this hypothetical event.
‘Yes, of course I thought about it. And either I’ve repressed it or I’ve come to the 
conclusion that there is no - no satisfactory solution. Well, what I actually 
wouldn’t like to do would be to move back home, because my parents needed 
care. Because that would mean a change of job, that would mean changing your 
whole life context.’ (76)
Man 508, country -» city, 1 sister, university, cohabiting, f/t employed,
no children [maternal caring tradition]
Some research participants proceeded to argue that because of the hypothetical and 
unpredictable nature of this event there was no need to think about or plan concrete care 
arrangements until infirmity actually occurred. Six men appeared to deploy this argument
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as a strategy to avoid specifying the scope and limits of their own possible commitments. 
Yet both the (initial) rejection to anticipate specific options and the articulation of a 
dilemma suggests a sense of filial responsibility and a pressure to act on the part of the 
younger generation. Indeed feelings of gratitude and obligations to repay their parents 
were articulated by a number of men and women both with and without familial caring 
traditions, seemingly confirming the view that norms of filial responsibility constitute a 
cultural source to justify plans and anticipated behaviour (Sorensen and Zarit 1996; 
Comway-Tumer and Karasik op.cit.). Members of the younger generation thereby 
deployed the language of the generational or procreative contract (Laslett 1992). By 
contrast, the older women, even though they largely provided kin work for older 
relatives, had not used any of those terms and modes of justification. On the other hand 
adult children often qualified and questioned, not simply stated reciprocity, and the 
expectation of gratitude was sometimes identified as pressure.
‘The first thing that of course is always expected is gratitude, right. If there is a 
reason for it. If you were always on very bad terms with your parents, then 
nobody will ask for it. But if you have had a good relationships, the parents 
perhaps not explicitly but also all the relatives who sit around and observe it will 
somehow expect that you look after them and repay what you received from the 
parents in affection and investments. I do believe that there is somehow this 
pressure behind it.’ (77)
Woman 811, p. 54, city country, 1 sister, skilled, married, not employed,
2 children [maternal caring tradition]
‘I also have the feeling, I owe my parents a lot, because they have supported me 
for a long time, because they made it possible that I had a good life for a long 
time, still always support me.’ (78)
Man 011, p. 67, city, 1 sister, university, married, f t  employed,
1 child [parental caring tradition]
‘It’s always a question of mutuality. It depends, as I said I’ve somehow 
experienced my parents mostly as tolerant, caring and devoted and would be 
willing to repay them, even if I know that they will be that old.’ (79)
Woman 710c, p. 47, city -> city, 2 brothers, skilled, single, f/t employed,
no children [no caring tradition]
Despite these apparent qualifications of reciprocity parents were not always characterised 
as having been ‘caring and devoted’. The last research participant (Woman 710c), for 
example, had talked at length about the conflicts that she had with her mother. She also 
had to give up her study of law because her father had withdrawn his financial support to
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force her to separate from her boyfriend of whom he did not approve. Furthermore, the 
reference to the cultural script of reciprocity did not necessarily indicate that reciprocal 
support was considered as a social norm, nor indeed did it necessarily entail anticipated 
commitments of personal care-giving.
When asked about social norms or the ‘normal’ way of dealing with parental care needs 
in their generation, some research participants saw a trend towards accommodating older 
people in elder care homes. This trend was contextualised in terms of a broader 
development towards a ‘society of singles’ (Man 124), with rising levels of independence 
and ‘egoistic concerns’ but also structural constraints such as geographical distance, 
small flats and family responsibilities for one’s own children. A minority of research 
participants saw the opposite trend. In the context of long-term care insurance and 
domiciliary services, more older people were being cared for at home. These opposing 
views fit together with the fact that the majority of men and women did not perceive any 
fixed norm or guideline on how to deal with parental care needs. But although as one 
respondent put it ‘you have to decide for yourself what you do and there are many 
different possibilities’ (Man 022), family bonds and moral concerns for filial 
responsibilities, as voiced above, were not absent. Women in particular anticipated 
feelings of guilt should they not be willing or able to provide for their parents, evidence 
of the morally charged relationship.
The assumption of unarticulated parental expectations
Despite a vocabulary of responsibility and repayment (of what is called the generational 
contract) and although the research participants often knew from previous family 
experiences that the unpredictability of a decline in health required communication and 
timely planning, potential care needs of older parents were for the most part not openly 
discussed in families. The fact that some of the adult children feared offending their 
parents when expressing their anticipated commitment and by implication its possible 
limits confirmed the tacit character of ‘family feelings’ as ‘caring at a distance’. Talking 
about care needs demanded a definition of boundaries between caring about and caring 
for older relatives that was assumed to be potentially hurtful.
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‘I didn’t dare to ask whether they have registered somewhere. Years ago my 
father talked about a senior citizens’ house... I don’t dare asking because I’m 
anxious that if you make suggestions they think you don’t want to look after 
them. I’ll go there at Christmas, perhaps I’ll raise it then. Because my sister has 
asked me, to talk to them because she doesn’t dare to either. Because they have a 
house and when the children move out they even would have the space. Well she 
is the one who is concerned there, and is a bit anxious... And of course when they 
raise it, it’s something different from when I raise it. Because I’m so far away, I 
wouldn’t be available for long-term care... But I think this is a subject that you 
simply must talk about with your parents in time.’ (80)
Woman 546d, p. 43/44, city —> city, 4 sisters, university, cohabiting,
f/t employed, 1 child [no caring tradition]
In accordance with the accounts of the older women, the research participants stated that 
their parents had not raised expectations of familial support and often said that they did 
not want to burden their children, but would rather move to an elder care home. From the 
perspective of adult children this does not rule out unarticulated wishes and hopes of 
familial support, and sometimes was even interpreted as a ‘threat’ to incite filial 
assurances to the contrary. Other research participants insinuated that their parents 
deployed the same strategy of ‘repression’, of a conscious not wanting to know, as they 
did. ‘That is repressed too. But they know that they repress it to a certain degree’ 
(Woman 811). Only three parents were reported to have actually put their name on a 
waiting list for an elder care home. Against this background of non-articulation and/or 
unspoken mutual assumptions, the expectation of one male respondent that an open 
rational negotiation of a caring ‘contract’ (Man 834) would take place, when care needs 
actually occurred, seemed unlikely.
‘She [widowed mother] always says, ‘well, then I go into an elder care home!’ 
Although I know exactly that she doesn’t want to go there at all. And we [he and 
his wife] always say when it’s due to be dealt with we will have to see together, 
then you come to us, no problem. ‘No, no I don’t go to X!’... You have to 
negotiate it when it occurs... then we will both state our conditions, well mother 
hers and we ours and then we see how we can bring them together.’ (81)
Man 834, p. 30/31, country -» city, no siblings, university,
married, f/t employed, 1 child [maternal caring tradition]
In the context of assumed antagonistic expectations, communication about parental care 
needs was also often said to be avoided among siblings. However, the absence of 
communication and planning tended to have different effects on brothers and sisters. 
Whereas brothers, as long as their sister had not explicitly stated anything to the contrary,
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were often implicitly or explicitly expecting that a sister would ‘stand in’, pressure 
increased on the part of those who felt that they might be the first line of resort. As in 
dealing with intergenerational legacies, women appeared to be more emotionally 
pressured than men when addressing their responsibilities, whose inescapability was 
sometimes expressed as physical pain. Yet none of the women interviewed openly 
reproached their brothers.
Resp: Three years ago we had the case that my grandfather needed nursing... And that 
was basically a horrible time, which also had to do with the fact that in this family 
many things have gone wrong for thirty years. Which means things, important 
things weren’t talked about, which was simply catastrophic in this situation. But I 
think, if there is more communication from the beginning it doesn’t have to get 
that bad. But the subject actually gives me stomach aches because I have the 
feeling that I’m stuck with it because my brother, I’d simply say, has a 
troubled/disturbed relationship to it...
Int: So you probably haven’t talked about this with your brother?
Resp: Yes, sure, I have, urn attempted, or let’s say, I let him know my worries or that I 
thought about it in this context. And well what I learned from the situation with 
my granddad is that you can never plan it anyway.(82)
Woman 707a, p. 56/57, city, 1 brother, university, cohabiting,
f/t employed, 0 child [caring tradition]
This de facto gendered sense of responsibility stands in stark contrast to the notion of a 
generational contract where ‘ all family members should -  whether it is a woman or a man 
-  all have the responsibility, because they are the parents of all and were there for the 
children’ (Woman 516). Despite the unforseeability of care needs and resources available 
and the lack of family communication, the majority of research participants had more or 
less tentatively developed and sometimes ‘privately’ discussed with their partners a 
number of different models of how to deal with parental care needs. Past familial caring 
experience thereby could be a script to continue or modify. Yet, although siblings have 
detailed and congruent memories of these experiences, the models that they develop on 
this basis could differ fundamentally according to gender and employment status.
Models of parental care and their justifications
In the sample of younger Germans at least five alternative, sometimes sequential, models 
of care emerged that often build on family caring experiences. Whereas in the ‘sister 
model’ a sister was expected to take over primary (usually co-residential) care-giving
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responsibility, in the ‘commuter model ’ parents were expected to stay with or being 
looked after by different siblings in turn. In the ‘co-residential care modeV on the 
contrary the participants themselves expected to provide day-to-day care in a shared 
household. In the 1 domiciliary care modeV social services and/or adult children were 
assumed to provide practical and emotional care in the parents’ home. Lastly, in the 
‘residential care model’ parents were expected to move into a nursing home and research 
participants anticipated to give complementary emotional support.
The ‘sister modeV and the ‘commuter model’
The sister model could, but did not have to, be evidence of the reliance on gendered care- 
giving responsibilities outlined above. Factors that made adult children consider their 
sister as a primary carer were not so much personal but structural, in particular the sister’s 
residential proximity and/or the fact that the mother/parents looked after the sister’s 
children. In one case a woman defined such an exchange of childcare and shared living 
from which future care will ‘naturally’ evolve explicitly as a ‘generational contract’ 
(Woman 857). In contrast to this perception of contract as lived practice the only other 
man in the sample who used the term contract referred to the anticipated rational 
negotiation of the terms of a caring arrangement (Man 834). In some of the men’s 
accounts, the emphasis on structural and personal factors of their sister’s 
‘appropriateness’ as a carer obfuscated the gendered nature of care-giving 
responsibilities. Both as brothers and husbands men had interests in enforcing or relying 
on the sister model.
Resp: The ideal case naturally would be that my parents move to X. (laughs) That they 
buy a house there 
Int: To your sister or what?
Resp: Yes... With the caring it will most likely amount to my sister doing it. That 
doesn’t mean that I somehow exclude myself, but merely because - . . .  my sister 
is there much more often and also has the best relationship with my mother. But I 
think that um in any case I will care about it too.
Int: What would be, let’s say, the maximum of what you can imagine?
Resp: I really can’t imagine anything... Well, to take the mother into the house, I could 
imagine that my wife would grumble there too. She also has a mother... she is the 
only daughter...
Int: It sounds a bit like, um well, your sister has rather a contribution there and now
you say your wife is the only daughter. Do you think that women are a bit 
responsible there?
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Resp: You know, but I think you also have to look at with whom the mother has the 
relationship. If the phone rings here every day it’s (her) mother... For this reason 
it probably also will be that the two brothers would say: You live there, then you 
can also look after your mother a bit more. It’s mostly like that. Well, that’s what 
you hear. It’s most likely still the thinking. And I have to say too that my sister 
would basically be the most sensible because she has the best relationship with 
my mother.(83)
Man 816, p. 35/37, city -» city, 1 sister, university, married, 
f/t employed, no children [no caring tradition]
Whereas the mother of the last participant had accommodated her mother in a home, an 
intra-familial legacy that seemed to have little bearing on his care anticipations, the 
maternal grandparents of the following research participant had stayed with different 
children in turn because the co-resident son had refused to support his parents on his own. 
But whereas the family tradition emphasised an equal sharing of responsibility, the 
research participant modified the ‘commuter model’ in that she assigned primary 
responsibility to her sister who in her view benefited the most with respect to grand- 
parental childcare. Anticipating the consequences of this arrangement on the side of her 
parents, however, she continued to refer to the experience of her mother-in-law who had 
relied on domiciliary care. Fusing the two models she anticipated an arrangement in 
which the children would commute to their parents to provide care in turn.
Resp: Well my husband he is of the opinion - 1 mean I have to give my opinion - but he 
says - I can’t do it, I’m a very emotional person, I would drop everything, if 
something were to happen. But my husband, he says ‘your parents have never 
done anything for us. They always went to A [sister], so they can take care of it’, 
right? Because my mother - when my sister needed somebody for her daughter, 
my mother was always there...
Dim: So you’re saying that concerning the need for care you wouldn’t feel responsible 
in the first place?
Resp: I would feel responsible, they are my parents after all. Well I would take the 
responsibility. Only if I consider the - how should I say - the situation, as a matter 
of principle, right, then I’d say ... ‘A, you had the greatest benefit, you take the 
greatest responsibility! ’... I think it could work like it did with my grandparents... 
it depends on the situation whether you can do it, whether you could really say: 
yes, we take them for a couple of weeks but mainly they stay with you, right... 
[or] that you can arrange it and go over there [like her mother-in-law did], that 
you take it in turns ... with the caring, then I think you can somehow arrange it at 
home. Because it is like this that you always feel most comfortable at home.(84)
Woman 546b, p. 12/13, 4 sisters, skilled, married, p/t employed,
2 children [no caring tradition]
These examples illustrate that, in contrast to male participants, women, independently of
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their marital and occupational status, sometimes developed several models and changed 
perspectives to accommodate both their own and their parents’ needs.
The ‘co-residential care m odel*
Accommodating one’s parents or moving back to live with them and giving up paid work 
to provide personal care in the sample of adult children was only anticipated by women. 
Co-residential care was seen as a means of avoiding residential care and sometimes 
continued a family tradition. None of the women who expressed this option had a 
university degree and it was expressed mainly by the housewives in the sample. In all 
cases the anticipation of home care was based on a strong sense of gendered family 
responsibility, but not necessarily on personal closeness. The plan to provide personal 
care varied, however, in the degree of perceived constraint: whereas some women saw 
providing co-residential care as a last resort only, others seemed more willing to give up 
their jobs and care for their parents at home. In the case of the following research 
participant, who was divorced and employed full-time the viability of this option was 
doubtful. Although she felt she had not received parental support during her divorce and 
referred to the problematic co-residential care arrangement between her mother and 
paternal grandmother, she anticipated this model of care against her mother’s explicit 
advice, which again illustrates both the complexity of family legacies and a distrust in 
parents’ stated expectations.
‘If it gets really serious, well, I would sacrifice my job .... The problem only starts 
if somebody is really in need of care, either bedridden or with other afflictions... 
And my mother has said now, because she experiences it live every day, she said: 
“Goodness me, if this happens to me, don’t worry, just put me in a home”. She 
says “you ruin your life, really, the strain is immense, don’t do that to yourself’. 
That’s what she says now, right? It’s a different thing whether you say it in such a 
situation when it concerns you yourself. And you always imagine, or I imagine 
that if it happened to my mother I could somehow cope with it. I think maybe you 
have a different relationship to your own mother than to your mother-in-law ... 
Well, I’d try it and if there is no other way, well you have to consider putting 
them in a nursing home.’ (85)
Woman 809, p. 52/53,1 brother, skilled, cohabiting, 
f/t employed, 1 child [caring tradition]
The ‘domiciliary care modeV and the iresidential care model*
Domiciliary service provision, such as meals on wheels or the assistance by a community
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nurse, and the accommodation of one’s parents in an elder care home were sometimes 
seen as sequential models and viable alternatives for those who stated that they would 
decline to provide full-time personal care in the future. Interestingly, more women than 
men in the sample anticipated residential care. A substantial minority of men, however, 
did not articulate any caring model at all. The anticipation of institutional care provision 
could be based on previous problematic family care-giving experiences, as well as on 
family traditions of residential care of older relatives and an unwillingness to give up 
one’s life plans.
Resp: We have regular contact, yes, and if it came to a caring situation I wouldn’t take 
her here, we already talked about that.
Int: With your mother?
Resp: Um. She had her mother in a nursing home too...
Int: Do you have a guilty conscience saying: I put my mother in a home. I really
should care for her at home?
Resp: No. I’d rather find it difficult if -  or with the fact that I stayed here in Bremen and 
continue to have contact with her, I’m always in touch if there are any problems 
or things that she can’t deal with, then she calls me and we do it. So that, in 
principle, considering my opportunities, kids and school, I’m always there for her
if there is something. In this way I practically cover my responsibility constantly.
(86)
Man 805, p. 41/42, city, 2 sisters, university, married,
2 children, f/t employed [no caring tradition]
This example illustrates the finding, reported already in dealing with intergenerational 
legacies, that men appeared to be less entangled in intergenerational relationships and 
were able to interpret regular practical kin work as fulfilling their filial duties. Whereas 
the wish to keep their (family) lives separate was a legitimate reason for men to anticipate 
domiciliary and residential care provision, women were concerned about their ability to 
continue their work lives, which is a domain seldom questioned by men. Overall women 
appeared to be more pressured by assumed family expectations. They were more likely to 
explain that they ‘were not ungrateful’ (Woman 811) and even when they thought that 
residential care was the right option, anticipated that they ‘would reproach [themselves] 
or feel guilty’ (Woman 821).
‘I probably would not take my parents. I thought about this very specifically, 
because my sister had a case, she had to take her mother-in-law into the house, 
seriously disabled, and that ruined the marriage.... Being in need of care means 
more than cooking, it means that they ring the bell at night, and you have to get 
up and things like that, right?... I would see that they get into a good home. That
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might sound hard but they have it better there. And I would do everything to keep 
them in their familiar environment as long as possible with these community 
workers ... because as soon as they loose the security within their own four walls, 
they go into a rapid decline ... But in a decent nursing home, they have speech 
therapists, they have carers who can give time and attention to the old people, 
right? I think you can’t do it that way ... Basically the person sits in front of the 
telly all day. It’s so isolated, it’s a (prison) cell, a family cell although it is not 
depicted like that.’ (87)
Woman 546c, city, 4 sisters, skilled, married, p/t employed,
3 children [no caring tradition]
The statements, that older people go into a rapid decline when they have to leave their 
homes and deteriorate when they are cared for within the family, demonstrates once again 
their view of the impossibility of a satisfactory solution to parental care. Anticipating 
service provision for her parents the woman had to depict institutional services in a 
positive light whilst at the same time excluding positive effects of a familiar 
environment. Yet, social service provision was not anticipated out of disinterest or 
indifference but also, for the most part, also out of positive concern for the well being of 
the parent. The long-term care insurance, introduced around the time when the interviews 
with the younger generation were conducted had no effect on prospects and anticipated 
commitments.
Younger Germans thus anticipated a range of models and drew on multiple, often 
conflicting, intra-familial caring experiences. These largely gendered family experiences 
offered the chance to identify with both carers and care receivers and thus did not provide 
one ‘right’ way of dealing with potential parental care needs but constituted a legacy to 
modify and transform. In contrast to the generation of older women, younger respondents 
deployed a vocabulary of reciprocity and repayment. But open negotiation of prospective 
arrangements with siblings and parents remained largely absent, and a gendered (and 
classed) hierarchy of primary caring responsibilities surfaced in care-giving anticipations. 
In comparison with the older generation, the younger research participants thus both 
reproduced and transformed gendered responsibilities: compared to their fathers 
(Erzberger 1993), younger men prospectively took on more family responsibilities. Yet, 
as an expansion of their traditional role this was considered as a voluntary act that must 
not jeopardise their own life plans. Women on the other hand felt more pressured to 
uphold traditional care-giving obligations. Whereas some women with lower educational
251
status intended to care for their parents at home, others struggled for a more equal 
distribution of care giving tasks among siblings and brothers- and sisters-in-law. More 
often than men, they considered social service provision. Welfare provision though not 
explicitly services provided under the care insurance thus contributed to an expansion of 
perceived life choices, particularly for those women who were employed. Women’s 
anticipations were overall more complex and often included multiple changes of 
perspectives in the quest for a ‘fair’ solution for both parents and adult children.
Given that both men and women had a detailed implicit and explicit knowledge and 
understanding of the gendered nature of parental care giving I would finally like to draw 
attention to the question of how this knowledge was reflected in the discussion of gender 
equality that usually followed the topic of care anticipations in the topic guide.
8.5. CONTEMPLATING GENDER EQUALITY:
‘MY IDEALS HAVE BEEN RATHER SCATTERED IN THE LAST YEARS, I
HAVE TO SAY’
The intergenerational increase in opportunities for women previously mentioned was 
seriously compromised when it came to evaluating gender equality. Overall the research 
participants’ views on this issue were surprisingly consensual: the participants agreed that 
there was more equality between the genders in their own generation than in that of their 
parents. But they almost unanimously found that women were still discriminated against 
and were highly sceptical that this inequality would be ever erased. On the contrary, 
progress towards more equality that was conceived of as initiated predominantly by 
women, was seen as moving forward only ‘inch by inch’ and sometimes was seen as 
reversing.
The first point of reference to inequality for both men and women was usually first-hand 
experiences of women’s discrimination in the work place. Labour market inequality, with 
its repercussions on income and pensions, was thought to be caused not by gendered 
differences in qualification or ability but in a personal and structural discrimination 
against actual or potential motherhood. The research participants agreed that structurally
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paid work was not made for people with childcare responsibilities. From an employers’ 
perspective the price of temporarily losing work force due to motherhood appeared 
uneconomical and ‘the gentlemen in power’ (Woman 034) who could implement 
measures to promote gender equality were seen as too much divorced from family life 
and responsibilities to do so.
At the same time the respondents agreed ‘that women have somewhat enlarged their 
circle but I don’t think that this reduces the chances of men’ (Man 093). Put differently, 
women’s increasing labour market participation had not been paralleled by men’s 
participation in family work or indeed by a public debate on a reduction in men’s 
working hours. Both men and women critically stated that although some men might 
have an increased interest in spending time with their children, their commitments in 
childcare and housework were often enforced by their female partners and fundamentally 
lacked the scope and the ‘self-evidence’ that family work had for women.
The majority of women had little trust in men’s voluntary commitment to change. 
Therefore solutions were sometimes envisioned on a structural level. Crucial for many 
women, apart from more flexible work hours and better childcare facilities, was a 
redistribution of work hours, which the most radical research participants held had to be 
enforced rather than merely offered.
‘I would see it as big progress if you if there weren’t any 8-hour jobs anymore, 
but six hours at the most... It shouldn’t be that a man has the possibility to work 
six hours but he is not allowed to work more than six, right. He isn’t allowed to 
earn anymore either.’ (88)
Woman 857, p. 57, country —» city, skilled, divorced, cohabiting, 
3 children, housewife [maternal caring tradition]
Affirmative action on the other hand was regarded sceptically insofar as it impinged on 
‘fair’ competition between the genders not only by some of the male respondents but also 
by some of those women who identified gender inequality as institutionalised, 
inescapable and unchangeable.
Resp: I think we women will always have it more difficult. Because we automatically 
have and will always have a dual and triple burden, that’s not going to change. 
Dim: This is your prognosis?
Resp: Yes, as simple as this. And I think it is a huge mistake if you introduce quotas
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that well, women are to be preferred.
Dim: I didn’t think about that but yes
Resp: It is a risk for every employer today through our legislation to employ women. I 
wouldn’t want to be an employer either who has to work with women.
Dim: Because of maternity leave or?
Resp: Maternity leave yes...
Dim: And who benefits then from or does anybody benefit from this debate on equal 
opportunities between men and women?
Resp: No, I think, those women who really want to have a career will never get 
themselves a family, they will always have their career... although they have it 
more difficult than men... We always have to prove, women have to be twice as 
good as men... there the equality legislation is good, because simply if payment is 
equal. What I don’t like is the quota legislation. I don’t want to be a quota 
woman. Simply either I manage it through my own energy, with my own 
conviction and not because I’m lucky that the quota says you have to take a 
woman, right.(89)
Woman 845, p. 40-41, country, skilled, married, f/t employed, 
1 child [maternal caring tradition and elder care experience]
Interestingly, despite their complex analysis of structural gender equality both women 
quoted above suggested that ‘if I as a woman want to have the same chances as a man, I 
have to decide against [having] children’ (Woman 857). This imagined escape from 
inequality through the renouncing of having children did not only contradict their own 
analysis of structural discrimination but also highlights to what extent the debate on equal 
opportunities focuses on childcare responsibilities, ignoring the fact that all children have 
parents who might need assistance at some point in their lives. The answer to the 
question of how gendered intergenerational responsibilities were reflected in the research 
participants’ views on gender equality is thus simple: even if they had been discussed 
minutes before, intergenerational responsibilities were without exception completely 
divorced from the evaluation of gender equality -  by both the interviewer and the 
research participants.
8.6. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis of intergenerational relationships from the perspective of a group 
of German young adults suggests that contrary to fears of a withering of family solidarity, 
the cohesion between generations remains strong. Even where family relationships were 
described as problematic and ambivalent, those adult children who participated in the
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study never completely broke off contact with their parents but worked through and often 
attempted to modify family legacies. Kin work practices, particularly grand-maternal 
childcare, remained a vital safety net and source of actual and potential support 
contradicting the thesis of a ‘de-traditionalisation’ (Kaufinann 1993) of intergenerational 
relationships. At the same time the analysis suggests that intergenerational relationships 
had changed towards more reflexivity. In the (preliminary) absence of contracts of need 
both men and women consciously aimed at creating family feeling through interaction 
between members of different generations. Family sentiments were described in terms of 
a latent connection of belonging that was vital for the construction of identities and 
family histories. It was not necessarily equalled with positive affection but with a caring 
about family members.
The research participants’ generational belonging and that of their parents was 
contextualised in the dominant frames of two historical generations, the ‘break out’ and 
‘reconstruction generation’ respectively. Connections and differences were constructed 
by drawing on these dominant frames -  discourses about the so-called welfare generation 
and resource competition were completely absent. On a level of personal and generational 
identity grandmatemal independence was one symbolical intra-familial legacy that 
women sometimes described quite literally as a hereditary disposition and resource of 
lifestyle. Maternal and paternal legacies of a strong work ethic and traditional gender 
roles were considered as more ambivalent and often as a charge that the research 
participants had to work consciously through and yet at times involuntarily reproduced.
Anticipating parental care the research participants produced a variety of possible care 
models, which reflected different needs and experiences, but also were marked by 
impacts of gender and socio-economic status. Cultural script, intra-familial traditions and 
social institutions provided resources and constituted a framework within which adult 
children sought to reconstitute the generational contract. Although not articulated as 
social norms, seemingly ungendered cultural norms of filial responsibility that were 
described by drawing on notions of reciprocity and back payments often corresponded to 
an intra-familial tradition of largely female responsibility for the care of older relatives. 
Moreover, the widespread practice of not (being able to) articulating preferences,
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expectations and the boundaries of a care-giving involvement appeared thus far to remain 
unchanged over two family generations.
The gendered legacy of tacit caring responsibilities was thus both reproduced and 
transformed. The development of domiciliary services and elder care homes constituted 
an expansion of opportunity structures for anticipating potential care arrangements. For 
the majority of both German men and women, service provision in its various forms was 
an important input to their anticipated care models. Albeit ambivalently, institutional 
support was thought of also as being in the interest of the parents, and included the 
anticipation of complementary practical and emotional support from the research 
participants. However, the persistence of women’s caring responsibilities is indicated not 
only by the substantial minority of German women with lower educational levels who, 
sometimes against their parents advice, envisaged providing personal care, but also by the 
intention of brothers and husbands to rely on their sisters’ and wives care-giving.
In the group of young adults interviewed, personal relationships with their parents and 
emotional closeness were far less important in the anticipation processes than cultural, 
and particularly socio-structural, resources. In the absence of more encompassing service 
provision that considers social and emotional needs generational policies such as the 
long-term care insurance, are likely to strengthen rather than challenging gendered 
intergenerational commitments. The findings presented here suggest that women, 
although they are the majority of those who explicitly promoted social service provision, 
will continue to be responsible for the organisation of personal and intergenerational care 
in the German welfare state. Given the exclusion of kin work and its insufficient resource 
allocation from private and public debates on gender equality this form of welfare 
production is likely to remain invisible.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has enquired both theoretically and empirically into the history of 
intergenerational relations and the ways in which they became shaped by the discourse of 
the generational contract. The context of the investigation has been the alleged scenarios 
of resource competition between contemporary generations and various policy 
recommendations on how to remedy the imbalance of material transfers that benefit ‘the 
old’ and ‘the childless’ and on ways of promoting new forms of intergenerational 
solidarity. Taking gender as an analytic tool, the analysis uncovered the inherent 
multiplicity of generational contracts and the things being said and not said, being visible 
and invisible when this ‘generative metaphor’ that frames politics is deployed in 
changing historical conditions.
The thesis has focussed on the metaphor of the generational contract from a variety of 
perspectives. In order to widen the horizon of the discursive associations of its 
constituting components ‘contract’ and ‘generation’, the analysis started by unravelling 
their repertoires in a historical perspective. It was shown how contract became associated 
with the commercial exchange contract, denoting freedom, self-interested rationality, 
reciprocity and fairness in quantifiable and legally enforceable arrangements between 
(male) individuals. This distinctly modem dominant conception made use of a moral 
institution (promise) and supplanted earlier ritual exchanges and so-called status or 
fraternisation contracts where women and men were conceived to give something of 
themselves, change their personal identity and were liable with their bodies. In these 
earlier conceptions contracts appeared to be both voluntary and coerced.
By offering a temporal perspective that draws attention to the socio-historical location of
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social actors and the temporality of their experiences, the concept of generation is a 
highly productive frame of analysis that highlights difference and diversity. Yet, whereas 
processes of social construction are more visible in the identification of historical 
generations, in its most narrow sense of family lineage the concept entails a set of often 
unquestioned assumptions of natural solidarity and positive sentiment embodied in 
unbreakable positive ties in ‘blood’ between man and his blood relatives. While the legal 
and moral circumscription of the father-child bond, the linking of blood to material 
benefits (historically predominantly for men), and the practical work of families in 
creating genealogies tend to be ignored in current discourse, the myth that blood is 
‘thicker than water’ and entails positive sentiment is a powerful image that is evoked in 
studies of intergenerational relations to the present day.
The next step in the analysis focused on the ways in which contract regulated 
intergenerational relations in classical and neo-classical social contract theories insofar as 
the construct of the generational contract draws on the image of the social contract. These 
social contract theories developed the idea of contract as a rationally willed, hypothetical 
agreement between all members of society that serves to justify the order of society. In 
terms of the regulation of intergenerational relations, classical theorists focused on 
lineage relationships based on the conjugal contract. In opposition to an order of status 
relations they elaborated the idea of intergenerational rights and duties between fathers 
and sons, which were meant to supplant yet partly drew on assumptions of natural 
solidarity given by blood. Rights of paternal and conjugal authority served to make the 
family an attractive domain for adult men. By presupposing reciprocity and equality 
(over time) these rights and duties appeared to be rationally willed, but were obligatory to 
secure the cohesion of the patriarchal family and the order of society. Women’s 
responsibility for the day-to-day-necessities of intergenerational support were for the 
most part not acknowledged or appeared as natural consequences of the conjugal 
contract.
Neo-classical social contract theories focus on relations of contemporary and non- 
contemporaneous generations as ensembles of age groups over time. Hypothetical 
deliberators are concerned to design a fair redistributive mechanism, but because
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contracts between non-contemporaneous generations cannot logically be mutually 
advantageous, theorists had to draw on constructs of natural lineage solidarity between 
fathers and sons and term certain redistributive mechanisms trust relations. By 
reconsidering social contract theories that may provide imageries and rationalities for 
contemporary actors and policy makers, the analysis revealed a multiplicity of 
generational contracts referring to family and welfare state relations and their conflicting, 
yet pervasive justifications that ambivalently draw on rationality and sentiment.
In a further step, the analysis focussed on the ways in which these generational contracts 
had been institutionalised in the German welfare state or generational politics were 
mapped onto those modes of justification. Indeed the idea of reciprocal intergenerational 
rights and duties between ascending and descending relatives had been institutionalised 
in early modem German poor relief and peasant retirement contracts by assuming and 
creating lineage care obligations which served to legitimise the subsidiary function of the 
state. The subordinate inclusion of women in agrarian retirement contracts was carried 
over into the modem German social security system. Social insurance ideologically drew 
on the idea of social solidarity both as the embodiment of Christian brotherly love 
[Nachstenliebe] and a rational redistribution of resources over the life course between 
workers of different cohorts. Chapter 3 showed how in the context of economic recession 
and a fundamental devaluation of metaphysical foundations such as religion or tradition, 
the notion of the generational contract in the Weimar Republic and particularly in post­
war Germany became a new ‘cadre d’appartenance’ (Frankenberg 1996, p. 74) linked to 
the PAYG pension system and mapped onto the image of the solidaristic pre-industrial 
multi-generation household. Intergenerational commitments in families were conceived 
as threatened and were idealised. For the most part, however, they remained taken for 
granted and were not acknowledged as a political-economic factor.
The mse of the metaphor of the generational contract up until the late 1980s was its claim 
to embody and guarantee social solidarity ‘for all’ Germans, while constituting and 
maintaining divisions of gender and social class in a social insurance scheme termed 
generational contract. The insurance scheme was financed by contributions based on 
labour market participation and reproduced its gendered and classed stratification. But it
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is not the inherent inequalities of the institutionalised generational or welfare contract, 
but changing contextual conditions, particularly rising mass unemployment and 
decreasing fertility, that currently are said to threaten the generational contract. Turning 
the underlying moral charge of fairness and equality against the generational contract 
itself, this contract is currently denounced as an immoral agreement chargeable to a third 
party, that is, to subsequent generations who will not receive in benefits of what they 
have paid in. Moreover, the hypothetical deliberators of the welfare contract are now 
identified as ‘real’ actors who have enriched themselves, effectively expressed in the 
notion of the welfare generation (Thomson 1989; 1992).
As a result, measures that target older men and women in particular have been proposed 
to redress the perceived imbalance. Although an alleged decline of intergenerational 
family solidarity had been deplored throughout the history of the German welfare state, 
the crisis scenarios of the generational contract, especially in their populist variants, now 
merge the alleged erosion of lineage solidarities with the alleged bankruptcy of the 
insurance system and themes such as the degradation of the environment and the ageing 
of the electorate. The dual targeting of women as saviours of family solidarity and as 
contributors to the PAYG system reveals the inherently contradictory structure of 
generational contracts where women’s commitments under the welfare contract are 
interpreted as a neglect of their responsibilities in the family and vice versa. The long­
term care insurance scheme can be considered as a means of institutionally resolving this 
structural ambivalence in targeting women for informal support but incorporating both 
care needs and informal support to some extent into social insurance.
Theoretically the analysis thus suggests that the generational contract became a powerful 
discursive frame through its association with solidarity. Solidarity was doubly justified 
by rationality (via the contract metaphor) and sentiment (via the generation metaphor). 
The history of legal and state regulations of intergenerational relations as well as personal 
and institutional constraints forging intergenerational cohesion is obfuscated in this 
image of solidarity.
Against the background of a hegemonic focus on the welfare contract with its
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contradictory justification in solidarity based on moral/emotional and rational behaviour, 
the empirical analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8 focused on the social logic of 
intergenerational commitments and contracts in historically specific families. With the 
family being constructed as a sphere of trusting and giving where contractual and self- 
interested forms of cooperation were suspended (despite the legal codification of support 
obligations between parents and children), these commitments were for the most part 
taken for granted and ignored by the dominant discourse that equated the generational 
contract with the social insurance system. The empirical research question was to what 
extent repertoires and the institutionalised procedures of the welfare contract impacted on 
the interpretation of intergenerational practices and commitments by members of 
different family generations. The basis for the empirical analysis were narratives 
produced in the research encounter with family members from two culturally contrasting 
regions in West Germany, older women and their adult children, who were at the same 
time cast as antagonists in the scenario of resource competition on the basis of their 
cohorts. The sample composition purposefully included older women who had all been 
trained for skilled training but who had different work histories, and young adults, 
including a number of sibling dyads of different gender, with different educational 
backgrounds, marital status and differing intra-familial legacies. Contextual information 
was provided by a life course survey and interview protocols.
As the field of adult intergenerational relations is still an undertheorised area in the social 
sciences the thesis proposed the heuristic framework of kinscripts for researching and 
representing the micro-politics of intergenerational commitments. The framework built 
on the work of Di Leonardo (1987), Stack and Burton (1993) and Finch and Mason 
(1992). It proposed social institutions, cultural scripts and intra-familial legacies as socio- 
historical dimensions in relation to which intergenerational commitments have to be 
analysed. The framework is located across conventionally perceived boundaries of public 
and private and aims to link broader societal conditions and the micro-politics of 
intergenerational relationships. Each of the socio-historical dimensions encompasses 
contradictory and gendered aspects of the generational contract. Thus social institutions 
include the social insurance system, cultural scripts include the norm of solidarity and 
intra-familial legacies include kin support given previously. The concept of kin work,
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defined as the practical, symbolic, emotional and material work of kinship that creates 
and maintains family feeling and cohesion, secures support within and across household 
boundaries, produces welfare and human capabilities and constitutes generational 
identity, is a central concept of analysis. Kin work is thus considered as a personal and 
political activity. Heuristically it poses questions as to processes of need interpretation, 
the politics of resource allocation, empowerment and disempowerment, emotions and 
normative frameworks and implicit and explicit processes of negotiation and ascription of 
kin work over the life course that have to be addressed and worked out in the empirical 
analysis.
Applying this heuristic framework to the analysis of kin practices in the two generations 
who were differently positioned according to their age and life cycle position, as well as 
their location in historical time, produced rich evidence of the subtleties and 
ambivalences of intergenerational commitments, their continuities and changes over two 
generations. Unambiguously the research showed that the discourse of intergenerational 
resource competition had no bearing on family relationships: research participants did not 
perceive their parents or children as antagonists in a dispute over scarce societal 
resources. The narratives of the group of older women bom around 1930 illustrated the 
extent to which the kin network in post-war Germany has been a resource and a gendered 
liability for women throughout their lives. Following Wilson (1994) kin support was 
likely to change repeatedly as boundaries from a relatively problem free organisation of 
daily living to possible ‘care’ needs were crossed and recrossed over time by members of 
the kin network. The women firmly located the substantial amount of their material, 
practical and emotional kin support in a historical context of material deprivation in the 
immediate post-war period and an ongoing inadequacy of child and elder care services, 
which was paradoxically also expressed in the contextualisations of defining kin support 
as self-evident or natural. Historical material showed that the lack in investment in 
consumer and service industries compared to investment in primary industries after the 
war had been a political decision that counted on and at times idealised but did not 
remunerate women’s subsistence work. Thus women’s kin work had never been 
completely invisible but was never formally acknowledged as a political-economic 
factor. Practical kin support frequently remained below the threshold of perception of the
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women themselves, and, insofar as emotional and material need was often intertwined in 
the relationship with their (widowed) mothers, was never considered as a political- 
economic activity. Although requiring competences and skill, neither was kin work 
perceived as empowering.
Following the cultural script that the family holds together with a gendered subtext that 
female relatives have to stand in in times of need, kin work was both assigned and 
negotiated over the life course with relatively little perceived room for manoeuvre. 
Women wanted to support their parents, children and grandchildren and felt they had to. 
At the same time kin networks opened new possibilities. Mothers and aunts facilitated 
access to the formal sphere of employment but also required temporal exits from 
qualified work when they needed help and support themselves. Intra-familial legacies or 
kinscripts that daughters were the life insurance of their parents opened up possibilities of 
taking over family businesses and becoming the family breadwinner in a new 
intergenerational division of labour.
Although the social logic of intergenerational kin work for this generation of women is 
better described by contracts o f need where women, just as in traditional status contracts, 
gave with their bodies something of themselves, than as mutually advantageous contracts, 
ideas of fairness and equality were never completely absent in intergenerational 
relationships. This is shown in a number of quasi-contractual strategies deployed to 
secure kin work such as the payment of money or insurance for periods of family care- 
giving. Yet, despite the increased currency of the generational contract in the public 
arena, a contractual language of reciprocity and payment in return was largely absent in 
the narratives. I have suggested that a focus on strategies is a productive way of 
conceiving how women followed and used cultural scripts to their own ends. Strategies 
included defensive coping mechanisms such as ‘forgetting’ previous conflicts when 
support was needed but, particularly after retirement, they also included proactive 
strategies of redefining the boundaries of the relationship and articulating constraints and 
personal demands in order to limit the practical support they gave to grandchildren and 
older relatives. These publicly invisible forms of resistance and change went beyond the 
more cautious semi-public expression in the interviews of a request for societal
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recognition for their dual paid and unpaid contributions to the generational contract.
By contrast the analysis of the narratives of a group of the women’s adult children, bom 
between 1953 and 1964 who had grown up better fed, housed and educated than any 
generation before them showed that as yet these young adults were not main providers in 
contracts related to need. As children of healthy and independent parents these research 
participants still were predominantly at the receiving end of material and practical kin 
support, particularly with respect to childcare. Not being under immediate pressure to 
‘stand in’ apart from providing emotional support around critical life events and 
occasional help with bureaucratic issues or gardening, these research participants 
appeared to have more time and resources than their mothers had had to think about and 
work through intra-familial legacies, such as the ambivalently perceived strong work 
ethics of their mothers. Members of the younger generation defined themselves both in 
terms of a historical (‘break out’) and a family generation, a combination that offered 
possibilities of positive identification but also new challenges and constraints. Although 
parents were sometimes sought for advice and appeared important in acknowledging 
lifestyles and identities, intergenerational family cohesion was perceived not as a given 
but as explicitly created, also as passing on a sense of family to their children. In this 
sense the research supports the thesis that as for the older women after retirement 
intergenerational relationships have become more reflexive across boundaries of gender 
and class.
On the other hand in the context of anticipating the care needs of their parents, the 
cultural script of a gendered (and classed) hierarchy of primary care-giving 
responsibilities reappeared. Contrary to their mothers’ generation, younger research 
participants did use a language of reciprocity and back payment, that like the script of 
family cohesion, had a gendered subtext. The anticipated care needs of their parents 
posed a dilemma given the participants’ multiple commitments on the hand and the 
negative image of residential care on the other. But young women and men were no more 
able than their mothers to discuss the possibility of parental care openly with their parents 
and siblings, even though or perhaps because social service provision had become for 
many an integral part of anticipating parental care. I have argued that mutual distrust of
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assurances of filial care or plans to go into an elder care home, and particularly the 
cultural script of non-articulation, seemingly secured freedom of choice, while actually 
increasing pressure on the part of those who felt and were held most responsible: adult 
daughters.
In practice the younger research participants had developed a range of models that drew 
on intra-familial legacies and experiences, which they prospectively reproduced and 
transformed. Social services (though not yet long-term care insurance) had become an 
institutional not a cultural resource to justify anticipated limitations of care-giving 
commitments but remained gendered and classed: it was exclusively women with lower 
educational background and longer periods spent outside the labour market who 
prospectively committed themselves to provide co-residential care to their parents. Two 
women in the sample already had first-hand experiences with personal care for the 
grandparental generation. Yet, both women’s and men’s demands to promote gender 
equality focused on combining paid work and childcare and did not include kin work 
responsibilities, evidence of its ongoing de-politicised character.
To return to the question posed at the beginning, the empirical analysis suggests that 
repertoires of the generational contract in the sense of solidarity connoting fairness and 
unconditional (gendered) kin support, had effects on the narratives of both older women 
and adult children. Given its conflicting character the generational contract is not a 
univalent script but a cultural repertoire including an array of meanings that allowed for 
differing interpretations. The research confirms that ‘the selection from the culturally 
available pool of meanings is likely to reflect situational and contextual pressures as 
much as, and probably more than, internalized norms or values’ (Marshall et al. 1987, p. 
411).
Even though it is not clear to what extent contracts of need will be reproduced by women 
of the younger generation the findings of the empirical analysis, in conjunction with the 
theoretically uncovered multiplicity and contradictory structure of generational contracts 
point to several substantive issues and challenges. Such issues have to be addressed if 
multigenerational social policies are to be created in Germany. And they may pose
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challenges for contemporary social theory more generally.
The uncovering of the substantial amount of kin work -  conceptualised as the production 
of welfare -  in the narratives of the older women points to the necessity of broadening the 
reference frame of ‘generational accounting’ to include informal intergenerational 
support provided mainly by women. Generational accounting, typically calculated on the 
basis of paid taxes by a ‘representative individual’ or ‘economic subject’ (Raffelhiischen 
and Walliser 1997, p. 69) subject to state transfers received, aims to represent net 
payment obligations of contemporary and future generations (cohorts) to the state in 
order to promote intergenerational equity. A widening and gendering of such accounting 
systems by including kin work leads to a refutation of the inclusive notion of the welfare 
generation as those generations ‘who have failed most to play a full part in these 
[welfare] exchanges’ (Thomson 1992, p. 230) by highlighting that older women of this 
socio-economic background were not net beneficiaries but often dual contributors to the 
generational contract. Disaggregating ‘the’ welfare generation according to gender and 
class makes use of the analytical value of the concept of generation that emphasises the 
different positionalities of members of a generation. Without acknowledging the 
gendered structure of kin work Thomson has refused to take it into account by arguing 
that these ‘contributions are also being made by other generations bom both before and 
after the welfare generation’ (Thomson op. cit., p. 234). This of course may well be the 
case, but injustice does not cease to be unjust because it is perpetuated. Furthermore, 
although women have long worked outside the home, for example as family labourers, 
their subordinate inclusion in the formal labour market in Germany was promoted by 
women of the so-called welfare generation (defined as cohorts bom between 1920 and 
1945). At the same time intergenerational commitments are likely to have increased for 
women of these cohorts due to an increased life expectancy and periods of war and 
depression.
In a more inclusive system of representing generational contributions proposals to recruit 
older women into unpaid voluntary work would have to be assessed by taking into 
account the kin work they provided over the life course. Furthermore, the findings of this 
small-scale study indicate that women of this generation and socio-economic background
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will for the most part not be able to afford to pay the ‘solidarity contribution of current 
pensioner generations’ (Raffelhuschen and Walliser op. cit., p. 87) as part of the 
promotion of ‘a flow from old to young’ (Thomson op. cit. 233) even though they were 
qualified workers. Instead these women would be likely to qualify for solidarity 
contributions if their dual contributions were taken into account.
The argument more generally is as Binstock (1994, p. 162) has rightly pointed out, that 
‘the very description of the axis upon which equity is to be judged tends to circumscribe 
the major options available for rendering justice’. If justice for coexisting and successive 
generations were to be taken into account a more inclusive representation of generational 
contributions would require policy recommendations such as those by Kessler (1996) to 
be assessed with respect to gender, class and race/ethnicity. Thus if the retirement age 
were to be increased for women, kin and caring work would have to be distributed more 
equally between men and women over the life course. Similarly younger generations 
should be better trained but equal employment opportunities would also have to be open 
for men and women. As has been discussed with respect to the transmission of wealth by 
this group of older women, younger generations, particularly younger women, will only 
be able to make private savings if they will find regular employment and adequate service 
provision to complement and assist their kin work. Importantly the empirical finding that 
intergenerational ‘exchange’ often meant that female relatives had to stand in and 
substitute for other women and a lack of service provision, points to the necessity to 
assess the constraints that opportunities for some women can intergenerationally place on 
others.
The thesis suggests that the major challenge for a representation of kin work is not how to 
measure what has consistently being de-represented. Time budget studies have shown 
ways of measuring the breadth and depth of practical and material kin work, even though 
they do not as yet capture its emotional and symbolic value (Gerstel and Gallagher 1993). 
The more difficult issue is that even practical kin work was frequently not represented by 
the women interviewed themselves. Moreover, the research has shown that 
intergenerational commitments in families for both younger and older members appear to 
be a domain where interests, demands, expectations and limits of commitments are
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frequently not articulated despite the novel cultural family script of ‘communicative 
conflict resolution’ (Kaufmann 1990, p. 147) and assumptions that adult children 
‘typically’ do communicate with an elderly parent with respect to care-giving decisions 
(Cicirelli 1991). That the family may not be the place where a ‘committed dialogue’ takes 
place as envisioned by Boszormenyi-Nagy (1987) at least where full-time personal 
commitment is required, has to do with the fact that those needs pose irreconcilable 
dilemmas between the wish (and felt obligation) to assist others and the wish (and 
obligations) to lead one’s own life. Furthermore gendered responsibilities are difficult to 
challenge in a context where cultural scripts of reciprocity already have an inbuilt tacit 
gendered character. More generally the research suggests that articulating interests in 
intergenerational relationships requires adequate alternatives. It was shown that contracts 
of need were frequently forged by the question ‘but who else is going to do it?’ (Aronson 
1992) thus pointing to the lack of perceived choices.
I suggest that issues of non-articulation have to be addressed by social theory more 
generally, such as the assumption in theories of reflexive modernisation that networks 
and identities become in principle negotiable or the focus on including different groups 
with different styles of argumentation in theories of participative democracy. What has to 
be called into question is the assumption that people have unambivalent interests and 
loyalties and can (easily) represent and negotiate them. The theoretical focus has to shift 
to what is not articulated and why. In the context of intergenerational relations research 
has shown that the non-articulation of cross-pressures can have detrimental effects on 
health and well being. Importantly articulation is necessary to access social services as 
well as interpersonal help. Twigg and Atkin (1994) have shown how in a context of 
scarce resources service providers give services to those who most effectively articulate 
their needs. Further the invisibility of carers can be a barrier to their incorporation in 
service provision and decision-making. One of the contributions of this thesis is to point 
to the paradox that articulation requires choices and effective choice requires articulation.
Shifting the subject of the contradictory and gendered structure of generational contracts 
and the significance of implicit and explicit kin work in all its aspects (emotional, 
practical, material and symbolic) into the public and political arena therefore becomes a
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major task of multigenerational social politics. Yet, we must not envision such policy 
discourse as a battlefield of people/generations with unambivalent and antagonistic 
interests but as a domain where, as suggested by the framework of kinscripts, the 
questions posed are not whether but how, by whom and under what conditions existing 
obligations are fulfilled. Obligations, as Hirschmann (1996) has argued, are a matter of 
degree, not a matter of all or nothing. By showing who has contributed what under what 
circumstances a more inclusive system of representing generational contributions points 
to the politics of resource allocation and can serve to increase transparency and 
accountability of generational contributions so that claims become more debatable and 
necessary contributions can be distributed in a more equitable manner.
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APPENDIX A
OBJECTIVES AND SEQUENTIAL SAMPLING PROCEDURE OF THE 
BREMEN RESEARCH PROJECTS
The research project ‘Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the 
Family’
The research project ‘Status Sequences of Women between Employment and the Family’ 
investigated the interweaving of paid and unpaid work in the life courses of the first 
generation of women in West Germany whose adult lives were not interrupted by the war 
in the context of normative ‘phase models’ (Myrdal and Klein 1968). The women had 
undergone skilled training after WWII and later started a family. Whereas during their 
vocational training the ‘two-phase model’ was valid according to which employment was 
conceived as a temporary phase between leaving school and marriage later the ‘three- 
phase model’ (employment before and after a period of exclusive child-rearing) became 
legitimate. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative data the project explored the 
significance of these phase models for actual life styles and subjective interpretations, as 
well as exploring what arrangements of combining employment and family older women 
expected of and recommended to the generation of their daughters 
(Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1989).
Methodologically, the sampling procedure aimed at ‘theoretical representativeness’, that 
is an adequate representation of theoretically relevant characteristics of the social context 
in the sample (Kelle et al. 1993). This method is different from the theoretical sampling 
suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967) where the analyst provisionally analyses her data 
and on the basis of emergent findings, which in turn theoretically informs further data 
collection (ongoing inclusion of comparison groups) to develop grounded theory. In the 
sampling procedure developed in the Bremen project, the results of two sequential 
quantitative surveys provided results in their own right and on this basis informed the 
composition of the qualitative sample. The qualitative sample did not aim to test the 
findings of the surveys but to produce new results, which referred to the same subject 
matter. The connection of results generated by research methods and different paradigms 
that constitute their subject matter in specific ways, was secured by several research
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strategies outlined in Chapter 5.
Two decisions regarding the sample selection of the group of older women were made 
from the onset. First, in order to analyse family commitments in conjunction with 
women’s employment histories, only women were chosen who had started a family and 
had a period of employment prior to having a family. To assess the previously 
unexamined impact of initial occupational qualification on the life course, women with 
the most common vocational qualification in post-war Germany were chosen, i.e., the 
level of skilled training or apprenticeship. One-third of the cohorts of women who came 
of age after the war obtained this, a number almost identical to the percentage among 
young age cohorts in Germany in the late 1980s (Bom 1989). Shifts in women’s 
vocational qualifications show a decrease in unskilled labourers in favour of women with 
degrees in higher education. For the sample construction it was assumed that the same 
level of initial vocational qualification would provide a relatively homogenous group of 
women in terms of their level of school education (completion of secondary school) and 
in terms of their age when they first entered the labour market. Possible differences in the 
timing of family events were thus not based on different educational careers.
Second, in view of a possible impact of different regionally embedded family values and 
practices, equal numbers of women were chosen from two culturally contrasting regions 
in West Germany, one a rural Catholic and the other an urban Protestant area. It was 
assumed that in the rural Catholic area a more rigid gendered division of labour would be 
predominant normatively whereas in the urban Protestant environment the regime of 
gender specific life styles would be loosened. By implication these selection criteria 
excluded women who were never married and/or remained childless29 as well as women 
without occupational training and the minority who obtained higher education after the 
war.
The process of sequential sampling comprised three parts. Part I of the study investigated
29 The life courses of never-married German women bom between 1919 and 1933 have been analysed by 
Wilken (1991). In the US Allen (1989) investigated the life courses of never-married women bom in 1910.
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the distribution of women’s occupations on the level of skilled training. A collection of 
primary data through the local chambers of commerce, trade corporations and vocational 
schools30 was necessary because leaving certificates in Germany were lost in the turbulent 
post war years and representative surveys only started after 1953. The rural Catholic 
district of Koblenz in Rhineland-Palatinate and the Protestant Free Hanseatic City 
Bremen were chosen on the basis of existing records and socio-cultural regional 
differences. The study consisted of a one hundred percent sample of women with 
vocational qualifications in 1948. The results showed that in both regions the five most 
common occupational qualifications of women in 1948 had been clerk, shop assistant, 
hairdresser, dressmaker and child minder. These occupations were thus neither bound to 
the specific economic conditions in the two regions, nor were they the result of a different 
normative attachment of occupational training to dominant gender roles.
Part II of the sequential sampling procedure explored the social structure of the life 
courses of the women in the five most common occupations. The current addresses of the 
ex-apprentices were traced via the residents’ registration offices and one hundred women 
for each of the five occupations equally distributed over the two regions were contacted 
using a mail order company to maintain anonymity. They were sent standardised 
questionnaires and asked about the timing of family events, periods of employment and 
their willingness to be interviewed at a later date. Family events included the timing of 
marriage(s), child birth(s), grand-motherhood(s) and divorce(s). Periods of employment 
were differentiated according to jobs in the occupation they were trained for, in other 
occupations and in jobs not covered by social insurance. Excluding incomplete 
questionnaires and the minority of women who had never started a family, 220 cases 
were eligible for inclusion in the quantitative analysis of approximately 50 cases per 
occupational group. 140 women (64%) sent back their current address as an indication
Her findings reveal the strong commitment of never-married women to kin relationships despite their 
almost continuous employment records.
30 Note that the German vocational system on the level of apprenticeship established at the end of the last 
century is differentiated into two tracks, one offering training in trades traditionally reserved for men such 
as baking or construction where the apprentice receives money during his training, and the other track 
consisting of full-time vocational schools for occupations traditionally reserved for women such as nurses 
or childminders where the ‘apprentice’ has to pay for her training. Most importantly the first track offers
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that they were willing to be interviewed.
The quantitative analysis of the survey showed that the women who finished their 
apprenticeship around 1948 had indeed begun their occupational training directly after 
they had completed secondary school and were thus of the same or similar age (that is, 
they were bom between 1928 and 1931). At the time of the survey they were at the actual 
or potential transition to retirement. A comparison with representative surveys showed 
that this group of women with respect to family events (average age at first marriage, 
number and placing of childbirths, rates of divorce and widowhood) could be considered 
as ‘typical’ for women of this birth cohort. Their employment participation compared 
with statistically representative samples at ten-year intervals, was slightly higher in 1960, 
lower in 1970 and again higher in 1980 than the national (Bom et al. 1996).
A cluster analysis for small samples of the added employment periods over each life 
course, differentiated by insurance status, revealed surprisingly that entries in and exits 
from the labour market were strongly correlated with differences in the women’s 
occupational training. Employment patterns were not related to family events, did not 
follow distinct phase models (neither the traditional ‘two-phase model’, nor the ‘three- 
phase model’) and did not vary according to regional location. The overall length and 
status of the women’s employment histories in the five occupations under study appeared 
to be structured by the kind of trade or schooling they had received before they first 
entered the labour market.
Four ‘dominant status configurations’ emerged that were related to different occupational 
training: women who left the labour market and were predominantly homemakers 
(predominantly hairdressers); women who were predominantly in the labour market in 
their trained occupation (predominantly office clerks); women who mainly worked in 
other occupations (dressmakers and shop assistants); and women who mainly worked in 
uninsured occupations (childminders). At the same level of qualification different 
occupations thus offered different opportunities to combine family and employment.
career prospects (‘master craftsman’) whereas the second leads to dead-end occupations (Kruger 1991).
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Given that the women surveyed were not ‘exceptional’ with respect to family events or 
occupational training these results are likely to have significance beyond the group 
studied.
Part III aimed at the exploration of subjective interpretation patterns focused on turning 
points between family and employment in the context of the women’s life history and the 
constitutive structural patterns. On the basis of the quantitative findings in Part II, the 
qualitative sample was selected according to the ‘model of deliberate sampling for 
heterogeneity’ (Cook and Campbell 1979 as quoted in Erzberger 1995). The sampling 
ensured that the theoretically relevant socio-structural variables (occupational training 
and dominant status configuration) were included in large enough numbers to develop 
‘explanatory power’ in the analysis. The researchers therefore aimed to include an equal 
number of women from the five occupations in the two regions and crosscutting these 
occupational groups an equal number of the four dominant status configurations. 
Previous research experience had shown that the principle of theoretical saturation 
(Glaser and Strauss op. cit., p. 61) is fulfilled in sub-groups of 10-12 persons. Saturation 
means that further data of the same group of persons does not provide additional 
information to develop relevant categories.
Applying these considerations to the pool of women who in the standardised 
questionnaires had indicated their readiness for an interview, 52 women bom between 
1928 and 1931 were included in the sample: 12 trained office clerks, 11 shop assistants, 
11 dress makers, 9 hairdressers and 9 childminders. With four exceptions all women had 
completed secondary school and three women had A level equivalents. All women 
started their apprenticeships at the end of the war. They started their families in the 1950s 
and had between one and five children. The dominant status configurations cut across 
these occupational groups: 13 women were predominantly homemakers, 12 were 
predominantly employed according to their occupational training, 19 were in other 
occupations and 8 were employed predominantly in uninsured positions.
Qualifications in full-time vocational schools are often neglected in analyses of occupational qualifications.
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The research project ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational 
Inheritance9
The research project ‘Patterns of Status Passages and Intergenerational Inheritance’ 
investigated processes of change within family life patterns and explored the life courses 
of a group of adult children of women (and men) studied in previous projects. As a cohort 
the group of children aged 30 to 41 belongs to the first generation to benefit from the 
expansion of the education system, considered responsible for an increase in marriage age 
and women’s labour market participation and decreasing birth rates. Being at the same 
time sons and daughters of parents previously studied the project analysed complex 
changes in family life and their dependence on institutional regulations and family 
traditions. The research-guiding question was whether asynchronic gender-specific 
modernisation processes in the older (parental) generation where women but not men had 
expanded their traditional life domains were expanding and had influenced the lifestyles 
of the younger generation (Sonderforschungsbereich 186 1994).
As to the sampling, access to the older women’s adult children could only be gained 
through their mothers. Therefore all 140 women who in the previous survey had declared 
their willingness to be interviewed and whose addresses were thus available were 
contacted again (whether or not they had been interviewed) with the request to provide 
contact to their children. From 326 existing children 149 took part in the quantitative 
survey and completed a postal questionnaire on their education, employment and family 
history, including information about living arrangements and cohabitation, 
maternity/paternity leave, military service and unemployment. Ninety-eight of the 
research participants indicated their willingness to be interviewed at a later stage.
The quantitative analysis showed that 89 women and 60 men had taken part in the survey. 
Their year of birth ranged from 1948 to 1974, with the average being 1959. The survey 
showed a generally high level of educational and occupational qualification. Eighty-two 
individuals (55.8%) obtained the highest school qualification (A-levels equivalents) and 
only 19 (12.2%) obtained the lowest level of school qualification, with men overall doing 
slightly better than women. Almost one third of the respondents had more than one
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occupational qualification; only 6 had none at all. Seventy-one persons (47.7%) were 
vocationally qualified and 72 (48.3%) had an academic degree. Comparisons with 
representative studies showed that the level of educational and occupational qualification 
was above the national average for the group bom between 1953 and 1964. In 
comparison with the life courses of their parents the generation of adult children, as could 
be expected, were more qualified and thus appeared to be indeed the beneficiaries of the 
educational reform in the 1970s. Women in particular often had obtained higher 
qualifications than their mothers.
Employment careers (including times of unemployment and part-time work) were similar 
for the younger men and women, at least for those who did not have children. At the birth 
of the first child a traditionalisation in life style occurred: it was predominantly women 
who took maternity leave and then changed to part-time jobs whereas men consolidated 
their employment careers. Only 5 men (4.3%) as opposed to 44 women (37.6%) of the 
117 research participants with children indicated that they had spent time as full-time 
homemakers, mainly due to parental leave and child rearing but also due to 
unemployment and in one case due to caring for a mother-in-law. In an intergenerational 
comparison women were employed for longer periods than their mothers in the same 
time interval whereas due to periods of prolonged education, unemployment and part- 
time work young men spent comparatively less time in paid work than their fathers.
The quantitative analysis corroborated changes in family patterns. Both men and women 
cohabited for long periods of time, had several long-term relationships and if they 
married, did so at a later stage. Marriage usually occurred at or around the time of the 
birth of the first child. Fifty-nine per cent of the research participants surveyed had at 
least one child (two women had 4 and 5 children). At the age of 35 more than 60% were 
married, c. 20% were cohabiting and 20% were single. Of the 74% who had had 
experience of marriage, 18% were divorced and almost half of those had remarried.
For reasons of comparability only the age groups bom between 1953-1964, whose 
formative years fell in the period of social change in the 1970s, were included in the
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qualitative sample. As gender had proven to be a salient marker of inter- and intra- 
generational life course differences we also aimed for the inclusion of an equal number of 
men and women, approximately 10-12 persons for each group. In addition we aimed to 
include an equal number of siblings o f different gender who could illuminate potential 
gender-specific differences in the perception of the life style of their mother and its 
impact on their own life style. The sample aimed at approximately 40-46 persons (10-12 
women, 10-12 men and 10-12 sibling dyads).
Crosscutting the gender and sibling dimension, four further (two-dimensional) sampling 
criteria were included. In terms of the heterogeneity of the younger generation, the 
sample reflected differences in occupational and family status. To account for differences 
in educational and employment status we aimed to include an equal amount at skilled and 
degree level. In terms of family status children had a decisive impact on life style for 
younger women. Therefore both persons with and without children were included. In 
terms of the potential ‘model function’ of the maternal life style, the mother's 
employment and familial caring experiences were relevant sampling criteria. It was 
decided to aim for an equal number of children whose mothers had been predominantly 
employed (defined as >18.5 years in the labour force) and mothers who had been 
predominantly homemakers (defined as <18.5 years). Given the interest in intra-familial 
legacies I aimed to include an equal number of children of women who had provided care 
for an older relative and those who had not. As a commitment to kin work had not been 
explored in the postal questionnaires I drew on the results of the qualitative study of the 
older women for this criterion, thereby aiming for a maximum of younger research 
participants whose mothers had also been interviewed.
Applying these considerations to the pool of 78 men and women bom between 1953 and 
1964 who had indicated their willingness to be interviewed, 49 persons were included in 
the qualitative sample: 10 brother-sister dyads, two sibling triads, and 8 men and 15 
women whose siblings were not interviewed. The four two-dimensional criteria were 
distributed as follows. Employment status: 25 persons with an academic degree and 23 
persons with skilled vocational training were included (one woman did not have an
299
occupational qualification); Family status'. 16 persons without and 33 with children were 
included; Employment history o f the mother. 28 children came from families were the 
mother was predominantly employed and 21 children came from families were the 
mother was predominantly a homemaker; and Familial caring experiences o f mothers: 28 
children had mothers who had provided personal care to older relatives and 21 came from 
families without caring experiences. Given that in the group of those who were willing to 
be interviewed there were only 6 men who were skilled workers, occupational status in 
the qualitative study was conflated with gender in that persons with academic degrees 
were predominantly men and skilled workers were women. The other characteristics were 
broadly equally distributed over the 21 men and 28 women in the sample.
Distribution o f  sam ple criteria by gender in the qualitative sam ple o f
adult children
Gender and occupational status
Women Men
Skilled 19 4
None
1
0
Academic 8 17
Gender and family status
Women Men
No
children
8 8
With 20 13
children
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Gender and family status
children
Gender and employment of mother
Women Men
Employment o f 
mother >18.5 yrs
17 11
Employment of 
mother >18.5 yrs
11 10
Gender and familial caring experience
Women Men
Elder care 
experience o f mother
15 13
No elder care 
experience o f mother
13 8
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW PASSAGES QUOTED IN GERMAN
Chapter 5
(0) Int: Finden Sie, daB dieses Verhaltnis von Ihnen zu Ihrer Mutter, diese Verpflichtung, 
die Sie ja auch so hatten, wohl gefiihlt haben, also Sie miissen Ihre Mutter pflegen- Resp: 
Jaja, muBte ja. Int: Pflegen, weil sonst ist auchniemand da. Resp: 1st janiemand da. Int: 
Glauben Sie, daB das die jungen Frauen heute auch so sehen? Oder daB das was ist, was 
immer so- Resp: Darauf wiird ich nicht bauen. Ich mein, unsere ist - wenn irgendwo was 
passiert -, wenn ich noch aufgeregt bin, dann ist sie so praktisch veranlagt, also daB die 
sofort das Richtige m acht.... Aber ich wtirde nicht annehmen, daB sie tiber ne langere 
Distanz das- Int: So machen wtirde- Resp: Sagen wtirde: das mufi ichjetzt so machen.... 
Int: Und wie finden Sie dieses - ja, ich nenn das mal ‘ein biBchen mehr Distanz’ - oder 
ich weiB nicht, wie man das sagen soli, daB Sie sagen: also darauf - Resp: Mehr Ich- 
stichtiger, meinen Sie, oder - Int: Nee, ich weiB nicht, ob ich das so- Resp: Nee, kann man 
auch nicht als - Int: Ich will das nicht negativ sagen- Resp: Neenee Int: Nur diese 
Verandenmg ... Finden Sie, daB das besser ist? Oder wtirden Sie sich wtinschen, also in 
der Beziehung sollte das doch eher gleich bleiben? Resp: Das kann ich echt nicht sagen. 
Denn ich hab’s ja jetzt zweimal mit durchgemacht. Das kann man nicht von jemandem 
verlangen. Wenn das nicht jemand freiwillig macht - erzwingen konnte man sowas nicht. 
(003)
Chapter 6
(1) ‘Ich muBte -  meine Mutter war ja immer auf Achse, wie man so sagt, urn irgendetwas 
zu essen zu beschaffen. Die war viel auf dem Lande. Und dadurch muBte ich dann schon 
mal die beiden GroBeren bekochen und meine kleine Schwester auch... So viel Gedanken 
hat meine Mutter sich eigentlich gar nicht gemacht. Wir sind so ziemlich -  ohne 
irgendwas aufgewachsen, nicht.’ (126)
(2) ‘Meine Mutter hatte nicht viel Zeit fur uns. Die hatte sieben Kinder, die hatte das 
Geschaft, da war nicht viel Zeit sich um die Kinder zu ktimmern. Wir waren gekleidet, 
wir waren satt, wir muBten helfen... Wir haben die Mutter geme gehabt, und sie hat auch 
alles fur uns getan. Aber das war keine Herzlichkeit zwischen den Eltem und uns. Mal 
liebhalten, mal ‘n KuB geben und sagen, das hast‘ gut gemacht. Da war keine Zeit, wir 
waren zu viele. Und das haben wir vermiBt.’ (525)
(3) Resp: Naja, die ganze Flucht, wir waren vier Monate im Auffanglager, in X. Da muBte 
ich fur die Familie sorgen. Meine Mutter war krank und da hatte ich eigentlich die 
Hauptlast zu tragen. Und dadurch fuhlte man sich auch verantwortlich so fur die ganze 
Familie mit. Ich mein, das ist in unserer Familie tiberhaupt ganz groB gewesen. Alle 
Geschwister eigentlich. Nachher, auch jetzt noch. DaB der eine so fur den anderen
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mitsorgt... Mit meiner Mutter konnte ich nie reden ... Ich glaub, man ist vom kleinen 
Kind gleich Erwachsen geworden. Was da so zwischen, die Zeit die dazwischen war, die 
fehlt. Und und ich mein auch immer zwischen meiner Mutter und mir hat was gefehlt, 
denn, sehen Sie mal, ich bin die ganzen Kriegsjahre eigentlich immer aushausig gewesen. 
Nie bei meiner Mutter. Ich war erst im KRV-Lager Y, dann war ich in Z und immer so’n 
halbes Jahr. Ja, dann war ich der U und dann im V. Und die Zeit immer von der Mutter 
weg, und da kann mir einer sagen was er will, da ist irgendwie, da fehlt was. Int: Da 
haben sie sich entffemdet? Resp: Ja ja. Und heute grubel ich manches mal noch, wie 
konnte sie das iiberhaupt machen. Wie konnte sie das machen, wie kann man ein Kind 
so- Int: Haben Sie sich so weggeschoben gefiihlt? Resp: Ja, ja. Das fehlt, die Zeit.... Denn 
wiederum sag ich, Gott, die Zeit war so hart, vielleicht konnte sie auch gar nicht anders.... 
Und dadurch sind die Menschen ja auch hart geworden. Und so war meine Mutter halt, 
bevor ich mal gestreichelt wurde, kriegt ich eher ‘n Schlag mit dem Stock. So war es.’ 
(822)
(4) ‘Ich hab nur oft gedacht, wenn mein Vater noch gelebt hatte, dann war, glaub ich, 
vielleicht einiges anders gelaufen, war ich vielleicht auch ausgebrochen. Aber meine 
Mutter- der hab ich immer nie auch keinen Kummer machen wollen.’ (857)
(5) ‘Jedenfalls unseren Eltem gegentiber wagten wir nicht, irgendwie so unseren 
Standpunkt klarzumachen. Wir versuchten immer da, denen nicht wehzutun auch nicht, 
und wir hatten immer Angst, daB wir denen wehtun.’ (814)
(6) Resp: Ich war ihre alteste Tochter und Vati war noch nicht da ... und ich war praktisch 
Muttis Stiitze kann man sagen. Alles was sie so brauchte, wir sind in’n Wald gegangen, 
haben Baume gesagt, damit wir iiberhaupt Heizmaterial hatten und hatten dann so’n 
Holzsammelschein. Int: Also daB Sie schon auch so’n biBchen- Resp: Sie brauchte 
eigentlich ‘n biBchen, aber ich war dann doch sehr egoistisch und hab’ gesagt, ich geh 
doch nach Bremen! Int: Haben Sie ja denn auch geschafft. Resp: Ja, aber dann, meine 
Schwester ist drei Jahre jtinger als ich. Dann kam die dann dran. Nech, wie das denn 
schon so ist. (073)
(7) ‘Also fur mich stand dahinter, daB ich einen Berufhatte, daB ich selbstandig war, daB 
ich mein eigenes Geld verdienen konnte, daB ich auf eigenen FiiBen stand. Das stand fur 
mich dahinter.’ (546)
(8) ‘Ich bin ja nun nicht so geme zu Hause gewesen. [Meine Eltem] hatten auch viel 
Probleme untereinander. Und das war schlimm.... Und da bin ich da hingegangen und 
hab mir dieses da gesucht. ... Aber das war auch irgendwo -  das war mir alles sehr 
verstandlich, weil ja meine Eltem auch wieder von vome anfangen muBten, und da hab 
ich gedacht: die haben das ja verloren, ohne daB sie schuld dran waren, also muB ich da 
mit helfen.’ (071)
(9) ‘Besonders meine Mutter, sie war sehrt begabt im Nahen, aber Madchen lemten ja 
nichts in der Generation. Ihre Briider lemten irgendeinen Beruf, aber sie muBte eben, wie 
man so sagte ffuher, in Stellung gehen. Und da hat sie sich geschworen, also wenn sie 
mal ein Madchen kriegt, das soli das nicht machen. Das soil was lemen.’ (115)
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(10) Resp: Das hatte meine Mutter angefangen, ja. Int: War sie gleich ohne Sie 
hingegangen oder? Resp: Ja, sie ist scheinbar ohne - also ich bin nicht mitgewesen, ich 
hab mich nur vorgestellt bei der Schneidermeisterin... Ich war mal grade 14 Jahre, ne. 
Also -  man hatte j a auch damals noch nicht, so wie heute ein Kind ist, mit 14 Jahren, das 
hatte man damals ja noch gar nicht. (034)
(11) Resp: Ich muB sagen, ich hab sehr viel Untersttitzung in meiner Tante gehabt, was 
Berufsausbildung anging. Wenn es meiner Mutter nach gegangen ware, wenn es allein 
nach ihr gegangen ware - meine Tante hat sich da ganz schon eingemischt,.... bei uns war 
das Geld knapp zu Hause, und meine Mutter sagte immer: wenn ich euch alle nach X, das 
war diese Papierfabrik, schicken wtirde, dann hatten wir mehr Geld. Int: Ja, haben Sie 
mehrere Geschwister auch? Resp: Ja. Dann brauchten wir nicht so rechnen und so. Und 
da war also meine Tante immer da, die da sagte: die Kinder miissen aber ne Ausbildung 
machen... Also bei uns zu Hause war das also so, daB meine Mutter oder so meine Tante, 
die sich hauptsachlich ja auch um uns gekummert hat, bedingt dadurch, daB mein Vater ja 
nicht mehr da war, hat sie auch so’n biBchen so sich verantwortlich geftihlt auch. (549)
(12) Resp: Ja, ich muB wohl voraus schicken, ich bin selber in einem Lebensmittel- 
einzelhandelsgeschaft groB geworden. Int: Ach Ihre Eltem Resp: Meine Eltem hatten ein 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandelsgeschaft und da bin ich als Kind schon friih durch Mithilfe 
tatig gewesen, auch wie mein Vater im Kriege eingezogen wurde...Also es war an sich 
gedacht gewesen: Ich hatte den Lebensmitteleinzelhandelsberuf gelemt, hatte das 
Geschaft meiner Eltem ubemommen und war’ sozusagen die Lebensversorgung meiner 
Eltem geworden. Int: Ja. Sie sind das einzige Kind gewesen? Resp: Ich bin das einzige 
Kind. So war das an sich mal geplant gewesen, und ich hatte groBe Liebe zu dem Bemf, 
aber es war eben nach dem Kriege nicht moglich. (805)
(13) ‘Uber mich war an und fur sich geplant worden, daB ich zu Hause bleiben sollte. Wie 
das friiher war in der Familie, wo Landwirtschaft war und so, daB eine Tochter zu hause 
blieb und die Eltem halt unterstiitzte. Meine altere Schwester war bei der Tante, wo der 
Mann als erster hier im Ort im Krieg umgekommen war und die hatte 9 kleine Kinder. 
Und selbstverstandlich muBte die Schwester bei der Tante einspringen. Die war damals 
16/17. Ja, und da muBte ich, wenn ich hier zu Hause bleiben wollte, eine 
landwirtschaftliche Berufslehre machen.’ (516)
(14) ‘Und dadurch, daB jetzt meine Eltem nicht mehr lebten, und die Firma da war, und 
ich einen jiingeren Bmder hatte, der die Firma eines Tages ubemehmen sollte, muBte j a 
irgendwas passieren, um die Firma fur ihn zu erhalten. Und da hab’ ich mich da also -  so 
ganz spontan -  entschlossen: ich trete in die Firma ein. Und das war eigentlich nur 
moglich mit ‘ner Lehre... wir muBten naturlich einen Teilhaber aufnehmen. Ich war ja zu 
jung, ich war ja nicht volljahrig....Also ich denke, das lag einfach so -  das lag in der Luft. 
Das war ja so: man fing ja praktisch mit Nichts wieder an. Es war ja alles vorbei, und 
man konnte -  also ich zumindest als 17jahrige, ich konnte iiberhaupt nicht abschatzen, 
was jetzt kommen wtirde. Es war ja - das einzige, was eigentlich noch so war, das war die 
Familie. Also meine GroBeltem lebten noch, und die hatten uns auch erst aufgenommen, 
und dann eben - ja, das Geschaft war da, wenn auch so auBerlich nicht mehr viel davon
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zu sehen war, nicht viel iibriggeblieben war. Aber irgendwie muBte es ja auch weiter- 
gehen ... das war mir eigentlich klar, daB ich da jetzt erstmal eben fur die Existenz von 
uns beiden sorgen muBte, sozusagen.’ (027)
(15) ‘Es gab zu Hause die Abmachung, da meine jiingere Schwester j a nicht lemen durfte - 
da hat meine Mutter sich durchgesetzt: Ja, die Jiingste, eine Tochter bleibt im Haus und 
die muss auch spater mal fur mich da sein - mit der muBte ich immer teilen. Meine 
Schwester bekam immer die Halfte von meinem Lohn.... Ich hatte ihr geme noch mehr 
gegeben, wenn ich mehr gehabt hatte, sehr geme. Denn ich hatte immer ein schlechtes 
Gefuhl ihr gegentiber. Ich konnte was lemen und sie nicht. Was sind 40 Mark, wenn ich 
nichts lemen kann? Es ist ja ein Almosen.’ (851)
(,6) ‘ Ja, ich bin 48 im April wiedergekommen und habe dann erstmal ein halbes Jahr lang 
meine GroBmutter gepflegt, die sehr krank war. Meine Mutter konnte es nicht, denn sie 
hatte Haushalt, und wir hatten auch kleine Landwirtschaft dabei... Meine GroBeltem 
haben gesagt: ‘Nein, also bitte bleib, und wir bezahlen auch die Versicherung’, damit war 
aber - wie wir jetzt erst hinterher festgestellt haben beim Auflisten, wo’s jetzt an die 
Rente geht: Ja, wo ist das denn? Ja, da ist nur in der Zeit Krankengeld bezahlt worden, fur 
die Krankenkasse, aber keine Sozialabgaben, nicht? Und das hatte wohl auch nicht viel 
ausgemacht. Also, ich hab sowieso verdient j a nichts, denn das wollte ich ja auch nicht.’ 
(118)
(17) Resp: Mein Vater, der ist 1951 todlich verungliickt in seiner Arbeitsstelle. Und da 
bekam meine Mutter sehr wenig Geld, sehr wenig Rente. Und da hab ich dann zu hause 
abgeben miissen, miissen nicht, aber das war selbstverstandlich, daB man das gemacht 
hat...Und was bekam meine Mutter da an Rente? Die ist mit 35 Mark im Monat 
angefangen, da bekam ich 95 im Monat an Gehalt. ... es war ausserst schwierig damit 
auszukommen. Und da war man schon bedacht, daB man auch ‘n biBchen verdienen 
wiirde. ... wenn ich noch mehr Geschwister gehabt hatte, ware das vielleicht anders 
gewesen. Ich hab das eigentlich so aus freien Stiicken gemacht. Int: Aber haben auch die 
schwierige Situation einfach so akzeptiert- Resp: Erkannt und dann, man hat ja 
zusammen gewohnt und muBte zusammen leben. (055)
(18) ‘Dann kriegte ich von der Firma gesagt, ich sollte in X eine Filiale iibemehmen. Da 
war ich 19 Jahre alt, da war ich die jiingste Filialleiterin in Y !... Und dann als mein Vater 
starb, das war im Marz ‘50, da war ich noch nicht ganz 20, dann kriegte meine Mutter 
keine Witwenrente so schnell, das dauerte einige Monate. Und wir hatten ja keine 
Erspamisse ... und wir kamen ja gar nicht mit dem Geld aus und sagte eine im 
Bekanntenkreis: ‘weisst Du wo Du hingehen musst? Du musst nach Z, da kannst Du am 
Band arbeiten, da verdienst Du viel Geld, da kannst Du mit Deiner Mutter gut davon 
leben‘. Und da hab ich dann zu meiner Mutter gesagt: ‘Soli ich das denn machen, damit 
wir besser leben konnen?’ Da hat sie gesagt, ‘Kind, ja, ich weiB ja nicht, ob Du denn 
nacher wieder da hinten anfangen kannst.’ Ich sag, ‘das ist egal, dann kann ich auch 
woanders noch arbeiten’. Und dann bin ich zu Z gegangen ans Band.’ (071)
(19) Resp: Ja, doch, ich muBte das abgeben. Das ging ja gar nicht anders, nicht. Aber da 
kam denn oft - und ich weiB noch so, das war eine Friseuse bei uns im Haus und die
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kriegte immer ein irrsinniges Trinkgeld und die schenkte ihrer Mutter so viel, und das 
konnte ich nicht. Das fand ich immer traurig, daB ich das nicht konnte, nicht. Und dann 
kam auch mal ‘die verdient auch so viel, und Du verdienst so wenig!’ Int: Sagte die 
Mutter das? Resp: Ja, ja. Und dann dachte ich mir, mensch, das kannst Du dir auch 
eigentlich gar nicht leisten, du hast so einen wunderbaren Beruf und nur halbtags 
arbeiten. Sicher, ich muBte machte zu Hause weiter, weil sie ja an der Nahmaschine saB, 
nich, und machte da den Haushalt, wir hatten einen riesen Garten. Und ich hab schon 
gearbeitet bis in die Nacht, aber eben nicht in meinem Beruf und geldbringend, nich. Und 
da fuhlte ich mich schon manchmal so’n biBchen schabig und war auch traurig. Ja ich hab 
dann schweren Herzens - ich mochte aber nicht im Kindergarten sagen, daB ich in die 
Fabrik will. — Das mochte ich nicht sagen. Als ich mich da vorgestellt hab und muBte 
mal frei oder so, nicht. Und ich hab oben noch so die Spruche liegen, die die Kinder mir 
geschrieben haben. Die wuBten alle, daB ich da -  da hab ich enorm drunter gelitten. Int: 
Hatte das irgendwas so mit unterschiedlicher Wertschatzung zu tun? Resp: Ach nee, die 
Wertschatzung nicht, aber — ich hing eben tatsachlich eben so sehr an dem Beruf, nich. 
Und das werfe ich heute meinem {weint} Heute sag ich auch noch zu meinem Mann: 
Mensch, daB ich das gemacht hab, nich Int: Mhm. Haben Sie denn da so Ihre Familie 
auch immer mit unterstiitzen miissen? Resp: (weint) Ja, — immer auch. Ich hab’s auch 
spater gemacht. Das hab ich auch gem gemacht. I: Mhm.— Soli ich ne kurze Pause 
machen? (130)
(20) Resp: Wissen Sie, ich hab auch ja immer so’n schlechtes Gewissen meiner Mutter 
gegeniiber gehabt. Ich ware - obwohl ich ja auch nicht dafur bin - das hat mir immer leid 
getan, daB sie -  daB Papa nun nicht kam; die anderen kamen dann wieder. Und dann 
freute man sich, daB der oder der in der Familie wiederkam, und sie weinte immer nur 
und weinte nur immer. Ich hab ein solches Abhangigkeitsverhaltnis zu meiner Mutter 
gehabt, das ist so schlimm gewesen ...Also diese Verwachsung, mit meiner Mutter, die 
Flucht, und dann dieses Alleinsein hier. Ich weiB nicht, das war schlimm. Ich glaub, da 
geht’s vielen in meiner Generation so. ...Das ist sehr belastend gewesen. Sehen Sie, auch 
mein Mann konnte nachher - hatte sich beruflich noch verbessem konnen... wurde ihm 
damals angeboten und so. Das hat er auch wegen meiner Mutter nicht getan. Weil sie 
dann sagte: ‘ja, dann bin ich allein, und ich hab in meinem Leben nichts gehabt.’ Aber sie 
hat- Int: Hat sie Sie ein biBchen damit erpreBt? Resp: Jaa. Vor alien Dingen, ich hab ja 
immer das Gefuhl, ich bin an allem schuld. Int: Wenn Sie nicht gewesen waren, dann 
hatte Ihre Mutter nochmal geheiratet, oder? Resp: Ne, das vielleicht gar nicht mal. Ich - 
mir hat das soo leid getan, daB sie da immer alleine ist, und daB sie - und das hat sie auch 
ausgenutzt, nicht. (016)
(21) ‘Also es, wirklich, ich hab eine derartig dominierende und despotische und — also 
eine Mutter, die also unwahrscheinlichen Druck auf mich ausgetibt hat. Das kann ich 
aber heute auch erst so formulieren. Denn von wegen unabhangig sein, ja, als ich 
heiratete, da war’s so, daB ich da -  daB mein Mann da wollte, daB ich hier rausgehe. Also 
mein Mann wollte, daB wir hier ausziehen. Denn inzwischen war meine Mutter jetzt 
allein. Alle sind sie gegangen... Und zwar war das so, daB wir schon - mein Mann und ich 
- uns schon eine Wohnung gemietet hatten im Souterrain.... Und dann kam meine Mutter 
dazu und hat gesagt: Das wirst Du doch wohl nicht tun, mich hier mit dem Haus alleine 
lassen? So. Und dann sind wir zur Miete hier -  da hab ich meinen Mann rumgekriegt, daB
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wir denn hier zur Miete doch eingezogen sind. Und naj a, da saB ich dann hier wieder fest. 
Wir haben dann allerdings gebaut... Da war ich auch schon mit der Lehre fertig, da hatt 
ich endlich ein eigenes Zimmer. Ich muBte immer mit meiner Mutter zusammen schlafen. 
Mein Vater war gefallen. Und das war hier so das Schlafzimmer. Und ich muBte ins Bett 
gehen, wann sie wollte, und ich muBte aufbleiben, wie lange sie wollte. Ja, also ehe man 
das durchschaute und ehe man das erkennt. Ich war jedenfalls -  ich war ‘n Dussel, ‘n 
dusseliges Madchen.’ (037)
(22) ‘Ein Jahr vor unserer Hochzeit, vor der EheschlieBung, bin ich nach X gegangen... 
Und ich hab das auch irgendwie als Sprungbrett benutzt, so rauszukommen von zu 
Hause. Meine Mutter hat’s mir sehr schwer gemacht. Meine Geschwister lieB sie alle ge­
hen, und mich wollt sie nicht gehen lassen. Und da hab ich mich also dann wirklich 
regelrecht abgesetzt... Das ist mir auch nicht schwergefallen. Ich muB allerdings auch 
sagen, ich hatte also nie ‘n guten Kontakt zu meiner Mutter. Ach, das war alles so, ich 
denke, dadurch, daB mein Vater so friih gestorben ist und so, da ist auch einiges anders 
gelaufen als wenn ne Familie so zusammen ist. Ich mein, sie hat es ja auch nicht leicht 
gehabt, mit 5 Kindem und dann nur wenig Geld und so. Aber trotzdem hab ich mich so 
ungerecht behandelt geftihlt all die Jahre, nicht... sie hat dann ihren Gefuhlen freien Lauf 
gelassen und hat -  ich mein, immer mir nur -  ich weiB nicht, ob sie meinen anderen -  
also meinen jiingeren Geschwistem mit Sicherheit nicht, aber ich denk immer, bei mir hat 
sie so alles abgeladen: Wenn ich Euch nicht hatte, ging’s mir ja viel besser. Ich wollt 
Euch alle nicht und so.’ (549)
(23) ‘Ich hab mit meiner Mutter zusammengelebt. Und die war ja auch allein, und die ist 
ganz aufgegangen, wie wir das Baby hatten... Und die hat fur mein Kind ganz gut 
gesorgt, gell. Und ich konnte doch vieles machen, wenn ich die jetzt nicht gehabt hatte, 
dann wtiBte ich nicht wie das gegangen ware. Ich hatte ja das Kind nicht irgendwo 
hingegeben. Das hatt ich nicht gemacht. Dann hatte ich mir einen anderen Mann suchen 
miissen. Irgendwie. Aber so war man da unabhangig und ich wollte auch nicht mehr.’ 
(849)
(24) Resp: Also das war auch so’ne Ubergangsphase, wo’s uns eben auch finanziell sehr 
schlecht ging. Wo ich eben fur meine Mutter zahlen sollte, und ich sie auch nicht 
hangenlassen mochte. Und dann ist die aus dem Grunde bei uns, anderthalb oder zwei 
Jahre hat sie gewohnt bei uns. Dann war ihr geholfen, und sie half mir, indem sie den 
Jungen versorgte, nich. ...Aber das machte ich wieder irgendwo, daB es also diesen Kreis 
hatte, nicht.... Und dann muBte meine Mutter nach Bremen zuriick. Da war ja auch mein 
Neffe, der irgendwie auch versorgt werden muBte. Denn da traten dann Probleme auf mit 
der Krankheit meiner Schwester wieder. Und das war schon ein Grund, daB sie da - da 
wurde sie mehr gebraucht als bei uns dann, nich. Dann haben wir’s, wie gesagt, so 
gemacht, daB ich ihr denn heimlich Geld gab. Und- das durfte nicht bekannt werden... 
Int: Wie bekannt werden, von der Behorde her? Resp: Ja. Sie kriegte j a Untersttitzung.... 
Und wir brauchten ja nicht fur sie aufkommen. Und wie wir das nun privat machten, das 
ging j a keinen was an, nich. (130)
(25) ‘Ich hab mein Kind dadurch wenig gesehen. Meine Schwiegermutter hat das so an 
sich gebunden. Wenn ich abends heimkam, war’s dunkel, im Winter... Ich hab das Kind
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dann samstags abends geholt, und dann kam meine Schwiegermutter sonntags mittags 
schon wieder und hat’s schon wiedergeholt... Weil montags nicht so viel zu tun war, bin 
ich dann montags zu Hause geblieben. Aber dann muBte ich noch um mein Kind 
kampfen. Dann hat sie immer gesagt: „ach, Du hast doch Hausarbeit. Mach das mal in 
Ruhe“’ (513)
(26) ‘Da haben die Kinder, so gesehen, mich nicht entbehrt. Die GroBmutter war an 
Mutter’s Stelle da, und wie ne GroBmutter zu den Enkelchen ist, weiB ja jeder. Da haben 
die nichts vermiBt. Aber ich sag immer: Haltet Eure Kinder in den ersten Jahren selbst in 
der Hand. Ich weiB es nicht... So, wenn man alter wird, dann denkt man: Ach ja, die 
schonsten Jahre haste dann doch all nicht so gehabt mit den Kindem, wie andere Frauen 
das damals hatten, woll.’ (516)
Chapter 7
(27) ‘Ich hab ihr das so oft gesagt, nich, ich sag, mensch, sag ich, gerade jetzt diese Jahre, 
dein Junge, nich, ich sag, du versaumst die schonste Zeit! Ich sag, wenn der erst zur 
Schule geht, dann ist das was anderes. Dann kannst du auch wieder arbeiten gehen. Tja, 
nun hab ich aber den guten Job und den soil ich nun aufgeben? Wer weiB, ob ich den 
wiederkrieg, und- so geht das denn los, nich. Also da kann man ganz schlecht was zu 
sagen.’ (809)
(28) ‘Also ich, ich rate auch -  also unser Sohn, der hat jetzt seit 6 Monaten haben wir ein 
Enkelkind. Und die Frau, die ist auch Beamtin, die ist an der Bahn beschaftigt. Und weil 
sie auch im Haus wohnen, sind die Eltem dabei, und ich sag immer: gib Deinen Beruf 
nicht auf. Vor alien Dingen, wo sie Beamtin ist. Sie profitiert ja nachher davon, nicht. Sie 
kann mit Kind j a arbeiten. Sicher, ich meine, sie brauchte's nicht. Unser Sohn verdient 
gut, aber trotzdem.’ (840)
(29) ‘Ich mein, wir suchten 'ne Tagesmutter fur ihn. Ich mein, daB ich nun zu Hause bin, 
im Moment, das ist Gltickssache... Naja, und da bin ich dann, wie sie sagte, sie findet 
keinen, da bin ich halt mitgegangen, und dann haben wirklich Tagesmutter gesehen, da 
hab ich gesagt: Nee. Nicht im Leben! ’ (822)
(30) Resp: Heute mach ich in vielen Dingen das, was ich will. Ich habe mich zwar zur Zeit 
ziemlich eingesperrt. Ich hab morgens mein Enkelkind, von sieben Uhr bis mittags 
halbeins... Int: Aber ich hor so, daB Ihnen das doch ein biBchen viel ist, daB sie nun jeden 
Tag auch noch Ihren Enkelsohn hier haben. Resp: Ich hab nicht viel Zeit fur mich. 
Absolut nicht. Und ich ftihl mich fn biBchen- eingesperrt. Sie haben mich j a erst geffagt 
ein Jahr, und als das Jahr rum war...Int: Aber daB sie [Schwiegertochter] jetzt arbeitet, das 
finden Sie richtig? Resp: Das find ich ganz in Ordnung, ja. Ja, nun, ich hab mich dadurch 
selber eingesperrt, das ist ein biBchen lange von morgens um sieben bis mittags halbeins. 
Nun ist das so, daB mein Sohn auch Schichtdienst hat.... aber ich kann j a trotzdem, ich 
kann kein Seminar mitmachen und nichts. Ich muB ja immer wieder da sein, nicht. Int: 
Und ihr Mann wtirde sich mit ihm alleine den Vormittag das nicht zutrauen? Resp: Nee, 
das macht der nicht geme.— Das macht mein Mann nicht geme. Da ist er auch nicht der
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Mensch nach. Int: Und Sie mogen aber nun auch nicht sagen, daB sie nun mal- Resp: Hab 
ich gesagt, hab ich gesagt. Es ist so, sie haben die Kinder haben mich gefragt, wiirdest Du 
den Jungen auch langer nehmen als ein Jahr. Da hab ich aber damit gerechnet, daB er 
jetzt, wenn er vier ist im Mai, dann in den Kindergarten kommt. Und das ist nicht 
gegeben. Bis zum Herbst und das ist mir eigentlich zu lange. Int: Und wie wollen Sie das 
nun-? Resp: Jetzt hab ich A gesagt, jetzt muB ich auch B sagen. Int: Das heifit Sie werden 
das machen bis zum Herbst? Resp: Jaa, klar, muB ich doch. Das muB ich doch machen! 
(022)
(3,) ‘Meine alteste Tochter heiratete, und dann hab ich ja schon vom Vierteljahr an 3 
Jahre lang dann wieder auf meine Enkelin aufgepaBt, von 8 bis halb3/3 Uhr nachmittags, 
und hatte somit wieder ein kleines Kind im Hause. Das hab ich 3 Jahre gemacht. Dann 
kam dieses Malheur mit der inzwischen 16jahrigen, mit der Kinderehe. Da hab ich dann 
ja auch immer alles - das Kind hab ich ja auch so quasi groBgezogen. Und dann kamen 
Schlag auf Schlag dann noch 3. Dann hab ich wieder die Kinder gehabt.... Und das ist bis 
zum heutigen Tage -  also wolln wir mal sagen, bis letzten Sonnabend so gewesen, daB 
ich immer fur die Enkelkinder da war. Jederzeit erreichbar, per Telefon: Mama, kannst 
Du? -  jetzt muB ich sagen, wo ich j a nun 62 werde, mocht ich doch 'n biBchen zur Ruhe 
kommen. Also jetzt mochte ich wirklich mal fur ne Stunde, fur 2, ist das alles in 
Ordnung. Aber nicht mehr so geme. Mit einem Mal ist SchluB, mocht nicht mehr.’ (126)
(32) ‘Ich hab nur die Wasche mitgemacht. Also 20 Jahre die Wasche, fur Schwiegervater 
fast 15 Jahre die Wasche.... Mein Gott, das zahl ich ja im Grunde gar nicht. Erst hat sie 
sie auch noch gebiigelt, auch noch gestopft. Das wurde dann eben, man hat das gar nicht 
so gemerkt, so peu a peu wurde immer irgendwas weniger. Dann mochte sie nicht mehr 
fahren, einholen. Dann machte der kleine Laden zu und denn zu X, dann war's aus. Dann 
fuhr sie schon nur noch zum Schlachter und zum Friedhof sonnabends. Ja, und denn so 
allmalich wurde das auch weniger. Und dann hat sie nur noch Eintopf gekocht, und das 
Fleisch hab ich denn so am Wochenende gemacht. Denn lieB sie alles anbrennen, dann 
ging das auch nicht mehr. ... Andere sagen immer, ja, nur dadurch werden sie 
unselbstandig, wenn man ihnen alles abnimmt. Aber kbnnen Sie das denn, wenn da - 
kommen nach Haus, und da oben ist alles angebrannt?... Die Zeit als Mutti lag war ganz 
schlimm. Da hab ich 3-4 Stunden, mehr hab ich nicht geschlafen. 20 Pfund hat das 
gebracht in dem halben Jahr bis Mutti eingeschlafen war. Und hab normal gegessen. Nur 
dieses keinen Schlaf kriegen das ist fur mich das Schlimmste dabei.’ (003)
(33) ‘Die Mutter meines Mannes lebt noch, die wird 90. Und die wohnt nur nebenan oben, 
aber die wird von uns voll versorgt und gepflegt auch mit. Und dadurch bin ich da mal 
eingesprungen... Das ist natuerlich in den letzten Monaten immer ‘n bisschen mehr 
geworden.’ (093)
(34) ‘Ich weiB es auch nicht, das war fur uns alles so selbstverstandlich. Es wurde da 
eigentlich nicht driiber geredet oder lange driiber nachgedacht. Wenn da Not war, war's 
fur uns selbstverstandlich, daB jeder von uns zuriicksteckt, und daB wir da helfen, 
genauso wiederum, als bei uns Not war, war meine Mutter da. Meine Schwester wiird’s 
sicherlich auch machen, wenn sie’s konnte. Und ich mein, mein Vater war da ein ganz 
anderer Typ, muB ich leider sagen, nich. Der hat sich nicht gekummert.’ (130)
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(35) ‘Und dann ich muB sagen, sie war mir immer treu gewesen und gut gewesen. Und 
dann war das ja auch selbstverstandlich, daB ich meine Mutter bis zu ihrem Tod auch hier 
hatte.’ (849)
(36) ‘Und ich denke, die wiirden das auch merken, wenn man das nur gezwungenerweise 
macht. Und ist auch nicht das, daB das was Gutes wird.’ (003)
(37) Resp: Ich hab meine Schwiegereltem nachher noch gepflegt. Sie waren krank. Meine 
Schwiegermutter hatte Herzinfarkt. War mein Schwiegervater 8 Wochen bei uns, und 
nachher bin ich dann dreimal die Woche immer hingefahren, hab gekocht fur sie, ich 
habe alles fur die beiden gemacht. Wir haben aber dafur gesorgt, daB sie dann auch 
hierhergezogen sind, in unsere Nahe, damit ich da auch hinkonnte, mit'm Rad 
wenigstens. Das war aber auch fur mich selbstverstandlich, daB ich das gemacht hab. Und 
sie waren naturlich sehr gliicklich, nicht, weil sie ja auch sonst kein Kind hatten, Tochter 
oder so. Int: Ja, war er der einzige Sohn? Resp: Ja...- meine Mutter ist verstorben. Dann 
hatte ich meine Tante, meine Mutter's Schwagerin, und die hatte keine Kinder. Wir waren 
stets friiher Weihnachten so - wir hatten immer GroBfamilie. Dann habe ich die 
versorgt.... Oder die hatten selber sehen miissen, wie sie zugange kommen so. Aber da 
bin ich kein Mensch nach, das kann ich nicht. Int: Also daB Sie dann mehr an sich 
gedacht hatten in dem Moment? Resp:: Hmhm, nein, das kann ich nicht. Int: Wurde das 
auch so erwartet, daB man das machte? Resp: Ach nein, das glaub ich nicht, das haben sie 
nicht erwartet. Vielleicht waren sie traurig gewesen, die Schwiegereltem, wenn ich das 
nicht gemacht hatte, aber erwartet haben sie das nicht. Int: Und war das fur Sie denn so 
ganz klar, als so diese Situation eintrat, daB Sie dann dahingehen? Resp: Ja, das war fur 
mich vollkommen klar. Das hab ich gemacht. Ich hab gesehen, das war erforderlich, und 
es war ja auch sonst niemand da. Und mein Mann hing ja auch sehr an seinen Eltem. Und 
sie haben uns ja auch viel Gutes getan so. Also das war fur mich klar. (068)
(39) ‘Vorher war die schon lange krank, daB ich also in dem Bauembetrieb noch alle 14 
Tage 4 Tage heimgefahren bin und hab die Mutter helfen pflegen, gell. Weil meine 
Schwester, die im Haus gewohnt hat, gesagt hat: Das mach ich nicht allein. Konnt sie 
auch nicht allein, gell. Und nachher, wie sie ganz gelegen hat das Jahr, da war ich noch 
offer. Da hatten wir aber nachts ne Schwester, die bei Mutter geschlafen hat, und wenn 
ich dann kam, hab ich bei der Mutter geschlafen. Und dann gab sie mir jedesmal, jeden 
Monat gab sie mir 100 Mark, und immer 20 Mark Fahrgeld, wenn ich kam. Wenn ich das 
nicht geholt hatt, war sie bos gewesen. Hatt ich nicht mehr durfen kommen, ja.’ (834)
(40) ‘Sie war dann voll pflegebediirftig. Dann hatte sie auch den Wunsch, daB sie einmal, 
wenn es geht, hier zu Hause stirbt. Da sag ich, Oma, den Wunsch erfull ich dir. Nur, 
wenn ich es nicht verantworten kann, und die war so mhig, die ist so eingeschlafen.’ 
(849)
(41) Resp: Wenn man das iiberlegt: 5mal am Tag muBte ich oft aus'm Haus, da ruber- Int: 
Zu Ihrem Schwiegervater? Resp: Ja. Und der ist nur in Windeln, und waschen und allem, 
und ein ganzes Haus da ja auch alleine. Int: Und Sie wollten aber, daB er da in dem Haus 
bleibt? Resp: Hmhm. Ich hatte es ihm mal versprochen. Solange es irgendwie moglich
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ist, diirfte er da bleiben. Int: Meine Giite. Resp: Hat man ja irgendwie geschafft. (003)
(42) ‘Und ich hab gesagt: wenn es gar nicht mehr geht, dann kommst du hierher... Auch 
meine Stiefmutter, muB ich dazu sagen, wie ich es meinem Vater versprochen hab, nich. 
Und meine Stiefmutter war sehr hart und, echt, die so'ne richtige Stiefmutter war, hatte 
nie Kinder, das kann man ihr vielleicht auch nicht vorwerfen, nich. Aber es war fur uns 
selbstverstandlich, auch fur meine Kinder. Als meine Stiefmutter in X lag, sind meine 
Kinder regelmaBig im Wechsel dahingefahren, sie zu besuchen.’ (130)
(43) Resp: Und so war meine Mutter halt, bevor ich mal gestreichelt wurde, kriegt ich 
eher’n Schlag mit dem Stock. So war es. Int: Und das hat sich dann spater auch nicht 
mehr verandert. Kann j a sein, wenn man alter wird und Abstand krieg, daB man dann 
sagt- Resp: Nein, nein, nein. Konnte nicht. Also ich hab meine Mutter noch gepflegt die 
letzte Zeit. Und denn sagten meine Kinder manches Mal, Mensch, kannst du das. Ich sag, 
komm erinnert mich nicht an ffuher. Wenn ich daran denke, denn kann ich es nicht. Ich 
muB die Zeit, die muB ich an die Seite driicken. Int: Hat sie bei Ihnen mit im Haus 
gelebt? Resp: Sie hat zeitweise hier mit gelebt. Und dann hab ich sie also ganz liebevoll 
betreut. Das muB ich sagen. (822)
(44) ‘Die hat in mir immer noch, also sie war auch so'n biBchen beherrschend.... Und da 
hatten wir mal, das war also so vier Jahren etwa, bevor-, war sie so 86, 87, da hatten wir 
mal wirklich 'ne Auseinandersetzung. Also nicht bosartig. Aber da hab ich mal gesagt, 
ich werd immer noch wie 'n Kind behandelt. Jeder wollte, mach so, mach so. Sie hatte es 
auch immer gut hier. DaB ich auch jetzt selber Oma bin, und doch auch mal 'n freier 
Mensch sein mochte. Und sag ich, ich komm mir vor, als hatt ich Fesseln an!’ (849)
(45) ‘Also ich werd 59 Jahre nachsten Montag, und fange erst an mich von meiner Mutter 
zu losen, nich. Obwohl sie noch im selben Haus wohnt.... Also ich bin jetzt so immer am 
Uben. Ich hab beispielsweise zu meiner Mutter gesagt: Hor mal zu, ich kann kann deine 
Gedanken doch nicht lesen! Ich kann das zwar, aber ich will es nicht mehr. Du hast ‘nen 
Mund und kannst sagen, wenn Du was mochtest! Ich tu jetzt nichts mehr, wenn du nicht 
zu mir sagst, daB du das und das mochtest. Ich sag, und dann priif ich noch, ob das 
angebracht ist, daB ich das tue!’ (037)
(46) Resp: Und ich bin zwar jeden Abend riibergegangen. Wir haben die dann zusammen 
ins Bett gebracht. Die muBte von einem Stuhl zum anderen getragen werden. Aber das 
war nicht meine Hauptaufgabe. Ich hab eben nur geholfen. Int: Aber wenn Sie das hatten 
machen miissen, hatten Sie das nicht mit dem Beruf vereinbaren konnen? Resp: Das kann 
man nicht, das kann man nicht, und das hatt ich auch nicht getan. Wenn ich die 
irgendwohin geschickt hatte und ware dann weiter arbeiten gegangen. Das hatte ich nicht 
gemacht. Obgleich mir das furchtbar schwergefallen ware. Meine Schwiegermutter hat 
mir Vorwiirfe gemacht, als meine Mutter alt war, und nicht mehr so gesund, daB ich 
immer weiter arbeiten gegangen bin. Hat sie mir mal Vorhaltungen gemacht und hat 
gesagt, das diirfte ich nicht tun. Denn hab ich mit dem Arzt gesprochen, da hat der 
gesagt: Ihre Mutter konnt ja allein sagen und Sie konnten in Amerika wohnen. Denn 
konnten Sie auch nichts machen. (070)
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(47) ‘Also eines im Leben war mir wichtig, nie abhangig von meinen Kindem zu sein. 
...Wie’s nachher mal wird, weiB ich nicht. Der Jiingste hat mal gesagt zur 
Schwiegertochter: „Mutter kommt nicht in ‘n Rentnerbunker.“ Wie die Jugend dann so 
spricht.... Aber ich laB mich nicht unter de Fusse kriegen.... Ich hab genug gesehen und 
von wegen hier Mutter. Wenn ich noch zehn Jahre alter, dann sagt man einfach, Mutter, 
da setz’ dich auf n Stuhl und steh nicht auf. Nee, mit mir nicht! ’ (069)
(48) ‘ Selbst unser Jtingster sagt -  ich weiB nicht, wie sie spater denken -  sagt er: Mutti, Du 
kommst nie ins Altenheim. Der hat jetzt so das Elend da miterlebt. Sie haben’s gut, ich 
hab selbst das gesehen. Aber sie haben j a nie, wo sie mit reden konnen. Also das ist das 
Traurige da ja, die Menschen brauchen ja Unterhaltung und verkummem so. Der sagt 
immer: kommst nie da - aber man weiB ja nicht, wie sie spater denken, wenn sie selbst 
‘ne Familie haben, nicht. Aber ich sag, ich werd meinen Kindem nie zur Last fallen. 
Gehen wir von selbst schon, weil wir an und ftir sich durch den Verein das kennen. Die 
gehen ziemlich alle in Altemheime so rein.’ (026)
(49) ‘Und ich wtirde doch sagen, ich verachte niemanden - und wenn jemand sagt, die 
konnen doch die Oma zu Hause behalten, bin ich die erste, die sagt, das kann man nicht 
so ohne weiteres sagen. Wenn es j emand kann und will... (aber) da kann man niemanden 
sagen, das muBt Du so machen. Und ich wie gesagt, von mir aus erwarte das auch 
nicht... Wahrend ich noch meine Eltem noch lange gepflegt hab... Aber das erwarte ich 
nicht von meinem Sohn, von ner Schwiegertochter kann man das sowieso nicht erwarten. 
Aber das hatt ich wohl auch nicht von einer Tochter erwartet. Da muB man zu stehen und 
das wollen, oder man muB es lassen, eins von beiden. Aber nicht gezwungen werden 
dazu. Und ich sag mal, ich hab alles ffeiwillig auf mich genommen. Und riickblickend 
wiird ich sagen: Ich wtird es auch noch mal so machen, wenn ich's wieder machen miiBte. 
Obwohl ich auch mal ne kurze Zeit etwas Zweifel hatte. Als mein Sohn ganz klein war, 
und meine Mutter eben so sehr krank war, daB das nicht gut war fur den kleinen Jungen. 
.. Aber trotzdem konnte ich's nicht anders machen und muBte es so durchziehen, weil ich 
das Gefuhl hatte: das muBt du so machen.’ (006)
(50) ‘Ich glaube, daB Frauen meiner Generation neben der Familie auch geme einen Bemf 
ausuben wollten. Mein Anlauf ist leider miBgliickt. Das bedauere ich sehr. Ebenfalls hatte 
ich die kleine mir ausgesprochene Rente geme mit 60 Jahren in Anspruch genommen, 
anstatt erst mit 65. Fur nichtbezahltes soziales Engagement sind wir natiirlich besonders 
geffagt.’ (857)
(51) ‘Die schreiben uns sowieso vor, was wir zu machen haben. Das ist ganz egal, wann, 
zu welcher Zeit und in welchem Regime und so. Na, weil das einfach notig war. Wir 
brauchten die ja. Und ich sag mir auch: die Frauen haben immer gearbeitet.’ (011)
(52) Resp: Dadurch daB mein Mann j a nun der alleinige Erbe war, hab ich nachher denn 
auch fast den ganzen Tag im Geschaft, aber auch als die Kinder denn nachher da waren, 
nich? ... Int: Da waren Sie ja praktisch auch berufstatig Resp: Ja, kann man sagen, aber 
ohne Entgelt. Mein Schwiegervater, der hat nich mal fur mich die Invalidenmarken ge- 
klebt. Hat gesagt, gib mal deine Karte her, fur sich selber den hochsten Satz geklebt und 
mir hat er nach 12 Jahren die Karte wieder gegeben. War nicht einmal etwas drauf
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geschehen... Ja, und dann starb mein Mann ja auch so friih und ich krieg noch keine 
Rente, also, bei mir wird sich das auch vielleicht auf300 Mark, also ich hab' schon mein 
halbes Haus ungefahr aufgegessen, nich? Ja, also die Niedrigrenten, die sind einfach zu 
niedrig. Ich finde, da wird so ilberall so viel Geld reingepumpt, da sollten se da mal was 
fur tun, damit die Leute nicht zum Sozialamt miissen. Also wirklich, nich? (074)
(53) ‘Meine Mutter hat bei meinem Vater in der Werkstatt mitgeholfen.... Und da haben 
meine Eltem allerdings den Fehler gemacht und den meine Mutter auch immer bedauert, 
daB man fur sie keine Beitrage gezahlt hat. Also mein Vater war selbstandig, die haben 
damals geglaubt, wenn sie sparen und sich noch 'n Haus bauen, ist das die 
Altersversorgung... Und dann stellte sich heraus, daB dieses Haus so wenig an Miete 
einbrachte. ... Aber mein Vater bekam dann j a wenigstens 'ne kleine Rente. Und als 
meine Mutter dann dahinter kam, da hat sie eben immer wieder, ist sie immer wieder 
davon angefangen, hatten wir doch bloB fur mich auch etwas eingezahlt... Ja, ich hab's ja 
bei meinen Eltem gesehen, wie es so lauft, wenn man nicht versichert ist. Aber damals, 
als wir heirateten, oder irgendwann danach, wurde mein Mann jabeamtet. Und dann hab' 
ich mir immer wieder gesagt, also du, fur dich ist es nicht so wichtig. Ich wuBte ja auch 
nicht, was und wie ich das wieder anfangen sollte. Und ich hab'aber auch nicht dariiber 
nachgedacht, daB man vielleicht mal so auf der StraBe steht, daB das mit 'ner Scheidung 
endet.’ (121)
(54) ‘So daB ich doch jetzt meine Monate da voll hab, daB ich jetzt wenigstens ein 
Taschengeld an Rente habe. Mehr will man ja nicht. DaB das vielleicht spater auch mal 
vom Staat anerkannt wird, was man da so geleistet hat.’ (126)
(55) ‘Aber ich wtirde immer sagen und jeder Frau sagen: Klebt Eure Mindestanspriiche an 
Rente weiter, damit ihr selber nicht abhangig werdet oder nicht so viel schlechter dasteht 
wie der Mann nachher!’ (037)
Chapter 8
(56) ‘Wir hatten ein Geschaft zu Hause. Sie war dann oft ganztags dort, obwohl sie halt 
versucht hat, das irgendwie mit den Kindem wieder auszugleichen, nachmittags halt zu 
Hause. Und dadurch, daB wir 'ne Oma halt im Haushalt hatten, ist das nicht so 
aufgefallen, ne. Also haben wir Kinder eigentlich nicht so direkte Entbehrungen 
gelitten.... Und -  ja, die Oma hat 'nen sehr groBen Teil abgedeckt: Kochen, Kinder 
betreuen so .... also fur mich hat die Oma 'ne sehr groBe Rolle gespielt. Die hat 'nen sehr 
groBen Ausgleich gebracht.’ (W 516)
(57) ‘Und ich weiB also um die Konflikt die meine Mutter mit ihrer ungeliebten 
Schwiegermutter im Haushalt. hatte, was also jahrelang auch zu Hause zu furchterlichen 
StreBsituationen und- zu schweren und groBen Auseinandersetzungen, sowohl zwischen 
meinem Vater und meiner Mutter, als auch zwischen meiner Mutter und meiner Oma 
gefuhrt hat, und wir Kinder letztendlich auch davon in irgend' ner Form betroffen waren. 
Das war halt irgendwie immer so, daB man auch Partei beziehen muBte. Und da war die 
Mutter und da war die Oma, die man auch gem hatte.’ (M 054)
313
(58) ‘Es ist so'n Stiick Erwartung, die in mich gesetzt wird, weil dieses Haus hier gehort 
meinem Mann, und das hat er damals gekriegt kurz vor unserer Hochzeit mit Wohnrecht 
auf Lebenszeit fur Schwiegereltem und schon irgendwo mit diesem Hintergedanken, daB 
wenn mal einer nicht mehr ist, der andere eben halt -  die haben ihr eigenes Zimmer da 
oben.’ (W 831)
(59) Resp: Ich hab ‘ne gewisse Verpflichtung, sagen wir mal so. Meine Mutter hat ‘n 
Riesending hier und mein Bruder ist schon langere Zeit arbeitslos ... Ich untersttitze halt 
meine Mutter so gut wie moglich.... wir haben umgebaut hier im Haus, unten, das hab1 
ich also viel allein gemacht mehr oder weniger am Wochenende oder abends, mit 'nem 
Freund von mir, mein Bmder hat geholfen, haben wir das ehemalige Geschaft von 
meinem Vater umgebaut und 'ne Wohnung erst einmal aufgemacht, da Dim: Fiir Ihre 
Mutter dann. Resp: No, zum Vermieten hier... Dim: Ist es denn so, daB Ihre Mutter auch 
von der Miete leben kann weiter, oder ist das jetzt kein Aspekt, daB sie dann- Resp: Ja, 
gut, das ist 'ne Einnahmequelle. ..ich untersttitze sie halt bei irgendwelchen rechtlichen 
Angelegenheiten oder sonstwie Belangen, wo ich halt aufgrund meiner Ausbildung halt 
besser mich auskenne als sie ... erwarten tut sie's nicht, daB ich mich da 'n biBchen 
kummere, oder mein Bruder, das erwartet sie nicht, ist aber fur mich eigentlich 
selbstverstandlich. (M 840)
(60) ‘Und ich wtiBte, wenn ich diesen Schritt [Scheidung] gewagt hatte oder gemacht 
hatte, daB meine Mutter mich aufgefangen hatte. Aufgefangen, daB ich erst mal gewuBt 
hatte wohin; daB ich also mit Kind und Kegel hatte vor der Tur steh'n konnen -  konnt' ich 
heute noch vor der Tur steh'n -, und daB ohne zu fragen einfach akzeptiert wtirde, daB ich 
da ware. Ja, so schatz' ich meine Mutter ein.’ (W 845)
(61) ‘Also wenn ich meine Mutter nich' hatte, und sagen wir mal -  wenn die sich nich' 
bereit erklart hatte, also -  ja -  auf S. aufzupassen oder ihn zu betreuen, also ware das 
nich' moglich. Weil ich ihn sicherlich nich' woanders hingeben hatte, dafur bin ich also 
zu lange weg, oder dadurch, daB ich ganztags arbeite ... Wir haben versucht, ihn mit 
dreieinhalb also schonmal in den Kindergarten zu geben, um auch meine Mutter zu 
entlasten, damit er ihr nich' da von morgens bis abends im Wohnzimmer rumhockt, ...also 
sie hat ja auch eigene Interessen auch. Und das hat nich' geklappt, da war er total 
tiberfordert... Und dann hat sie gesagt: naj a, gut -  wenn's denn unbedingt sein muB, nech. 
Da sie ja auch immer viel Mitleid mit dem Kind hat, weil ich ja so'ne Rabenmutter bin, 
damit das Kind j a nicht zu Schaden kommt, hat sie sich denn dazu bereit erklart. Aber ich 
denke, vielleicht hat sie sich auch gefreut, daB sie jemanden dann hat, daB sie wieder 'ne 
Aufgabe hat.’ (W 809)
(62) ‘Ich hatte das so manchmal schon ganz geme, daB sie nicht so spontan, wenn ihr das 
paBt kommt, sondem schon mit uns abgesprochen oder auch zu festen Zeiten, damit das 
fur die Kinder auch einfacher ist, daB sie wissen, mittwochs kommt die Oma oder so... 's 
ist auch mein eigenes Interesse, weil ich eigentlich auch mochte, daB ja, die Kinder dann 
ne Oma haben, die haben schon keinen Opa und ich denke eigentlich auch, daB ihr das 
Spass machen muBte.... Manchmal hab ich so den Eindruck, ihre Familie ist ihr gar nicht 
so wichtig.... Ok, mir war mein Opa und meine Oma halt sehr wichtig, vielleicht kommt 
das auch daher. Und dann denk ich hatt meine Frau mal ‘n biBchen -  Pause.’ (M 115)
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(63) ‘Also Familie ist, ist, mit denen kann man sich auch mal streiten oder, oder diskutieren 
oder sonstwas, auch iiberwerfen und jahrelang anschweigen. Aber es ist Familie. Die sind 
doch immer irgendwo noch erreichbar oder ... wahrend alles andere dann oft endgiiltig 
ist, nich.’ (W 857)
(64) Resp: Wenn wir uns treffen, sprechen wir nur tiber Banalitaten, aber jeder macht sich 
furchterlich Sorgen um den anderen. Also wenn -  als diese Geschichte mit der Scheidung 
meiner Schwester war, dann liefen hier die Telefone heiB und - Dim: Wie kann man sie 
unterstiitzen, oder? Resp: Ja, ja, und dann wird iiberlegt und geredet und Meinungen dazu 
gesagt... Aber wenn wir uns treffen, ist also - also daB mal wirklich so richtig 
personliche Gesprache gefuhrt werden, das ist ganz selten. (W 546d)
(65) ‘Niemand belastigt den anderen mit seinen Gefuhlen quasi, wiird' ich mal so auf den 
harten Punkt bringen... Was ich bei meinen Leuten sehe ist: das FamilienbewuBtsein mit 
dem Alter wachst und auch die Nahe zu den Eltem jeweils wachst halt. Auch nie richtig 
gekiindigt war. Also ich kenn' kaum jemanden, der so richtig 'n Schnitt mit seinen Eltem 
macht, sich total verkracht hat mit seinen Eltem halt so. ... Die Leute reisen auch 
teilweise zu ihren Eltem immer noch und da 'ne enge Verbindung auch ist.... und da auch 
gewisse Verantwortungsgefuhle aufkommen.’ (M 011)
(66) ‘Das waren die sogenannten Trummerfrauen... die wirklich ihr, in dieser Generation 
oft ihr eigenes Leben gefuhrt haben, ganz einfach, weil sie muBten... das war eigentlich 
das, was ich immer so an ihr bewundert hab', ihre Selbstandigkeit, diese, ihr ganzes 
Leben zu meistem wirklich alleine und da irgendwie ohne sich nach jemandem zu 
richten.... meine Mutter hat, glaub' ich, meine GroBmutter nie verstanden. Sie hat das nie 
so empfunden. Sie hat einfach nur immer die Arbeit gesehen, die sie gemacht hat und 
meine Mutter muBte als Kind natiirlich auch viel dadmnter leiden und auch viel arbeiten. 
Meiner Mutter ging's, glaub' ich, einfach nur dadrum, es besser zu haben, also daB wir 
als Kinder es spater mal gut haben, 'ne gesicherte Existenz und in, materiell, auf 
materielle Sachen beschrankt. Das ist, glaub' ich, der Unterschied zwischen meiner Oma, 
meiner Mutter und mir. Bei meiner Mutter geht's um materielle Sachen, bei meiner Oma 
und bei mir ging's vielleicht, geht's vielleicht mehr um ideelle Sachen.’ (W 508)
(67) Dim: Wiirden Sie sagen, daB es so was wie Familientradition gibt dann in dieser wenn 
sie das jetzt alles so Resp: Von der einen Seite meines Vaters ja. Das waren eigentlich 
alles Frauen, auch meine GroBmutter, die dominierend waren; die also, auch was ich so 
gelesen hab', immer ihr Eigenleben gefuhrt, auf irgend'ne Art ihr Eigenleben gefuhrt 
haben, diese Frauen, j a. Und ich glaub', ich schlag' also eher in diese Seite rein wie in die 
Seite meiner Mutter. (W 845)
(68) ‘Ich fang jetzt an zu sortieren: was find' ich gut und was find' ich schlecht... Meine 
Geschwister sagen, ich war' sehr stark auf meine Mutter gepragt. Ich merk' das auch in 
manchen Sachen, wenn das nur im Haushalt ist, Kleinigkeiten. Wobei ich so vom 
Gedankengut eigentlich mehr zu meinem Vater hin neige. Mehr so'n biBchen in die 
liberalere Richtung, daB ich denke, man muB sich erstmal alles angucken, nicht einfach 
alle Traditionen ubemehmen, nur weil's gemacht wurde. Fallt aber schwer, weil durch die 
Erziehung das in einem drinnen steckt, das kann man also nicht abschiitteln so einfach. 
Der Wunsch ist da, und man macht es vielleicht auch. Aber immer wieder begleitet von
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diesem Vergleich.’ (W 516)
(69) ‘Und das hab' ich von meiner Mutter, das ist ganz klar. Ne Frau hat ihr eigenes Geld. 
Von meinem Vater hab' ich so mitgekriegt: 'ne Frau hat 'ne Ausbildung, oder meine 
Madchen kriegen die gleiche Ausbildung wie mein Sohn, so .... Und das ist mir wichtig. 
Und was ich auch mitnehme, ist die VerlaBlichkeit meiner Eltem. Also das ist eben so, 
also wenn - bei allem, was man gegen sie sagen kann -, wenn's irgendwie kneift, also 
sowohl bei ihren Freunden als auch bei ihren Kindem, dann sind die da, und man kann 
sich auf sie verlassen. Und dann helfen sie auch, egal, was sie da nun von denken.’ (W 
Oil)
(70) ‘Ich [hab] also schon sehr friih dagegen rebelliert hab', daB ich ein Madchen bin, ja, 
und also gezetert hab' bei dem Gedanken, daB mir Briiste wachsen konnten. Ja, und auch 
von daher also gar nicht wahrhaben wollte, daB ich meinetwegen in Sprachen begabt bin, 
also gegen das Betreiben meiner Mutter dann auch eben in der Oberstufe den 
naturwissenschaftlichen Zweig gewahlt hab', und nicht etwa den sprachlichen... Das war 
eben immer meine Mutter, die mir zugesetzt hat... Insbesondere, weil ich meiner Mutter 
auch in gewissen Punkten sehr ahnlich bin, und auch mich selber haufig -  ja, also in 
inneren Konflikten gefunden habe, wenn ich eben meine Seiten, die meiner Mutter 
gleichen, in mir bekampft hab', ja.’ (W 700)
(71) ‘Ich wiird sagen, daB ich mich bemuht hab', wenn es denn moglich war, nicht nur ein 
abwesender Vater zu sein...wobei festzustellen is', daB ich eher dazu neige, die Rolle 
meines Vaters zu wiederholen, wahrend also die P. da eher ausgleichend ist, und die auch 
mich zurecht stupft z.B., daB sie eben sagt: du muBt die Kinder emster nehmen und du 
muBt die Kinder fur voller nehmen, kannst nicht immer den Autoritaren raushangen 
lassen. Also da konnte ich fur mich sagen, muB ich immer verflucht aufpassen, daB ich da 
nich' die Rolle meines Vater weiterspiele.’ (M 054)
(72) ‘ Ja, tiber bewuBte BeschluBlage, ich will das anders als meine Eltem, sowas nicht. Das 
war einfach, also diese Abgrenzung hab' ich nie das Gefuhl notig zu haben, sondem es 
war fur mich logisch. Also, ich hab' auch nicht das Gefuhl, ich bin jetzt 'n besonders 
emanzipierter Mann, weil ich das so mach', sondem ich fmde das selbstverstandlich und 
brauch' da keine Mannergruppe oder G. keine Frauengruppe, um das irgendwie 
aufzuarbeiten. Das ist einfach so... Ich hatte Dnen festes Weltbild, was ich fur mich 
verfolgt hab, aber nicht im Gegensatz zu dem Leben meiner Eltem gesehen hab. ’ (M 814)
(73) Resp: Meine Eltem sind sehr streng katholisch.... Und in dem Sinne sind wir naturlich 
auch ein biBchen streng erzogen worden, ob das nun Beziehungen mit Freunden war oder 
nee, also ne offene Aussprache gab es auch zu Hause nicht... Meine Tochter konnte auch 
Fragen stellen [Sexualitat], sie war dann auch bereit daruber mit mir zu sprechen. Dim: 
Also ist hat die Veranderung hat dann bei Ihnen eigentlich stattgefunden, obwohl Sie so 
erzogen worden sind Resp: Nee, bei meinen Eltem hat die Veranderung stattgefunden, 
nicht bei mir. Ich mein, meine Eltem haben uns zwar dementsprechend erzogen, aber das 
war nicht so, wir wollten ja daruber sprechen, nur wir konnten nicht. Wir waren also 
relativ frei, auch wenn unsere Eltem uns relativ streng erzogen haben, aber durch das 
Umfeld, das soziale Umfeld, wo wir aufgewachsen sind, Freunde, Bekannte usw usf., 
Schule, war das also relativ frei. Und da war auch dieser Umbruch dann so Ende der 60er
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Jahre und das war ja im grundegenommen der groBe Ausbruch dann damals, wo man sich 
befreite von alien Zwangen und so, ne. Und das, das war also, daB jeder seine Meinung 
auBem konnte und daB man, das war fur meine Eltem war das unheimlich schlimm. (W 
546b)
(74) ‘Ich wollte auf keinen Fall so leben wie sie. Also das wuBte ich von klein auf 
eigentlich. Ich wollte also nie immer nur zu Hause sein, so wie sie mir das halt 
vorgemacht hat... Aber das ist halt - ich denk' - wenn man das so vorgelebt kriegt, man 
verinnerlicht das halt irgendwie... in den 70er Jahren in 'ner Schule kriegt man sowas mit, 
daB man eben aussteigen sollte, wollte, muBte. Da war das schon bald verpont, wenn man 
das nich' tat. Und da bin ich halt mitgegangen. Aber das ist eigentlich total zerissen, und 
ich glaube, das is' auch 'n Dilemma unserer Generation, daB wir wirklich also von 
unseren Eltem und GroBeltem noch irgendwie so ganz tradierte Sachen mitgekriegt 
haben, die wir auch irgendwo in uns haben und uns auch wtinschen, aber eben 
gleichzeitig von auBen dieser Bruch kommt. Und grade als Frau - denke ich - is' man da 
total- also schwimmt man irgendwo auch. Weil also ja, standig eigentlich diese 
Entscheidung, Bemf oder Mutter... so diese ganz feinen inneren Strukturen, die - denke 
ich - sind genau so bei mir. Ich erschrecke da auch oft driiber, daB es sich denn so 
wiederholt.’ (W 821)
(75) Resp: Meine Mutter hatte 'ne sehr negative Einstellung ihren Schwiegereltem 
gegeniiber, sehr negativ. Und - es war 'ne Zeit, da hat mein GroBvater, als mein Vater 
gestorben ist, mit meiner GroBmutter, bei meiner Mutter gewohnt, 'ne. ... Und das hat 
immer Wut und Krach gegeben, das hat keinen Zweck gehabt. Und dann ist der 
GroBvater zu mir. Dim: War' das damals zur Debatte gestanden, daB Ihr GroBvater auch 
zu Ihrem Bruder geht, oder war das dann also sozusagen, als Ihre Mutter ausgefallen ist, 
klar, daB Sie das tibemehmen wtirden so als Enkeltochter? Resp: Ich glaub', da hat sich 
keiner Gedanken drum gemacht (lacht), das war so. Ich weiB, ich kann mich noch 
unheimlich gut dran erinnem, mein Mann hat dann also wirklich mal gestreikt und hat 
gesagt, du, dein Bmder, der kann das genauso gut mal machen. Und da kam der auch an 
dem Abend noch. Und da sagte er, Du K. jetzt geh Du mit mir, und dann holen wir den 
Opa aus'm Bett! So. Neuja, der ist dann auch mit, und ich hab' nur, ich hab' auf einmal 
kam jemand die Treppe runter. Ich hab' gedacht, der, als wenn jemand hinter dem her 
ware. Und dann springt der mit voller Montur unter die Dusche. Dim: Mit voller Montur 
(lacht)? E: Mit voller Montur. Und zwar die Urinflasche war umgefallen und ihm fiber 
die Schuhe... Das war' ich nie vergessen, ne. Das war also 'n Beispiel, ne. Und von Stund' 
an, der hat, mein Mann hat ihn auch nie mehr geffagt, ne. Das war einfach so. Der kann's 
nicht, und das hat auch keinen Zweck. (W 845)
(76) ‘Ja sicher, hab' ich mir schon Gedanken daruber gemacht. Und entweder hab' ich's 
verdrangt oder bin zum Ergebnis gekommen, das gibt da keine - keine befriedigende 
Losung. Also was ich eigentlich ungem machen wtirde, ware jetzt nach Hause zu ziehen, 
weil meine Eltem pflegebedtirftig werden. Weil das wtirde bedeuten ‘nen Jobwechsel, 
das wurde bedeuten, das ganze Lebensumfeld zu andem.’ (M 508)
(77) ‘Das erste, was nattirlich immer erwartet wird, ist Dankbarbeit, nich. Sofem's 'nen 
Gmnd daftir gab. Wenn man jetzt sowieso mit seinen Eltem ewig zerstritten war, denn 
wird da keiner nach ffagen. Aber wenn man eben ein gutes Verhaltnis gehabt hat, werden
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die Eltem vielleicht nicht ausdriicklich, aber auch alle die Verwandten, die da drum 
herumsitzen und das ganze nur betrachten, die werden irgendwo erwarten, daB man sich 
dadrum kiimmert und das dann zuriickzahlt, was man von den Eltem mal an Zuwendung 
und Investitionen bekommen hat. Das glaub' ich schon, daB dieser Dmck da irgendwo ein 
biBchen hintersitzt.’ (W 811)
(78) ‘Ich hab auch das Gefuhl hab, ich schulde meinen Eltem eine ganze Menge, weil sie 
mich lange unterstiitzt haben, weil sie mir ein gutes Leben lange ermoglicht haben, mich 
jetzt auch immer noch untersttitzen.’ (M 011)
(79) ‘Das ist auch immer 'ne Frage der Gegenseitigkeit. Kommt drauf an, wie gesagt, ich 
hab' meine Eltem sonst iiberwiegend als tolerant und fursorglich und hingebungsvoll 
irgendwie erfahren und ware bereit, das ihnen auch wiederzugeben, auch wenn ich weiB, 
daB sie so alt werden.’ (W 710)
(80) ‘Ich hab' mich nicht getraut, irgendwie zu ffagen, ob sie da sich irgendwo angemeldet 
haben. Mein Vater hat vor Jahren mal von einem Seniorenwohnhaus gesprochen... weil 
ich hab' dann schon Angst, daB dann so kommt - also wenn man dann so Vorschlage 
macht, daB sie dann denken, man will sich nicht um sie kummem...Weihnachten fahr' ich 
hin, vielleicht sprech' ich das dann einfach nochmal an. Weil meine Schwester, die hatte 
mich auch gebeten, ich soli sie doch mal ansprechen, weil sie sich auch nicht traut. Weil, 
sie haben das eben eigene Haus, und wenn die Kinder aus dem Haus sind, hatten sie 
sogar Platz. Also sie ist diejenige, die so betroffen und da auch so'n biBchen Angste hat. 
... Und wenn sie das naturlich jetzt ansprechen, dann ist schon was anderes, als wenn ich 
das anspreche. Weil, ich bin so weit weg, ich kam' zunachst mal fur so'ne Dauerpflege 
gar nicht infrage... Aber ich denk', das ist schon 'n Thema, was man mit den Eltem 
rechtzeitig besprechen muB einfach.’ (W 546d)
(81) ‘Sie sagt dann immer: och, dann geh' ich in's Altersheim. Obwohl ich genau weiB, daB 
sie da gar nicht hin will. Und wir sagen immer: „du, wenn das ansteht, dann miissen wir 
zusammen gucken, dann kommst du halt zu uns, ist gar kein Problem.“ „Na, na, nach X 
geh' ich nicht!“ ... Das muB man dann verhandeln, wenn's ansteht... werden wir beide 
unsere Bedingungen sagen, also Mutter ihre und wir unsere und dann gucken, was uns 
zusammenbringen konnte.’ (M 834)
(82) Resp: Wir hatten vor drei Jahren den Fall, daB mein Opa 'n Pflegefall war... Und es 
war einfach im Grunde genommen 'ne ganz schreckliche Zeit, was allerdings auch damit 
zusammenhing, daB viele Dinge in dieser Familie einfach so quergelaufen sind seit 30 
Jahren. D. h. es wurde so wenig geredet, wenig wichtige Dinge geredet, was dann 
naturlich in so 'ner Situation, einfach nur noch zu 'ner halben Katastrophe flihrte. Also ich 
denk', wenn da von Anfang an auch mehr Kommunikation ist und, muB es ja nicht so 
schlimm werden. Aber das Thema bereitet mir eigentlich Bauchschmerzen, weil ich so 'n 
biBchen das Gefuhl auch hab', es wurde an mir hangenbleiben, weil mein Bmder da so 'n 
biBchen, sag' ich mal einfach, gestortes Verhaltnis hat... Int: Uber das Thema hast Du 
auch mit Deinem Bruder wahrscheinlich noch nicht gesprochen? Resp: Ja klar, doch, 
ansatzweise; ah, oder sagen wir mal so, ich teil' ihm eher meine Befurchtungen mit so, 
oder daB ich mir mal daruber Gedanken gemacht hab' in dem ganzen Zusammenhang 
auch. Und also, was ich einfach auch gelemt hab' aus der Sache mit meinem Opa ist, daB
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man so was naturlich eh nicht planen kann. (W 707)
(83) Resp: Im Idealfall war's naturlich so, daB meine Eltem nach X ziehen. (lacht) DaB sie 
da 'nen Haus kaufen. Int: Zu Deiner Schwester oder wie? Resp: Ja ... Mit dem Pflegen, 
ich denk' mir, daB wird hochstwahrscheinlich doch viel darauf hinauslaufen, daB meine 
Schwester das mitmacht. Und das heiBt nicht, daB ich mich da irgendwie ausklinke, aber 
rein jetzt vom vom Verhaltnis, das wir auch zueinander haben. Meine Schwester ist 
einfach wesentlich offer da und hat auch 'nen das beste Verhaltnis zu meiner Mutter. Aber 
ich denk' mir, daB ich eh auf jeden Fall da auch eh mich mit drum kiimmem will. Int: 
Was war denn, sagen wir mal, das Maximum was Du dir vorstellen konntest? Resp: Ich 
kann mir da wirklich nix vorstellen.... Also die Mutter mit nach Hause nehmen, ich konnt 
mir vorstellen, daB da meine Frau dann auch dicke Backen macht. Sie hat j a auch noch ne 
Mutter... sie ist die einzige Tochter... Int: Es klang jetzt so'n biBchen durch, eh, daB also 
Deine Schwester sich da auch eher beteiligt und dann sagst Du jetzt, Deine Frau ist die 
einzige Tochter. Meinst Du, daB die so - die Frauen da so'n biBchen zustandig sind? 
Resp: WeiBt Du, ich denk' aber auch irgendwo, muB man vielleicht auch so gucken, 
wohin die Mutter jetzt das Verhaltnis auch hat. Also, wenn das Telefon klingelt einmal 
am Tag, dann ist das die (Schwieger)Mutter... Aber darum, aus dem Grande wird's 
hochstwahrscheinlich auch so sein, daB die beiden Briider vom Typ her auch eher sagen 
wiirden: Du wohnst da, dann kannst Du Dich doch auch 'nen biBchen mehr um Deine 
Mutter kummem. Und das ist auch meistens so. Das hort man also. Das ist nicht, eh, ich 
weiB nicht, das ist hochstwahrscheinlich immer noch so in den Kopfen ziemlich drin. 
MuB ich bei mir auch irgendwo sagen, daB meine Schwester im Grande genommen die 
sinnvollste da ware, weil sie hat das beste Verhaltnis zu meiner Mutter. (M 816)
(84) Resp: Also mein Mann, der ist ja dann immer so der Meinung - ich mein', muB ja 
meine Meinung auBem - aber dann sagt er - ich kann das ja nicht. Ich bin ja ein 
unheimlich geftihlsbetonter Mensch. Ich wtirde also alles liegen- und stehenlassen, wenn 
was ware. Aber mein Mann, der sagt also: Deine Eltem haben nie was fur uns getan. Sie 
sind immer nur nach A. gelaufen, dann konnen sie dafur auch gradestehen, ne. Weil, 
meine Mutter - also wenn meine Schwester jemanden fur ihre Tochter brauchte, war 
meine Mutter immer da.... Dim: Also so daB Sie aber jedenfalls zur Pflegebediirftigkeit 
sagen, Sie wtirden sich da erstmal nicht zustandig fuhlen? Resp: Ich wtirde mich schon 
dafur zustandig fuhlen, es sind ja nun mal meine Eltem. Also die Verantwortung 
iibemehm' ich schon. Nur, wenn ich jetzt vom reinen - ja, wie soil ich das sagen? - jetzt 
vom vom - von der Situation bedingt her sehe, der Ordnung halber, ne, will ich mal so 
sagen, ... A, Du hast den groBten Nutzen davon gehabt, also trag' auch die groBte 
Verantwortung!... Ich denke mir mal, daB das vielleicht so ablaufen wird wie das bei 
meinen GroBeltem war... das kommt immer auf die Situation, ob man das machen kann, 
ob man jetzt wirklich sagen kann: ja gut, wir nehmen die mal ein paar Wochen, aber 
hauptsachlich sind sie bei dir, ne, so.. . [oder] wenn man das so regeln kann, daB man 
dann eben da hinfahrt, daB man sich abwechselt... in der Pflege, dann denk' ich, kann man 
das schon irgendwie hauslich regeln. Denn es ist ja nun mal so, daB man sich zu Hause 
immer am wohlsten ftihlt. (W 546b)
(85) ‘Also gesetzt den Fall, es kommt hart auf hart, also ich wtirde auf meine 
Berafstatigkeit verzichten... Das Problem setzt ja dann erst ein - sagen wir mal - wenn
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entweder jemand stark pflegebedtirftig ist oder entweder bettlagerig ist oder sonstige 
Gebrechen h a t... Und meine Mutter hat jetzt gesagt, also aufgrund dessen, daB sie das 
also j a nun live da hat jeden Tag, hat sie gesagt: also mein Gott nochmal, also wenn mir 
das passiert, also nimm da bloB keine Rticksicht drauf und steck mich in irgend'n Heim. 
Also sagt sie: bloB ja sowas nich1. Also sie sagt: das ist -  machst dir dein Leben kaputt, 
das ist also wirklich, die Belastung also ist immens, und tu dir das nich' an. Gut, das sagt 
sie jetzt, nech? Das is' naturlich immer so'ne Sache, ob man das jetzt aus so'ner Situation 
heraus sagt oder dann selber betroffen is'. Wobei man sich ja auch immer einbildet, oder 
ich bilde mir ein, naja - wenn das denn meiner Mutter passiert, also irgendwie kam' ich 
schon mit ihr klar. Ich denke, man hat vielleicht zu der eigenen Mutter auch noch 'ne 
andere Beziehung, als zu seiner Schwiegermutter... Also versuchen wtirde ich es, und 
wenn's gar nich' anders geht, j a gut, dann bleibt einem da nichts anderes tibrig, als so'ne 
Heimunterbringung in Erwagung zu ziehen.’ (W 809)
(86) Resp: Wir sind regelmaBig in Kontakt miteinander, ja, und wenn's dann zu 'ner 
Pflegesituation kommen wtirde, ich wiirde sie nicht hierhemehmen, so, das haben wir 
also auch schon besprochen. Int: Mit Deiner Mutter so besprochen? Resp: Hmhm. sie hat 
ihre eigene Mutter auch im Pflegeheim gehabt. .. Int: Macht Dir das so ein schlechtes 
Gewissen zu sagen: also dann geb' ich meine Mutter ins Heim. Eigentlich sollte ich sie zu 
Hause pflegen. Resp: Das nicht. Das ist eher so, was ich schwierig finden wiirde ware, 
wenn - oder mit der Tatsache, daB ich hier in Bremen wohnen geblieben bin und 
weiterhin in Kontakt mit ihr, immer im Kontakt bin, und wenn irgendwelche Probleme 
oder Sachen da sind, die sie nicht regeln kann, dann ruft sie mich an, dann machen wir 
das. DaB ich also im Prinzip mit meinen Moglichkeiten, Kindem und Schule, immer fur 
sie da bin, wenn was anliegt. Damit hab' ich praktisch meine Verantwortung - deck' ich 
damit laufend ab. (M 805)
(87) ‘Ich wiirde ahm meine Eltem wahrscheinlich nicht aufhehmen. Also daruber hab ich 
schon ganz konkret driiber nachgedacht, weil, bei meiner Schwester so ein Fall war, die 
hat also ihre Schwiegermutter aufhehmen miissen, auch in dem Haus, 
schwerstpflegebediirftig, und da is' die Ehe dran zerbrochen... pflegebediirftig heiBt, daB 
nachts geklingelt wird, drei mal die Nacht raus und solche Dinge alles, ne? Ich wiirde 
dafur sorgen, daB meine Mutter oder mein Vater 'nen guten Heimplatz bekommt. Das 
hort sich vielleicht jetzt ganz hart an, aber ich denke, daB es ahm die da besser 
aufgehoben sind.... Und ich wiirde auch alles tun, wenn also keine 
Schwerstpflegebediirftigkeit vorliegt, meine Eltem so lange in der vertrautenUmgebung 
zu lassen wie's nur irgend geht, ne? mit diesen Wehrdienstverweigerem... weil also, 
sobald die Geborgenheit in der eigenen, in den eigenen vier Wanden wegfallt, verfallen
die dann j a auch, dann Aber in so 'nem einigermaBen guten Pflegeheim, da gibt's fn
Logopaden, da gibt's auch Betreuer, die auch auf die ahm alteren Leute auch eingeh'n, 
ne? Ich glaube, ich man kann das gar nich' so meberbringen.... im Grunde genommen is' 
der Patient den ganzen Tag alleine da, vor'm Femseher. Die is' also isoliert, is' dann so'ne 
Zelle hier, so'ne Familienzelle, und das is' naturlich in so 'nem Pflegeheim, obwohl das 
oft nicht' so dargestellt wird.’ (W 546c)
(88) ‘Einen groBen Fortschritt wiirde ich darin sehen, daB man, daB es keine 8-Stunden- 
Stellen mehr gibt, sondem allerhochstens 6. ... es soli nicht sein, daB der Mann die
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Moglichkeit hat, 6 Stunden zu arbeiten, sondem der darf nicht mehr als 6, nich. Der darf 
auch nicht mehr verdienen.’ (W 857)
(89) Resp: Ich denk' mir, wir Frauen werden es immer schwerer haben. Dadurch weil wir 
automatisch 'ne Doppel- und Dreifachbelastung haben und immer haben werden, das 
wird sich nicht andem. Dim: Das ist Ihre Prognose? Resp: Ja, ganz einfach. Und ich denk' 
mir einfach, es ist 'n Riesenfehler, wenn man wirklich diese Quoten anschafft, daB also - 
Frauen zu bevorzugen sind. Dim: Daran hatte ich jetzt gar nicht gedacht, aber j a. Resp: 
Es ist fur jeden Arbeitgeber ein Risiko heute durch unsere Gesetzgebung, Frauen 
einzustellen. Ich mochte also auch kein Arbeitgeber sein, der mit Frauen arbeiten muB. 
Dim: Also jetzt, wegen diesem Erziehungsurlaub? Resp: Erziehungsurlaub ja... Int: Und 
wem nutzt dann diese oder nutzt iiberhaupt dann jemand diese Debatte um 
Chancengleichheit zwischen Mann und Frau? Resp: Nee, ich denk' mir, Frauen, die 
wirklich Karriere machen wollen, oder Frauen, die wirklich, werden sich nie 'ne Familie 
anschaffen; die werden immer ihre Karriere machen, ja.... Die haben's zwar schwer, 
schwerer wie die Manner,... Wir miissen erst mal beweisen, Frauen miissen doppelt so 
gut sein wie die Manner... Da ist natiirlich das Gleichstellungsgesetz wieder gut, weil 
ganz einfach, wenn die Bezahlung schon mal gleichgestellt wird. Was ich schlecht finde 
da, ist die Quotenregelung. Ich mochte keine Quotenffau sein. Ganz einfach, entweder 
schaff ich's aus meiner eigenen Energie, mit meiner Uberzeugung, und nicht, weil ich 
grad das Gliick hab', daB die Quote sagt, also du muBt die Frau nehmen, j a..., immer der 
Bessere soil die Chance haben. (W 845)
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